Samuel Hayden Faulk v. the State of Texas

In The

Court of Appeals

Ninth District of Texas at Beaumont

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NO. 09-25-00114-CR
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SAMUEL HAYDEN FAULK, Appellant

V.

THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee

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On Appeal from the County Court at Law No. 2
Jefferson County, Texas
Trial Cause No. M323227
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MEMORANDUM OPINION

Appellant, Samuel Hayden Faulk, was charged by information with driving

while intoxicated, second offense, a Class A misdemeanor. See Tex. Penal Code

Ann. §§ 49.04(a), 49.09(a). He entered a plea of “not guilty” to the charge. The jury

found Appellant guilty of driving while intoxicated. Appellant then pleaded “true”

to the enhancement paragraph alleging a prior misdemeanor DWI conviction. The

trial court assessed punishment at 365 days, probated for two years with 30 days’

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jail time as a condition of the probation. Faulk filed a notice of appeal. In one issue,

Faulk argues that the evidence is insufficient to support the jury’s verdict. Faulk

argues the evidence is insufficient to establish he was driving while intoxicated

because the arresting officer was “a rookie” with no prior experience in DWI

investigations, the arresting officer’s supervisor, while also present at the scene, had

limited interaction with Faulk, the nurse at the hospital only focused on the blood

draw, and the toxicologist who testified about the result of the blood test only

testified about the blood alcohol level.

For the reasons explained below, we affirm the conviction as reformed.

Summary of the Evidence Presented at Trial

Paul Jeffrey Vickers testified that on the night of May 11, 2019, he was asleep

at his home in Nederland, Texas, when the sound of a crash outside caused him to

wake up. He went outside to see what happened and found a black vehicle had left

the roadway, and it had crashed through his fence and hit a tree in his yard on the

side of his house. Vickers’s written statement to the police in 2019 was admitted into

evidence without objection. In the statement, Vickers notes that there was only one

occupant in the vehicle; Vickers reached in the car and put the vehicle in park, and

Vickers turned the engine off, and called the police.

Officer Peyton Collins testified that he was an officer with the Nederland

Police Department, where he had worked for the past six years. Collins was

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dispatched to the scene of an accident at approximately 11:45 p.m. on the evening

of May 11, 2019, and Collins and his supervising Sergeant, Timothy Smith,

responded to the call. They arrived within a couple of minutes of being called, and

upon arrival it appeared that the vehicle had left a straight roadway, driven through

a privacy fence, struck a table and a tree, and the front of the vehicle was resting up

against the tree. Faulk was the only person in the vehicle, and he was sitting in the

driver’s seat.

Officer Collins spoke to Faulk and noted that Faulk was conscious, but Collins

described Faulk as acting “strange, erratic.” Collins asked Faulk if he was injured or

needed an ambulance and initially Faulk answered, “No.” Collins asked Faulk to

“put on his shoes” and get out of the vehicle, and Faulk said he could not because

“he was hurting,” so Collins called for “fire and EMS” as a precaution. Because he

did not initially detect the odor of alcohol, Collins decided to treat the situation as a

medical emergency. Collins then asked Faulk if he had been drinking alcohol or

taking any drugs, and initially Faulk said “No.” When EMS arrived, they removed

Faulk from the vehicle and assisted him onto a stretcher. Collins asked for consent

to search the vehicle, and Faulk gave consent. Faulk told Collins he would find

alcoholic drinks from that night in the vehicle. Based on that statement, Collins again

asked Faulk whether he had been drinking and then Faulk responded that he had not

but was “going to drink” alcohol. Thereafter, when Collins asked again if Faulk had

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been drinking before the accident, Faulk admitted that he had consumed a “couple

more” drinks within four hours before the accident.

Officer Collins observed that Faulk had “[s]lurred speech[,]” exhibited “up

and down[]” behavior and appeared disoriented and confused. These signs of

intoxication led him to believe that Faulk had lost the normal use of his physical and

mental faculties. Although this was Collins’s first DWI investigation, his supervisor

was on the scene with him. In searching Faulk’s vehicle, Collins found two

prescription-type pill bottles. One bottle contained five pills, and the other was

empty. The empty bottle was labeled “Klonopin[,]” and Collins used his phone to

identify the five pills in the bottle and determined that they were “Adderall.” Neither

bottle had a prescription labeled for Faulk. Because Collins was concerned that

Faulk might have hit his head in the crash, he did not conduct any field sobriety tests

at that time. Faulk was transported by EMS to the hospital for evaluation. Collins

identified the body camera footage taken at the scene, which was admitted into

evidence and shown to the jury. After Faulk arrived at the hospital, Collins

administered the horizontal gaze nystagmus (HGN) test because it could be

performed while Faulk was sitting. Collins testified that he had been trained and

certified to administer the HGN test. In performing the test, he observed jerking in

Faulk’s eye muscles. Collins concluded from the HGN test that Faulk was

intoxicated. Collins stated he did not perform other field sobriety tests because they

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would have required Faulk to stand, which Collins believed was unsafe until Faulk

was medically cleared. Collins identified the camera footage taken at the hospital,

which was also admitted and played for the jury.

Once Faulk was medically cleared but still at the hospital, Collins read Faulk

the Miranda warnings and requested consent to obtain a blood specimen, and Faulk

refused. Collins then sought and obtained a blood-draw warrant. The warrant was

signed at 1:51 a.m., and a sample of Faulk’s blood was taken by the hospital nurse.

Collins identified additional camera footage for the jury showing Faulk, which was

admitted and played for the jury. The video footage contains several separate

statements made by Faulk wherein Faulk states that he had been drinking. Faulk

made those statements in response to questions from Collins and in response to

questions from the EMS driver. 1

Sergeant Timothy Smith, a certified peace officer and supervising patrol

officer with the Nederland Police Department, with almost ten years of experience,

testified that he was dispatched to the scene of the accident. Upon arrival, he

observed that the vehicle appeared to have been traveling eastbound when it left the

roadway, crashed through a pass-through fence, and then struck a tree in the

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There are other statements from Faulk on the video footage from the hospital
including where Faulk answers the question of the physician about what happened
and Faulk responds, “I . . . [was] driving around crazy just drunk . . . not drunk . . .
driving . . . I was drinking[,]” and when responding to Collins as to whether he would
consent to a blood draw, Faulk stated, “I have drank.”
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backyard. He observed that Faulk was the sole occupant of the vehicle and was

sitting in the driver’s seat. When Sergeant Smith first arrived, he was concerned that

the situation might be a medical emergency, but he was also concerned about the

potential for a driving-while-intoxicated case. At that time, Sergeant Smith had

several years of experience, and he had completed “[a] lot[]” of DWI investigations.

Based on his training and experience, and on what he observed at the scene,

Smith became suspicious that intoxicated driving was involved. The nature of the

crash, Faulk’s statements, and Faulk’s demeanor contributed to Smith’s suspicion.

Faulk was transported to the hospital by EMS. After Faulk refused to voluntarily

provide a blood sample, Collins left to obtain a warrant, while Sergeant Smith

remained with Faulk at the hospital. Sergeant Smith also testified that he prepared

the crash report.

Travis Armstrong, a registered nurse who was working at Southeast Texas

Medical Center on the early morning of May 12, 2019, also testified. Armstrong

explained that pursuant to a blood-draw warrant, Armstrong withdrew Faulk’s blood

sample at 2:19 a.m. on May 12th. Armstrong identified the blood vials he used, and

he explained the procedure he used to obtain the blood from Faulk, which included

the use of an iodine solution to prep the arm for the blood draw.

Toxicologist Memling Altamirano testified that she is employed with the

Jefferson County Regional Crime Lab, and she is an expert in the field of blood

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alcohol toxicology. She is licensed by the Texas Forensic Science Commission in

blood alcohol toxicology. She identified the “blood kit” used in this case. She

testified that she received two vials of blood, vial A and vial B, each with labels

corresponding to Faulk’s case. She took samples from vial A and used her expertise

and equipment in her lab to determine the alcohol content in the blood. She explained

to the jury how she analyzes blood, the procedure, and the equipment she uses, as

well as the calibration certification she conducted to verify her equipment. She

testified that she had prepared a report, and she identified the report she prepared

reflecting the results of her testing, and the report was admitted into evidence.

According to Altamirano, the testing revealed that the blood sample contained

greater than 0.400 grams of ethanol, a blood alcohol concentration exceeding the

0.08 statutory limit. She agreed that normally blood alcohol dissipates over time, and

her testing was not performed until May 21, 2019.

The defense called Deborah Faulk, Appellant’s mother, as the only witness in

the guilt-innocence phase of the trial. Deborah testified that she had just purchased

the used vehicle that Faulk was driving that night, and earlier that day she and Faulk

had used the car to travel to and from the three properties she owned, and they were

working together to clear debris caused by a tornado. She testified that the

prescription bottles that were in her car were there because she oversees getting them

refilled for her family, and she had to take them to the pharmacy for refills.

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According to Deborah, her daughter and Faulk, her son, both have prescriptions to

take Klonopin, and she and Faulk have prescriptions for Adderall. Deborah

explained that she is a registered nurse, and she works at emergency rooms and takes

Adderall for ADD and to stay awake during her shifts. Deborah testified she was

with Faulk “off and on” during the day of May 11th because they worked at the

properties she owns. She testified that she does not allow Faulk to drink in front of

her, she did not allow him to have liquor in any of the houses they were in that day,

and she does not believe he was drinking because he becomes violent if he has been

drinking. Faulk dropped her off between 9:30 p.m. and 10:00 p.m. at her house that

night. She last spoke with him around 10:00 p.m., and he told her he was on his way

to their rental house to feed the dogs and straighten the house, and afterward he said

he might go to HEB. She did not hear from him again that evening, and she did not

check on him.

After closing arguments, the case was submitted to the jury and the jury

returned a verdict of “We, the jury, find the defendant guilty as charged in the

information of driving while intoxicated.” The punishment phase of the trial was

conducted by the trial judge, and Faulk pleaded “true” to the enhancement paragraph

alleging a prior misdemeanor conviction for driving while intoxicated. After hearing

additional evidence, receiving a presentence report, and hearing arguments of

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counsel, the trial court assessed punishment at 365 days, probated for two years with

certain terms of probation and time to be served as explained by the trial court.

Law and Analysis

In evaluating legal sufficiency of the evidence to prove the charged offense,

we review all the evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict to determine

whether any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime

beyond a reasonable doubt. See Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 318-19 (1979);

Hooper v. State, 214 S.W.3d 9, 13 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007); see also Metcalf v. State,

597 S.W.3d 847, 855 (Tex. Crim. App. 2020). Under the Jackson standard, we defer

to the jury’s responsibility to fairly resolve conflicting testimony, weigh the

evidence, and draw reasonable inferences from basic facts to ultimate facts. See

Hooper, 214 S.W.3d at 13. The jury as factfinder is the sole judge of the weight of

the evidence and witnesses’ credibility, and it may believe all, some, or none of the

testimony presented by the parties. Metcalf, 597 S.W.3d at 855 (citations omitted).

We do not reweigh the evidence or determine the credibility of the evidence, nor do

we substitute our judgment for that of the factfinder. See Williams v. State, 235

S.W.3d 742, 750 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007). “Each fact need not point directly and

independently to a defendant’s guilt, as long as the cumulative force of all the

incriminating circumstances is sufficient to support the conviction.” Balderas v.

State, 517 S.W.3d 756, 766 (Tex. Crim. App. 2016) (citation omitted). We treat

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direct and circumstantial evidence equally and consider “‘the combined and

cumulative force of all the evidence[]’” viewed in the light most favorable to the

jury’s verdict. See Clayton v. State, 235 S.W.3d 772, 778 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007)

(quoting Hooper, 214 S.W.3d at 16-17). We give deference to the jury’s

determinations, including determinations involving the credibility and demeanor of

the witnesses; we may not substitute our judgment for that of the jury’s. Johnson v.

State, 23 S.W.3d 1, 7, 9 (Tex. Crim. App. 2000); Hardy v. State, 246 S.W.3d 290,

295 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2008, pet. ref’d).

A person commits the offense of driving while intoxicated when the person is

intoxicated while operating a motor vehicle in a public place. Tex. Penal Code Ann.

§ 49.04(a). A person is intoxicated when he does not have the normal use of his

mental or physical faculties by reason of the introduction of alcohol into the body,

or by having an alcohol concentration of 0.08 or more. Id. § 49.01(2)(A), (B).

Texas law allows a jury to infer the defendant was intoxicated from

circumstantial evidence showing “erratic driving, post-driving behavior such as

stumbling, swaying, slurring or mumbling words, inability to perform field sobriety

tests or follow directions, bloodshot eyes, [and] any admissions by the defendant

concerning what, when, and how much he had been drinking[.]” Kirsch v. State, 306

S.W.3d 738, 745 (Tex. Crim. App. 2010). For example, evidence showing “[a] lack

of balance and slurred speech can prove intoxication.” Kiffe v. State, 361 S.W.3d

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104, 108 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2011, pet. ref’d). Additionally, the

testimony of a law enforcement officer stating that the officer concluded that the

defendant was intoxicated, and describing what he observed, is probative evidence

of intoxication. Henderson v. State, 29 S.W.3d 616, 622 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st

Dist.] 2000, pet. ref’d) (testimony of officer is probative evidence of intoxication);

see also Annis v. State, 578 S.W.2d 406, 407 (Tex. Crim. App. 1979) (officer’s

opinion that defendant was intoxicated was legally sufficient evidence to support

DWI conviction based on officer’s experience and observed facts, including that the

defendant swerved his car across a lane-divider, and other facts indicated he was

intoxicated).

Here, the jury could have drawn its own conclusions from observing Faulk’s

behavior in the videotapes to decide whether he appeared intoxicated. See generally

Vaughn v. State, 493 S.W.2d 524, 525 (Tex. Crim. App. 1972) (“It is elementary in

Texas that one need not be an expert in order to express an opinion upon whether a

person he observes is intoxicated.”). The testimony from Officer Collins and

Sergeant Smith supports the jury’s conclusion that Faulk was driving while

intoxicated. Additionally, the testimony from the toxicologist and the copy of

Faulk’s laboratory report showed he had a blood alcohol concentration well over the

allowable limit of 0.08. A blood alcohol test result showing that the defendant

exceeded the legal limits at the time of the blood draw, considered with other indicia

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of intoxication at the time of a traffic stop, may logically support an inference that

the defendant was driving while intoxicated. See Kirsch, 306 S.W.3d at 745.

As the sole judge of the weight and credibility of the evidence, the jury bore

the burden of determining what to believe. See Hooper, 214 S.W.3d at 13. Based on

the record before us, viewing all the evidence in the light most favorable to the jury’s

verdict, we conclude that a rational jury could have found, beyond a reasonable

doubt, that Faulk committed the offense of driving while intoxicated. See Tex. Penal

Code Ann. § 49.04(a); see also Jackson, 443 U.S. at 318-19; Murray v. State, 457

S.W.3d 446, 448-49 (Tex. Crim. App. 2015); Hooper, 214 S.W.3d at 13.

More specifically, a jury could have reasonably concluded, based on the

evidence—which included, among other things, the testimony from the witness who

heard the crash and who was first on the scene and described that Faulk drove his

vehicle off the road, crashed through the witness’s fence and into a tree; the

testimony of the arresting officer and of the supervising officer, describing Faulk’s

erratic behavior, slurred speech, and the statements made by Faulk admitting he had

at least “a couple” of drinks of alcohol before driving; the testimony explaining that

Faulk failed the HGN test; the testimony from the toxicologist and the toxicology

report establishing Faulk’s blood alcohol was in excess of .40, well in excess of the

statutory limit; and the video footage from the scene, and from the hospital showing

Faulk’s post-accident behavior and statements—that Faulk was driving while

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intoxicated. The jury could have reasonably found based on the evidence and

reasonable inferences therefrom that Faulk did not have the normal use of his mental

or physical faculties by reason of the introduction of alcohol into his body or that he

had an alcohol concentration of 0.08 or more. See Tex. Penal Code Ann. §

49.01(2)(A), (B).

For the reasons explained above, we overrule Faulk’s sole issue.

We note that in the judgment the section entitled “1st Enhancement

Paragraph[]” recites “N/A[,]” but the record indicates that Faulk entered a plea of

“true” to the enhancement paragraph. This Court has the authority to reform the trial

court’s judgment to correct nonreversible clerical errors. See Tex. R. App. P. 43.2(b);

Bigley v. State, 865 S.W.2d 26, 27 (Tex. Crim. App. 1993). Therefore, we delete the

“N/A” in the section entitled “1st Enhancement Paragraph[]” and substitute “True”

in its place. Otherwise, we affirm the trial court’s judgment of conviction as

reformed.

AFFIRMED AS REFORMED.

LEANNE JOHNSON
Justice

Submitted on December 30, 2025
Opinion Delivered February 4, 2026
Do Not Publish

Before Johnson, Wright and Chambers, JJ.

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