Keondrick Arabian Ali Barlow v. the State of Texas

In The

Court of Appeals

Ninth District of Texas at Beaumont

________________

NO. 09-23-00087-CR
________________

KEONDRICK ARABIAN ALI BARLOW, Appellant

V.

THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee
________________________________________________________________________

On Appeal from the 163rd District Court
Orange County, Texas
Trial Cause No. B190539-R
________________________________________________________________________

MEMORANDUM OPINION

A jury convicted Appellant Keondrick Arabian Ali Barlow (“Barlow”) of the

murder of Lamont Williams (“Williams”), a first-degree felony. See Tex. Penal Code

Ann. § 19.02. The jury assessed punishment at eighty years of confinement plus a

$10,000.00 fine, and the trial court sentenced him accordingly. The trial court’s

judgment also required Barlow to pay attorney’s fees, despite his being indigent. In

two issues, Barlow complains: (1) the trial court abused its discretion by admitting

an oral statement of his custodial interview in violation of article 38.22 section

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3(a)(2), because the statement was not voluntary; and (2) the trial court abused its

discretion by assessing attorney’s fees to an indigent offender. See Tex. Code Crim.

Proc. Ann. art. 38.22 § 3(a)(2). The State concedes Barlow’s second issue. For the

following reasons, we affirm the trial court’s judgment as modified.

BACKGROUND 1

Facts

On the morning of December 22, 2018, Williams’s mother found him

deceased in his apartment after Williams’s girlfriend notified her that she could not

reach him. Williams had been shot three times, with a fatal gunshot wound to the

head. Williams’s car was also found abandoned nearby. The investigation revealed

he was last heard from on December 21, 2018, but forensic pathologists could not

determine a time of death.

In Williams’s home, investigators and crime scene technicians found two

condoms removed from the wrappers, an apparent blood stain on the wall, an IBC

Cream Soda bottle near Williams, digital scales, a marijuana cigarette, marijuana

residue, and small plastic baggies. A television was pulled from the wall, and

Williams’s surveillance cameras were missing. Williams, a drug dealer, was known

to keep cash in his home, but investigators did not locate any cash at the scene.

1We limit our background discussion to those facts necessary to resolve the

appeal. See Tex. R. App. P. 47.1 (requiring appellate court to hand down an opinion
as brief as practicable that addresses all issues necessary to the appeal’s resolution).
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On December 22, 2018, Barlow called the Orange Police Department and told

Detective Jason Laughlin (“Laughlin”) he wanted to clear his name. So, two other

detectives picked him up, and he voluntarily came to the police station. Barlow

provided a signed written statement that he was at Williams’s house on December

21, but he left around 9:30 p.m. Barlow stated that when he left, four other men were

there, and “two white girls” were on the porch when he left. Barlow said that when

he left Williams’s house, he went to work in Louisiana and did not return until six

the next morning.

On December 23, 2018, Barlow repeatedly called the Orange Police

Department and provided the name of a “white woman” who may be responsible.

That afternoon, Barlow came to the police station unannounced and told Laughlin

that Jasmine Jackson (“Jackson”) picked him up from Williams’s house then brought

him to his grandmother’s. After that, he said JoCoby Vontoure (“Vontoure”) gave

him a ride to work between 9:30 and 9:45 p.m. During this interview, Barlow told

Laughlin he had never driven Williams’s vehicle.

On December 28, 2018, Barlow voluntarily spoke to police again and

provided a timeline of events to Detectives Henry and Steele. At this point,

investigators noticed more inconsistencies with Barlow’s original statement,

including who was there when he left. That day, Barlow consented to the

investigators’ searching his cell phone and later, he voluntarily provided a DNA

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sample. Barlow initially told investigators that he had been at Williams’s house on

December 21, 2018, and that several people came to Williams’s home to purchase

drugs. Barlow also told investigators he left Williams’s apartment at 9:20 or 9:30

p.m. when his girlfriend, Jasmine Jackson,2 picked him up and took him home. Then,

at 9:45 p.m., Vontoure picked him up to go to work in Vinton where he stayed for a

few hours, after which Vontoure brought him home. Barlow also denied ever driving

Williams’s car.

Other witnesses contradicted Barlow’s version of events and timeline.

Jackson told investigators that Barlow instructed her to tell the police she had given

him a ride on December 21, 2018, which she denied, because she lost her car keys.

Likewise, Vontoure, who had an ankle monitor, did not take Barlow to Louisiana,

because Vontoure’s son was in the hospital. The data from Vontoure’s ankle monitor

verified this. Barlow’s manager at the concrete plant testified that Barlow last

worked on December 20, 2018. The manager denied that Barlow worked on

December 21, 2018, and because Barlow failed to show up for work at all that day,

they fired him. GPS data from the woman’s phone that Barlow said may be

responsible showed that she was not near Williams’s house during the murder.

When investigators downloaded Barlow’s phone data, text messages showed

that he wanted to buy a car a week before the murder, but on December 21, 2018, he

2The record shows that Jasmine Jackson also went by the name Jasmine Riggs.

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did not have enough money. The day after Williams’s murder, Barlow had the

money to buy the car.

Custodial Statements

On January 2, 2019, and April 16, 2019, while Barlow was in custody for

unrelated charges, investigators interviewed him about the murder twice. These

statements were video recorded, and the State redacted the videos and agreed to play

only the audio to avoid any prejudicial effect on the jury or seeing Barlow in

handcuffs and to avoid mentioning extraneous offenses. Barlow objected to the

voluntariness of both statements under article 38.22. The trial court conducted a

hearing outside the jury’s presence. During the hearing, Laughlin testified that he

met with Barlow on January 2, 2019, when he arrested him for an unrelated theft

charge. After arresting him, Laughlin read Barlow his rights, which Barlow

voluntarily waived, and then Barlow continued discussing this case. Laughlin

testified the recording accurately depicts what occurred, and the only alterations

were redactions to avoid the prejudicial effect. The video recording of the January

2, 2019, interview was played for the trial court and shows Laughlin reading Barlow

his rights and Barlow signing a waiver. Laughlin testified the people in the room

speaking during the interview were Detective Ward, Barlow, and himself.

Laughlin testified that on April 16, 2019, they interviewed Barlow again while

he was in custody. Laughlin likewise testified that he read Barlow his rights, and

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Barlow waived them, which the video recording played for the trial court shows.

Barlow then spoke with detectives. Laughlin authenticated the original video then

testified the only alterations in the audio version removed prejudicial information.

He identified the speakers on the video as Detective Ward, Barlow, and himself.

At the end of the hearing, the trial court found the statements were voluntary

and admitted them but noted only the redacted portions would be played for the jury.

The trial court also signed a written order finding the statements voluntary under

article 38.22, section 2(a).

After the trial court admitted both audio recordings, the State played them for

the jury. In the first recording, on January 2, 2019, investigators confronted Barlow

about inconsistencies between the evidence and his prior statements. Among other

things, during the interview, Barlow denied he was around Williams’s house, despite

previously telling investigators he was there. In the second recording, on April 16,

2019, investigators again confronted Barlow about his lies, including the DNA

evidence, but Laughlin testified he doubled down. During the interview, Barlow

admitted he was “supposed to get rid of Josh [Rhodes]” and said he “made an honest

mistake.”

Additional Evidence and Jury’s Verdict

Laughlin testified that Josh Rhodes also came up as a suspect during the

investigation. They questioned Josh Rhodes, but Laughlin was unaware if anyone

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took a DNA swab from him. They also did not download his phone or search his

house. Laughlin testified they were able to confirm other suspects’ alibis. Barlow

did not have an alibi and continually lied to investigators. The evidence established

that Barlow’s DNA profile matched DNA found on the following evidence: a blood

stain on the wall in Williams’s living room; the IBC bottle near Williams; a condom;

the interior driver’s side door panel of Williams’s car; and the front driver’s side seat

of Williams’s car.

The jury found Barlow guilty of murder and assessed punishment at eighty

years of confinement plus a $10,000.00 fine. The trial court pronounced Barlow’s

sentence consistent with the jury’s verdict, but the judgment reflects that the trial

court assessed attorney’s fees of $19,914.00, listed as “Reimbursement Fees.”

ISSUE ONE: ARTICLE 38.22 § 3(a)(2),
VOLUNTARINESS OF CUSTODIAL STATEMENT

In issue one, Barlow complains the trial court abused its discretion by

admitting Barlow’s recorded custodial statements as they were involuntary and

violated Texas Code of Criminal Procedure article 38.22, section 3(a)(2).

Specifically, Barlow asserts that the number of officers present and the fact that he

was in jail made his statements involuntary. The State responds that it complied with

the applicable statutory requirements, and the trial court properly admitted the

recorded custodial statements.

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Standard of Review and Applicable Law

Generally, we review a trial court’s ruling on a motion to suppress custodial

statements under a bifurcated standard. Lerma v. State, 543 S.W.3d 184, 189–90

(Tex. Crim. App. 2018). We give almost total deference to a trial court’s factual

findings supported by the record especially if they depend on an evaluation of

credibility and demeanor. See State v. Lujan, 634 S.W.3d 862, 865 (Tex. Crim. App.

2021) (quoting Guzman v. State, 955 S.W.2d 85, 87 (Tex. Crim. App. 1997)).

Likewise, we afford almost total deference to the trial court’s determinations of

mixed questions of law and fact that depend on credibility and demeanor. See id. at

865–66. When a trial court’s application of law to the facts does not depend on

credibility and demeanor, we conduct a de novo review. See Cole v. State, 490

S.W.3d 918, 922 (Tex. Crim. App. 2016). In ruling on a motion to suppress, the trial

court is the exclusive trier of fact and judge of the witnesses’ credibility. Valtierra

v. State, 310 S.W.3d 442, 447 (Tex. Crim. App. 2010); Garza v. State, 213 S.W.3d

338, 346 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007). A trial court may choose to believe or disbelieve

any part of a witness’s testimony. Valtierra, 310 S.W.3d at 447. We must uphold the

trial court’s ruling on a motion to suppress, if the “ruling is ‘reasonably supported

by the record and is correct under any theory of law applicable to the case.’” Id. at

447–48 (quoting State v. Dixon, 206 S.W.3d 587, 590 (Tex. Crim. App. 2006)); see

also Lujan, 634 S.W.3d at 866. “Determining whether the requirements of Article

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38.22 were met is an application-of-law-to-fact question that commands a view of

the evidence that is most favorable to the trial court’s ruling.” Lujan, 634 S.W.3d at

866 (citation omitted).

Article 38.22, section 3(a)(2) states that “prior to the statement during the

recording the accused is given the warning in subsection (a) of Section 2 . . . and the

accused knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily waives any rights set out in the

warning.” Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 38.22, § 3(a)(2). Article 38.22, section 2

provides that for a statement to be admissible as evidence:

(a) the accused, prior to making the statement, either received from a
magistrate the warning provided in Article 15.17 of this code or
received from the person to whom the statement is made a warning that:
(1) he has the right to remain silent and not make any statement
at all and that any statement he makes may be used against him
at his trial;
(2) any statement he makes may be used as evidence against him
in court;
(3) he has the right to have a lawyer present to advise him prior
to and during any questioning;
(4) if he is unable to employ a lawyer, he has the right to have a
lawyer appointed to advise him prior to and during any
questioning; and
(5) he has the right to terminate the interview at any time; and
(b) the accused, prior to and during the making of the statement,
knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily waived the rights set out in the
warning prescribed by Subsection (a) of this section.

Id. art. 38.22, § 2(a), (b). If a question is raised as to the statement’s voluntariness,

the trial court must conduct a hearing outside the jury’s presence and make an

independent finding the statement was voluntary. See id. art. 38.22, § 6. Then, the

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trial “court must enter an order stating its conclusion as to whether or not the

statement was voluntarily made, along with specific findings of fact upon which the

conclusion was based, which order shall be filed among the papers of the cause.” Id.

“Coercive government misconduct renders a confession involuntary if the

defendant’s ‘will has been overborne and his capacity for self-determination

critically impaired.’” Davis v. State, 313 S.W.3d 317, 337 (Tex. Crim. App. 2010)

(quoting Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 225–26 (1973)). Whether a

defendant’s will has been overborne is assessed considering the totality of the

circumstances, including the accused’s characteristics and details of the

interrogation. See id. (citation omitted); see also Craeger v. State, 952 S.W.2d 852,

855 (Tex. Crim. App. 1997) (“Voluntariness is decided by considering the totality

of the circumstances under which the statement was obtained.”). Additionally, “[t]he

mere fact that an individual is in custody” does not render the statement involuntary.

Sugars v. State, No. 07-03-0029-CR, 2004 WL 609318, at *5 (Tex. App.—Amarillo

Mar. 29, 2004, pet. ref’d) (mem. op., not designated for publication) (citing Alonzo

v. State, 591 S.W.2d 842, 847 (Tex. Crim. App. 1979)); see also Reyes v. State, 741

S.W.2d 414, 430 (Tex. Crim. App. 1987) (citations omitted) (discussing

voluntariness in the context of consent to search and explaining that custody alone

does not render consent involuntary but is a factor to consider).

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Analysis

When Barlow objected to the statements’ voluntariness, the trial court

conducted a hearing outside the jury’s presence. See Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art.

38.22, § 6. The trial court determined the statements were voluntary and signed an

order explaining that: the statements were electronically recorded; all voices were

identified; the defendant received copies not later than the 20th day before trial; and

before each interrogation, Barlow was advised of his constitutional rights as required

under 38.22, § 2(a) and that he appeared in the video recording “to understand and

voluntarily waive those constitutional rights.”

During the January 2, 2019, interrogation, Barlow was initially belligerent,

did not want to talk to detectives, and demanded to know what he was under arrest

for. Detectives Ward and Laughlin explained he was under arrest for a separate theft

charge, then Barlow told detectives he wanted to talk. Detective Laughlin read him

his rights, Barlow said he understood, then signed a waiver. The officers pointed out

discrepancies in his story, but they were not forceful or misleading and remained

seated for most of the interview. Neither detective displayed a weapon at any time

during the interrogation.

The video recording of Barlow’s second custodial interrogation on April 26,

2019, shows detectives Ward and Laughlin with Barlow. Ward leaves at Barlow’s

request, because Barlow said he wanted to talk to Laughlin alone. Detective

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Laughlin explained that he could not talk to Barlow without reading him his rights.

Barlow complained about Laughlin’s reading his rights, but Laughlin insisted on

reading them, after which Barlow said he understood and wanted to talk. A few

minutes later, the video shows Barlow signing a card acknowledging that he was

read his rights. Laughlin noted the inconsistencies between Barlow’s story and the

evidence. He did not pressure Barlow and told him he would be willing to talk to his

attorney after “he brought the case.” The recording shows that Barlow became

emotional and refused to get out of his chair as the two detectives prepared to return

him to the jail. Barlow told them he “might as well get tazed and pepper sprayed.”

Despite this, the detectives remained calm. The only time additional officers were

present was after the second interrogation ended and Barlow refused multiple

requests to leave the interrogation room; officers came and stood by in the hallway

waiting to assist with his removal if needed. Barlow eventually agreed to leave, so

the officers in the hall did not have to intervene. Even in the face of Barlow’s

obstinance, neither detective displayed a weapon.

Barlow cites to Manzi v. State, for the proposition that the Court of Criminal

Appeals is “critical of consent given in the face of numbers of armed officers.” 56

S.W.3d 710, 717 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th] Dist. 2001), aff’d, 88 S.W.3d 240

(Tex. Crim. App. 2002). Manzi involved consent to search a hotel room after a

suspect fled and was “arrested at gunpoint by three armed officers.” Id. Our sister

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court noted that the display of weapons could be a coercive factor in the context of

consent to search. See id. Here, we are faced with a custodial statement rather than

a consent to search, and the record before us establishes that officers did not display

their weapons. Even so, in Manzi, the Houston Court of Appeals ultimately

determined that the trial court did not err by finding the appellant voluntarily

consented to the search of his hotel room. See id. at 719.

Contrary to Barlow’s assertion that three officers were in the interrogation

room, the video recordings show that during the interrogations, only two officers

were present. Additionally, for most of the second interrogation and at Barlow’s

request, only one officer was in the room. Although Barlow repeatedly said he knew

his rights, Detective Laughlin insisted on reading the statutory warnings and

obtaining an express waiver from Barlow of his rights before he questioned him. See

Davis, 313 S.W.3d at 337 (citation omitted) (finding no police misconduct and

noting the detective “was especially diligent in reading the warnings in their entirety,

in making sure that appellant understood them, and in obtaining an express waiver”).

Barlow complains that the number of officers and the fact that he was in custody

rendered his statements involuntary, yet the record supports the trial court’s

conclusion that officers read Barlow his rights, he voluntarily waived them, and the

statements were voluntary. See Lujan, 634 S.W.3d at 865–66. Examining the totality

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of the circumstances in the light most favorable to the trial court’s ruling, the record

does not show that Barlow’s will was overborne. See id. We overrule issue one.

ISSUE TWO: INDIGENCE AND ATTORNEY’S FEES

In his second issue, Barlow complains that the trial court erred by requiring

him to pay attorney’s fees since he is indigent. The State concedes this issue.

Applicable Law

Absent a change in a defendant’s indigent status, a trial court cannot impose

an award of attorney’s fees in the judgment against a defendant who remains indigent

when the judgment is pronounced. See Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Ann. arts.

26.04(p) (stating an indigent defendant is presumed to remain indigent unless there

is a material change in his financial circumstances), 26.05(g); Wiley v. State, 410

S.W.3d 313, 317 (Tex. Crim. App. 2013); Roberts v. State, 327 S.W.3d 880, 883–

84 (Tex. App.—Beaumont 2010, no pet.). Article 26.05(g) requires that a judge

order a defendant to pay a reimbursement fee to offset legal services provided to the

defendant “[i]f the judge determines that [the] defendant has financial resources” to

do so. See Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 26.05(g).

Analysis

The trial court appointed counsel to represent Barlow, and nothing in the

record establishes that the trial court found a material change in Barlow’s financial

circumstances. See Wiley, 410 S.W.3d at 317; Roberts, 327 S.W.3d at 883–84. Thus,

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the trial court erred by assessing reimbursement for court-appointed attorney’s

fees. See Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Ann. arts. 26.04(p), 26.05(g); Roberts, 327 S.W.3d

at 884 (concluding trial court abused its discretion by taxing indigent defendant with

attorney’s fees). We sustain Barlow’s second issue.

CONCLUSION

We have overruled Barlow’s first issue, but since the trial court erred by

assessing attorney’s fees against him given his indigent status, we modify the

judgment to delete the attorney’s fees of $19,914.00 reflected as “Reimbursement

Fees.” See Tex. R. App. P. 43.2(b) (allowing appellate courts to modify a judgment).

We affirm the judgment in all other respects.

AFFIRMED AS MODIFIED.

W. SCOTT GOLEMON
Chief Justice

Submitted on June 26, 2024
Opinion Delivered March 19, 2025
Do Not Publish

Before Golemon, C.J., Johnson and Wright, JJ.

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