Melvin Douglas Waldrop v. the State of Texas

In The
Court of Appeals
Seventh District of Texas at Amarillo

No. 07-25-00315-CR

MELVIN DOUGLAS WALDROP, APPELLANT

V.

THE STATE OF TEXAS, APPELLEE

On Appeal from the 415th District Court
Parker County, Texas 1
Trial Court No. CR24-0670, Honorable Graham Quisenberry, Presiding

May 1, 2026
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Before PARKER, C.J., and DOSS and YARBROUGH, JJ.

Appellant, Melvin Douglas Waldrop, appeals from his conviction for the offense of

criminal solicitation of a minor 2 and resulting sentence of twenty-five years’ incarceration. 3

We affirm the trial court’s judgment.

1 This cause was originally filed in the Second Court of Appeals. It was transferred to this Court by
a docket-equalization order of the Supreme Court of Texas. See TEX. GOV’T CODE § 73.001. In the event
of any conflict, we apply the transferor court’s case law. TEX. R. APP. P. 41.3.
2 See TEX. PENAL CODE § 15.031(b).

3 The charging indictment alleged that Appellant is a habitual offender who had been previously

convicted of two felony offenses. See TEX. PENAL CODE § 12.42(d).
BACKGROUND

In April of 2024, Appellant agreed to take his twelve-year-old neighbor, L.F., and

L.F.’s twelve-year-old friend, I.B., to the local Family Dollar to purchase snacks. Appellant

allowed L.F. to drive to the store. After making their purchases, I.B. asked Appellant if he

would let her drive back to L.F.’s house. Appellant told her that she could drive “[i]f you

show me your tits.” I.B. immediately refused Appellant’s request and returned to the

Family Dollar where she told Jason Frye, an off-duty firefighter, about the encounter. Law

enforcement was contacted and I.B. identified Appellant on security cameras.

A few days later, a Parker County Sheriff’s Office Investigator, Joshua Vaughn,

went to Appellant’s house where he conducted a recorded interview of Appellant. During

this interview, Appellant admitted to making “a stupid comment like, well show me your

tits.” He indicated that he meant the statement as a form of exchange, like “you gotta

give me something if you want me to give you something.” Appellant also acknowledged

that he was aware that I.B. was thirteen years old at the time of the incident. 4

Appellant was charged by indictment with the offense of criminal solicitation of a

minor. After trial, a jury found Appellant guilty as charged. At punishment, Appellant

pleaded “true” to a habitual offender enhancement allegation, and the jury recommended

a twenty-five-year sentence, which was followed by the trial court. Appellant timely

appealed.

By his appeal, Appellant presents three issues. He first contends that the evidence

is insufficient to support his conviction. By his second issue, Appellant contends that the

4 The record indicates that I.B. was within days of turning thirteen when the event occurred.

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conviction violated the statutory corroboration requirement contained in Texas Penal

Code section 15.031. Finally, Appellant contends that the trial court committed

fundamental error by failing to properly instruct the jury about the elements of criminal

solicitation of a minor and the corroboration requirement.

EVIDENTIARY SUFFICIENCY

By his first issue, Appellant contends that the evidence is insufficient to support his

conviction. Specifically, Appellant argues that the State failed to prove that he solicited

“sexual conduct” as statutorily defined. We review Appellant’s sufficiency of the evidence

challenge under the standard enunciated in Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 318–20,

99 S. Ct. 2781, 61 L. Ed. 2d 560 (1979). See Brooks v. State, 323 S.W.3d 893, 912 (Tex.

Crim. App. 2010). Under that standard, we must determine whether, considering all the

evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict, the jury was rationally justified in finding

guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. Jackson, 443 U.S. at 319; Brooks, 323 S.W.3d at 899.

We defer to the jury’s determinations regarding the witnesses’ credibility and the weight

to be given their testimony. Brooks, 323 S.W.3d at 901.

A person commits the offense of criminal solicitation of a minor as alleged in the

present case

if, with intent that an offense under [Texas Penal Code] Section . . . 43.25
be committed, the person by any means requests, commands, or attempts
to induce a minor or another whom the person believes to be a minor to
engage in specific conduct that, under the circumstances surrounding the
actor’s conduct as the actor believes them to be, would constitute an
offense under [Texas Penal Code section 43.25.]

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TEXAS PENAL CODE § 15.031(b). An offense under section 43.25 is committed “if, knowing

the character and content thereof, [a person] employs, authorizes, or induces a child

younger than 18 years of age to engage in sexual conduct or a sexual performance.” Id.

§ 43.25(b). “Sexual conduct” includes “lewd exhibition of . . . any portion of the female

breast below the top of the areola.” Id. § 43.25(a)(2).

Appellant argues that no evidence proves that he “specifically requested exposure

of ‘any portion of the female breast below the top of the areola’ . . . .” We are mindful that

the applicable standard for our sufficiency review is whether, considering all the evidence

in the light most favorable to the verdict, the jury was rationally justified in finding guilt

beyond a reasonable doubt. Jackson, 443 U.S. at 319; Brooks, 323 S.W.3d at 899. Here,

the statute does not require the request to specify that the minor expose any portion of

her breast below the top of the areola. Rather, the evidence that Appellant asked I.B. to

“show me your tits,” when considered in the light most favorable to the verdict, is sufficient

to allow the jury to reasonably infer that Appellant’s request was that I.B. expose her

breasts below the top of the areola.

Further, I.B. testified that she understood Appellant’s request to require her to

remove both her shirt and her bra in a manner that would completely expose her breasts.

Additionally, Investigator Vaughn testified that he understood Appellant’s request to

encompass exposing the entire naked breast. This evidence would allow the jury to

reasonably conclude beyond a reasonable doubt that Appellant’s request was that I.B.

expose her breasts at or below the top of the areola. We overrule Appellant’s first issue.

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CORROBORATING EVIDENCE

By his second issue, Appellant contends that his conviction violated the statute’s

requirement that evidence beyond the testimony of the minor corroborate his commission

of the offense. “A person may not be convicted [of criminal solicitation of a minor] on the

uncorroborated testimony of the minor allegedly solicited unless the solicitation is made

under circumstances strongly corroborative of both the solicitation itself and the actor’s

intent that the minor act on the solicitation.” TEX. PENAL CODE § 15.031(c). In assessing

the sufficiency of evidence corroborating the minor’s testimony, we eliminate the minor’s

testimony from consideration and then determine whether there is other incriminating

evidence tending to connect the accused with the crime. Lumsden v. State, 564 S.W.3d

858, 875 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2018, pet. ref’d) (citing Richardson v. State, 700 S.W.2d

591, 594 (Tex. Crim. App. 1985)). “The tends-to-connect standard presents a low hurdle

for the State because the evidence need not directly link the accused with the crime or

be sufficient in itself to establish guilt.” Id. (citing Brown v. State, 270 S.W.3d 564, 567

(Tex. Crim. App. 2008)).

In the present case, sufficient evidence was presented tending to connect

Appellant to the offense. Particularly, Appellant admitted in a recorded statement that he

made the solicitation. We find this evidence strongly corroborates the solicitation itself.

Further, Appellant admitted that he made the request as a condition to allowing I.B. to

drive his truck. Subsequently, Appellant expressed regret at having made the “stupid”

comment. However, had Appellant not intended for I.B. to act on his request, he would

have presumably not felt regret for making the request. We conclude that this evidence

corroborates that, at the time of the solicitation, Appellant intended I.B. to act on the

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solicitation. Thus, we conclude that Appellant’s recorded statement is sufficient

corroboration of I.B.’s testimony. See Shepard v. State, 244 S.W.3d 421, 424 (Tex.

App.—Amarillo 2007, pet. ref’d) (Appellant’s statement and testimony is sufficient to

corroborate minor’s testimony). We overrule Appellant’s second issue.

JURY CHARGE

By his third issue, Appellant contends that the trial court committed fundamental

error by failing to properly instruct the jury on the definition of sexual conduct and the

corroboration requirement. A jury-charge-claim analysis involves two steps: first, we

determine whether the charge is erroneous. Alcoser v. State, 663 S.W.3d 160, 165 (Tex.

Crim. App. 2022). If it is, then we must decide whether the appellant was harmed by the

erroneous charge. Id. There are two standards of review for jury-charge-error claims.

Id. (citing Almanza v. State, 686 S.W.2d 157, 171 (Tex. Crim. App. 1984) (op. on reh’g)).

If a defendant timely objects to alleged jury-charge error, the record need only show

“some harm” to obtain relief. Id. If there was not a timely objection, the record must show

“egregious harm.” Id. Harm is assessed “in light of the entire jury charge, the state of the

evidence, including the contested issues and weight of [the] probative evidence, the

argument of counsel and any other relevant information revealed by the record of the trial

as a whole.” Id.

Appellant complains that the jury charge failed to “adequately explain” the

definition of sexual conduct that was included in the charge. The charge defined sexual

conduct, as applicable to this case, as “Lewd exhibition of any portion of the female breast

below the top of the areola.” This definition tracks the language of section 43.25(a)(2) of

the Texas Penal Code. None of the terms used in this definition are specifically defined
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by statute. Consequently, the trial court was not required to define those terms in the jury

charge. Tovar v. State, 165 S.W.3d 785, 790 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2005, no pet.) (“if

the phrase or word is not statutorily defined, the trial court is not required to define the

word or phrase to the jury”). We also note that Appellant does not identify how the trial

court should have instructed the jury. We find no error in the trial court’s jury charge

regarding the definition of sexual conduct.

Appellant also contends that the trial court “failed to instruct the jury on the

mandatory corroboration requirement under Section 15.031.” The jury charge in this case

included the following:

A person may not be convicted for the offense of criminal solicitation of a
minor on the uncorroborated testimony of the minor allegedly solicited
unless the solicitation is made under circumstances strongly corroborative
of both the solicitation itself and the actor’s intent that the minor act on the
solicitation.

Therefore, in this case, unless you find from the evidence beyond a
reasonable doubt that the testimony of [I.B.] is corroborated by other
evidence in the case, outside of the evidence of the said [I.B.], and that the
solicitation itself, if any, was made under circumstances strongly
corroborative of both the solicitation itself, if any, and the defendant’s intent,
if any, that [I.B.] would act on the alleged solicitation, then you will acquit
the defendant; or if you have a reasonable doubt as to the existence of
either of such matters, then you will find the defendant not guilty.

The first paragraph tracks Texas Penal Code section 15.031(c). The second paragraph

merely applies the law to the facts of the case. However, we acknowledge that the

charge’s application paragraph does not specifically reference the corroboration

requirement. See Davison v. State, 602 S.W.3d 625, 646 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 2020,

pet. ref’d) (application paragraph must identify all conditions of a theory, such as the law

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of parties, before jury can convict). Because the application paragraph does not identify

the corroboration requirement, we conclude that the jury charge was erroneous.

However, we must still assess whether Appellant was harmed by the error.

Because Appellant did not preserve his complaint by objecting to the jury charge, we

review the error to determine whether Appellant suffered egregious harm. Alcoser, 663

S.W.3d at 165. In conducting this analysis, we must consider the entire jury charge, the

state of the evidence, the argument of counsel, and any other relevant information

revealed by the record of the trial as a whole. Id. Here, as noted, the jury charge instructs

the jury that it must find evidence other than I.B.’s testimony that tends to connect

Appellant to the solicitation and his intent that I.B. act on the solicitation. As we have

previously determined, the state of the evidence is that I.B.’s testimony is sufficiently

corroborated by other evidence tending to connect Appellant to the commission of the

crime. See Lankford v. State, 255 S.W.3d 275, 280 (Tex. App.—Waco 2008, pet. ref’d)

(“when the corroborating evidence is strong enough that any reasonable jury would find

it to be true, . . . the alleged error is harmless”). As to the arguments of counsel, we note

that Appellant did not raise this issue before the trial court and, on appeal, incorrectly

contends that the charge failed to instruct the jury on the corroboration requirement. See

Tran v. State, 870 S.W.2d 654, 658 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 1994, pet. ref’d)

(appellant bears burden of showing actual harm suffered from charging error and reversal

not required if he fails to do so). Finally, we have identified no other relevant information

revealed by the record and Appellant has not cited any. Therefore, we conclude that

Appellant did not suffer egregious harm from the erroneous jury charge.

We overrule Appellant’s third issue.

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CONCLUSION

Having overruled each of Appellant’s issues, we affirm the judgment of the trial

court.

Judy C. Parker
Chief Justice

Do not publish.

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