Billy Marquis D/B/A Marquis Brothers General Construction v. Zachary Sadeghian, Trustee of Kamy Real Property Trust

In the
Court of Appeals
Sixth Appellate District of Texas at Texarkana

No. 06-25-00032-CV

BILLY MARQUIS D/B/A MARQUIS BROTHERS GENERAL CONSTRUCTION, Appellant

V.

ZACHARY SADEGHIAN, TRUSTEE OF KAMY REAL PROPERTY TRUST, Appellee

On Appeal from the 431st District Court
Denton County, Texas
Trial Court No. 24-2092-431

Before Stevens, C.J., van Cleef and Rambin, JJ.
Memorandum Opinion by Justice Rambin
MEMORANDUM OPINION

Zachary Sadeghian, Trustee of the Kamy Real Property Trust (Kamy), filed suit against

Billy Marquis d/b/a Marquis Brothers General Construction alleging shoddy workmanship of

roof repairs nine and one-half years after the repairs were completed. When Marquis moved for

limitations-based summary judgment and sanctions, Kamy nonsuited. The trial court denied

Marquis’s motion for sanctions, and Marquis appeals. Because we find the trial court did not

abuse its discretion in denying sanctions, we affirm.

I. Background

Kamy filed suit against Marquis in March 2024 alleging damages arising from 2015

roofing work at one of Kamy’s properties. Kamy brought causes of action for, among other

things, breach of contract and negligence and sought damages in excess of $250,000.00,

including damages due to emotional distress and mental anguish.

Marquis answered by filing a general denial and asserting the statute of limitations as an

affirmative defense. Some months later, Marquis filed a traditional motion for summary

judgment based on limitations and a motion for sanctions.

Four days after Marquis filed his motions, Kamy, through different counsel, filed a notice

of nonsuit with prejudice. The next day, the trial court entered an order of nonsuit with

prejudice. Marquis filed a motion for new trial reasserting his motion for sanctions. After an

evidentiary hearing, the trial court signed a final judgment and order denying Marquis’s motion

for sanctions.

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Marquis appeals.1

II. Standard of Review and Applicable Law

“We review a trial court’s ruling on a motion for sanctions for an abuse of discretion.”

In re Newkirk Logistics, Inc., 718 S.W.3d 240, 246 (Tex. 2025) (per curiam) (orig. proceeding)

(citing Cire v. Cummings, 134 S.W.3d 835, 838 (Tex. 2004)); see Dinkins v. Calhoun, No. 02-

17-00081-CV, 2018 WL 2248572, at *4 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2018, no pet.) (mem. op.);

Cypress Creek EMS v. Dolcefino, 548 S.W.3d 673, 695 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2018,

pet. denied) (reviewing denial of sanctions for an abuse of discretion). “A trial court abuses its

discretion when it acts without reference to any guiding rules and principles such that its ruling

was ‘arbitrary or unreasonable.’” In re Newkirk Logistics, 718 S.W.3d at 246 (quoting Cire, 134

S.W.3d at 839); see Dinkins, 2018 WL 2248572, at *4.

Marquis moved for sanctions under Chapter 10 of the Texas Civil Practice and Remedies

Code and Rule 13 of the Texas Rules of Civil Procedure. “For the purposes of Chapter 10 and

Rule 13, courts presume pleadings, motions, and other papers are filed in good faith.” Dolcefino,

548 S.W.3d at 694 (quoting WWW.URBAN.INC. v. Drummond, 508 S.W.3d 657, 675 (Tex.

App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2016, no pet.)); see Dinkins, 2018 WL 2248572, at *4. “[T]he party

moving for sanctions[] bears the burden of overcoming this presumption.” Dolcefino, 548

S.W.3d at 694.

1
This appeal was transferred to this Court from the Second Court of Appeals pursuant to a Texas Supreme Court
docket equalization order. See TEX. GOV’T CODE ANN. § 73.001 (Supp.). Accordingly, we apply the precedent of
the Second Court of Appeals in deciding this case to the extent that it conflicts with our own. See TEX. R. APP. P.
41.3.
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“A trial court may impose sanctions pursuant to Rule 13 if a pleading is groundless and

brought in bad faith or groundless and brought for the purpose of harassment.” Id. (citing TEX.

R. CIV. P. 13); see Dinkins, 2018 WL 2248572, at *4. “A claim is groundless for purposes of

Rule 13 if it has ‘no basis in law or fact’ and the claim is ‘not warranted by good faith argument

for the extension, modification, or reversal of existing law.’” Dolcefino, 548 S.W.3d at 694

(quoting TEX. R. CIV. P. 13); see Dinkins, 2018 WL 2248572, at *4.

“To determine if a claim is groundless, the trial court must objectively ask whether the

party and counsel made a reasonable inquiry into the legal and factual basis of the claim at the

time the document in question was filed.” Dolcefino, 548 S.W.3d at 694 (quoting Drummond,

508 S.W.3d at 676). “We determine whether a reasonable inquiry has been made by looking at

the facts available to the attorney and the circumstances that existed when the attorney signed

and filed the document in question.” Id.

“In determining whether a party acted in bad faith, we must be mindful that bad faith ‘is

the conscious doing of a wrong for dishonest, discriminatory, or malicious purposes,’ and does

not exist when a party ‘merely exercises bad judgment or is negligent.’” Dolcefino, 548 S.W.3d

at 694 (quoting Drummond, 508 S.W.3d at 676); see Dinkins, 2018 WL 2248572, at *4. “A

document is filed for the purpose of harassment if it is filed with the intent to annoy, alarm, and

abuse another person.” Dolcefino, 548 S.W.3d at 694 (quoting Drummond, 508 S.W.3d at 676);

see Dinkins, 2018 WL 2248572, at *4. “[T]he trial court must measure the party’s conduct and

examine the facts available to the party at the time the relevant document was signed.”

Dolcefino, 548 S.W.3d at 694 (alteration in original) (quoting Drummond, 508 S.W.3d at 676).

4
“The trial court must consider the acts or omissions of counsel and not merely the legal merit of

a pleading or motion.” Id.

Chapter 10 provides that the signature of attorneys or parties on a pleading
or motion constitutes a certificate by them that, to the best of their knowledge,
information, and belief formed after a reasonable inquiry, the instrument is not
being presented for an improper purpose, is warranted by existing law or by a
nonfrivolous argument for the extension, modification, or reversal of existing law
or the establishment of new law, and there is evidentiary support for each
allegation or contention.

Id. (quoting Drummond, 508 S.W.3d at 676–77 (citing TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN.

§ 10.001)); see Dinkins, 2018 WL 2248572, at *5. “A court that determines that a person has

signed a pleading or motion in violation of Section 10.001 may impose a sanction on the person,

a party represented by the person, or both.” Dolcefino, 548 S.W.3d at 695 (quoting TEX. CIV.

PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 10.004(a)); see Dinkins, 2018 WL 2248572, at *5. However, “[t]he

court may not award monetary sanctions against a represented party for a violation of Section

10.001(2).” TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 10.004(d). “The party moving for sanctions

under chapter 10 must prove the pleading party’s subjective state of mind.” Dolcefino, 548

S.W.3d at 695; see Dinkins, 2018 WL 2248572, at *5.

In deciding whether the denial of sanctions constitutes an abuse of
discretion, we examine the entire record, including the findings of fact and
conclusions of law, reviewing the conflicting evidence in the light most favorable
to the trial court’s ruling and drawing all reasonable inferences in favor of the
court’s judgment.

Dolcefino, 548 S.W.3d at 695.

Neither party to this suit requested findings of fact and conclusions of law. “In [an]

appeal from a judgment following a bench trial where no factual findings were requested, all

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necessary findings supported by the evidence are implied, and the legal and factual sufficiency

standards of review govern appellate challenges to those findings.” PDT Holdings, Inc. v. City

of Dallas, 712 S.W.3d 597, 603 (Tex. 2025).

III. Analysis

In his sole issue, Marquis claims that the trial court’s denial of his motion for sanctions

was arbitrary and unreasonable. Marquis argues that Kamy and its multi-millionaire beneficiary,

Khosrow Sadeghian, have committed a pattern of harassment against former clients of Eugene

DuBose (DuBose) of DuBose Litigation, P.C., Appellant’s counsel, and that they knew they

would not be able to collect any potential judgment against Marquis, Khosrow’s former

employee. Marquis additionally claims that Kamy’s suit was clearly barred by the statute of

limitations, with no possible application of the discovery rule to extend that period.

In its petition, Kamy identified itself as “the owner of numerous properties in Denton

County and surrounding areas that it holds for sale or rent.” Marquis obtained a permit for a

roofing project at 133 Maverick Trail, Oak Point, Texas, one of Kamy’s properties, on July 31,

2015. Kamy alleged in its petition that “the exact date of completion for the roofing work

remain[ed] unspecified within the available documentation.” Kamy further alleged that one of

its employees became aware of “significant disrepair on the roof” around February 5, 2024, that

included “missing shingles, exposed holes, decking damage, and various other structural issues,”

as well as “facia [sic] and soffit exhibit[ing] substantial damage and appear[ing] to have been

untouched by any previous repair efforts.” Kamy claimed that it had obtained an inspection and

an estimate “unequivocally attributing the observed damages to the roofing work performed by

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Billy Marquis.” Kamy urged, “[f]or statute of limitations purposes,” that Marquis had

committed a continuous tort because “the harm inflicted by his actions has persisted over time.”

Kamy sought monetary relief of at least $250,000.00 in the form of damages, including

compensatory damages, punitive damages, and damages due to emotional distress.

As stated above, Marquis raised limitations as an affirmative defense. In his motion for

summary judgment, Marquis argued that the physical damage Kamy alleged was not “inherently

undiscoverable” and that Kamy’s claims were barred by the statute of limitations. Regarding his

motion for sanctions, Marquis asserted that Kamy violated Sections 10.001(1) and (2) of the

Texas Civil Practice and Remedies Code as well as Rule 13 of the Texas Rules of Civil

Procedure by suing a judgment-proof defendant for more than $250,000.00 and by bringing

claims that were clearly barred by the statute of limitations. Marquis sought sanctions against

Kamy’s attorney in an amount no more than the fees he incurred in bringing the motions for

summary judgment and sanctions, but he contended that sanctions against the Sadeghian family

should be no less than $50,000.00 because any less would have no effect due to their wealth.

In a declaration attached to his motion for summary judgment and entered into evidence

at the hearing on the motion for sanctions, Marquis stated that the roof work was finished in

August 2015. Marquis said that Sadeghian2 and his manager inspected and approved the roof

work. Marquis further declared that he “never heard any complaint about the workmanship of

that job until [he] received this lawsuit.”

2
Marquis identified the persons who approved the roof work as only, “Mr. Sadeghian and his manager.” There are
references later in the declaration to Khosrow Sadeghian and Amy Sadeghian, but no reference to Zachary
Sadeghian. Zachary Sadeghian is identified in our record only as the trustee of the Kamy Real Property Trust. Our
record does not reveal any relationship between Zachary Sadeghian and Khosrow Sadeghian. Marquis identified
Khosrow Sadeghian in the motion for sanctions as “paterfamilias of the clan Sadeghian.”
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In an affidavit attached to his motion for summary judgment, DuBose averred that

another client of his had previously sued Khosrow and lost. A “Sadeghian entity with which the

[client] had never had any dealings” then “brought [a] suit for back rent against him.” DuBose

asserted that his client was only sued because “the Sadeghians knew [he] would not leave [his]

client in [a] lurch and . . . would have to defend [him]” even though he “could not afford to pay

any of [his] fees.” DuBose alleged that the trial court found violations of Chapter 10 of the

Texas Civil Practice and Remedies Code in that suit and a hearing on the amount of sanctions

was imminent. DuBose attached to his affidavit an excerpt of testimony by Khosrow in a

separate case in which he testified that he probably had fifty million dollars’ worth of properties

on the tax rolls.

At the hearing on the motion for sanctions, Marquis presented the testimony of DuBose,

exhibits in the form of Marquis’s declaration, and Khosrow’s testimony excerpt that had been

attached to the motion for summary judgment,3 as well as an invoice detailing DuBose’s attorney

fees on the matter.

DuBose testified that the roof damage Kamy claimed could not possibly have been

missed. He noted that Kamy’s former counsel filed the suit, and when current counsel saw the

lack of applicability of the discovery rule, “he immediately moved to dismiss the suit.” DuBose

stated that Khosrow “likes to throw his weight around” and bring meritless suits. DuBose

emphasized Khosrow’s wealth and again requested $50,000.00 in attorney fees.

3
Kamy objected to a portion of Marquis’s declaration, which was not admitted. Marquis does not appeal the
exclusion of that portion of the declaration, and we do not discuss it here.
8
Kamy’s response at the sanctions hearing included an admission by counsel that when he

investigated whether there was evidence that supported Kamy’s claims beyond the statute of

limitations, he found none.

Rule 13 states that a trial court “shall impose an appropriate sanction” if “[a]ttorneys or

parties” bring groundless pleadings in bad faith or for the purpose of harassment. TEX R. CIV. P.

13. “‘Groundless’ . . . means no basis in law or fact and not warranted by good faith argument

for the extension, modification, or reversal of existing law.” Id. “But rule 13 does not permit

sanctions on groundlessness alone; the pleading must also be brought in bad faith or to harass.”

Dinkins, 2018 WL 2248572, at *4. “‘[B]ad faith’ is not just bad judgment or negligence, but

‘means the conscious doing of a wrong for dishonest, discriminatory, or malicious purpose,’ and

‘harass’ means the pleading was intended to annoy, alarm, and verbally abuse another person.”

Id. (quoting Keith v. Solls, 256 S.W.3d 912, 916–17 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2008, no pet.)).

Whether a pleading was filed in bad faith or for the purpose of harassment may be determined in

an evidentiary hearing, but “motions and arguments of counsel are not evidence in a sanctions-

hearing context.” Id.

Marquis had the burden to overcome the presumption that Kamy’s pleadings were filed

in good faith. See Dolcefino, 548 S.W.3d at 694. To do so, he had to show that Kamy’s

pleadings were brought in bad faith or to harass. See Dinkins, 2018 WL 2248572, at *4.

Marquis did not meet that burden. Marquis declared that Khosrow accepted the roof work in

2015. DuBose testified that the damages Kamy alleged could not have possibly been missed and

that Khosrow liked to bring meritless suits and had been sanctioned in another suit. But that

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evidence, even when combined with the admission that there was no factual basis to overcome

the statute of limitations, did not establish bad faith or an intent to harass, particularly on the part

of this defendant. We conclude the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying sanctions

under Rule 13. See id.

Under Chapter 10, a trial court may impose sanctions if an attorney has signed pleadings

that violate Section 10.001. See TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 10.004(a). Section

10.001 provides, in relevant part, that the signatory of a pleading certifies “that to the signatory’s

best knowledge, information, and belief, formed after reasonable inquiry: (1) the pleading or

motion is not being presented for any improper purpose, including to harass or to cause

unnecessary delay or needless increase in the cost of litigation;” and “(2) each claim, defense, or

other legal contention in the pleading or motion is warranted by existing law or by a nonfrivolous

argument for the extension, modification, or reversal of existing law or the establishment of new

law.”4 TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 10.001(1), (2).

For the same reasons stated above regarding the motion for sanctions based on Rule 13,

the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying sanctions based on Section 10.001(1).

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On appeal, Marquis lists all four subdivisions of Section 10.001, calling them “requirements” that must be met
before a motion for sanctions may be granted. We do not agree with this reading of Section 10.001. Instead, we
view Section 10.001 as imposing requirements on signatories of pleadings, requiring that they certify that “the
pleading or motion at issue . . . not be brought for an improper purpose and . . . be both legally and factually sound.”
Champion Printing & Copying LLC v. Nichols, No. 03-15-00704-CV, 2017 WL 3585213, at *9 (Tex. App.—Austin
Aug. 18, 2017, pet. denied) (mem. op.). But with respect to issuing sanctions, “[a] document that fails on any one of
these elements violates the section.” Id. (emphasis added); see Mobley v. Mobley, 506 S.W.3d 87, 95 (Tex. App.—
Texarkana 2016, no pet.) (“Chapter 10 provides for an award of sanctions when a party shows (1) that the pleading
or motion was brought for an improper purpose, (2) that there were no grounds for the legal arguments advanced, or
(3) that the factual allegations or denials lacked evidentiary support.” (emphasis added)).

At trial, Marquis alleged violations of only the first two subsections of Section 10.001, quoted above; thus, we limit
our review to the alleged violations of only those two subsections. See TEX. R. APP. P. 33.1.
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Marquis did not prove improper purpose as required by Section 10.001(1). See Dolcefino, 548

S.W.3d at 694; Dinkins, 2018 WL 2248572, at *5.

“Unlike sanctions for violating section 10.001(1), [however,] sanctions under 10.001(2)

do not require an improper-purpose finding.” Dinkins, 2018 WL 2248572, at *5. “Chapter 10

provides that a claim that lacks a legal or factual basis—without more—is sanctionable.” Id.

(quoting Nath v. Tex. Child.’s Hosp., 446 S.W.3d 355, 369 (Tex. 2014)). “Legally, the claim

must be warranted by existing law or a nonfrivolous argument to change existing law.” Id.

(quoting Nath, 446 S.W.3d at 369). “But a finding that a pleading was signed in violation of this

section nevertheless does not require the trial court to impose sanctions: chapter 10 sanctions are

permissive, not mandatory.” Id. (citing TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 10.004(a)).

Marquis recognizes that sanctions are permissive under Chapter 10, and he cites no case in which

an appellate court reversed a trial court for not awarding a discretionary sanction. As did the

court in Dinkins, “[w]e therefore cannot conclude that the trial court abused its discretion by

failing to award [Marquis] sanctions under section 10.001(2).” Id.

We overrule Marquis’s sole issue.

IV. Conclusion

We affirm the trial court’s judgment.

Jeff Rambin
Justice

Date Submitted: October 23, 2025
Date Decided: December 31, 2025
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