In the Matter of J.C., a Juvenile v. the State of Texas

Fourth Court of Appeals
San Antonio, Texas
MEMORANDUM OPINION

No. 04-24-00795-CV

IN THE MATTER OF J.C., a juvenile

From the 386th Judicial District Court, Bexar County, Texas
Trial Court No. 2024JUV00810
Honorable Jacqueline Herr-Valdez, Judge Presiding

Opinion by: Lori Massey Brissette, Justice

Sitting: Irene Rios, Justice
Lori Massey Brissette, Justice
Adrian A. Spears II, Justice

Delivered and Filed: November 19, 2025

AFFIRMED

Appellant J.C. 1 challenges the juvenile court’s order of adjudication finding he engaged in

delinquent conduct and the order of disposition committing him to the Texas Juvenile Justice

Department for a ten-year term. He argues (1) the evidence was factually insufficient to adjudicate

him of aggravated robbery and aggravated assault with a deadly weapon, (2) the juvenile court

violated his double jeopardy rights, and (3) the juvenile court committed jury charge error. Based

upon our review of the law and the record, we affirm the trial court’s judgment.

1
To protect the identity of appellant, who is a minor, we refer to appellant by his initials. See TEX. R. APP. P. 9.8(c);
TEX. FAM. CODE § 56.01.
04-24-00795-CV

BACKGROUND

Annelise Ramirez was confronted by a male with a handgun as she sat in her car outside

of North Star Mall. When she refused to exit her vehicle, the male—now joined by others—opened

her door, whereupon Ramirez offered gas and cash transfers. Eventually, the perpetrators returned

to their vehicle and, as they drove off, the male who originally confronted her shot three times in

the direction of Ramirez’s car, with the third shot hitting her right forearm near the elbow. Ramirez

chased them to get their license plate number and then stopped to seek medical assistance. The

San Antonio Police Department (SAPD) secured surveillance footage from the parking garage

identifying the perpetrator’s vehicle, secured J.C.’s fingerprints from that vehicle, and had Ramirez

positively identify J.C. as the perpetrator based on a blind photo array.

The State filed a petition seeking a determinate sentence, alleging J.C. engaged in

delinquent conduct by committing (1) aggravated robbery in violation of Section 29.02 of the

Texas Penal Code, and (2) aggravated assault with a deadly weapon in violation of section 22.02

of the Texas Penal Code. TEX. PEN. CODE §§ 29.02(a)(2); 29.03(a)(2). J.C. pled not true to both

counts. After a two-day trial, a jury found J.C. engaged in the alleged delinquent conduct. The

juvenile court signed an order of adjudication and committed him to the Texas Juvenile Justice

Department for a term of ten years with a possible transfer to the Texas Department of Criminal

Justice. J.C. now appeals.

FACTUAL SUFFICIENCY

First, J.C. argues the State’s identity evidence against him was factually insufficient to

support the jury’s verdict. J.C. specifically contends (1) Ramirez’s identification of him as her

assailant, including the State’s use of a blind photo array, was insufficient to identify him and

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(2) neither J.C.’s fingerprints nor his DNA were ever found on the Camaro or inside the Audi, and

were only found on the Audi’s exterior passenger side of the vehicle.

Evidence is factually insufficient to support the verdict if, after considering and weighing

all of the evidence in the record, the verdict is so against the great weight and preponderance of

the evidence as to be clearly wrong or manifestly unjust. See, e.g., Matter of R.E.J., No. 04-17-

00088-CV, 2017 WL 6032561, at *4 (Tex. App.—San Antonio Dec. 6, 2017, no pet.) (mem. op.);

Matter of E.K.G., 487 S.W.3d 670, 676 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2016, no pet.) (mem. op.). In

our review, we are mindful the jury is the sole judge of credibility and may choose to believe or

disbelieve any or all of the witnesses’ testimony. Matter of R.I.C., No. 04-19-00834-CV, 2020 WL

806947, at *3 (Tex. App.—San Antonio Feb. 19, 2020, pet. denied) (mem. op.).

Here, after considering and weighing all of the evidence in the record, the evidence is

factually sufficient. The evidence at trial focused almost exclusively on identity. The fingerprint

evidence was mixed. The State introduced evidence of six separate prints taken from the Camaro

driver-side door. Of those, only one of the print cards included usable fingerprints, and those did

not match J.C.’s fingerprints despite Ramirez’s testimony he opened her driver door. 2 The State

also introduced fingerprints evidence matching J.C. from the red Audi, secured shortly after the

vehicle was located. Those fingerprints were from the passenger side of the vehicle and the rear

driver’s side frame exterior. The State’s fingerprint examiner testified she also processed J.C.’s

fingerprints the same day she testified and again confirmed his fingerprints matched the

fingerprints from the Audi. As for DNA, the State secured DNA samples from the Camaro, but

none of it was of sufficient quantity or quality to make it suitable for comparison.

2
Nor was J.C. positively identified from surveillance footage.

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04-24-00795-CV

The focus of trial then shifted to Ramirez’s eyewitness testimony. Ramirez testified she

saw the Audi park near her vehicle. She testified a male, initially wearing a camouflage facial

covering, approached her vehicle. He was an African-American male wearing an Under Armor

shirt, black or charcoal gray pants, and “an inch-and-a-half of a fro.” The video evidence is, at

best, unclear as to this description because it was from a distance, but it shows a tall individual

emerge from the passenger side of the vehicle with lighter-colored pants and a hoodie (but it’s not

clear if there is a shirt underneath). Nevertheless, Ramirez testified she got a “good” look at J.C.’s

face after he removed his camouflage facial covering, and she witnessed him shoot her in the arm

from the passenger side of the vehicle. She also positively identified him in the courtroom as her

assailant.

Ramirez also identified J.C. from a blind photo array. State’s Exhibit 71 confirms the

positive identification, providing Ramirez identified J.C. based on his bushy eyebrows, “skin tone,

shadowing of face, [and his] ear perked out more than the other one.” Ramirez testified she did a

photo array two or three times.

SAPD lead detective Julissa Perez testified she was able to trace the incident to J.C. by

reviewing security camera footage to identify and locate the Audi and secure J.C.’s fingerprints

from the vehicle. She used that evidence to have youth services create a blind photo array that

included J.C. and had a different detective with no knowledge of the case—Detective Claudia

Torres—review the photo array with Ramirez. Both Detectives Perez and Torres testified Ramirez

identified J.C. as the perpetrator in one of the two blind photo arrays, and Detective Torres further

testified Ramirez stated “no” to all of the individuals in the other photo array. Detective Torres

testified Ramirez began crying upon seeing J.C.’s photo. She also testified there was no video

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04-24-00795-CV

footage of the photo array, but she did not normally wear her body cam at the police department

where the photo array was conducted and no other camera recorded it.

To summarize, the State did not have J.C.’s DNA or fingerprints to the Camaro or

surveillance video of him. But Detective Perez used the surveillance footage to locate the Audi,

lift fingerprints from it, and positively identify J.C.’s fingerprints. She then used a mugshot of J.C.

to conduct a blind photo array during which Ramirez positively identified him. Ramirez was

certain she saw J.C.’s face, and she again positively identified him in court. Despite some evidence

in the record that calls into question the identity testimony, and being mindful of our standard of

review, we cannot conclude the verdict is so against the great weight and preponderance of the

evidence as to be clearly wrong or manifestly unjust. J.C.’s first two points of error are overruled.

DOUBLE JEOPARDY

Second, J.C. contends the trial court’s disposition order punished him twice for the same

offense, violating his rights under the Double Jeopardy Clause of the Fifth Amendment of the

United States Constitution. The Double Jeopardy Clause protects against: (1) a second or

successive petition alleging delinquent conduct for the same delinquent conduct on which there

was a previous finding of delinquency or no delinquency; and (2) multiple commitments for a

determinate term for delinquency to the Texas Juvenile Justice Department. See Sledge v. State,

666 S.W.3d 592, 599 (Tex. Crim. App. 2023).

A juvenile’s double jeopardy challenge may be raised for the first time on appeal if it is

“clearly apparent” from the face of the record and enforcement of the usual rules of procedural

default serves no legitimate state interest. Sledge v. State, 666 S.W.3d 592, 599 (Tex. Crim. App.

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2023); see, e.g., Garfias v. State, 424 S.W.3d 54, 58 (Tex. Crim. App. 2014). 3 Double jeopardy is

a legal issue which we review de novo if its resolution requires an application of the law to the

facts and does not involve credibility and demeanor determinations. Sledge v. State, 666 S.W.3d

592, 599 (Tex. Crim. App. 2023).

J.C. specifically challenges that, by the trial court’s order, he was the subject of multiple

commitments for the same offense. See Sledge, 666 S.W.3d at 599; Ex parte Estevez, 713 S.W.3d

913, 918 (Tex. Crim. App. 2025) (providing double jeopardy protection prevents both successive

punishment and successive prosecution for same offense). A multiple-commitments violation may

arise either (1) in the context of lesser-included offenses, where the same conduct is punished

under a greater and a lesser-included offense, or (2) when the same conduct is punished under two

distinct statutes where the Legislature only intended for the conduct to be punished once. See

Garfias, 424 S.W.3d at 58.

J.C. makes both arguments here. But, as to the first, the Court of Criminal Appeals has

rejected the contention that aggravated assault causing bodily injury is always a lesser-included

offense of aggravated robbery by threat in Garfias v. State. See 424 S.W.3d at 62; see also Floyd

v. State, 714 S.W.3d 9, 14 (Tex. Crim. App. 2024); cf. TEX. PEN. CODE § 22.02(a)(1) (agg. assault

causing bodily injury); TEX. PEN. CODE § 29.03(a)(3) (agg. robbery by threats). As to his second

argument, J.C—just as in Garfias—was charged with aggravated robbery by threat and aggravated

assault causing bodily injury based on the different conduct that occurred during the full

interaction. See Garfias, 424 S.W.3d at 60-61 (concluding offenses of aggravated robbery by threat

and aggravated assault causing bodily injury, as charged in Garfias’s indictment, each contained

3
See also In re J.R.R., 696 S.W.2d 382, 384 (Tex. 1985); State v. C.J.F., 183 S.W.3d 841, 848 (Tex. App.—Houston
[1st Dist.] 2005, pet. denied); Matter of S.G., Jr., 935 S.W.2d 919, 923 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 1996, writ dism’d
w.o.j.).

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element other did not and recognizing gravamen of offenses of aggravated robbery by threat and

aggravated assault bodily injury are different, one focusing on threat and one focusing on actual

harm inflicted on victim); see also Floyd, 714 S.W.3d at 14.

J.C. relies on the language within the concurrence in Garfias to contend he was subjected

to double jeopardy because the State treated the events as one criminal transaction. But, even

taking into account the concern set forth in that concurrence, Justice Cochran—the concurring

author—still joined the majority in finding no double jeopardy violation apparent on the face of

the record. See Garfias, 424 S.W.3d at 64 (Cochran, J., concurring). And, in any event, we are

bound by the majority opinion in Garfias, not the concurrence. But, most importantly, our review

of the pleadings fails to support J.C.’s assertion that the State treated the various acts of J.C. as a

single criminal transaction. See Nawaz, 663 S.W.3d at 744 (requiring review of pleadings and

relevant statutory provisions, not evidence presented at trial, to determine nature of State’s case);

see, e.g., Bien v. State, 550 S.W.3d 180, 184 (Tex. Crim. App. 2018); Garfias, 424 S.W.3d at 58–

59. And J.C. identifies no controlling authority to the contrary. See TEX. R. APP. P. 38.1(i).

Thus, we conclude that double-jeopardy principles were not violated in this case.

JURY CHARGE ERROR

In reviewing a claim of jury charge error, we first determine whether there was error.

Lozano v. State, 636 S.W.3d 25, 29 (Tex. Crim. App. 2021); In re C.C., No. 06-22-00057-CV,

2023 WL 1872368, at *2 (Tex. App.—Texarkana Feb. 10, 2023, pet. denied). The parties agree

the trial court committed jury charge error when it failed to limit the appropriate culpable mental

state definitions to their respective conduct elements. See Price v. State, 457 S.W.3d 437, 441

(Tex. Crim. App. 2015); Servin v. State, 582 S.W.3d 629, 632 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2019, no

pet.). This is supported by the record.

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But, because appellant failed to lodge a timely objection to the jury charge in the trial court,

we will reverse only if the error is so egregious that the defendant did not have a fair and impartial

trial. Almanza v. State, 686 S.W.2d 157, 171 (Tex. Crim. App. 1984); see, e.g., Lozano, 636 S.W.3d

at 29. Such egregious harm must involve actual harm, not just theoretical harm, and must affect

the very basis of the case, deprive the defendant of a valuable right, or vitally affect a defensive

theory. Servin, 582 S.W.3d at 631; see, e.g., Lozano, 636 S.W.3d at 29. In considering whether

harm is egregious, we review the entire record, including the jury charge, the evidence, the

contested issues, the arguments of counsel, and anything else in the record that might inform our

analysis. Lozano, 636 S.W.3d at 29.

Courts have repeatedly found that a jury charge that tracks the statutory language is

generally not egregiously harmful. See, e.g., Poor v. State, 715 S.W.3d 15, 34 (Tex. App.—

Eastland 2024, pet. ref’d); Reed v. State, 421 S.W.3d 24, 30 (Tex. App.—Waco 2013, pet. ref’d);

see also Medina v. State, 7 S.W.3d 633, 640 (Tex. Crim. App. 1999); Servin, 582 S.W.3d at 633

(rejecting as egregiously harmful aggravated robbery jury charge which properly tracked statute

because facts, as applied to law, in application paragraphs, pointed jury to appropriate portion of

definitions). Thus, because the language used here tracks the statutory language in the Penal Code,

this factor does not favor finding egregious harm. See TEX. PEN. CODE §§ 6.03(a)-(b), 29.02(a)(2);

29.03(a)(2).

Further, courts have held that egregious harm is not present where the subject of the error

was not the focus at trial, either of the State or the defendant in presenting the evidence or argument

to the jury. See e.g., Servin, 582 S.W.3d at 633 (holding charge error relating to mental state did

not result in egregious harm where the defendant’s mental state was not the focus at trial); see also

Herrera v. State, 527 S.W.3d 675, 680 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2017, pet. ref’d) (same).

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Here, a review of the record demonstrates that the focus at trial was whether J.C. was the

perpetrator, not the mental state or conduct elements, with both the State and defense counsel

presenting evidence and argument attempting to bolster or discredit identification testimony.

We therefore cannot conclude J.C. suffered egregious harm. 4

CONCLUSION

For these reasons, we affirm the trial court’s order of adjudication and order of disposition.

Lori Massey Brissette, Justice

DO NOT PUBLISH

4
J.C. also contends the trial court erred in sustaining the State’s challenge for cause of venirepersons 19 and 20. But
J.C. did not object—stating nothing on the record for the State’s challenge to venireperson 20 and stating “okay” on
venireperson 19—and his complaints are therefore not preserved for our review. See, e.g., TEX. R. APP. P. 33.1; Ortiz
v. State, 93 S.W.3d 79, 88 (Tex. Crim. App. 2002); see also In re A.V., No. 11–16–00078–CV, 2017 WL 2484348, at
*2 (Tex. App.—Eastland June 8, 2017, no pet.) (mem. op.); In re J.O., 38 S.W.3d 718, 720 (Tex. App.—San Antonio
2000, no pet.).

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