Devon Dinger v. the State of Texas

In the
Court of Appeals
Second Appellate District of Texas
at Fort Worth
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No. 02-25-00314-CR
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DEVON DINGER, Appellant

V.

THE STATE OF TEXAS

On Appeal from Criminal District Court No. 2
Tarrant County, Texas
Trial Court No. 1666164

Before Sudderth, C.J.; Birdwell and Walker, JJ.
Memorandum Opinion by Justice Birdwell
MEMORANDUM OPINION

Appellant Devon Dinger faced a five-count indictment. Count One alleged that

he had committed the first-degree felony offense of continuous sexual abuse of a

young child, see Tex. Penal Code § 21.02, Counts Two and Three alleged that he had

committed the first-degree felony offenses of aggravated sexual assault of a child

younger than 14 years of age, see id. § 22.021(a)(2)(B), and Counts Four and Five

alleged that he had committed the second-degree felony offenses of indecency by

contact with a child younger than 17 years of age, see id. § 21.11(a)(1).

As part of a plea bargain, Dinger agreed to plead guilty to Counts Two through

Five, and the State agreed to waive Count One and to recommend deferred

adjudication community supervision for ten years. The trial court followed the plea

bargain. Dinger pleaded guilty to Counts Two through Five, and the trial court placed

Dinger on deferred adjudication community supervision for ten years on Counts Two

through Five.

Two years and nine months later, the State filed its first amended petition to

proceed to an adjudication on each count. Each petition alleged the same four

violations. At the hearing on the State’s petitions, Dinger pleaded true to all four

allegations. The trial court found the allegations true, adjudicated Dinger guilty of

Counts Two through Five, and sentenced him to fifty years’ confinement for Counts

Two and Three, the two first-degree felonies, see id. § 12.32(a) (providing range of

imprisonment for a first-degree felony of life or any term of not more than 99 years

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or less than 5 years), and twenty years’ confinement for Counts Four and Five, the

two second-degree felonies, see id. § 12.33(a) (providing range of imprisonment for a

second-degree felony of any term of not more than 20 years or less than 2 years). The

sentences run concurrently. Dinger appealed.

Dinger’s counsel—after determining that Dinger’s appeal was frivolous—filed

a motion to withdraw and a brief in support of that motion. See Anders v. California,

386 U.S. 738, 744–45, 87 S. Ct. 1396, 1400 (1967). Counsel’s motion and brief meet

the requirements of Anders by presenting a professional evaluation of the record

showing why there are no arguable grounds for relief. See id. at 744, 87 S. Ct. at 1400.

Additionally, in compliance with Kelly v. State, counsel provided Dinger with copies of

the brief and the motion to withdraw and informed him of his right to file a pro se

response, to review the record, and to seek discretionary review pro se should this

court declare his appeal frivolous. See 436 S.W.3d 313, 319 (Tex. Crim. App. 2014).

Counsel also provided Dinger with a form motion for pro se access to the appellate

record. See id. Although given an opportunity to file a pro se response to counsel’s

Anders brief, Dinger has not filed one. The State, for its part, filed a letter in which it

agreed that Dinger had no meritorious grounds on which to advance an appeal.

We have carefully reviewed the record and counsel’s brief and have determined

that this appeal is wholly frivolous and without merit. We find nothing in the record

that might arguably support the appeal. See Bledsoe v. State, 178 S.W.3d 824, 827–28

(Tex. Crim. App. 2005); see also Meza v. State, 206 S.W.3d 684, 685 n.6 (Tex. Crim.

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App. 2006). We therefore grant counsel’s motion to withdraw and affirm the trial

court’s judgments.

/s/ Wade Birdwell

Wade Birdwell
Justice

Do Not Publish
Tex. R. App. P. 47.2(b)

Delivered: June 11, 2026

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