Melanie Kae Holland v. the State of Texas

In the
Court of Appeals
Second Appellate District of Texas
at Fort Worth
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No. 02-25-00260-CR
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MELANIE KAE HOLLAND, Appellant

V.

THE STATE OF TEXAS

On Appeal from the 235th District Court
Cooke County, Texas
Trial Court No. CR23-00027

Before Bassel, Wallach, and Walker, JJ.
Memorandum Opinion by Justice Bassel
MEMORANDUM OPINION

I. Introduction

In a single point, appellant Melanie Kae Holland contends that the trial court

abused its discretion by revoking her community supervision and by failing to grant

her a new trial. We affirm.

II. Procedural Background

In 2023, Holland pleaded guilty in Cooke County to hindering apprehension or

prosecution of a known felon in exchange for a sentence of eight years’ confinement,

probated1 for five years. As part of the agreement, she waived her right to appeal.

Holland began her community supervision in Cooke County, but it was later

transferred to Grayson County.

In 2024, the State filed a motion to revoke Holland’s community supervision,

alleging that she had violated five of the conditions, including failing to report; failing

to work any community-service hours; failing to submit to urinalysis (UA) tests as

ordered; and failing to pay court costs. The trial court appointed counsel for Holland.

After a hearing at which Holland pleaded true to all of the State’s allegations, the trial

court revoked her community supervision and sentenced her to four years’

incarceration.

1
In this memorandum opinion, we use the terms probation and community
supervision interchangeably.

2
Holland’s appointed counsel timely filed a motion for new trial and an

amended motion for new trial, alleging facts outside the record: that at the time of

her original plea in 2023, Holland was suffering from health issues that had caused her

not to understand the consequences of her plea. The trial court denied the amended

motion, and Holland timely appealed.

III. Trial Court Did Not Abuse its Discretion by Revoking Holland’s
Community Supervision or by Denying Her Amended Motion for New Trial

In one point, Holland complains that the trial court erred by revoking her

community supervision because (1) even though she admitted violating her

conditions, she explained how the circumstances of her violations were beyond her

control and (2) she had showed that she was making sincere efforts to redeem herself.

Holland also complains that the trial court abused its discretion by denying her

amended motion for new trial because she did not fully understand her initial guilty

plea.

To begin with, we overrule Holland’s new-trial complaint. “A defendant

placed on ‘regular’ community supervision may raise issues relating to the

conviction . . . only in appeals taken when community supervision is originally

imposed,” not “in appeals filed after ‘regular’ community supervision is revoked.”

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Manuel v. State, 994 S.W.2d 658, 661 (Tex. Crim. App. 1999). 2 Thus, the trial court did

not abuse its discretion by denying Holland’s motion for new trial.

Next, we consider Holland’s argument that revocation was unwarranted

because of the evidence in her favor. In a revocation proceeding, the trial court is the

sole judge of the witnesses’ credibility and the weight to be given their testimony, and

we review the evidence in the light most favorable to the trial court’s ruling. Hacker v.

State, 389 S.W.3d 860, 865 (Tex. Crim. App. 2013); Cardona v. State, 665 S.W.2d 492,

493 (Tex. Crim. App. 1984).

The State did not offer any evidence in light of Holland’s true pleas. A

defendant’s plea of true is generally sufficient on its own to support a trial court’s

decision to revoke community supervision. Tapia v. State, 462 S.W.3d 29, 31 n.2 (Tex.

Crim. App. 2015); Duncan v. State, 321 S.W.3d 53, 58 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.]

2010, pet. ref’d).

Holland called two witnesses––herself and a recovery counselor who had met

with Holland several times in the Cooke County Jail––and provided the trial court

with three character letters from family members.

The recovery counselor testified generally that she had seen a “true” change in

Holland, that she thought Holland would be successful remaining on community

2
Holland has not argued that an exception to this general rule applies, and
nothing in the record indicates that any recognized exception would apply. See Wright
v. State, 506 S.W.3d 478, 482 (Tex. Crim. App. 2016) (discussing void-judgment
exception); Jordan v. State, 54 S.W.3d 783, 786 (Tex. Crim. App. 2001) (discussing
possibility of relief via pretrial habeas corpus application).

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supervision, and that she did not think incarceration would help Holland. But on

cross-examination, the counselor admitted that she had never discussed with Holland

what problems or struggles of hers had led to her conviction. She also agreed that

someone who had been given the chance of probation and then had failed to comply

with its terms had shown no benefit from the probation.

Holland testified and explained that at the time of her 2023 arrest, she had

medical conditions that confined her to a wheelchair and that she had no

transportation. 3 She likewise had no transportation during her community

supervision.4 When asked about Grayson County’s attempted visit to her home in

October 2023, she responded that she did not know anyone had tried to visit her, and

she explained, “I didn’t know they came, but I don’t go anywhere. I had no way to go

nowhere, and if I went, I walked.” Holland said that she had failed to submit to a UA

because her medical condition made urinating difficult and although she had tried to

explain that fact to the probation officer, the officer “would not hear anything

[Holland] had to say.”5

She said that after her arrest, she taught herself to walk while in the Cooke
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County Jail.
4
On cross-examination, Holland said that during her probation, she had been
“going to classes and stuff in the world, even though” she had not reported because
of her lack of transportation.
On cross-examination, Holland testified that she had brought the medical
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records documenting her condition with her to the Cooke County Jail but that Cooke
County did not have those records anymore.

5
Holland also stated that she had been a long-time drug addict and had been to

prison for over seventeen years. She admitted having been incarcerated five times.

Despite this history, Holland had worked as a babysitter while on community

supervision and had worked as a caretaker for an elderly couple before her 2023

arrest. According to Holland, she knew that if given a second chance, she could

succeed on community supervision.

First, the trial court did not have to believe Holland’s or the recovery

counselor’s testimony. See Hacker, 389 S.W.3d at 868. But even if it did, the trial

court could have taken into account that Holland had agreed to community

supervision knowing that she had no way to report and thus could have concluded

that Holland had never intended to comply with at least one of her community-

supervision’s terms. Additionally, the trial court was entitled to consider that if being

incarcerated five times had not prompted Holland to make lasting change, continuing

her community supervision would not do so. For these reasons, we hold that the trial

court did not abuse its discretion by revoking Holland’s community supervision. See,

e.g., Perez v. State, No. 08-23-00314-CR, 2024 WL 3195845, at *5 (Tex. App.—El Paso

June 26, 2024, no pet.) (mem. op., not designated for publication); Poss v. State, No.

02-12-00010-CR, 2013 WL 2435536, at *2 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth June 6, 2013, pet.

ref’d) (mem. op., not designated for publication); Hays v. State, 933 S.W.2d 659, 661

(Tex. App.—San Antonio 1996, no pet.).

We overrule Holland’s sole point.

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IV. Conclusion

Having overruled Holland’s sole point, we affirm the trial court’s judgment.

/s/ Dabney Bassel

Dabney Bassel
Justice

Do Not Publish
Tex. R. App. P. 47.2(b)

Delivered: May 7, 2026

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