Trevor Dallas Blankenship v. the State of Texas

In the
Court of Appeals
Second Appellate District of Texas
at Fort Worth
___________________________
No. 02-25-00225-CR
___________________________

TREVOR DALLAS BLANKENSHIP, Appellant

V.

THE STATE OF TEXAS

On Appeal from Criminal District Court No. 3
Tarrant County, Texas
Trial Court No. 1776728

Before Sudderth, C.J.; Womack and Wallach, JJ.
Memorandum Opinion by Justice Womack
MEMORANDUM OPINION

I. INTRODUCTION

Appellant Trevor Dallas Blankenship pleaded guilty to evading arrest or

detention with a vehicle. See Tex. Penal Code Ann. § 38.04(b)(2)(A). Blankenship

was placed in the Veterans Treatment Court (VTC), a pretrial diversion program.

After being revoked from the VTC program following an alleged assault of his

girlfriend, the trial court adjudicated Blankenship guilty of evading arrest or detention

with a vehicle and found true that he had used the vehicle as a deadly weapon. The

trial court later denied Blankenship’s motion to withdraw his guilty plea—which had

been based on his contention that he “did not plead true to the deadly weapon

enhancement”—and it sentenced him to six years’ confinement. In three issues on

appeal, Blankenship argues that (1) the trial court’s deadly weapon finding rendered

his plea involuntary, (2) the trial court should have allowed him to withdraw his guilty

plea, and (3) the evidence was insufficient to support the trial court’s deadly weapon

finding. We will affirm.

II. BACKGROUND

A. Blankenship’s Indictment, His Guilty Plea, and His Placement in the VTC
Program

In August 2023, Blankenship was indicted for evading arrest or detention with

a vehicle stemming from an incident that had occurred on April 20, 2023. The

2
indictment included a deadly weapon allegation that Blankenship had used the vehicle

as a deadly weapon during the offense.

On December 6, 2023, Blankenship signed documents pleading guilty to

evading arrest or detention with a vehicle. The plea paperwork explicitly mentioned

that “[t]he State does not waive the deadly weapon finding notice, if applicable.” It

also provided that, if convicted, Blankenship faced the following range of

punishment: “THIRD-DEGREE FELONY: Imprisonment for a term of not more

than 10 years or less than 2 years in the Texas Department of Criminal Justice; and in

addition, a fine not to exceed $10,000 may be assessed.” In the written waivers that

were part of the paperwork, Blankenship represented that his plea was “knowingly,

freely, and voluntarily entered” and that “[n]o one ha[d] threatened, coerced, forced,

persuaded[,] or promised [him] anything in exchange for [his] plea.” His attorney also

stated in the plea paperwork that he was satisfied that Blankenship “has intelligently,

knowingly, and voluntarily waived his rights and will enter a guilty plea understanding

the consequences thereof.”

In connection with his plea, Blankenship signed a judicial confession. Notably,

the following preprinted language was crossed out of the confession portion of the

paperwork:

Any and all deadly weapon allegations are true and correct. All other
affirmative findings made by the Court pursuant to this plea agreement
are true and correct. I further admit my guilt on any unadjudicated
offenses set forth in the plea recommendation set out above, and request

3
the Court to take each into account in determining my sentence for the
instant offense(s).[1]

Next to the crossed-out language were initials that correspond to Blankenship and his

attorney who signed the paperwork, as well as the initials “NA.”

Following his plea, Blankenship was placed into the VTC program.

B. The June 6, 2025 and June 9, 2025 Hearings on Blankenship’s Termination
from the VTC Program

On June 6, 2025, the trial court conducted a hearing on Blankenship’s

termination from the VTC program due to his alleged assault of a woman he was

dating. At the outset of that hearing, the trial court and counsel for both sides had a

lengthy exchange regarding the purpose of the hearing, the next steps regarding

Blankenship’s case, and whether Blankenship had pleaded true to the deadly weapon

enhancement. During that discussion, the trial court noted that Blankenship had

already pled guilty and that “[p]rocedurally[,] he cannot withdraw his plea.”

Blankenship’s counsel responded, “That’s not where I’m going, Judge.”

Blankenship’s counsel then clarified that his argument was addressing what

Blankenship had—and had not—pled to; Blankenship’s counsel told the trial court

that “it was abundantly clear that [Blankenship] did not plead true to the deadly

weapon enhancement.” The hearing was later recessed and resumed on June 9, 2025.

1
Other language was also crossed out in the plea paperwork, including language
referencing a sex offender registration requirement, a victim impact statement, and a
conviction of a misdemeanor involving family violence.

4
When the hearing resumed, the trial court considered testimony regarding

Blankenship’s plea. Blankenship called as a witness the magistrate judge who had

accepted his plea. The magistrate judge testified that she had no independent

recollection of Blankenship’s plea. On cross-examination, the State showed the

magistrate judge a document titled “District Clerk Certificate of Proceedings” that she

had signed in Blankenship’s case.2 That document stated, “12/6/23: Open plea of

guilty; deadly weapon – true; plea accepted by court; Veteran admitted to Veteran

Court Program; Surety Bond satisfied.”

Blankenship also called as a witness a clerk who had been present when his plea

was made. The clerk’s testimony was very brief; the trial court sustained the State’s

objections to defense questions about the plea agreement on the grounds that “the

document speaks for itself.” Blankenship also called as a witness his attorney who

had signed the plea paperwork. After making a record of the attorney’s qualifications,

Blankenship passed the witness, and the State had no questions for the witness.

Blankenship then rested as to that portion of the hearing. The trial court asked

Blankenship’s counsel, “Make sure I understand. So you’re not challenging the

voluntariness of the plea or the deadly weapon plea; is that correct?” Blankenship’s

counsel responded, “I am prepared to say that we’re challenging only the deadly-

weapon finding, whether that was agreed based upon the paperwork.”

2
That document was admitted into evidence at the June 9, 2025 hearing.

5
Later during the hearing, the State called Blankenship’s ex-girlfriend and the ex-

girlfriend’s daughter to testify about a June 16, 2024 incident regarding Blankenship’s

assault of the ex-girlfriend.3 The State also called Joseph Campbell, a police officer

with the North Richland Hills Police Department, to testify about Blankenship’s

underlying offense for evading arrest or detention with a vehicle.

Officer Campbell testified that around 3:02 a.m. on April 20, 2023, he was

dispatched to a vehicle on Rufe Snow Drive south of the intersection of Mid Cities

Boulevard. Officer Campbell stated that that portion of Rufe Snow is “a seven-lane

road, three lanes each direction with a center turn lane.” Officer Campbell observed

that the vehicle—which was being driving by Blankenship—was traveling the wrong

way, noting that “[t]he vehicle was in the inside southbound lane when it was facing

northbound at the intersection.” Officer Campbell attempted to make a traffic stop,

but Blankenship continued driving against the opposite lanes of traffic. Officer

Campbell indicated that Blankenship’s vehicle “continued driving mostly against the

far left curb . . . of [the] seven-lane roadway” and that “a few blocks later,

[Blankenship] eventually yielded in [a] parking lot.” Officer Campbell testified that

Blankenship’s vehicle was traveling above the posted speed limit during the incident,

noting that he had paced the vehicle as traveling fifty-five miles per hour in a forty

3
We do not detail their testimony because it is not pertinent to the issues raised
in this appeal. See Tex. R. App. P. 47.1.

6
mile per hour zone. According to Officer Campbell, authorities later determined that

Blankenship was intoxicated during the commission of the offense.

A video from the dashcam of Officer Campbell’s police vehicle was admitted

into evidence at the hearing. In the beginning of that video, Blankenship’s vehicle is

stopped at an intersection facing northbound in the inside southbound lane. A

southbound vehicle is stopped with its hazard lights on in the southbound lane next

to Blankenship’s vehicle. Another southbound vehicle drives past the stopped

vehicles in the outer southbound lane. Officer Campbell’s police vehicle is stopped

behind Blankenship’s vehicle at the intersection facing northbound. A woman—who

appears to be the driver of the southbound vehicle that has its hazard lights on—is

outside of her vehicle talking to Officer Campbell.

The video then shows Blankenship’s vehicle slowly making its way through the

intersection, with the traffic light at the intersection changing from green to yellow to

red as Blankenship’s vehicle gradually traverses through it. After Blankenship’s

vehicle goes through the intersection, it quickly accelerates speed and continues down

the road going the wrong way. Officer Campbell then activates his police vehicle’s

siren and lights and pursues Blankenship. As Officer Campbell crosses the

intersection on a red light, a westbound police vehicle approaches the intersection on

a green light and has to stop to avoid Officer Campbell’s vehicle.

Officer Campbell pursues Blankenship while Blankenship travels northbound

in the outer southbound lane. After approximately forty seconds, Blankenship stops

7
his vehicle. But as Officer Campbell pulls up behind it, Blankenship’s vehicle takes

off again, continuing northbound in the outer southbound lane. Officer Campbell

pursues. After approximately thirty seconds, Blankenship turns his vehicle into a gas

station. Blankenship eventually parks his vehicle in the gas station’s parking lot, and

he is subsequently placed under arrest.

Following Officer Campbell’s testimony, the State rested. The trial court asked

Blankenship’s counsel if he wanted a Presentence Investigation Report (PSI) to be

prepared, and Blankenship’s counsel answered affirmatively. The trial court then

stated that it had found Blankenship guilty and that the deadly weapon allegation was

true.

C. Blankenship’s June 13, 2025 Motion to Withdraw His Plea and the Trial
Court’s June 30, 2025 Sentencing Hearing

On June 13, 2025, Blankenship filed a motion to withdraw his plea. In that

motion, he argued that he “did not plead true to the deadly weapon enhancement”

and that “as such, [his] plea was not entered into freely and voluntarily.”

On June 30, 2025, the trial court held a sentencing hearing. At the outset of

the hearing, the trial court asked if Blankenship had any objection to the court

receiving the PSI that had been prepared. Blankenship’s counsel stated that he had no

objection. Blankenship’s counsel then brought to the court’s attention that

Blankenship had filed a motion to withdraw his plea on June 13, 2025. When asked

by the trial court whether that motion had been ruled on previously, Blankenship’s

8
counsel stated that it had not been ruled on, noting, “Previously[,] I do not believe

that we affirmatively exercised his right to withdraw his plea.” After hearing

argument from both sides regarding the motion, the trial court denied it.4

Blankenship then called two witnesses to testify—a case manager for the VTC

court program and Blankenship’s cousin5—and following that testimony, both sides

rested and closed. The trial court then sentenced Blankenship to six years’

confinement for the offense of evading arrest or detention with a vehicle. In the trial

court’s written judgment, the court stated that Blankenship had “made [his] plea freely

and voluntarily[] and was aware of the consequence of the plea.” This appeal

followed.

III. DISCUSSION

A. Blankenship’s Complaint Regarding the Voluntariness of His Plea

In his first issue, Blankenship argues that he intended to plead guilty to evading

arrest without an entry of a deadly weapon finding and that the trial court’s deadly

weapon finding rendered his plea involuntary.

That same day, the trial court signed a written order denying Blankenship’s
4

motion to withdraw his plea.
5
Because it is not relevant to the issues raised on appeal, we do not detail their
testimony. See Tex. R. App. P. 47.1.

9
1. Applicable Law

To be valid, a guilty plea must be entered knowingly and voluntarily. Tex.

Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 26.13(b); Ex parte Broussard, 517 S.W.3d 814, 816 (Tex.

Crim. App. 2017). A defendant must have an understanding of the law in relation to

the facts surrounding his guilty plea. Broussard, 517 S.W.3d at 816. “A guilty plea is

valid only if it is ‘a voluntary and intelligent choice among the alternative courses of

action open to the defendant.’” Id. (quoting State v. Guerrero, 400 S.W.3d 576, 588

(Tex. Crim. App. 2013)). We must examine the entire record to determine the

voluntariness of a defendant’s plea. Williams v. State, 522 S.W.2d 483, 485 (Tex. Crim.

App. 1975); Dunn v. State, No. 02-18-00082-CR, 2019 WL 1388546, at *2 (Tex.

App.—Fort Worth Mar. 28, 2019, no pet.) (mem. op., not designated for publication).

When a defendant has been duly admonished, there is a prima facie showing

that the guilty plea was entered knowingly and voluntarily. Martinez v. State,

981 S.W.2d 195, 197 (Tex. Crim. App. 1998); Perez v. State, No. 02-24-00160-CR, 2025

WL 494645, at *2 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth Feb. 13, 2025, no pet.) (mem. op., not

designated for publication). A defendant who attested that he understood the nature

of his plea and that his plea was voluntary bears the “heavy burden” on appeal to

show that his plea was involuntary. Johnson v. State, No. 02-23-00090-CR, 2024 WL

1318238, at *2 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth Mar. 28, 2024, pet. ref’d) (mem. op., not

designated for publication); Thomas v. State, 615 S.W.3d 552, 569 (Tex. App.—

Houston [1st Dist.] 2020, no pet.). To meet that burden, the defendant must

10
affirmatively show that he was not aware of the consequences of his plea and that he

was misled or harmed by the trial court’s erroneous admonishment. Johnson, 2024 WL

1318238, at *2; Thomas, 615 S.W.3d at 569.

2. Analysis

In his brief, Blankenship concedes that his “plea was certainly voluntary as to

his guilt for the offense of evading arrest in a motor vehicle.” But he contends that

“the record in this case reflects that [he] had no intention of pleading true or

otherwise admitting that he [had] used a deadly weapon during the commission of

that offense.” Thus, he contends that his plea was involuntary because he did not

understand that “his refusal to admit to using a deadly weapon could result in a deadly

weapon finding.” He points to the struck language in the plea paperwork concerning

the deadly weapon allegation as evidence that his plea was made involuntarily.

But just because that language was struck from the plea paperwork does not

indicate that Blankenship’s plea was involuntary. No evidence was presented to

indicate that Blankenship would not have entered the plea if he had known that a

deadly weapon finding was possible. And he should have known that a deadly

weapon finding was possible because his plea paperwork specifically provided—in

language that was not stricken—that “[t]he State does not waive the deadly weapon

finding notice, if applicable.” Courts routinely hold that a trial court’s entry of a

deadly weapon finding does not violate a plea agreement when the plea paperwork

does not evidence an agreement concerning the entry of a deadly weapon. See, e.g.,

11
State v. Weems, No. 05-02-00239-CR, 2002 WL 1551904, at *2 (Tex. App.—Dallas

July 16, 2002, no pet.) (not designated for publication) (noting that “courts have held

the entry of a deadly weapon finding does not violate the plea agreement” in

situations where a defendant “pleads guilty pursuant to a plea agreement that does not

include a term concerning the entry of a deadly weapon”); Lister v. State, 24 S.W.3d

525, 527 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi 2000, pet. ref’d) (“We hold that where no

mention is made in the record of any plea bargain agreement concerning a finding of

the use of a deadly weapon the trial court has within its discretion the power to make,

or not make, such a finding.”); Alexander v. State, 868 S.W.2d 356, 361 (Tex. App.—

Dallas 1993, no pet.) (“A plea agreement silent on deadly weapon findings will not

prevent a trial court from making such a finding.”).

Moreover, other evidence in the record indicates that Blankenship’s plea was

made voluntarily. His plea paperwork states that he was admonished by the trial

court, which is prima facie evidence that his plea was entered knowingly and

voluntarily. See Martinez, 981 S.W.2d at 197; Perez, 2025 WL 494645, at *2. In

addition, Blankenship stated in the plea paperwork that his plea was “knowingly,

freely, and voluntarily entered” and that “[n]o one ha[d] threatened, coerced, forced,

persuaded[,] or promised [him] anything in exchange for [his] plea.” His attorney also

indicated in the plea paperwork that he was satisfied that Blankenship “has

intelligently, knowingly, and voluntarily waived his rights and will enter a guilty plea

understanding the consequences thereof.” And the “District Clerk Certificate of

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Proceedings” that was admitted into evidence reflected that the deadly weapon

finding had been found true on Blankenship’s plea and that the plea had been

accepted by the magistrate judge on December 6, 2023. See Breazeale v. State,

683 S.W.2d 446, 450 (Tex. Crim. App. 1985) (op. on reh’g) (“[T]he recitations in the

records of the trial court . . . are binding in the absence of direct proof of their

falsity.”).

Given the foregoing, and assuming without deciding that Blankenship has not

waived his right to bring this issue on appeal,6 we hold that Blankenship has not

carried his “heavy burden” of showing that his plea was involuntary. See Johnson,

2024 WL 1318238, at *2; Thomas, 615 S.W.3d at 569. We overrule Blankenship’s first

issue.

B. Blankenship’s Complaint Regarding His Attempt to Withdraw His Plea

In his second issue, Blankenship argues that the trial court should have allowed

him to withdraw his guilty plea.

In its brief, the State argues that Blankenship has waived his first issue. In
6

support of that argument, the State points to representations contained in the plea
paperwork in which Blankenship stated that he was giving up and waiving “all pretrial
motions that may have been filed in [his] case” and “any and all rights of appeal in this
case.” The State also pointed to the exchange between the trial court and
Blankenship’s counsel at the June 9, 2025 hearing when the trial court asked whether
Blankenship was challenging the voluntariness of the plea or the deadly weapon plea,
and Blankenship’s counsel responded, “I am prepared to say that we’re challenging
only the deadly-weapon finding, whether that was agreed based upon the paperwork.”

13
1. The Law

A defendant may withdraw his guilty plea as a matter of right without assigning

a reason at any time before judgment has been pronounced or the case has been taken

under advisement. Jackson v. State, 590 S.W.2d 514, 515 (Tex. Crim. App. [Panel Op.]

1979); Perkins v. State, No. 02-07-258-CR, 2008 WL 2002739, at *1 (Tex. App.—Fort

Worth May 8, 2008, pet. ref’d) (mem. op., not designated for publication). However,

when the defendant decides to withdraw his guilty plea after the trial court

pronounces judgment or takes the case under advisement, the withdrawal of such plea

is within the sound discretion of the trial court. Jackson, 590 S.W.2d at 515; Grant v.

State, 172 S.W.3d 98, 100 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 2005, no pet.). The passing of a

case for a PSI is considered taking the case under advisement. Jackson, 590 S.W.2d at

515; Grant, 172 S.W.3d at 100. An abuse of discretion is shown only when the trial

court’s ruling lies outside the zone of reasonable disagreement. Montgomery v. State,

810 S.W.2d 372, 391 (Tex. Crim. App. 1990) (op. on reh’g); Grant, 172 S.W.3d at 100.

2. Analysis

In his brief, Blankenship argues that he had the ability to withdraw his guilty

plea as a matter of right. We disagree. The trial court took the case under advisement

at the June 9, 2025 hearing when it ordered the PSI. See Jackson, 590 S.W.2d at 515;

Grant, 172 S.W.3d at 100. But Blankenship did not file his motion to withdraw his

guilty plea until June 13, 2025. And, based on the record before us, he did not present

that motion to the trial court or obtain a ruling on it until the June 30, 2025

14
sentencing hearing. Thus, Blankenship’s ability to withdraw his guilty plea was not a

matter of right but was within the discretion of the trial court. See Jackson, 590 S.W.2d

at 515; Grant, 172 S.W.3d at 100.

Blankenship suggests that we should not look at the June 13, 2025 filing date of

his motion to withdraw for purposes of establishing when he first expressed his desire

to withdraw his plea, contending that he had raised the issue at the June 6, 2025 and

the June 9, 2025 hearings.7 The record belies that contention. Our review of the

record does not demonstrate that Blankenship sought the withdrawal of his guilty plea

at any time prior to the filing of his June 13, 2025 motion to withdraw his plea.

Indeed, at the June 6, 2025 hearing, when the trial court noted that Blankenship had

already pled guilty and that “[p]rocedurally[,] he cannot withdraw his plea,”

7
Blankenship points to Mendez v. State, 138 S.W.3d 334 (Tex. Crim. App. 2004),
to support this proposition. In Mendez, the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals stated,
“We have held that some defendants, although not explicitly requesting to change
their pleas from guilty to not guilty, have conveyed sufficiently to the trial court a
desire to have the issue of guilt decided by the jury.” Id. at 345. Blankenship’s
reliance on that statement is misplaced. Mendez involved the issue of whether a
defendant can change his plea of guilty to not guilty when evidence inconsistent with
guilt is introduced at a jury trial. Id. at 336 (“In this case[,] we resolve conflicts in our
cases that have existed for over 75 years on the question of a defendant’s changing a
plea of guilty to a plea of not guilty when evidence that is inconsistent with guilt is
introduced in a jury trial.”). Those circumstances are not present here. The issue here
is whether Blankenship sought the withdrawal of his plea prior to the trial court’s
taking the case under advisement, an issue of timeliness. In Mendez, the court
recognized the importance of timeliness with respect to a defendant’s changing of his
plea, stating, “We hold that a defendant has a right on timely request to change the
plea, but that a court has no duty to do it on the court’s own motion.” Id. at 336
(emphasis added).

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Blankenship’s counsel stated, “That’s not where I’m going, Judge.” Moreover, at the

June 30, 2025 sentencing hearing, Blankenship’s counsel stated that Blankenship had

not previously “affirmatively exercised his right to withdraw his plea.” At that

hearing, when pressed by the trial court on whether Blankenship’s ability to withdraw

his plea was a matter of right or within the trial court’s discretion, his attorney agreed

with the court that “[a]t this point[,] it’s not a matter of right” but “a matter of

discretion for the Court.” Thus, Blankenship’s ability to withdraw his plea was within

the trial court’s discretion. See Jackson, 590 S.W.2d at 515; Grant, 172 S.W.3d at 100.

In his brief, Blankenship concedes that, assuming that the first time he sought

to withdraw his plea was when he filed his motion on June 13, 2025, “the trial court

had discretion to deny it.” And Blankenship offers no argument as to why the trial

court would have abused its discretion by denying the motion to withdraw. Given the

circumstances present here—the plea paperwork’s representations by Blankenship

and his counsel that Blankenship had intelligently, knowingly, and voluntarily pled

guilty; the “District Clerk Certificate of Proceedings” reflecting that Blankenship had

been found guilty and that the deadly weapon finding had been found true; and no

evidence being presented to suggest that Blankenship would not have entered the plea

if he had known that a deadly weapon finding was possible—and assuming without

deciding that Blankenship has not waived his right to bring this issue on appeal,8 the

In its brief, the State argues that Blankenship has waived his second issue. It
8

contends that the VTC program is comparable to a contract, that Blankenship was

16
trial court was within its discretion to deny Blankenship’s motion to withdraw. See

Montgomery, 810 S.W.2d at 391; Grant, 172 S.W.3d at 100.

We overrule Blankenship’s second issue.

C. Blankenship’s Complaint Regarding the Sufficiency of the Evidence

In his third issue, Blankenship argues that the evidence is insufficient to

support the trial court’s deadly weapon finding under Article 1.15 of the Texas Code

of Criminal Procedure.

1. Standard of Review

Article 1.15 of the Texas Code of Criminal Procedure requires the State to

offer sufficient evidence to support a judgment based on a guilty plea in a felony case.

Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 1.15; Wiggs v. State, No. 10-22-00055-CR, 2023 WL

398667, at *2 (Tex. App.—Waco Jan. 25, 2023, no pet.) (mem. op., not designated for

publication). Pursuant to Article 1.15, the State must “introduce evidence into the

record showing the guilt of the defendant and said evidence shall be accepted by the

court as the basis for its judgment and in no event shall a person charged be convicted

upon his plea without sufficient evidence to support the same.” Tex. Code Crim.

Proc. Ann. art. 1.15. Our review is limited to a determination of whether the State

introduced evidence of guilt embracing every essential element of the offense charged.

required to plead guilty as a condition of enrollment in the program, and that by
failing to successfully complete the program, Blankenship has waived his right to
change or withdraw his plea.

17
Clark v. State, No. 06-13-00156-CR, 2014 WL 2152005, at *2 (Tex. App.—Texarkana

May 21, 2014, no pet.) (mem. op., not designated for publication); Chindaphone v. State,

241 S.W.3d 217, 219 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2007, pet. ref’d).

2. Applicable Law

By statute, a motor vehicle is not a deadly weapon per se, but it can be a deadly

weapon if its “manner of . . . use or intended use is capable of causing death or

serious bodily injury.” Tex. Penal Code Ann. § 1.07(17)(B); Couthren v. State,

571 S.W.3d 786, 789 (Tex. Crim. App. 2019).

To determine whether evidence sufficiently shows that a vehicle was used as a

deadly weapon, we (1) evaluate the manner in which the defendant used the motor

vehicle during the felony and (2) consider whether, during the felony, the motor

vehicle was capable of causing death or serious bodily injury. Sierra v. State,

280 S.W.3d 250, 255 (Tex. Crim. App. 2009); Gordon v. State, No. 02-23-00101-CR,

2024 WL 2760913, at *4 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth May 30, 2024, pet. ref’d) (mem. op.,

not designated for publication). As to the first element, “[a] motor vehicle may be a

deadly weapon where ‘the vehicle was intentionally, recklessly, or negligently used as a

weapon by the accused.’” Nguyen v. State, 506 S.W.3d 69, 76 (Tex. App.—Texarkana

2016, pet. ref’d) (quoting English v. State, 828 S.W.2d 33, 38 (Tex. App.—Tyler 1991,

pet. ref’d)). As to the second element, while the “danger posed to motorists must be

actual, and not simply hypothetical, the statute itself does not require pursuing police

officers or other motorists to be in a zone of danger, take evasive action, or require

18
[an] appellant to intentionally strike another vehicle to justify a deadly weapon

finding.” Drichas v. State, 175 S.W.3d 795, 799 (Tex. Crim. App. 2005).

3. Analysis

Blankenship argues that “Officer Campbell’s testimony and the [dash-cam]

video are not sufficient to constitute proof of—even at the low standard of

[A]rticle 1.15—the allegation that [Blankenship] used his car as a deadly weapon

during the commission of the offense of evading arrest or detention.” We disagree.

As to the first element needed to support the deadly weapon finding—the

manner in which the defendant used the motor vehicle during the felony—the record

reflects that Blankenship was driving his vehicle at a high rate of speed while

intoxicated and that he was driving in the opposite direction of traffic. Such evidence

supports a finding that Blankenship operated his vehicle in a reckless and dangerous

manner. See Foley v. State, 327 S.W.3d 907, 916 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi–Edinburg

2010, pet. ref’d) (mem. op.) (considering among factors in determining recklessness or

dangerousness whether driver was intoxicated, speeding, or disregarding traffic signs);

Drichas, 175 S.W.3d at 798 (holding that appellant’s manner of using his truck “posed

a danger to pursuing officers and other motorists that was more than simply

hypothetical . . . [but] was real” when he drove his truck “on the wrong side of the

highway”).

As to the second element—whether, during the felony, the motor vehicle was

capable of causing death or serious bodily injury—Blankenship contends that the

19
evidence shows that “there were no other cars on the road at the time” and that “it

appears as though [Blankenship was] driving in the shoulder of the road as he

look[ed] for a place to exit the street.” Thus, according to Blankenship, “the State’s

proffered evidence did not tend to show that [his] car was a deadly weapon.” The

evidence belies Blankenship’s argument.

Officer Campbell testified that Blankenship was driving the wrong way on Rufe

Snow Drive, and video from Officer Campbell’s dashcam confirmed it. While Officer

Campbell attempted to stop Blankenship’s vehicle, Blankenship continued driving

against the opposite lanes of traffic. Blankenship was intoxicated while he was

driving, and according to Officer Campbell, Blankenship was also speeding. Contrary

to Blankenship’s assertion that “there were no other cars on the road at the time,”

Officer Campbell’s police vehicle was on the road during the chase. See Moore v. State,

No. 06-10-00173-CR, 2011 WL 3274840, at *3 (Tex. App.—Texarkana Aug. 2, 2011,

no pet.) (mem. op., not designated for publication) (“[P]olice officers should not be

excluded from the class of persons capable of being endangered by the driver of a

fleeing vehicle.”).

Moreover, in the seconds immediately prior to the chase—at a point when

Blankenship’s vehicle was facing the wrong way—a car with its blinkers on was

stopped next to him, and another car drove by. See Drichas, 175 S.W.3d at 799 (“[A]

deadly weapon finding is appropriate on a sufficient showing of actual danger, such as

evidence that another motorist was on the highway at the same time and place as the

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defendant when the defendant drove in a dangerous manner.”); Mangiafico v. State, No.

05-21-00601-CR, 2023 WL 4861783, at *4 (Tex. App.—Dallas July 31, 2023, pet.

ref’d) (mem. op., not designated for publication) (considering evidence that “[i]n the

twenty seconds that followed [the appellant’s] collision with the concrete barrier, six

other vehicles and a tank truck passed” in analysis affirming trial court’s deadly

weapon finding as to the appellant’s vehicle during police chase). And notably, after

Officer Campbell activated his vehicle’s lights and siren and began a northbound

pursuit of Blankenship, a westbound police vehicle approaching the intersection on a

green light was forced to stop as Officer Campbell’s vehicle passed through the

intersection. See Meredith v. State, No. 03-02-00688-CR, 2003 WL 22023350, at *3

(Tex. App.—Austin Aug. 29, 2003, pet. ref’d) (mem. op., not designated for

publication) (affirming deadly weapon finding when evidence reflected that “[t]he

danger to others was not hypothetical—three other drivers actually had to take

evasive action”).

Based on our review of the evidence, we hold that the State introduced

evidence of guilt embracing every essential element of the deadly weapon allegation.

See Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 1.15; Clark, 2014 WL 2152005, at *2; Chindaphone,

241 S.W.3d at 219. We overrule Blankenship’s third issue.

IV. CONCLUSION

Having overruled Blankenship’s three issues, we affirm the trial court’s

judgment.

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/s/ Dana Womack

Dana Womack
Justice

Do Not Publish
Tex. R. App. P. 47.2(b)

Delivered: January 22, 2026

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