The Guardianship of Dalton Homer Cobb, Jr., an Incapacitated Person v. the State of Texas

In the
Court of Appeals
Second Appellate District of Texas
at Fort Worth
___________________________
No. 02-25-00571-CV
___________________________

THE GUARDIANSHIP OF DALTON HOMER COBB, JR., AN INCAPACITATED
PERSON

On Appeal from Probate Court No. 1
Tarrant County, Texas
Trial Court No. 2023-GD000791

Before Kerr, Birdwell, and Bassel, JJ.
Memorandum Opinion by Justice Kerr
MEMORANDUM OPINION

Appellants Kaleb and Kylie Cobb—who are “interested persons” under the

Texas Estates Code because they are devisees under the will of Dalton Homer Cobb,

Jr., see Tex. Est. Code Ann. § 1002.018(1)—attempt to appeal the probate court’s

order setting aside its earlier order approving a mediated settlement agreement

between Dalton and his wife Lezlie Boone Cobb in connection with their divorce.

Dalton executed a will in 2021 that created a family trust and a marital trust

whose assets were to go to Kaleb and Kylie (Dalton’s nephew and niece) upon

Lezlie’s death, inability, or unwillingness to serve as trustee.1 The next year, Lezlie

filed for divorce, and Dalton counterpetitioned. In March 2023, Dalton’s divorce

lawyer sought to have a guardian appointed for Dalton because he had been

diagnosed with dementia.

The probate court appointed separate guardians for Dalton’s person and his

estate and authorized the estate guardian to represent Dalton’s interests in the divorce.

In June 2025, Dalton—through his estate guardian—and Lezlie entered into an

irrevocable mediated settlement agreement, and the guardian applied to the probate

court for an order approving the MSA and proposed divorce decree.

Because the various parties share a surname, we use their first names for
1

clarity.

2
Dalton died on July 16, 2025, the day before the probate court approved the

MSA on July 17; twelve days later, the probate court set that order aside. 2 Through a

motion to reconsider, Kaleb and Kylie sought to have the probate court revisit its July

29 set-aside order and instead allow the July 17 order approving the MSA to stand.

When the probate court declined to do so, Kaleb and Kylie filed this appeal.

On November 4, 2025, we notified the appellants of our concern that we lack

jurisdiction over this appeal because the July 29 order does not appear to be a final

judgment or appealable interlocutory order. We warned that unless the appellants (or

anyone else wanting to continue the appeal) filed a response showing grounds for

continuing the appeal, we would dismiss it for want of jurisdiction. See Tex. R. App. P.

42.3(a), 44.3. Kaleb and Kylie responded, but their response does not show grounds

for continuing the appeal.

Generally, appeals may be taken only from final judgments or interlocutory

orders that are authorized by statute. Lehmann v. Har-Con Corp., 39 S.W.3d 191, 195,

200 (Tex. 2001). A judgment or order is final if it disposes of every pending claim and

party. Id. at 205. “Probate and guardianship proceedings present an exception to the

‘one final judgment’ rule.” In re Guardianship of Jones, 629 S.W.3d 921, 924 (Tex. 2021)

(cleaned up). An order in a guardianship proceeding will be final and appealable if it

2
The probate court was presumably unaware that Dalton had died when it
entered its July 17 order.

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disposes of all issues and all parties “in the phase of the proceeding for which it was

brought.” Id. at 925.

Although a ward’s death “will necessarily bring the guardianship of the person

to an end,” “the guardianship proceeding does not automatically terminate on the

ward’s death. Instead, the probate court’s jurisdiction continues until the court settles

and closes the guardianship and discharges the guardian.” In re Guardianship of Fairley,

650 S.W.3d 372, 381 (Tex. 2022) (noting that Estates Code authorizes guardian to

take certain actions after ward’s death before closing guardianship). We do not

construe the probate court’s order setting aside the approval of the MSA in Dalton

and Lezlie’s divorce as disposing of a particular phase of the guardianship proceeding—

nor do Kaleb and Kylie argue that it did.3 Thus, the order was interlocutory.

Accordingly, we dismiss this appeal for want of jurisdiction. See Tex. R. App. P.

42.3(a), 43.2(f).

/s/ Elizabeth Kerr
Elizabeth Kerr
Justice

Delivered: December 18, 2025

3
Indeed, in their response to our jurisdictional letter, they candidly describe this
particular-phase-finality issue as “admittedly unclear” and state that their appeal was
taken “[i]n abundance of caution,” recognizing that if we dismiss the appeal for lack
of finality, they can appeal the order when the guardianship proceeding concludes.

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