In the Interest of F.R. and R.R., Children v. the State of Texas

In the
Court of Appeals
Second Appellate District of Texas
at Fort Worth
___________________________
No. 02-25-00314-CV
___________________________

IN THE INTEREST OF F.R. AND R.R, CHILDREN

On Appeal from the 231st District Court
Tarrant County, Texas
Trial Court No. 231-619733-17

Before Kerr, Birdwell, and Bassel, JJ.
Memorandum Opinion by Justice Kerr
MEMORANDUM OPINION

Appellant S.R. attempts to appeal three temporary orders in a suit affecting the

parent–child relationship (SAPCR): (1) “Temporary Orders” signed on June 4, 2025;

(2) “Order on Motion to Quash Subpoenas and for Protective Order Regarding

Third-Party Subpoena” signed on June 4, 2025; and (3) “Temporary Orders in Suit to

Modify Child Support” signed on June 20, 2025. None of the three temporary orders

appears to be a final judgment or an appealable interlocutory order, and the district

clerk has confirmed that the trial court has not signed a final judgment or order in this

case.

On July 11, we informed Appellant of our concern that we do not have

jurisdiction over his appeal. We stated that, unless he or another party desiring to

continue the appeal responded with grounds for continuing the appeal, it might be

dismissed for want of jurisdiction. See Tex. R. App. P. 42.3(a), 44.3.

In response, Appellant acknowledges that “temporary orders issued in SAPCR

proceedings are generally not appealable under Tex[as] Fam[ily] Code [Section]

105.001(e),” but he contends that “this appeal is warranted because the orders at issue

involve constitutional violations, judicial misconduct, and coercive conduct that

render them functionally final or otherwise voidable or void ab initio.” He asks this

court to continue his appeal or alternatively to either construe it as a petition for writ

of mandamus or to consolidate it with a “soon-to-be-filed petition addressing the

same judicial conduct and due[-]process violations.”

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This court’s appellate jurisdiction is generally limited to review of: (1) final

judgments that dispose of all parties and all claims; and (2) certain interlocutory orders

made appealable by statute. See, e.g., CMH Homes v. Perez, 340 S.W.3d 444, 447 (Tex.

2011). The three temporary orders do not dispose of all parties and claims. See

Lehmann v. Har-Con Corp., 39 S.W.3d 191, 195 (Tex. 2001). As Appellant concedes,

“[t]emporary orders rendered [in SAPCR cases] are not subject to interlocutory

appeal,” see Tex. Fam. Code Ann. § 105.001(e), and Appellant has not otherwise

shown that any of the challenged temporary orders are appealable. Thus, we lack

jurisdiction over this appeal.

Regarding Appellant’s alternative request that we construe his appeal as a

petition for writ of mandamus, we decline to do so because his jurisdictional response

and other filings in this appeal do not meet the requirements of Texas Rule of

Appellate Procedure 52. See Tex. R. App. P. 52; Thomas v. Tex. Dep’t of Crim. Just.—Inst.

Div., 3 S.W.3d 665, 667 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 1999, no pet.). We also deny his

request to consolidate this appeal with a future-filed original proceeding.

Accordingly, we dismiss this appeal for lack of jurisdiction. See Tex. R. App. P.

42.3(a), 43.2(f).

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/s/ Elizabeth Kerr
Elizabeth Kerr
Justice

Delivered: August 14, 2025

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