Exxon Mobil Global Services v. State Office of Administrative Hearings, and Keneshia Washington in Her Official Capacity as Administrative Law Judge

Affirmed and Majority and Dissenting Opinions filed December 5, 2025.

In The

Fifteenth Court of Appeals

NO. 15-24-00034-CV

EXXON MOBIL GLOBAL SERVICES, Appellant
V.

STATE OFFICE OF ADMINISTRATIVE HEARINGS, AND KENESHIA
WASHINGTON IN HER OFFICIAL CAPACITY AS ADMINISTRATIVE
LAW JUDGE, Appellees

On Appeal from the 419th District Court
Travis County, Texas
Trial Court Cause No. D-1-GN-23-001403

OPINION

By statute, the State Office of Administrative Hearings (SOAH) is
prohibited from hearing a tax appeal concerning property classified as industrial.
See Tex. Gov’t Code § 2003.904 (authorizing appeals to SOAH of
“determination[s] of the appraised or market value made by an appraisal review
board in connection with real or personal property, other than industrial property”).
The issue in this appeal is whether an Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) at SOAH
nevertheless has a ministerial duty to conduct an evidentiary hearing when a party
appeals a tax case involving property classified by the taxing authority as
industrial. We conclude the ALJ had no such ministerial duty and did not violate
the appealing party’s due-process rights. We therefore affirm the district court’s
grant of SOAH and the ALJ’s plea to the jurisdiction.

BACKGROUND
Exxon Mobil Corp. began consolidating operations at a new site in northern
Harris County in 2014, including the relocation of its corporate headquarters to that
site in 2023. Among the operations consolidated at that site was a subsidiary,
Exxon Mobil Global Services (EMGS), which had previously owned and operated
computers and telecommunications equipment for Exxon’s use. Prior to the
relocation, EMGS operated in downtown Houston at 1301 Fannin Street and in an
office park at 5150 Westway Park Boulevard near the Sam Houston Tollway.1
EMGS completely vacated both locations when the leases expired in June and
March (respectively) of 2021.
The dispute underlying this appeal arises from the Harris County Appraisal
District’s (HCAD) appraisal of EMGS’s property at its former locations for tax
year 2021. For the previous tax year of 2020, HCAD had appraised the value of
EMGS’s equipment at the two locations at $45,487,537.2 EMGS claims that
because “nearly all” of this equipment was “transferred to the new campus” or
“scrapped or recycled” before 2020 ended, the value of the equipment at both

1
The latter location is alternatively listed in the record as 11003 Corporate Center Drive, an
adjacent address.
2
State Office of Administrative Hearings, Harris County Appraisal District Personal Property
Account Information, Docket No. XXX-XX-XXXX at 27–28; State Office of Administrative
Hearings, Harris County Appraisal District Personal Property Account Information, Docket No.
XXX-XX-XXXX at 27–28.

2
locations on January 1, 2021 (the applicable valuation date 3) was only $1,315,752.
According to EMGS, differences in the parties’ appraisals of the computers at its
former sites “had been settled within SOAH proceedings in previous years.” But
that changed when HCAD simply rolled over the 2020 appraisal for 2021.
In response to the 2021 appraisal, EMGS filed protests (one for each former
site) with the Harris County Appraisal Review Board (ARB). See Tex. Tax Code
§§ 41.41, 42.21(h). By orders dated July 26, 2021, the ARB denied the protests
and simply carried the 2020 appraisal forward to 2021 with the explanation
“Formal Value Not Changed.”
EMGS appealed to SOAH instead of the district court. HCAD moved to
dismiss the appeals on jurisdictional grounds, asserting that HCAD had classified
EMGS’s property as industrial and that SOAH has no jurisdiction over appeals
relating to industrial property. An ALJ agreed with HCAD and refused to hear any
evidence on the classification of EMGS’s property as industrial before dismissing
both appeals for lack of jurisdiction.
EMGS then filed a petition for mandamus against SOAH and the ALJ in
Travis County district court, seeking to compel SOAH and the ALJ to withdraw
the dismissal orders and to hold an evidentiary hearing regarding whether the
property is industrial property.4 SOAH and the ALJ responded with a plea to the
jurisdiction asserting sovereign immunity. The district court granted that plea and
dismissed EMGS’s petition.

STANDARD OF REVIEW
A plea to the jurisdiction is a dilatory plea that challenges the trial court’s
subject-matter jurisdiction without regard to whether the asserted claims have
3
See Tex. Tax Code § 22.01.
4
EMGS also sought declaratory relief, but it later dropped that claim.

3
merit. Texas Dep’t of Parks & Wildlife v. Miranda, 133 S.W.3d 217, 226 (Tex.
2004). Whether a court has jurisdiction is a question of law, City of Conroe v. San
Jacinto River Auth., 602 S.W.3d 444, 451 (Tex. 2020), and we review a trial
court’s ruling on a plea to the jurisdiction de novo, Houston Belt & Terminal Ry. v.
City of Houston, 487 S.W.3d 154, 160 (Tex. 2016).

The burden is on the plaintiff to affirmatively demonstrate the trial court’s
jurisdiction. Heckman v. Williamson Cnty., 369 S.W.3d 137, 150 (Tex. 2012).
When the plea to the jurisdiction challenges the sufficiency of the plaintiff’s
pleadings, as in this case, we must determine “if the pleader has alleged facts that
affirmatively demonstrate the court’s jurisdiction to hear the cause.” Houston Belt,
487 S.W.3d at 160 (quoting City of El Paso v. Heinrich, 284 S.W.3d 366, 378
(Tex. 2009)). In determining whether the plaintiff has met that burden, “we
liberally construe the pleadings, taking all factual assertions as true and looking to
the plaintiff’s intent.” Texas Dep’t of Crim. Just. v. Rangel, 595 S.W.3d 198, 205
(Tex. 2020) (quoting City of Ingleside v. City of Corpus Christi, 469 S.W.3d 589,
590 (Tex. 2015)). If the pleadings affirmatively negate the existence of
jurisdiction, the plea may be granted without affording the plaintiff an opportunity
to replead. Miranda, 133 S.W.3d at 226.

ANALYSIS
For 30 years after adoption of the Texas Property Tax Code in 1979, a
property owner’s only avenue to challenge an excessive local appraisal was a
petition for review filed in a local district court. 5 In response to taxpayer

5
See Tex. Tax Code §§ 42.01, 42.21; see also Act of May 26, 1979, 66th Leg., R.S., ch. 841,
§ 1, sec. 42.01, 42.21, 1979 Tex. Gen. Laws 2217, 2309, 2311 (codified at Tex. Tax Code
§§ 42.01, 42.21). In 2005, the Tax Code was amended to provide for an appeal through binding
arbitration, but only for property valued at less than $1 million. See Tex. Tax Code § 41A.01.

4
complaints that the cost of litigating property values in district court “often exceeds
the shift in appraised value they hoped to obtain,” and perceiving a need to “help
speed up the appeals process,” 6 the Legislature in 2009 adopted Subchapter Z of
Chapter 2003 of the Government Code, a pilot project giving SOAH jurisdiction to
decide appraisal appeals in seven populous counties.7 See Tex. Gov’t Code
§§ 2003.901–.914. Effective January 1, 2014, the Legislature extended that
program statewide. 8 As a result, a dissatisfied taxpayer, like EMGS, now has a
choice as to where it may bring a challenge to appraisal review board
determinations. It can either file a suit for judicial review in district court, see Tex.
Tax Code § 42.21(a), or, for property other than industrial property, file an appeal
in SOAH, see Tex. Gov’t Code § 2003.904; see also id. § 2003.914 (“An appeal to
[SOAH] under this subchapter is an election of remedies and an alternative to
bringing an appeal under Section 42.01, Tax Code.”).
District courts and ALJs at SOAH do not have the same jurisdiction by
design. Administrative agencies have only those powers expressly conferred on
them by the Legislature. In re CenterPoint Energy Houston Elec., LLC, 629
S.W.3d 149, 154 (Tex. 2021). There is no presumption that administrative
agencies are authorized to resolve disputes, and courts will not imply additional
authority to agencies. Subaru of Am., Inc. v. David McDavid Nissan, Inc., 84
S.W.3d 212, 220 (Tex. 2002). “Rather, they may exercise only those powers the
law, in clear and express statutory language, confers upon them.” Id.
Although the Legislature created the option for property owners to seek

6
House Research Organization, Bill Analysis, Tex. H.B. 3612, 81st Leg., R.S. (2009).
7
See Act of May 31, 2009, 81st R.S., ch. 1180, § 1, 2009 Tex. Gen. Laws 3745, 3746–49
(codified as amended at Tex. Gov’t Code §§ 2003.901–.914).
8
See Act of May 22, 2013, 83rd R.S., ch. 851, § 1–2, 2013 Tex. Gen. Laws 2198–200 (codified
at Tex. Gov’t Code §§ 2003.901–.914). The 2009 Act excluded industrial and mineral properties
from SOAH appeals, but the 2013 act dropped the mineral exclusion.

5
review of appraisal review board orders at SOAH, see Tex. Gov’t Code
§ 2003.901, it limited the scope of this review by enacting Government Code
Section 2003.904, which provides that the statute applies “only to an appeal of a
determination of the appraised or market value made by an appraisal review board”
and not to “industrial property.” Id. § 2003.904. In other words, the Legislature
limited SOAH’s authority to the review of determinations of appraised or market
value of real or personal property that is not industrial property. In this case, the
appraisal district determined that EMGS’s property was industrial property. And
the Legislature has provided no express authority for a SOAH judge to decide in
the course of a tax appeal whether property is industrial.
Unlike SOAH, Texas district courts have broad jurisdiction. The Texas
Constitution provides district courts with “exclusive, appellate, and original
jurisdiction of all actions, proceedings, and remedies, except in cases where
exclusive, appellate, or original jurisdiction may be conferred by this Constitution
or other law on some other court, tribunal, or administrative body.” Tex. Const.
art. V, § 8. Texas districts courts are courts of general jurisdiction. Dubai
Petroleum Co. v. Kazi, 12 S.W.3d 71, 75 (Tex. 2000). That is, they are presumed
to have subject-matter jurisdiction over any dispute, including those that require
resolution of an evidentiary issue, unless a specific statute or a provision of the
constitution says otherwise. In re CenterPoint Energy, 629 S.W.3d at 154. In
other words, unlike SOAH, which has no jurisdiction unless the Legislature
expressly confers it, district courts have jurisdiction over all issues not expressly
excluded from their jurisdiction. See id. The Legislature provided for judicial
review of appraisal decisions to district court, and it provided no jurisdictional
limitations on the subject matter of such judicial review. Tex. Tax Code § 42.21.
These jurisdictional differences are evident within the statute conferring
jurisdiction on SOAH when compared to the one that outlines the jurisdiction of a
6
district court in a tax appeal. In providing SOAH jurisdiction over tax appeals as
an alternative to a district court, the Legislature allowed for an appeal to SOAH of
an “appraisal review board order determining a protest concerning the appraised or
market value of property brought under Section 41.41(a)(1) or (2), Tax Code[.]”
Tex. Gov’t Code § 2003.901 (emphasis added). The Legislature’s reference in
Section 2003.901 to specific subsections of Section 41.41(a) of the Tax Code is
significant in limiting SOAH’s jurisdiction. Section 41.41(a) authorizes property
owners to protest certain actions of an appraiser or appraisal district to an appraisal
review board. Tex. Tax Code § 41.41(a). Subsection (a)(1) authorizes the board’s
review of a determination of the appraised or market value of property, and
subsection (a)(2) authorizes the board’s review of a contention of unequal appraisal
of the owner’s property. Id. § 41.41(a)(1), (2). Notably, neither subsection
expressly authorizes review of a taxing authority’s classification of property as
industrial.
Section 41.41(a)(10), on the other hand, authorizes a property owner to
protest “any other action of the chief appraiser, appraisal district, or appraisal
review board that applies to and adversely affects the property owner.” Id.
§ 41.41(a)(10). Here, the appraisal district classified EMGS’s property as
industrial, and EMGS could have protested that determination pursuant to Section
41.41(a)(10). It did not. And, the Legislature could have provided SOAH with
jurisdiction to review the types of determinations covered under Section
41.41(a)(10). It did not. Instead, the Legislature provided limited jurisdiction to
SOAH and provided no limitation at all on the jurisdiction of the district court to
review such matters on appeal. See id. § 42.01(a)(1) (providing that “property
owner is entitled to appeal . . . an order of the appraisal review board determining
. . . a protest [under Sections 41.41–.48]”).
Against this backdrop, EMGS nevertheless chose to file its appeal at SOAH
7
rather than in district court. And then, when the ALJ refused to hold an evidentiary
hearing on whether EMGS’s property was industrial property, EMGS sought
mandamus relief and claimed the ALJ acted ultra vires and violated its due process
rights in refusing to decide the issue.
Specifically, EMGS argues that the ALJ’s refusal to hold a hearing on its
contention that its property was not industrial was ultra vires conduct. To fall
within the ultra vires exception, a suit “must allege, and ultimately prove, that the
officer acted without legal authority or failed to perform a purely ministerial act.”
See Heinrich, 284 S.W.3d at 372; see also Hall v. McRaven, 508 S.W.3d 232, 240–
41 (Tex. 2017). “[A]ctions taken ‘without legal authority’ ha[ve] two fundamental
components: (1) authority giving the official some (but not absolute) discretion to
act and (2) conduct outside of that authority.” McRaven, 508 S.W.3d at 239. A
government officer acts without legal authority if he or she exceeds the bounds of
the granted authority or if his or her acts conflict with the law itself. Houston Belt,
487 S.W.3d at 158.
The question presented in this appeal is not whether the ALJ had a
ministerial duty to consider its jurisdiction before proceeding. It certainly had such
a duty and fulfilled it by acknowledging the Legislature limited its jurisdiction and
that it therefore could not proceed with the appeal because HCAD had designated
the property as industrial. Rather, the real question is whether the ALJ had a
ministerial duty on appeal to hold an evidentiary hearing to determine, as a factual
matter, whether HCAD properly designated the property as industrial. Framed this
way, the question yields an obvious answer: the ALJ had no ministerial duty to
hold an evidentiary hearing for the purpose of making a determination that the
Legislature has not expressly authorized it to make.
EMGS complains, however, that the ALJ had a ministerial duty to decide its
own jurisdiction and that by declining to consider facts EMGS contends prove its
8
property is not industrial, the ALJ acted ultra vires. The problem with this
argument is that it likens an ALJ’s jurisdiction to a district court’s jurisdiction.
Without question, a district judge must consider its own jurisdiction when
presented with a case, even if that requires hearing evidence. And, to an extent,
ALJs must consider their jurisdiction as well, as the ALJ did in this case by
dismissing the appeal upon learning of the industrial classification of EMGS’s
property. But EMGS takes the argument for a ministerial duty even further. In
effect, EMGS suggests that although the Legislature did not expressly provide
ALJs with the power to decide whether property is industrial, it must do so anyway
because that fact implicates the ALJs jurisdiction.
EMGS’s contention illustrates a misunderstanding of what constitutes an
ultra vires act. An ultra vires act is, as relevant here, the refusal to perform a
ministerial act. See id; McRaven, 508 S.W.3d at 239. Had the Legislature given
express authority for the ALJ to decide the proper classification of property subject
to tax and it refused to do so, then EMGS may very well have alleged an ultra vires
act sufficient to defeat a plea to the jurisdiction. But it didn’t. The Legislature
gave SOAH no express authority to decide how to classify property subject to
taxation, and we decline to alter the statutory scheme the Legislature created for
tax appeals by imputing such authority. If anything, the ALJ would have acted
ultra vires if it went beyond the powers granted by the Legislature as EMGS
requested. See Norman v. Janak, No. 15-24-00068-CV, 2025 WL 1271748, at *3
(Tex. App.—15th May 1, 2025, pet. denied) (rejecting argument that executive
director of TDCJ should exercise discretion to decide issue beyond his authority).
EMGS’s due process claim fares no better. “If an individual is deprived of a
property right, the government must afford an appropriate and meaningful
opportunity to be heard to comport with procedural due process.” Mayhew v. Town
of Sunnyvale, 964 S.W.2d 922, 939 (Tex. 1998). What process is due depends on
9
the practical requirements of the circumstances, using a flexible standard that
considers “(1) the private interest that will be affected by the official action; (2) the
risk of an erroneous deprivation of such interest through the procedures used, and
the probable value, if any, of additional or substitute procedural safeguards; and (3)
the government’s interest, including the function involved and the fiscal and
administrative burdens that the additional or substitute procedural requirement
would entail.” Univ. of Tex. Med. Sch. v. Than, 901 S.W.2d 926, 930 (Tex. 1995).
Applying this test, we conclude that EMGS’s due process claim fails on its
face because it seeks procedural process SOAH does not have the express authority
to provide, as discussed above. As explained previously, SOAH’s jurisdiction in a
tax appeal is limited, and the ALJ did not have the discretion to exceed the
jurisdiction granted by the Legislature. The only way EMGS could have received
the process that it claims was due is if the ALJ had violated this principle of
administrative law and exceeded the powers granted by the Legislature.

Moreover, EMGS chose to file its appeal at SOAH rather than in the district
court. EMGS could have chosen to appeal to the district court, which would have
allowed it to challenge the industrial classification with a full evidentiary hearing,
had it chosen to do so. 9 SOAH provided EMGS with full procedural process for
the issues within its statutory authority, and EMGS cannot be heard to complain of
a due process concern in selecting SOAH over a district court that had full
authority to decide any factual dispute concerning classification of its property.
9
According to EMGS’s pleading in the district court—which no party disputed—“the
classification of a property makes no difference as to the method used to appraise it or as to its
ultimate appraised value,” because property “must be valued using the same method and should
result in the same appraised value” no matter what category is applied. Assuming that is the
case, it is even more apparent why the Legislature provided no express authority for SOAH to
decide the issue as an evidentiary matter. Instead, the Legislature provided the taxpayer a
choice—appeal the taxing authority’s decision to district court if the property is classified as
industrial or to either the district court or SOAH if it is not. The Legislature’s provision of this
choice precludes EMGS’s claim of procedural infirmity.

10
The dissent invites us to make bad law because of bad facts in the interest of
“doing justice.” See Dissent at 5. It starts by mistakenly equating district judges
and administrative law judges. They are not the same. They do not have the same
jurisdiction, as explained fully in this opinion. The dissent cites no authority for
the idea that an administrative law judge must abide by the same rules as a district
judge when reviewing a jurisdictional plea. This difference causes the dissent’s
analogy to Miracle on 34th Street, dissent at 5-6, while creative, to fall flat—an
administrative proceeding at SOAH is not a “court” proceeding in any respect and
should not be treated as such. The dissent contends that “we have no business”
insisting that EMGS appeal to a district court to obtain review of a taxing
authority’s classification of its property as industrial. Dissent at 3. But what the
Court has no business doing is becoming the first court in Texas to create new,
implied powers for an ALJ that the Legislature did not expressly grant it.
The dissent concludes by noting the amount of money EMGS will lose
because a mistake was made and expressing that “we have to do better than this.”
Dissent at 6. It is not the role of a court, however, to choose winners and losers
based on the amount of money one party will lose due to a procedural mistake.
Instead, we are charged with following the law no matter the outcome. Contrary to
what the dissent believes, as a court of law we can do no better than that.

CONCLUSION
We affirm the district court’s order dismissing EMGS’s claims for lack of
jurisdiction.

/s/ Scott K. Field
Scott K. Field
Justice

11
Before Chief Justice Brister and Justices Field and Farris.

12