In Re TikTok Inc.; TikTok Ltd.; TikTok Pte. Ltd.; TikTok U.S. Data Security Inc.; ByteDance Ltd.; And ByteDance Inc. v. the State of Texas

15-25-00209-CV ACCEPTED
15-25-00209-CV
FIFTEENTH COURT OF APPEALS
AUSTIN, TEXAS
11/18/2025 7:46 PM
No. 15-25-_________ CHRISTOPHER A. PRINE
CLERK
FILED IN
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FIFTEENTH
15thDISTRICT
COURT OF APPEALS
AUSTIN, TEXAS AUSTIN, TEXAS
11/18/2025 7:46:49 PM
CHRISTOPHER A. PRINE
Clerk
In re TikTok Inc.; TikTok Ltd.; TikTok Pte. Ltd.;
TikTok U.S. Data Security Inc.; ByteDance Ltd.; and ByteDance Inc.,

Relators.

Original Proceeding from the 250th District Court of Travis County, Texas
Cause No. D-1-GN-25-003118
The Honorable Cory Liu

Petition for Writ of Mandamus

Neema T. Sahni (pro hac vice) Brandon Duke
nsahni@cov.com bduke@omm.com
COVINGTON & BURLING LLP O’MELVENY & MYERS LLP
1999 Avenue of the Stars 700 Louisiana St., Suite 2900
Los Angeles, CA 90067 Houston, TX 77002
Tel. (424) 332-4800 Tel. (832) 254-1500
Fax. (424) 332-4749 Fax. (832) 254-1501

Megan A. Crowley (pro hac vice)
mcrowley@cov.com
COVINGTON & BURLING LLP
850 Tenth Street, NW
Washington, DC 20001
Tel. (202) 662-6000
Fax. (202) 778-5112

ATTORNEYS FOR RELATORS

ORAL ARGUMENT REQUESTED
IDENTITY OF PARTIES AND COUNSEL

Relators: TikTok Inc.; TikTok Ltd.; TikTok Pte.
Ltd.; TikTok U.S. Data Security Inc.;
ByteDance Ltd.; and ByteDance Inc.

Counsel for Relators: Neema Sahni
COVINGTON & BURLING LLP
1999 Avenue of the Stars
Los Angeles, CA 90067

Megan A. Crowley
COVINGTON & BURLING LLP
850 Tenth Street, NW
Washington, DC 20001

Brandon Duke
O’MELVENY & MYERS LLP
700 Louisiana St., Suite 2900
Houston, TX 77002

Real Party in Interest: State of Texas

Counsel for Real Party: Richard McCutcheon
Assistant Attorney General
Consumer Protection Division
808 Travis Street, Suite 1520
Houston, Texas 77002

David H. Thompson
Adam P. Laxalt
Brian W. Barnes
COOPER & KIRK, PLLC
1523 New Hampshire Ave., NW
Washington, DC 20036

ii
Respondent: Judge Cory Liu
250th District Court
Travis County Civil & Family Court
1700 Guadalupe Street
9th Floor
Austin, TX 78701

iii
TABLE OF CONTENTS
IDENTITY OF PARTIES AND COUNSEL ........................................................ ii
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES ................................................................................. vi
MANDAMUS RECORD ..................................................................................... xii
STATEMENT OF THE CASE........................................................................... xiii
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION .................................................................. xiv
ISSUES PRESENTED ......................................................................................... xv
INTRODUCTION................................................................................................. 1
STATEMENT OF FACTS ................................................................................... 4
I. The TikTok Platform......................................................................... 4
II. The SCOPE Act ................................................................................ 6
III. The DTPA......................................................................................... 9
IV. Procedural History ............................................................................ 10
ARGUMENT ....................................................................................................... 13
I. The trial court abused its discretion in refusing to dismiss the
SCOPE Act Claims, despite the State’s dispositive concessions. ...... 14
II. The trial court abused its discretion by expanding the scope of the
DTPA. .............................................................................................. 19
III. The trial court abused its discretion by denying Relators immunity
under Section 230. ............................................................................ 25
A. Section 230 provides broad immunity for publishing
decisions. ................................................................................ 25
B. Section 230 bars Count IX. ..................................................... 27
C. Section 230 bars Counts I-VIII and X...................................... 30
IV. The trial court abused its discretion by failing to dismiss the DTPA
claims under the First Amendment. .................................................. 32
A. The DTPA Claims target expressive activity. ......................... 33
B. The DTPA claims seek to compel speech. .............................. 35
V. An appeal is not an adequate remedy to correct the trial court’s
abuses of discretion. .......................................................................... 39

iv
CONCLUSION AND PRAYER ........................................................................... 41
CERTIFICATE OF COMPLIANCE ................................................................... 43
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE ............................................................................ 44
APPENDIX .......................................................................................................... 45

v
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

Cases Page(s)

A.B. v. Salesforce, Inc.,
123 F.4th 788 (5th Cir. 2024) ........................................................................... 26

In re Acad., Ltd.,
625 S.W.3d 19 (Tex. 2021) ............................................................................... 39

Angelilli v. Activision Blizzard, Inc.,
781 F. Supp. 3d 691 (N.D. Ill. 2025) ...................................................... 27, 34, 38

Barnes v. Yahoo!, Inc.,
570 F.3d 1096 (9th Cir. 2009) .................................................................... 26, 30

Beckman v. Match.com, LLC,
668 F. App’x 759 (9th Cir. 2016) ..................................................................... 30

Bennett v. Google, Inc.,
2017 WL 2692607 (D.D.C. June 21, 2017) .................................................. 31, 32

Bogard v. TikTok Inc.,
2025 WL 604972 (N.D. Cal. Feb. 24, 2025)..................................................... 35

Bolger v. Youngs Drug Prods. Corp.,
463 U.S. 60 (1983) ........................................................................................... 36

Brown v. Ent. Merchs. Ass’n,
564 U.S. 786 (2011) .................................................................................... 33, 38

Burton v. Prince,
577 S.W.3d 280 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2019, no pet.) ...................20

Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n of N.Y.,
447 U.S. 557 (1980) .......................................................................................... 39

Comm’n for Lawyer Discipline v. Benton,
980 S.W.2d 425 (Tex. 1998) ...................................................................... passim

Comput. & Commc’ns Indus. Ass’n v. Paxton,
747 F. Supp. 3d 1011 (W.D. Tex. 2024) ............................................................. 8

vi
Comput. & Commc’ns Indus. Ass’n v. Paxton,
No. 24-50721 (5th Cir. Nov. 3, 2025) ................................................................. 9

Doe v. Backpage.com,
817 F.3d 12 (1st Cir. 2016) ................................................................................ 27

Doe v. Grindr,
128 F.4th 1148 (9th Cir. 2025) ............................................................. 28, 29, 30

Doe v. MySpace,
528 F.3d 413 (5th Cir. 2008) ...................................................................... 26, 30

Dyroff v. Ultimate Software Grp., Inc.,
934 F.3d 1093 (9th Cir. 2019) ............................................................... 26, 29, 30

Ent. Software Ass’n v. Blagojevich,
469 F.3d 641 (7th Cir. 2006) ............................................................................ 37

In re Essex Ins. Co.,
450 S.W.3d 524 (Tex. 2014) ...................................................................... 13, 40

In re Facebook, Inc.,
625 S.W.3d 80 (Tex. 2021) ............................................................... 4, 13, 29, 40

Fair Hous. Council of San Fernando Valley v. Roommates.com, LLC,
521 F.3d 1157 (9th Cir. 2008) ..................................................................... 26, 32

Fields v. Twitter, Inc.,
217 F. Supp. 3d 1116 (N.D. Cal. 2016) .............................................................. 27

In re First Rsrv. Mgmt. L.P.,
671 S.W.3d 653 (Tex. 2023) ............................................................................. 25

Force v. Facebook, Inc.,
934 F.3d 53 (2d Cir. 2019) .......................................................................... 27, 28

In re Geico Cnty. Mut. Ins. Co.,
2022 WL 17843869 (Tex. App.—Dallas Dec. 22, 2022, no pet.) ..................... 25

Herrick v. Grindr LLC,
765 F. App’x 586 (2d Cir. 2019) ....................................................................... 29

vii
Holzman v. State,
2013 WL 398935 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi-Edinburg Jan. 31,
2013, pet. denied)............................................................................................. 24

Household Retail Servs., Inc. v. State,
2001 WL 984779 (Tex. App.—San Antonio Aug. 29, 2001, no pet.) ................24

James v. Meow Media, Inc.,
300 F.3d 683 (6th Cir. 2002) ............................................................................ 38

In re John G. & Marie Stella Kenedy Mem’l Found.,
315 S.W.3d 519 (Tex. 2010) .............................................................................40

Johnson v. Arden,
614 F.3d 785 (8th Cir. 2010)............................................................................. 32

Lemmon v. Snap, Inc.,
995 F.3d 1085 (9th Cir. 2021) ........................................................................... 38

In re McAllen Med. Ctr., Inc.,
275 S.W.3d 458 (Tex. 2008) ............................................................................ 41

Moody v. NetChoice, LLC,
603 U.S. 707 (2024) ................................................................................... passim

NAACP v. Button,
371 U.S. 415 (1963)........................................................................................... 15

Nat’l Inst. of Fam. & Life Advocs. v. Becerra,
585 U.S. 755 (2018) .......................................................................................... 37

Nat’l Rifle Ass’n of Am.. v. Vullo,
602 U.S. 175 (2024) ......................................................................................... 37

NetChoice v. Carr,
789 F. Supp. 1200 (N.D. Ga. 2025) ................................................... 2, 16, 17, 40

NetChoice, LLC v. Bonta,
113 F.4th 1101 (9th Cir. 2024) .................................................................... 36, 37

NetChoice, LLC v. Reyes,
748 F. Supp. 3d 1105 (D. Utah 2024) ............................................................... 38

viii
O’Handley v. Padilla,
579 F. Supp. 3d 1163 (N.D. Cal. 2022) ............................................................. 34

Patterson v. Meta Platforms, Inc.,
2025 WL 2092260 (N.Y. App. Div. July 25, 2025)........................................... 34

Perry v. Del Rio,
66 S.W.3d 239 (Tex. 2001) .............................................................................. 13

M.P. ex rel. Pinckney v. Meta Platforms Inc.,
127 F.4th 516 (4th Cir. 2025) ..................................................................... 27, 28

In re Prudential Ins. Co. of Am.,
148 S.W.3d 124 (Tex. 2004) ................................................................. 13, 39, 40

Reaves v. City of Corpus Christi,
518 S.W.3d 594 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi–Edinburg 2017,
no pet.) ............................................................................................................ 25

Riley v. Nat’l Fed’n of the Blind of N.C., Inc.,
487 U.S. 781 (1988) .......................................................................................... 36

Riverside Nat’l Bank v. Lewis,
603 S.W.2d 169 (Tex. 1980) .............................................................................20

Snyder v. Phelps,
562 U.S. 443 (2011).......................................................................................... 38

In re Soc. Media Adolescent Addiction/Pers. Inj. Prods. Liab. Litig.,
702 F. Supp. 3d 809 (N.D. Cal. 2023) .................................................. 28, 29, 32

In re Soc. Media Adolescent Addiction/Pers. Inj. Prods. Liab. Litig.,
753 F. Supp. 3d 849 (N.D. Cal. 2024) ........................................................ 28, 29

State ex rel. Rosenblum v. TikTok Inc.,
2025 Ore. Cir. LEXIS 5135 (Or. Cir. Ct. June 13, 2025) ........................ 28, 29, 31

Students Engaged in Advancing Tex. v. Paxton,
765 F. Supp. 3d 575 (W.D. Tex. 2025) .................................................... 8, 15, 18

Students Engaged in Advancing Tex. v. Paxton,
No. 25-50096 (5th Cir. Feb. 21, 2025) ................................................................ 9

ix
Texas v. Colony Ridge, Inc.,
2024 WL 4553111 (S.D. Tex. Oct. 11, 2024)..................................................... 24

TikTok, Inc. v. Eight Jud. Dist. Ct. in & for Cnty. of Clark,
141 Nev. Adv. Op. 51, 2025 WL 3111587 (Nev. Nov. 6, 2025) .................... 38, 39

Walker v. Packer,
827 S.W.2d 833 (Tex. 1992) ............................................................. 13, 18, 32, 33

Winter v. Facebook, Inc.,
2021 WL 5446733 (E.D. Mo. Nov. 22, 2021) ............................................. 30, 31

Woods v. Littleton,
554 S.W.2d 662 (Tex. 1977) ............................................................................. 21

Word of Faith World Outreach Ctr. Church, Inc. v. Morales,
787 F. Supp. 689 (W.D. Tex. 1992) ...................................................... 20, 22, 23

Wozniak v. YouTube, LLC,
319 Cal. Rptr. 3d 597 (Cal. Ct. App. 2024) ................................................. 29, 30

Zauderer v. Off. of Disciplinary Couns. for Sup. Ct. of Ohio,
471 U.S. 626 (1985) .......................................................................................... 37

Zeran v. Am. Online, Inc.,
129 F.3d 327 (4th Cir. 1997) ............................................................................. 32

In re Zoom Video Commc’ns Inc. Priv. Litig.,
525 F. Supp. 3d 1017 (N.D. Cal. 2021) ............................................................. 32

Statutes

Children’s Online Privacy Protection Act of 1998, 15 U.S.C. §§ 6501,
et seq. ................................................................................................................ 11

Communications Decency Act, 47 U.S.C. § 230 ............................................. passim

Deceptive Trade Practices Act, Tex. Bus. & Com. Code §§ 17.41,
et seq. .......................................................................................................... passim

Securing Children Online through Parental Empowerment Act,
Tex. Bus & Com. Code §§ 509.001, et seq. ................................................. passim

x
Other Authorities

Lease, Black’s Law Dictionary (12th ed. 2024)....................................................... 21

Lease, Cambridge Dictionary.................................................................................. 21

Order Consolidating Cases, CCIA v. Paxton, No. 24-50721,
SEAT v. Paxton, No. 25-50096 (5th Cir. Feb. 21, 2025) ..................................... 9

Purchase, Black’s Law Dictionary (12th ed. 2024) ................................................. 21

Purchase, Cambridge Dictionary ............................................................................ 21

Recording of Oral Argument, CCIA v. Paxton, No. 24-50721
(5th Cir. Nov. 3, 2025) ....................................................................................... 9

Tex. R. Civ. P. 91a .......................................................................................... passim

xi
MANDAMUS RECORD

A. Plaintiff’s Original Petition ................................................................... MR 0001
(October 3, 2024)

B. Plaintiff’s First Amended Petition ....................................................... MR 0020
(August 19, 2025)

C. Defendants’ Rule 91a Motion ............................................................... MR 0100
(August 22, 2025)

D. Plaintiff’s Response to Defendants’ Rule 91a Motion........................... MR 0250
(September 22, 2025)

E. Defendants’ Reply in Support of Rule 91a Motion ................................ MR 0321
(September 26, 2025)

F. Transcript of Hearing on Rule 91a Motion ............................................ MR 0359
(September 29, 2025)

G. Defendants’ Supplemental Memorandum Addressing State’s
In-Hearing Submission of Authority ..................................................... MR 0462
(September 30, 2025)

H. Order Denying Defendants’ Rule 91a Motion ...................................... MR 0465
(October 1, 2025)

xii
STATEMENT OF THE CASE

Nature of the Case: This original proceeding arises from the trial court’s denial
of Relators’ Rule 91a motion to dismiss. Relators—
TikTok Inc., TikTok Ltd., TikTok Pte. Ltd., TikTok U.S.
Data Security Inc., ByteDance Ltd., and ByteDance Inc.—
were sued by Real Party in Interest, the State of Texas,
which alleges violations of the Securing Children Online
through Parental Empowerment (“SCOPE”) Act and the
Deceptive Trade Practices Act (“DTPA”). Relators
argued that the SCOPE Act claims must be dismissed
because the Act is unconstitutionally vague, as applied to
them. During the hearing on Relators’ motion, the State
repeatedly admitted it did not know how Relators allegedly
violated the SCOPE Act or what the Act’s governing
liability standard means as applied to them. Relators also
argued the DTPA claims fail because TikTok—a free
platform—is not a good or service that is purchased or
leased for purposes of the DTPA. The trial court,
however, ignored the State’s concessions regarding the
SCOPE Act and adopted the State’s expansive
interpretation of the DTPA to apply it—for the first
time—to conduct that does not and cannot involve any
statutory consumers, goods, or services. Relators also
argued that the DTPA claims are barred by Section 230 of
the Communications Decency Act and the First
Amendment.
Trial Court Hon. Cory Liu
250th District Court, Travis County, Texas
Cause No. D-1-GN-25-003118
Proceedings: Following an oral hearing, Respondent, The Honorable
Cory Liu, denied Relators’ Rule 91a motion on October 1,
2025. Relators seek mandamus relief from the denial of
their Rule 91a motion, by which Respondent declined to
dismiss the State’s action in its entirety.

xiii
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION

The denial of a Rule 91a motion to dismiss is reviewable by mandamus. In re

Facebook, Inc., 625 S.W.3d 80, 86–87 (Tex. 2021). This Court has jurisdiction to

issue a writ of mandamus to correct the trial court’s error. Tex. Gov’t Code

§§ 22.220(d)(1); 22.221(b), (c-1).

xiv
ISSUES PRESENTED

1. Did the trial court misapply the law, and thus abuse its discretion, in

refusing to recognize that the SCOPE Act provisions at issue are unconstitutionally

vague as applied to Relators, particularly in light of the State’s concessions at oral

argument that it does not know “what [Relators] are currently doing that’s alleged

to be a violation of the Act” or what its standards mean as applied to Relators?

2. Did the trial court misapply the law, and thus abuse its discretion, by

construing the DTPA to regulate conduct that cannot even theoretically affect any

statutory “consumer” or involve any “goods” or “services”?

3. Did the trial court misapply the law, and thus abuse its discretion, by

concluding that the State’s DTPA claims are not barred by Section 230 of the

Communications Decency Act and the First Amendment?

4. Is an appeal following a plenary trial an inadequate remedy for these

abuses of discretion?

xv
INTRODUCTION

Mandamus relief is necessary to correct the trial court’s clear abuse of

discretion in allowing the State’s claims under the Securing Children Online

Through Parental Empowerment (“SCOPE”) Act and the Deceptive Trade

Practices Act (“DTPA”) to proceed. The SCOPE Act claims rest on vague

statutory language that, as applied to Relators, denies fair notice and invites arbitrary

enforcement—defects the State itself has acknowledged. Indeed, the State

conceded in open court it does not know what the statute means or how Relators

allegedly violated it. The DTPA claims fare no better and are foreclosed by both

Texas and federal law. Allowing these claims to proceed not only disregards

controlling precedent but threatens constitutional rights and statutory boundaries.

Mandamus is the only adequate remedy.

SCOPE Act. At the September 29 hearing on Relators’ Rule 91a Motion, the

State repeatedly conceded that it does not know what the SCOPE Act requires or

how Relators allegedly violated it—insisting that it would need “both discovery and

expert testimony” to answer those questions. MR 0430:25–31:9. The State further

admitted it did not know what Relators are “doing now” to comply with the statute

or “what [they were] supposed to be doing,” stating, “I don’t have TikTok. I never

1
have.” MR 0430:25–31:9. These concessions are dispositive. The State’s inability

to articulate what conduct violates the SCOPE Act, what “commercially

reasonable” (the Act’s core liability standard) “means to TikTok,” MR 0421:15–16,

or “what [Relators] are currently doing that’s alleged to be a violation of the Act,”

MR 0432:13–33:4, confirms that the Act is unconstitutionally vague as applied to

Relators. As a matter of constitutional due process, a statute that fails to provide fair

notice of prohibited conduct and invites arbitrary enforcement is void for vagueness.

See Comm’n for Lawyer Discipline v. Benton, 980 S.W.2d 425, 437 (Tex. 1998). And

courts must apply “a stricter vagueness standard” to laws like the SCOPE Act that

are “capable of reaching protected speech.” Id. at 438. The State’s disparate

enforcement approach—applying different standards to different platforms—

further underscores the Act’s constitutional infirmity. See NetChoice v. Carr, 789 F.

Supp. 1200, 1231 (N.D. Ga. 2025), appeal filed No. 25-12436 (11th Cir. July 16,

2025).

Despite these admissions, the trial court denied Relators’ motion to dismiss

in a single line. The trial court’s refusal to dismiss the SCOPE Act claims—despite

the State’s concessions that it does not know what the statute means or how Relators

have violated it and despite its duty to apply a stricter vagueness standard—

constitutes a clear abuse of discretion.

2
DTPA. The DTPA claims are equally untenable. The State seeks to rewrite

the statute to create enforcement authority the Attorney General does not have. The

DTPA applies only when a “consumer” purchases or leases “goods” or “services,”

yet the State advances claims for which there cannot ever be a “consumer”—even

theoretically—nor any “goods” or “services.” See Tex. Bus. & Com. Code Ann.

§ 17.45. TikTok1 is an indisputably free platform; its users do not “purchase or lease

any goods or services” when using the platform as alleged in the amended petition

and therefore cannot qualify as consumers. Allowing these claims to proceed would

mark the first time the State has applied the DTPA to a free digital platform—an

unprecedented and legally unsupported expansion of the statute’s reach. The court

adopted that expansion without any reasoning and notwithstanding having expressed

concern about the “consequences of the [State’s] interpretation” at the hearing.

MR 0393:6–12.

Even if users could somehow be deemed “consumers,” the State’s DTPA

claims are barred by Section 230 of the Communications Decency Act (“Section

230”), which immunizes online platforms from liability for publishing third-party

content. The injunctive relief the State seeks would also impermissibly restrict

1
References to “TikTok” herein, absent additional specification, denote the TikTok platform and
business.
3
Relators’ constitutionally protected speech and other expressive activity under the

First Amendment. Mandamus relief is thus necessary to correct the trial court’s

clear abuse of discretion and to restore the DTPA’s statutory limits, preserve federal

immunity, and protect core constitutional rights. See, e.g., In re Facebook, Inc., 625

S.W.3d 80 (Tex. 2021) (mandamus warranted to protect important substantive

rights, including Section 230’s immunity from suit).

This Court should review and reverse on the SCOPE Act and DTPA claims.

STATEMENT OF FACTS

I. The TikTok Platform

TikTok is an online platform that enables users to create, share, and view

videos. See MR 0033. The TikTok app is free to download and use. MR 0027.

TikTok Inc., a California corporation with its principal place of business in

California, provides the platform in the United States. MR 0030. TikTok users,

who must be 13 years or older to access the “regular TikTok app,” can interact with

content in several ways. See, e.g., MR 0033–34. Central to the TikTok experience

is the “For You” feed, which provides personalized content for each user. MR 0034.

Users can also search for particular videos or types of content. MR 0034.

TikTok is available on the Apple App Store, which requires developers to

complete an age rating questionnaire before making their apps available for

4
download. MR 0022; MR 0034–35. Apple’s questionnaire requires developers to

select the level of frequency for certain categories of content and provides only three

possible responses: “None,” “Infrequent/Mild,” and “Frequent/Intense.”

MR 0035. The Petition alleges that “TikTok” selected the “Infrequent/Mild”

option for four categories: “Profanity or Crude Humor”; “Mature/Suggestive

Themes”; “Sexual Content and Nudity”; and “Alcohol, Tobacco, or Drug Use or

Reference.” MR 0035 (collectively, “Questionnaire Responses”). Based on these

answers, Apple assigned TikTok a “12+” age rating. MR 0036. TikTok has a “T

for Teen” rating in the Microsoft and Google Play stores, meaning that its content

is generally suitable for users 13 and up. MR 0059-60 (collectively, “Age Ratings”).

TikTok’s publicly available Community Guidelines (“Guidelines”) “inform

users about what content TikTok permits” and set forth policies regarding the scope

of permissible content on the platform. MR 0066-68. TikTok removes content that

violates the Guidelines and internal policies. See, e.g., MR 0041.

TikTok takes a number of measures to protect younger users. For example,

TikTok’s “Family Pairing” feature “allow[s] ‘parents or guardians [to] link their

TikTok accounts to their teens’ to manage a variety of content, privacy, and well-

being settings,’” including “the ability to monitor and limit the amount of time a

5
known minor can use TikTok.” MR 0073–74 (second alteration in original). The

Petition also discusses other measures, such as:

• Setting a known minor’s “account to ‘private’ by default” and setting the
amount of time a known minor can use TikTok to 60 minutes per day by
default;

• Prohibiting users under the age of 16 from sending and receiving “direct
messages” with other users and, “[f]or users under the age of 16 with public
accounts, not displaying the content they post in the ‘For You’ feed of users
with whom they are not ‘friends;’”

• Prohibiting users under the age of 18 from going LIVE (i.e., live broadcasting
videos from their device); and

• Providing “a more restricted version of TikTok” for “users under the age of
13,” where they can then view certain feeds, “like” content, and “create but
not post shortform videos.”

MR 0072–74.

II. The SCOPE Act

On September 1, 2024, the SCOPE Act went into effect. The Act imposes

requirements on certain “digital service provider[s],” which include “a website, an

application, a program, or software that collects or processes personal identifying

information with Internet connectivity.” Tex. Bus. & Com. Code § 509.001(1).

Under the Act, providers must require all users to register their age, and anyone who

enters an age younger than 18 is considered a “known minor.” Id. §§ 509.051(a–b).

The Act imposes several requirements and prohibitions regarding “known

minors.” Under Section 509.101 (the “Verification Requirement”), digital service
6
providers must “verify, using a commercially reasonable method and for each person

seeking to perform an action on a digital service as a minor’s parent or guardian:

(1) the person’s identity; and (2) the relationship of the person to the known minor.”

Id. § 509.101(a). The statute does not define “commercially reasonable,” nor does

it provide any guidance as to what methods would satisfy that standard. And, as

discussed below, the State has conceded it is not clear what this standard means. See

MR 0434:9–13.

Verification is the predicate for imposing additional statutory requirements

and prohibitions on digital service providers. Section 509.052 (the “Data–Sharing

Prohibition”) states that “[u]nless a verified parent provides otherwise,” digital

service providers may not (1) allow any under-18 user to make purchases, (2) “share,

disclose, or sell the known minor’s personal identifying information,” (3) “use the

digital service to collect the known minor’s precise geolocation data,” or (4) “use

the digital service to display targeted advertising to the known minor.” Tex. Bus. &

Com. Code § 509.052(2). And, under Section 509.054 (the “Parental Tools

Requirement”), digital service providers must “create and provide to a verified

parent parental tools to allow the verified parent to supervise the verified parent’s

known minor’s use of [the] digital service.” Id. § 509.054(a).

7
Even before the SCOPE Act took effect, federal courts had already enjoined

key provisions of the law. In Computer & Communications Industry Ass’n v. Paxton,

747 F. Supp. 3d 1011 (W.D. Tex. 2024) (“CCIA”), the court barred enforcement of

the Act’s requirements that providers monitor and filter a minor’s exposure to

harmful material and ensure algorithms do not interfere with those duties. See Tex.

Bus. & Com. Code §§ 509.053, 509.056(1). The court held these provisions failed

strict scrutiny under the First Amendment, are unconstitutionally vague, and are

barred by Section 230. CCIA, 747 F. Supp. at 1044. Similarly, in Students Engaged

in Advancing Texas v. Paxton, 765 F. Supp. 3d 575 (W.D. Tex. 2025) (“SEAT”), the

court enjoined multiple provisions of the SCOPE Act—including its monitoring,

targeted advertising, content moderation, and age-verification requirements—as

either unconstitutional under the First Amendment or impermissibly vague. Id. at

604; see Tex. Bus. & Com. Code §§ 509.052(2)(D), 509.053, 509.055, 509.056(1),

509.057.2

The Attorney General’s appeals in CCIA and SEAT have been consolidated

and are currently pending before the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit. See

2
The district court declined to enjoin each challenged provision of the statute only because
plaintiffs had not yet shown, at the preliminary injunction stage, that these other provisions were
independently unconstitutional when not combined with the enjoined provisions. SEAT, 765 F.
Supp. 3d at 604 n.18.
8
Order Consolidating Cases, CCIA v. Paxton, No. 24-50721; SEAT v. Paxton, No. 25-

50096 (5th Cir. Feb. 21, 2025). At oral argument before the Fifth Circuit, the court

repeatedly inquired as to whether the statutory interpretation questions at issue

should be certified to the Texas Supreme Court. Recording of Oral Argument at

15:35–16:30, 25:00–26:05, 34:10–34:40, CCIA v. Paxton, No. 24-50721 (5th Cir. Nov.

3, 2025).

III. The DTPA

The “underlying purpose[]” of the DTPA is to “protect consumers”—that

is, “individual[s] . . . who seek[] or acquire[] by purchase or lease, any goods or

services”—“against false, misleading, and deceptive business practices.” Tex. Bus.

& Com. Code Ann. §§ 17.44, 17.45(4). Consistent with that purpose, it provides a

cause of action for “[f]alse, misleading, or deceptive acts or practices in the conduct

of any trade or commerce” and enumerates 34 such acts. Id. §§ 17.46(a), (b). In

Counts I–X, the State claims Relators committed four of these acts: “representing

that goods or services have . . . characteristics . . . which they do not have” (id.

§ 17.46(b)(5)); “representing that goods or services are of a particular standard,

quality, or grade . . . if they are of another” (id. § 17.46(b)(7)); “advertising goods or

services with intent not to sell them as advertised” (id. § 17.46(b)(9)); and “failing

to disclose information concerning goods or services . . . to induce the consumer into

9
a transaction” (id. § 17.46(b)(24)). See MR 0075–90 (all DTPA claims exclusively

alleging violations of Sections 17.46(b)(5), (7), (9), and (24)).

IV. Procedural History

On October 3, 2024, just one month after the SCOPE Act took effect, the

State filed suit in Galveston County against Relators under the new law without any

prior outreach or investigation and without specifying how Relators failed to comply

with its standards. Following the SEAT court’s injunction of certain provisions of

the SCOPE Act, see supra 8–9, the parties agreed that the State would amend its

petition to account for the injunction. On January 9, 2025, the State filed a separate

action against Relators, also in Galveston County, alleging violations of the DTPA.

On March 19, 2025, the SCOPE Act case was transferred from Galveston to Travis

County. The parties subsequently agreed to transfer the DTPA case to Travis

County, and to consolidate the actions for pretrial purposes. On July 24, 2025, the

State filed an amended consolidated petition, which added no detail to the State’s

SCOPE allegations. On August 13, 2025, over Relators’ objection, the court set trial

in the case for August 17, 2026.

The State’s amended petition alleges three violations of the SCOPE Act

(“SCOPE Act Claims”), alleging that Relators failed to implement a “commercially

reasonable” verification method (Count XI), improperly disclosed minors’ personal

10
information without consent from a “verified parent” (Count XII), and failed to

provide “verified parent[s]” with required tools under the Act (Count XIII). The

State’s amended petition also alleges ten claims under the Texas Deceptive Trade

Practices Act (“DTPA Claims”), asserting that TikTok’s age ratings and

questionnaire responses mislead users about the app’s content (Counts I–VIII), that

the platform was designed to be addictive and negatively impacts users’ mental

health, which is not disclosed to users (Count IX), and that its Guidelines do not

align with some content available on the platform (Count X).

Relators moved to dismiss all thirteen claims under Rule 91a of the Texas

Rules of Civil Procedure. As to the SCOPE Act, Relators argued the claims rely on

unconstitutionally vague provisions, as applied to Relators; violate the First

Amendment; and are preempted by the Children’s Online Privacy Protection Act.

Relators also sought dismissal of the DTPA Claims, explaining that TikTok is a free

platform and therefore not a “good or service” that can be purchased or leased.

They further argued that the claims are barred by Section 230 and the First

Amendment.

At the Rule 91a hearing before The Honorable Cory Liu, the court noted the

State’s repeated failure to explain how Relators allegedly violated the SCOPE Act or

what the statute requires. When asked to address “in what manner [Relators] have

11
fallen short,” the State responded that it needed discovery and expert testimony to

understand how TikTok fails to comply with the statute. MR 0430:22–31:9. The

State also conceded that it could not explain what the term “commercially

reasonable” means, and that it would need expert discovery to answer that question.

MR 0434:9–13. Relators, in urging the court to dismiss the SCOPE Act claims,

underscored that the State’s concessions that it cannot explain a key term in the

Act—“commercially reasonable”—without expert testimony or discovery is the

“very definition of vagueness in a statute.” MR 0434:9–13.

As to the DTPA, Relators argued, among other things, that the State’s claims

must be dismissed because TikTok, as a free platform, is not a good or service that

is purchase or leased, as required by the Act. Moreover, Relators asserted that the

DTPA Claims are barred by Section 230 and the First Amendment.

Despite the trial court’s concerns with the State’s SCOPE Act Claims and

Relators’ arguments as to the DTPA Claims, the court denied the motion to dismiss

in a one-sentence order. 3 Relators now seek mandamus relief to correct this error.

3
After the State failed to explain (for the second time) “what [Relators] are currently doing that’s
alleged to be a violation” of the SCOPE Act, the court expressed its view that “it’s a fair point for
[Defendants] to raise [‘]what are we alleged to have done wrong?[‘]” and then suggested the
parties “have a conversation . . . instead of litigating this as a violation.” MR 0432:13–34:5. Before
filing the instant Petition, Relators sent a letter to the State to initiate the dialog suggested by the
court.
12
ARGUMENT

Mandamus relief is appropriate where “(1) the trial court abused its discretion

by denying [Relators’] Rule 91a motion[] to dismiss, and (2) [Relator] has no

adequate remedy by appeal.” In re Essex Ins. Co., 450 S.W.3d 524, 526 (Tex. 2014).

A “failure by the trial court to analyze or apply the law correctly []

constitute[s] an abuse of discretion.” Walker v. Packer, 827 S.W.2d 833, 840 (Tex.

1992). This is true even when the “erroneous legal conclusion [is] in an unsettled

area of law.” Perry v. Del Rio, 66 S.W.3d 239, 257 (Tex. 2001). And there is no

adequate remedy for appeal when, absent mandamus: (1) the parties and public

would waste “time and money spent on fatally flawed proceedings,” In re Essex, 450

S.W.3d at 526; or (2) a litigant would “suffer ‘impairment . . .’ of ‘important

substantive . . . rights,’” including those conferred by statutes that “provide covered

defendants with immunity from suit,” In re Facebook, Inc., 625 S.W.3d 80, 87 (Tex.

2021) (second alteration in original) (quoting In re Prudential Ins. Co. of Am., 148

S.W.3d 124, 136 (Tex. 2004)).

The trial court’s rulings meet this standard. The court did not “analyze or

apply the law correctly” when it (1) refused to dismiss the SCOPE Act Claims for

unconstitutional vagueness, despite the State’s inability to explain how Relators

allegedly violated the Act or what the Act’s standards require Relators to do; (2)

13
applied the DTPA, for the first time, to an action seeking to regulate conduct that

cannot even theoretically affect any statutory “consumer”; (3) refused to apply

Section 230’s immunity to the DTPA Claims, which target publishing conduct; and

(4) refused to recognize that the First Amendment bars the DTPA Claims for

targeting plainly expressive activities. Mandamus is necessary to preserve Relators

substantive rights and to spare the parties and public from wasting resources on a

fatally flawed set of claims.

I. The trial court abused its discretion in refusing to dismiss the
SCOPE Act Claims, despite the State’s dispositive concessions.

The trial court’s refusal to dismiss the State’s SCOPE Act Claims is a

textbook case for mandamus relief. The State conceded it cannot explain what the

SCOPE Act requires or how Relators allegedly violated it—underscoring the

statute’s vagueness as applied. This defect is especially acute given the Act’s

regulation of protected speech under the First Amendment.

Under well-settled Texas law, a “vague statute offends due process” and is

void if it “fails to give fair notice of what conduct may be punished” or “invites

arbitrary or discriminatory enforcement.” Comm’n for Lawyer Discipline v. Benton,

980 S.W.2d 425, 437 (Tex. 1998). And where a “statute’s language is capable of

reaching protected speech,” courts apply “a stricter vagueness standard.” Id. at

438. That is “[b]ecause First Amendment freedoms need breathing space to
14
survive.” Id. (quoting NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 433 (1963)). That stricter

vagueness standard applies here: as the SEAT court explained, the SCOPE Act

threatens minors’ “‘right to receive information and ideas’ . . . and ‘communicate

with one another.’” SEAT, 765 F. Supp. 3d at 591–92.

The SCOPE Act’s “verification” requirement—and thus also the definition

of “verified parent”—fails this standard, requiring dismissal of all three SCOPE Act

claims. Section 509.101 of the SCOPE Act requires digital service providers to

“verify, using a commercially reasonable method and for each person seeking to

perform an action on a digital service as a minor’s parent or guardian: (1) the

person’s identity; and (2) the relationship of the person to the known minor.” Tex.

Bus. & Com. Code § 509.101(a) (emphasis added). The phrase “commercially

reasonable method” is the statute’s central liability standard—yet the Act does not

define it, identify any acceptable methods, or provide guidance of any kind for

providers to follow. See id. § 509.101. It therefore both “forc[es] people to guess at

the statute’s meaning,” and “invites arbitrary or discriminatory enforcement.”

Benton, 980 S.W.2d at 437.

Courts have already recognized this problem. In NetChoice v. Carr, the

Northern District of Georgia held that the identical “commercially reasonable”

standard in a similar Georgia statute was unconstitutionally vague, emphasizing that

15
its indeterminate nature enabled the state’s “disparate enforcement plan,” which

was “a central and fatal source of vagueness under the law.” 789 F. Supp. 3d 1200,

1211–12, 1231 (N.D. Ga. 2025) (citing O.C.G.A. § 39-6-2(a)), appeal filed No. 25-

12436 (11th Cir. July 16, 2025). The same defect exists here.

The State’s own pleading and admissions confirm the point. In its amended

petition, the State acknowledges that TikTok offers the Family Pairing feature,

which “allow[s] ‘parents or guardians [to] link their TikTok account to their teens’

to manage a variety of content, privacy, and well-being settings.’’ MR 0073–74.

Family Pairing requires parents to request to pair their own account with their

minor’s and have that request accepted by the minor. MR 0074. The State alleges

that this method is not a “commercially reasonable” method of complying with

Section 509.101 without identifying what would be reasonable or why TikTok’s

method is not. MR 0090. Tellingly, the charging paragraphs complain only about

unrelated features of Family Pairing, not anything to do with the verification

requirements of Section 509.101. 4 Relators are left with no notice of “what conduct

may be punished.” Benton, 980 S.W.2d at 437.

4
Specifically, the State complains that TikTok “unnecessarily requires a parent or guardian to
create an account” before being able to access Family Pairing tools, and that “known minor[s]
[have] sole discretion to accept or deny their parent or guardian access to the parental tools.”
MR 0090. The State never explains how either of these features has anything to do with the
verification requirements of Section 509.101.
16
The State’s concessions at the motion to dismiss hearing remove any doubt.

When asked to explain “in what manner [Relators] have fallen short,” the State

admitted that it would need “both discovery and expert testimony” to answer that

question. MR 0430:20–31:9. The court pressed further, asking again “what

[Relators] are currently doing that’s alleged to be a violation of the Act.” MR

0432:13–15. The State again failed to answer, noting instead that it “would have to

wait for—essentially for discovery and for us to get that . . . knowledge into evidence

because I don’t have it in front of me right now.” MR 0433:8–9. The State even

indicated that “what commercially reasonable means to TikTok” might be a

different standard than one that applies to “all different possible providers”—

precisely the arbitrary enforcement Benton forbids. MR 0421:10–22; see Carr, 789 F.

Supp. 3d at 1231 (state’s argument that “what is commercially reasonable for

Facebook . . . might be different than what is commercially reasonable for

Dreamwidth” demonstrates a “fatal source of vagueness in the law”).

These admissions are dispositive: the State cannot articulate what the Act

requires, what “commercially reasonable” means, or how Relators allegedly violated

the law. Few cases illustrate vagueness more starkly than this one.

The court recognized that Relators had raised “a fair point” about “what are

we alleged to have done wrong,” MR 0433:5–34:5, and even suggested that the

17
parties “have a conversation . . . instead of litigating this as a violation.” MR 0433:5–

34:5. Nonetheless, the court denied Relators’ motion. This failure to correctly apply

the law is an abuse of discretion. Walker, 827 S.W.2d at 840 (A “failure by the trial

court to analyze or apply the law correctly [] constitute[s] an abuse of discretion.”).

That error is especially serious because the court was required to apply a heightened

vagueness standard, given that the challenged provisions regulate speech. Benton,

980 S.W.2d at 438 (laws “capable of reaching protected speech” demand “a stricter

vagueness standard”); SEAT, 765 F. Supp. 3d at 591–92 (SCOPE Act threatens

minors’ “‘right to receive information and ideas’ . . . and ‘communicate with one

another’”).

The vagueness of the “verification” requirement in Section 509.101 requires

dismissal of all of the State’s SCOPE Act Claims. Because the term “verified

parent”—which appears throughout the Act, including in the provisions underlying

Counts XII and XIII—is defined by reference to Section 509.101, the term “verified

parent” is unconstitutionally vague, as well. 5 The vagueness of Section 509.101’s

5
See Tex. Bus. & Com. Code Ann. § 509.001(7) (“‘Verified parent’ means the parent or guardian
of a known minor whose identity and relationship to the minor have been verified by a digital
service provider under Section 509.101.”); see also MR 0091 (Count XII) (alleging that TikTok
uses minors’ information “without obtaining permission from their verified parent” (citing Tex.
Bus. & Com. Code § 509.052)); MR 0092 (Count XIII) (alleging that TikTok does not provide
“verified parents” the tools required under Section 509.054); Tex. Bus. & Com. Code
§ 509.054(a) (“A digital service provider shall create and provide to a verified parent parental tools
18
“commercially reasonable” standard thus infects not only Count XI (alleging

TikTok does not use a commercially reasonable standard to verify a minor’s parent),

but also Counts XII (alleging TikTok disclosed minor data without a “verified

parent[’s]” consent) and Counts XIII (alleging TikTok failed to provide proper tools

to “verified parents”). 6 See Tex. Bus. & Com. Code §§ 509.001, 509.052, 509.054;

MR 0091–92. Relators are thus left with no option but to guess at who counts as a

“verified parent,” and then to again guess at how to get the necessary approvals from

and provide the required tools to those parents.

II. The trial court abused its discretion by expanding the scope of the
DTPA.

The trial court did not merely misinterpret the DTPA; it created a sweeping,

unprecedented expansion of the statute by regulating alleged conduct that does

not—and cannot—affect any “consumer.” By extending the Act beyond its text and

purpose, the court transformed a consumer-protection statute into a generalized

prohibition on alleged deception, a role the Legislature never authorized. This

interpretation is not supported by any precedent and contradicts the statute’s

to allow the verified parent to supervise the verified parent’s known minor’s use of a digital
service.”).
6
Relators maintain, as they argued in their Rule 91a motion, that Sections 509.052 and 509.054 are
also independently vague. However, Relators limit this mandamus petition to the threshold
“commercially reasonable” standard.
19
express purpose to protect “consumers” seeking to “purchase or lease” “goods or

services.” See Burton v. Prince, 577 S.W.3d 280, 291 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th

Dist.] 2019, no pet.); Tex. Bus. & Com. Code § 17.44 (“underlying purpose[]” of

DTPA is to “protect consumers”); Word of Faith World Outreach Ctr. Church, Inc.

v. Morales, 787 F. Supp. 689, 697 (W.D. Tex. 1992) (state must establish there are

“‘consumers’ within the statutory definition whose rights will be protected”), rev’d

on other grounds, 986 F.2d 962 (5th Cir. 1993).

The DTPA defines “consumer” as one “who seeks or acquires by purchase or

lease, any goods or services.” Tex. Bus. & Com. Code § 17.45(4) (emphasis added).

Here, the State cannot show any “goods,” “services,” “purchase,” or “lease.”

No “goods.” Both parties agree that TikTok is not a “good,” which the

DTPA defines as “tangible chattels or real property purchased or leased for use.”

Id. § 17.45(1); compare MR 0119–20, with MR 0269–79.

No “services.” TikTok is also not a “service” under the DTPA, defined as

“work, labor, or service purchased or leased for use, including services furnished in

connection with the sale or repair of goods.” Tex. Bus. & Com. Code § 17.45(2).

The Texas Supreme Court has held that “services” under the DTPA must involve

“activity on behalf of one party by another”—“similar in nature to work or labor.”

Riverside Nat’l Bank v. Lewis, 603 S.W.2d 169, 174 (Tex. 1980). TikTok is not

20
“conduct or performance that assists or benefits someone,” Woods v. Littleton, 554

S.W.2d 662, 667 (Tex. 1977) (citations omitted); it is a platform, not an activity

performed for a user. Without a “good” or “service,” there is no “consumer.”

Tex. Bus. & Com. Code § 17.45(4).

No “purchase” or “lease.” Even if TikTok were “similar in nature to work

or labor” (i.e., a “service”), it is not “purchased or leased.” See Tex. Bus. & Com.

Code § 17.45(2). Users download and use TikTok for free.7 The State’s theory—

that exchanging data for access to the platform constitutes a “purchase”—is

unsupported by the statute and contradicts common usage. 8 If that interpretation

were correct, every free online interaction—running a Bing search, checking scores

on ESPN.com, or getting directions on Google Maps—would qualify as a

“purchase.” The State effectively conceded this absurdity at the hearing.

MR 0393:9–23.

7
See Purchase, Black’s Law Dictionary (12th ed. 2024) (“The act or an instance of buying”);
Purchase, Cambridge Dictionary (“to buy something”); Lease, Black’s Law Dictionary (12th ed.
2024) (“To grant the possession and use of (land, buildings, rooms, movable property, etc.) to
another in return for rent or other consideration”); Lease, Cambridge Dictionary (“to make a legal
agreement by which money is paid in order to use land, a building, a vehicle, or a piece of equipment
for an agreed period of time”).
8
That position not only conflicts with the State’s petition, but it also badly mischaracterizes what
happens when a user downloads and uses the TikTok app for free. Users do not provide data in
“exchange” for downloading the app. The Petition itself recognizes that data is not given in
exchange for a download but is rather part-and-parcel of the experience that the user is receiving
for free: “Defendants process the data collected from and about TikTok users to provide a never-
ending stream of videos personalized for them by TikTok’s algorithm.” MR 0034.
21
Confronted with clear statutory definitions and binding precedent, the State

advanced an extraordinary theory: that it may bring a DTPA claim based on conduct

that does not—and cannot even in theory—involve any “goods,” “services,” or

“consumers.” That position is wrong, and it was an abuse of discretion for the court

to extend the DTPA in this limitless manner.

First, the DTPA’s “Construction and Application” provision mandates that

the Act be “applied to promote its underlying purposes, which are to protect

consumers against false, misleading, and deceptive business practices.” Tex. Bus. &

Com. Code Ann. § 17.44 (emphasis added). The statute identifies no class other

than “consumers” for protection and expressly assigns enforcement authority to the

Attorney General’s “consumer protection division.” Id. §§ 17.46(a) (emphasis

added), 17.45(8). By attempting to regulate conduct that cannot even theoretically

affect any “consumer,” as defined in the statute, the State seeks to rewrite the

statute and expand its scope to a place it has never gone. The DTPA cannot be

“[c]onstruct[ed] and [a]ppli[ed]” in that manner. Id. § 17.44.

Second, the only court to address whether the State may bring a DTPA claim

in the absence of any “consumer” held that it cannot. See Word of Faith, 787 F.

Supp. at 698. That court concluded that “there must be some ‘consumer,’ either

the plaintiff, or if the Attorney General is bringing the action, ‘consumers,’ within

22
the statutory definition whose rights will be protected.” Id. at 697. Because church

donors did not “seek to purchase goods or services” in exchange for their donation,

they were “not ‘consumers,’” and the Attorney General could not sue on their

behalf. Id. at 698. The same is true here: TikTok users do not purchase goods or

services when downloading and using the free platform.

Third, the State’s own pleadings and testimony at the hearing contradict its

theory. The Petition references “consumer[s]” 66 times and bases each DTPA

claim (Counts I–X) on statutory provisions requiring misrepresentations about

“goods or services.” See Tex. Bus. & Com. Code §§ 17.46(b)(5), (7), (9), and (24);

MR 0075–90. At the hearing, the State described the TikTok users whom it was

allegedly protecting as “consumers” at least nine times. 9 Yet the State now insists

the Act applies even when no consumer, good, or service exists—a position

irreconcilable with its own allegations.

Finally, the State’s reliance on three cases it raised at the 91a hearing is

misplaced. See MR 0400:19–402:6. Those decisions merely hold that the Attorney

General need not prove injury and need not be a consumer; they do not authorize

enforcement where no consumer exists. In each case, the State acted to protect

9
See, e.g., MR 0382:3–6; MR 0383:10–14; MR 0383:24–0384:2, MR 0385:1–12; MR 0389:15–16;
MR 0391:24–25; MR 0392:2–9; MR 0393:17–19.
23
consumers of goods or services: Colony Ridge, Inc. involved misrepresentations

inducing land purchases; 10 Holzman concerned privacy violations affecting patients

of a physician; 11 and Household Retail Servs., Inc. addressed deceptive practices

harming HVAC purchasers. 12 Here, by contrast, there are no consumers, goods, or

services at all. Extending the DTPA to this context would be a radical and

unauthorized expansion of the statute.

* * *

In sum, the State cannot satisfy the statutory definitions of “goods” or

“services,” nor demonstrate any “purchase” or “lease.” As a result, there are no

“consumers” affected by Relators’ alleged conduct. Tex. Bus. & Com. Code

§ 17.45(4). Applying the DTPA to circumstances without even the possibility of any

“consumers” would transform a consumer-protection statute into a generalized

prohibition on alleged deception. Concerned with that possibility, the court asked

the State about the “consequence[s] of the interpretation [it was] advancing[.]”

MR 0393:6–12. Though the State doubled down on its expansive interpretation,

10
Texas v. Colony Ridge, Inc., 2024 WL 4553111, at *1-–2 (S.D. Tex. Oct. 11, 2024).
11
Holzman v. State, 2013 WL 398935, at *1 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi-Edinburg Jan. 31, 2013,
pet denied).
Household Retail Servs., Inc. v. State, 2001 WL 984779, at *4 (Tex. App.—San Antonio Aug. 29,
12

2001, no pet.).
24
MR 0393:9–23, the court nonetheless adopted it without any reasoning to address its

own concern.

Because these claims are “barred by an established legal rule,” In re First Rsrv.

Mgmt. L.P., 671 S.W.3d 653, 661 (Tex. 2023), and courts have “rejected the viability

of [similar] action under the circumstances pleaded by the plaintiff,” In re Geico Cnty.

Mut. Ins. Co., 2022 WL 17843869, at *2 (Tex. App.—Dallas Dec. 22, 2022, no pet.)

(quoting Reaves v. City of Corpus Christi, 518 S.W.3d 594, 608 (Tex. App.—Corpus

Christi–Edinburg 2017, no pet.)), the trial court was required to dismiss the DTPA

Claims under Rule 91a. Its failure to do so was an abuse of discretion.

III. The trial court abused its discretion by denying Relators immunity
under Section 230.

Section 230 of the Communications Decency Act (“Section 230”) bars the

State’s DTPA Claims (in Counts I–X) because they seek to impose liability on

Relators for publishing and moderating user-generated content. The trial court’s

refusal to apply Section 230 was an abuse of discretion.

A. Section 230 provides broad immunity for publishing
decisions.

Section 230 states: “No provider or user of an interactive computer service

shall be treated as the publisher or speaker of any information provided by another

information content provider.” 47 U.S.C. § 230(c)(1). Courts have repeatedly held

25
that this provision confers “broad immunity” on online providers for “all claims

stemming from their publication of information created by third parties,” including

at the motion to dismiss stage. A.B. v. Salesforce, Inc., 123 F.4th 788, 794 (5th Cir.

2024) (emphasis omitted) (quoting Doe v. MySpace, Inc., 528 F.3d 413, 418 (5th Cir.

2008)).

Publishing activity includes “any activity that can be boiled down to deciding

whether to exclude material that third parties seek to post online,” Fair Hous.

Council of San Fernando Valley v. Roommates.com, LLC, 521 F.3d 1157, 1170–71 (9th

Cir. 2008) (en banc), such as “reviewing, editing, and deciding whether to publish

or to withdraw from publication third-party content,” Barnes v. Yahoo!, Inc., 570

F.3d 1096, 1102 (9th Cir. 2009); accord Salesforce, 123 F.4th at 795 (Section 230 bars

claims that would create a “duty [that] would necessarily require an internet

company to monitor, alter, or remove third-party content.”) (cleaned up).

TikTok Inc. indisputably qualifies as a “provider” of “an interactive

computer service.” See Dyroff v. Ultimate Software Grp., Inc., 934 F.3d 1093, 1097

(9th Cir. 2019).13 Nor is there any question that the videos the State complains about

are not “[TikTok’s] own content [but], rather, third-party material published on

Relators’ arguments in this Section focus on TTI because TTI is the publisher of TikTok in the
13

United States. If TTI is immune from the State’s claims under Section 230, so are the remaining
Relators.
26
[TikTok].” See Angelilli v. Activision Blizzard, Inc., 781 F. Supp. 3d 691, 699 (N.D.

Ill. 2025). Section 230 therefore mandates dismissal of claims that seek to hold TTI

liable “for deciding whether” and “how” to “publish, withdraw, postpone or alter

content provided by third parties,” M.P. ex rel. Pinckney v. Meta Platforms Inc., 127

F.4th 516, 525–26 (4th Cir. 2025) (cleaned up), including each of the State’s DTPA

claims.

B. Section 230 bars Count IX.

In Count IX, the State seeks to hold Relators liable for failing to disclose that

design features allegedly “contribute[] to compulsive or excessive use that harms

users.” MR 0087. Courts have held that Section 230 immunity extends both to

“failure to warn” claims and to platform design and algorithmic tools because these

are “part and parcel of [a platform’s] overall design and operation,’” and involve

“‘choices about what content can appear on the [platform] and in what form’ and

thus ‘fall within the purview of traditional publisher functions.’” Fields v. Twitter,

Inc., 217 F. Supp. 3d 1116, 1124 (N.D. Cal. 2016) (quoting Doe v. Backpage.com, LLC,

817 F.3d 12, 20–21 (1st Cir. 2016)); see also Force v. Facebook, Inc., 934 F.3d 53, 66 (2d

Cir. 2019) (the “ordinary meaning” of “publisher” encompasses an online

platform’s use of “tools such as algorithms that are designed to match [third-party]

information with a consumer’s interests”); M.P., 127 F.4th at 526 (“Decisions

27
about whether and how to display certain information provided by third parties are

traditional editorial functions of publishers, notwithstanding the various methods

they use in performing that task.”).

Section 230 thus bars Count IX as to each of the features it challenges:

TikTok’s algorithm-based “stream of content . . . that is acutely personalized”,

MR 0061–62; 14 interactive features such as “comments,” “direct messages,” and

“group chats,” MR 0056–58;15 TikTok’s “infinite scroll,” “autoscroll,” and

14
“[A]lgorithms that predict and show . . . third-party content that is most likely to interest and
engage users” are “an essential part of traditional publishing.” Force, 934 F.3d at 65, 70–71
(emphasis in original omitted); M.P., 127 F.4th at 526 (“[T]he fact that Facebook uses an algorithm
to achieve . . . engagement does not change the underlying nature of the act that it is performing.”);
In re Soc. Media Adolescent Addiction/Pers. Inj. Prods. Liab. Litig., 702 F. Supp. 3d 809, 832–33 (N.D.
Cal. 2023) (algorithm-based recommendation systems are the very “means through which
defendants publish third-party content to users,” by determining “whether, when, and to whom”
to publish such content); State ex rel. Rosenblum v. TikTok Inc., 2025 Ore. Cir. LEXIS 5135, at *36
(Or. Cir. Ct. June 13, 2025) (TikTok’s “‘algorithms,’ ‘autoplay,’ ‘infinite scroll,’ and incessant
notifications are all content amplification features meant to publish content in a manner that
increases user engagement” and protected publishing activity under Section 230).
15
Doe v. Grindr, 128 F.4th 1148, 1153 (9th Cir. 2025) (interactive features, which “‘facilitate the
communication and content of others’ and are ‘content neutral’ on their own,” are subject to
Section 230 immunity (quoting Dyroff, 934 F.3d at 1098, 1100)); In re Soc. Media Adolescent
Addiction/Pers. Inj. Prods. Liab. Litig., 753 F. Supp. 3d 849, 882 (N.D. Cal. 2024) (“MDL II”).

28
“autoplay” features, MR 0060–62;16 ephemeral content, MR 0061; 17 notifications,

MR 0064–65; MR 0042; 18 and filters and effects, MR 0058. 19

Styling these allegations as a “failure to warn” claim does not change the

analysis. See MR 0088. Courts around the country—including the Supreme Court

of Texas—have rejected attempts to evade Section 230 by repackaging publishing

decisions in this way. 20 A contrary rule would eviscerate Section 230’s protections.

See Wozniak v. YouTube, LLC, 319 Cal. Rptr. 3d 597, 615 (Cal. Ct. App. 2024), as

modified on denial of reh’g (Apr. 2, 2024) (“allow[ing] essentially every state cause of

16
State ex rel. Rosenblum, 2025 Ore. Cir. LEXIS 5135, at *36 (holding TikTok’s “autoplay” and
“infinite scroll” are “content amplification measures” protected by Section 230); In re Soc. Media
Adolescent Addiction/Pers. Inj. Prods. Liab. Litig., 702 F. Supp. 3d 809, 831 (N.D. Cal. 2023) (“MDL
I”) (making such features the basis of liability would force platforms “to publish less third-party
content”).
17
MDL II, 753 F. Supp. 3d at 881 (quoting MDL I, 702 F. Supp. 3d at 832) (Section 230 immunizes
platforms’ choices as to “the length of content published and how long to publish” such content
as “traditional editorial functions.”).
18
Id. (quoting MDL I, 702 F. Supp. 3d at 833) (“[W]here notifications . . . alert users to third-party
content [on a platform], Section 230 bars” liability based on the notifications.).
19
See Dyroff, 934 F.3d at 1096 (Section 230 protects “content-neutral tools” that are “meant to
facilitate the communication and content of others.”).
20
See, e.g., In re Facebook, Inc., 625 S.W.3d at 95–96 & n.11 (holding Section 230 barred claims
“premised on Facebook’s alleged failures to warn or to adequately protect Plaintiffs from harm
caused by other users”) (collecting cases); Grindr, 128 F.4th at 1154 (“Nor can Grindr be held
liable for failure to warn. . . . Grindr’s role as a publisher of third-party content does not give it a
duty to warn users of a general possibility of harm resulting from the App.” (internal quotations
omitted)); Herrick v. Grindr LLC, 765 F. App’x 586, 591 (2d Cir. 2019) (“Herrick’s failure to warn
claim is inextricably linked to Grindr’s alleged failure to edit, monitor, or remove the offensive
content provided by his ex-boyfriend; accordingly, it is barred by § 230.”).
29
action otherwise immunized by section 230 to be pleaded as a failure to warn” claim

“runs counter” to settled authority).

C. Section 230 bars Counts I-VIII and X.

Counts I–VIII and X seek to hold Relators liable for the allegedly high volume

of user-generated content on the platform that is inappropriate for teens (Counts I–

VIII) and TTI’s alleged failure to enforce its own Guidelines (Count X). These

claims directly target editorial decisions—conduct Section 230 squarely protects. 21

Courts have consistently held that claims based on a platform’s alleged failure

to follow its own content moderation policies are barred by Section 230. For

example, in Doe v. Grindr, 128 F.4th 1148, 1154 (9th Cir. 2025), the court held that

Section 230 bars negligent misrepresentation claims based on a platform’s

“description of its moderation policy.” 22 Similarly, in Winter v. Facebook, Inc., the

court held that Section 230 barred a claim that TTI “refused to remove” content,

including by “failing to follow their own Community Standards and tak[e] down

21
“[W]hat matters is not the name of the cause of action,” Barnes, 570 F.3d at 1101, but instead
“whether the claims ‘inherently require[] the court to treat the defendant as the publisher or
speaker of content provided by another,’” Dyroff, 934 F.3d at 1098 (alteration in original) (quoting
Barnes, 570 F.3d at 1102).
22
Accord Beckman v. Match.com, LLC, 668 F. App’x 759, 759 (9th Cir. 2016) (rejecting
misrepresentation claims based on platform’s alleged non-compliance with own safety policies
because the “basis for each of those claims is [the service’s] role as a publisher of third-party
information”); Doe v. MySpace, 528 F.3d at 419–22 (rejecting negligent misrepresentation claims
based on similar alleged failures to limit content and interactions).
30
content that violates those standards.” 2021 WL 5446733, at *4–5 (E.D. Mo. Nov.

22, 2021). In short, platforms cannot be held liable for describing the general

standards that govern the third-party content they publish or for the manner in which

they enforce those standards. See, e.g., State ex rel. Rosenblum v. TikTok Inc., 2025

Ore. Cir. LEXIS 5135, at *40 (Or. Cir. Ct. June 13, 2025) (dismissing claims based

on TTI’s alleged failure to moderate content or enforce its Guidelines and noting

only “specific misrepresentations about particular safety products or features” may

be actionable (emphasis added)); see also id. at *32–34 (collecting cases in accord).

For good reason: “holding [an online provider] liable for establishing standards and

guidelines would ultimately create a powerful disincentive for service providers to

establish any standards or ever decide to remove objectionable content, which the

CDA was enacted to prevent.” Bennett v. Google, Inc., 2017 WL 2692607, at *2

(D.D.C. June 21, 2017), aff’d sub nom. Bennett v. Google, LLC, 882 F.3d 1163 (D.C.

Cir. 2018). But that is precisely what the State seeks to do here.

The State’s theory—that TikTok’s Age Ratings and Guidelines are deceptive

because “TikTok’s filters and moderators often fail to catch [mature content],”

MR 0039—cannot be disentangled from the platform’s publishing decisions. See

also, e.g., MR 0041, MR0045–46, MR 0049, MR 0069 (alleging statements are

deceptive due to high “leakage” rates for content categories). Courts have

31
repeatedly held that such claims are barred by Section 230 because they are premised

on “activity that can be boiled down to deciding whether to exclude material that

third parties seek to post online.” Roommates.com, 521 F.3d at 1170–71. 23 Indeed,

even when a provider “adopts definitive prohibitions regarding the content of third-

party user material, and does not enforce them,” Section 230 immunity applies.

Bennett, 2017 WL 2692607, at *2.

Given the overwhelming authority applying Section 230 to bar claims

targeting publishing and moderation conduct, the trial court’s refusal to dismiss

Counts I–X reflects a clear failure to apply controlling law—and thus an abuse of

discretion. See Walker, 827 S.W.2d at 840.

IV. The trial court abused its discretion by failing to dismiss the DTPA
claims under the First Amendment.

Beyond Section 230’s immunity, the First Amendment to the U.S.

Constitution independently protects an online platform’s editorial discretion over

how it selects, organizes, and presents third-party, user-generated content. The

23
See also Johnson v. Arden, 614 F.3d 785, 792 (8th Cir. 2010) (Under Section 230, claims “seeking
to hold a service provider liable for its exercise of a publisher’s traditional editorial functions—
such as deciding whether to publish, withdraw, postpone or alter content—are barred.” (quoting
Zeran v. Am. Online, Inc., 129 F.3d 327, 330 (4th Cir. 1997))); In re Zoom Video Commc’ns Inc. Priv.
Litig., 525 F. Supp. 3d 1017, 1030 (N.D. Cal. 2021) (“[T]he text of § 230(c) immunizes the
‘blocking and screening of offensive material,’ . . . also known as ‘content moderation.’”); MDL
I, 702 F. Supp. 3d at 853 n.58 (noting that “plaintiffs are barred from holding defendants’ [sic]
liable for their content moderation activities” and that their claims “must . . . not take issue with
defendants’ choices as to what content to take down or censor”).
32
State’s DTPA Claims (Counts I–X) violate this protection in two ways: first, by

seeking to impose liability for constitutionally-protected expressive activity; and

second, by compelling Relators to convey the State’s preferred message about

platform content. The U.S. Supreme Court has squarely held such claims

unconstitutional. Moody v. NetChoice, LLC, 603 U.S. 707 (2024). The trial court’s

refusal to apply that binding precedent constitutes an abuse of discretion. Walker,

827 S.W.2d at 840.

A. The DTPA Claims target expressive activity.

In Moody, the U.S. Supreme Court confirmed that an online platform’s

choices about “what third-party speech to display and how to display it”—including

“prioritization of content,” “use of algorithms,” “content moderation,” and the

platform’s “labels,” “warning[s], disclaimers, or general commentary”—are

expressive activities entitled to full First Amendment protection. 603 U.S. at 716–

17, 730–35, 739 (alteration in original). That protection applies fully even where, as

here, a state assertedly seeks to protect minors from allegedly harmful speech. See

Brown v. Ent. Merchs. Ass’n, 564 U.S. 786, 794 (2011) (The First Amendment “does

not include a free-floating power to restrict the ideas to which [minors] may be

exposed,” and “only in relatively narrow and well-defined circumstances may

33
government bar public dissemination of protected materials to them.” (citation

omitted)).

The State’s claims directly challenge these editorial choices. Counts I–VIII

seek to enjoin and impose liability for how different types of content allegedly appear

on TikTok. MR 0076, MR 0077, MR 0079–82, MR 0084, MR 0086, MR 0092.

Count X similarly targets and seeks to enjoin alleged content-moderation practices—

specifically, enforcement of the Guidelines. MR 0089, MR 0092. And Count IX

expressly targets and seeks to enjoin alleged design features that dictate “what third-

party speech to display and how to display it.” Moody, 603 U.S. at 716; see MR 0087–

88. Courts consistently dismiss such claims under the First Amendment.24 See

O’Handley v. Padilla, 579 F. Supp. 3d 1163, 1188 (N.D. Cal. 2022), aff’d sub nom.

O’Handley v. Weber, 62 F.4th 1145 (9th Cir. 2023), cert. denied, 144 S. Ct. 2715

(2024).

The State’s requested relief lays bare its unconstitutional objective: it asks the

court to enjoin TTI from making its current “representations in the Community

24
E.g., Patterson v. Meta Platforms, Inc., 2025 WL 2092260, at *5 (N.Y. App. Div. July 25, 2025)
(“[S]ocial media defendants are entitled to First Amendment protection for third-party content
recommended [] by algorithms.”); Angelilli, 781 F. Supp. 3d at 701 (“[I]nteractive features [that]
make [content] engaging and effective” implicate “First Amendment protection . . . at its
zenith.”); State ex rel. Rosenblum v. TikTok Inc., 2025 Ore. Cir. LEXIS 5153, at *50 (Or. Cir. Ct.
June 13, 2025) (refusing to impose liability based on TikTok’s design, because doing so would
interfere with “editorial decisions regarding how it disseminates information”).
34
Guidelines about the content permitted on TikTok,” MR 0093, such as statements

about what content is “not allowed,” MR 0068, and the statement that the

Guidelines “establish a set of norms and common code of conduct that provide for

a safe and welcoming space for everyone,” MR 0067–68. 25 But the First

Amendment forbids government efforts to “regulat[e] the content-moderation

policies” that an online platform “use[s] for [its] feed[]” in an attempt to “change

the speech that will be displayed there.” Moody, 603 U.S. at 743. It bars any

“interfere[nce]” with a platform’s “editorial choices” regarding what content-

moderation policies to adopt, and any attempt to “alter[] the content of [its]

compilation” by compelling inclusion of excluded material—or exclusion of

included material. Id. at 731–32. The State’s theory thus strikes at the heart of

protected editorial discretion, seeking precisely the kind of government control over

speech that the First Amendment forbids.

B. The DTPA claims seek to compel speech.

The injunction the State seeks would force Relators to adopt the State’s

preferred disclosures about TikTok’s content and alleged risks. Counts VIII, IX,

25
While the First Amendment does not protect fraudulent speech, these “statements of policy”
at issue here are too “general” to be verifiably false. See Bogard v. TikTok Inc., 2025 WL 604972,
at *11 (N.D. Cal. Feb. 24, 2025) (addressing “don’t allow” statements in TikTok’s Community
Guidelines and noting “it is difficult to imagine how such statements of policy could be considered
‘false’”).
35
and X assert that Relators “failed to disclose” that the platform contains “Explicit

Adult Content,” is “addictive,” and “deliberately permit[s]” “mature content.”

MR 0086, MR 0088–89. And the Prayer for Relief demands that Relators disclose

these messages in the Guidelines. MR 0093. The State thus seeks a court order

telling Relators how to label and communicate about the content on the platform.

Compelling platforms to label content or adopt government-scripted warnings

violates the First Amendment. Moody recognized that a platform’s “labels,”

“warning[s], disclaimers, or general commentary” are part of its expressive

message. 603 U.S. at 735, 739. These disclosures are not mere commercial speech,

which “does no more than propose a commercial transaction.” Bolger v. Youngs

Drug Prods. Corp., 463 U.S. 60, 66 (1983) (internal quotations omitted); NetChoice,

LLC v. Bonta, 113 F.4th 1101, 1119–20 (9th Cir. 2024) (rejecting argument that

speech about platform was commercial); Riley v. Nat’l Fed’n of the Blind of N.C., Inc.,

487 U.S. 781, 801 (1988) (noting that “a speaker’s rights are not lost merely because

compensation is received”). Instead, the State’s requested relief seeks to compel

Relators to tailor how they label and speak about the types of content available on

TikTok to reflect the State’s perspective—that is, to carry the State’s preferred

message about TikTok.

36
The First Amendment does not tolerate these types of efforts to force private

entities to communicate the government’s message. See Nat’l Inst. of Fam. & Life

Advocs. v. Becerra, 585 U.S. 755, 766 (2018) (laws that compel speech with a

particular message about controversial issues violate the First Amendment); see also

Nat’l Rifle Ass’n of Am. v. Vullo, 602 U.S. 175, 180–81, 188–91 (2024) (reaffirming

that “[g]overnment officials cannot attempt to coerce private parties in order to

punish or suppress views that the government disfavors”). The Ninth Circuit’s

recent decision in Bonta underscores this point: it struck down a law requiring

platforms to create reports about “harm” to children and mitigation plans, holding

that compelled disclosure of “highly subjective opinions about content-related

harms” violates the First Amendment. 113 F.4th at 1116–17, 1122.26 So, too, here:

The State not only seeks to impose liability on Relators for not communicating the

State’s preferred message that TikTok contains “Explicit Adult Content” and is

26
While in some circumstances, the Constitution permits the State to require speakers to convey
certain messages without their consent, those are typically limited to the inclusion of “purely
factual and uncontroversial information” and those requirements must be “reasonably related to
the State’s interest in preventing deception of consumers.” See Zauderer v. Off. of Disciplinary
Couns. for Sup. Ct. of Ohio, 471 U.S. 626,651–52 (1985); see also Ent. Software Ass’n v. Blagojevich,
469 F.3d 641, 651 (7th Cir. 2006). What the State contends TTI must say but has not—for
example, the subjective determinations that “Mature/Suggestive Themes” are
“Frequent/Intense” rather than “Infrequent/Mild” or that the platform’s age rating is “17+”
rather than “12+,” see MR 0078, MR 0084—is neither purely factual, nor uncontroversial.
37
allegedly addictive, see MR 0086, MR0088, but it also asks the court to dictate

Relators’ own speech about these topics, MR 0093.

The First Amendment therefore bars each of the State’s DTPA Claims. 27 The

court abused its discretion in ruling otherwise. 28

27
Courts do not typically apply the tiers of scrutiny where, as here, the State seeks to impose tort-
like liability in violation of the First Amendment; if the First Amendment has been properly raised
in defense, they simply dismiss the claims. See Snyder v. Phelps, 562 U.S. 443, 451–52 (2011); James
v. Meow Media, Inc., 300 F.3d 683, 696–97 (6th Cir. 2002); Angelilli, 781 F. Supp. 3d at 700–03. If
any level of scrutiny applies, the State’s claims would be subject to strict scrutiny because they are
content based: the State seeks to enjoin and impose liability for how specific types of content
allegedly appear on TikTok, and alleges TikTok is addictive because of the way it curates and
displays certain content to its users, and because the subject matter of that content is supposedly
too engaging. See, e.g., MR 0060–66, MR 0087–88. And the State’s claims cannot survive strict
scrutiny: while protecting minors is an important state interest, it does not give the State “free-
floating power to restrict the ideas to which [minors] may be exposed.” Brown, 564 U.S. at 794.
The State’s use of civil litigation—including penalties and coercive injunctions—is not tailored to
serve that interest. There are less restrictive ways to protect minors, such as public education
campaigns to inform users and parents about its views on platform safety. E.g., NetChoice, LLC v.
Reyes, 748 F. Supp. 3d 1105, 1127 (D. Utah 2024).
28
The Nevada Supreme Court’s recent decision denying a writ petition filed by TikTok Inc. and
others—including on Section 230 and First Amendment grounds—is not persuasive, as it is both
distinguishable and wrongly decided. See TikTok, Inc. v. Eighth Jud. Dist. Ct. in & for Cnty. of Clark,
141 Nev. Adv. Op. 51, 2025 WL 3111587 (Nev. Nov. 6, 2025). For its Section 230 ruling, Nevada
relied on Lemmon v. Snap, Inc., 995 F.3d 1085 (9th Cir. 2021), see TikTok Inc., 2025 WL 3111587 at
*6–*7, which rejected Section 230 immunity because the claims targeted Snap’s own design
features—not any third-party content—that caused harm “fully independent” of publishing
activity, Lemmon, 995 F.3d at 1093. Texas’s claims, by contrast, challenge algorithmic
amplification of allegedly harmful third-party content, see MR 0052, MR 0056–58, implicating both
Section 230’s protections for publishing activity and the First Amendment’s independent
protections for editorial discretion—a challenge that the State of Nevada expressly disclaimed,
TikTok Inc., 2025 WL 3111587 at *7–*8. Nevada’s reasoning, grounded entirely in Lemmon, is
therefore inapposite. (Nevada was also wrong to rely on Lemmon: in Nevada, the alleged harms
arising from the design elements at issue were not independent of the third-party content that those
elements caused to be published.)

The First Amendment analysis is likewise irrelevant. Nevada found the State’s claims fell
outside Moody’s scope because they involved algorithms that allegedly respond “solely” to user
38
V. An appeal is not an adequate remedy to correct the trial court’s
abuses of discretion.

Whether “an adequate appellate remedy exists” is determined “by weighing

the benefits of mandamus review against the detriments.” In re Acad., Ltd., 625

S.W.3d 19, 32 (Tex. 2021). “Mandamus review of significant rulings in exceptional

cases may be essential to preserve important substantive and procedural rights from

impairment or loss, allow the appellate courts to give needed and helpful direction

to the law that would otherwise prove elusive in appeals from final judgments, and

spare private parties and the public the time and money utterly wasted enduring

eventual reversal of improperly conducted proceedings.” In re Prudential, 148

S.W.3d at 136. Under this standard, there is no adequate remedy here for at least

two independent reasons.

First, where, as here, a proceeding is “fatally flawed,” mandamus relief is

appropriate to “spare the parties and the public” from wasting “time and money.”

behavior. TikTok Inc., 2025 WL 3111587 at *8 (quoting 603 U.S. at 736 n.5). By contrast, Texas
alleges TikTok’s algorithm incorporates company-driven inputs and editorial standards, making it
expressive under Moody. See MR 0038–39, MR 0040–41, MR 0044–0046, MR 0062. (Nevada’s
First Amendment analysis was also wrong: the State of Nevada’s theory is that TikTok’s
algorithm and other features are addictive to users because of the overall mix of videos displayed
and the way in which they are displayed. That theory not only challenges algorithms deemed
expressive in Moody, but it is also a content-based claim subject to strict scrutiny.) Finally,
Nevada’s reliance on Central Hudson Gas & Electric Corp. v. Public Service Commission of New York,
447 U.S. 557 (1980) to treat TikTok’s statements as commercial speech, see TikTok Inc., 2025 WL
3111587 at *8, does not apply. The statements Texas challenges concern content moderation
policies—not economic interests—and thus remain fully protected.
39
In re Essex, 450 S.W.3d at 528. Relators should not be required to engage in time-

intensive and expensive discovery, trial, and appeal processes before obtaining an

appellate ruling that the State’s SCOPE Act and DTPA Claims have no basis in law

or fact. See id.; see also In re Prudential, 148 S.W.3d at 136; In re John G. & Marie

Stella Kenedy Mem’l Found., 315 S.W.3d 519, 523 (Tex. 2010) (“[M]andamus relief

is appropriate” to spare parties time and money wasted on proceedings that will

eventually be reversed.). By contrast, the burden of mandamus review here is

minimal: Rule 91a dismissal turns exclusively on the plaintiff’s pleadings; no

depositions, discovery responses, or other evidence can be considered. See Tex. R.

Civ. P. 91a.6. And neither the government nor the public has any “legitimate interest

in enforc[ing] [] an unconstitutional law.” Carr, 789 F. Supp. 3d at 1233.

Second, mandamus relief is especially critical in this case to prevent the

“impairment or loss” of Relators’ “important substantive and procedural rights.”

In re Prudential, 148 S.W.3d at 136. The Texas Supreme Court has already held that

the immunity from suit conferred by Section 230 is among the “important

substantive . . . rights” that can “only be vindicated by dismissal” and mandamus,

rather than appeal. In re Facebook, 625 S.W.3d at 86–87. In fact, “[t]he most frequent

use we have made of mandamus relief involves cases in which the very act of

proceeding to trial—regardless of the outcome—would defeat the substantive right

40
involved.” In re McAllen Med. Ctr., Inc., 275 S.W.3d 458, 465 (Tex. 2008). And the

vague SCOPE Act provisions at issue infringe on Relators’ rights under the Due

Process Clause and First Amendment. These rights demand clear notice at the

outset and are infringed on an ongoing basis while the State litigates claims against

Relators when it cannot articulate what they have done wrong or how they could

have complied with the Act. See Benton, 980 S.W.2d at 437.

CONCLUSION AND PRAYER

For the reasons set forth above, this Court should grant mandamus and

reverse the trial court’s denial of Relators’ Rule 91a Motion to Dismiss the State’s

amended petition. This Court should further enter an order vacating the trial court’s

decision and instructing the trial court to enter an order dismissing the State’s

amended petition in its entirety.

41
November 18, 2025 Respectfully submitted,

/s/ Brandon Duke

Neema T. Sahni (pro hac vice) Brandon Duke
nsahni@cov.com bduke@omm.com
COVINGTON & BURLING LLP O’MELVENY & MYERS LLP
1999 Avenue of the Stars 700 Louisiana St., Suite 2900
Los Angeles, CA 90067 Houston, TX 77002
Tel. (424) 332-4800 Tel. (832) 254-1500
Fax. (424) 332-4749 Fax. (832) 254-1501

Megan A. Crowley (pro hac vice)
mcrowley@cov.com
COVINGTON & BURLING LLP
850 Tenth Street, NW
Washington, DC 20001
Tel. (202) 662-6000
Fax. (202) 778-5112

ATTORNEYS FOR RELATORS

42
CERTIFICATE OF COMPLIANCE

I certify that this Petition for Writ of Mandamus contains 10,333 words as

calculated under Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure 9.4(i)(1).

/s/ Brandon Duke

Brandon Duke
bduke@omm.com
O’MELVENY & MYERS LLP
700 Louisiana St., Suite 2900
Houston, TX 77002
Tel. (832) 254-1500
Fax. (832) 254-1501

43
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I certify that a true and correct copy of the this document was electronically

filed and served on all counsel of record on November 18, 2025.

/s/ Brandon Duke

Brandon Duke
bduke@omm.com
O’MELVENY & MYERS LLP
700 Louisiana St., Suite 2900
Houston, TX 77002
Tel. (832) 254-1500
Fax. (832) 254-1501

44
APPENDIX

Tab 1: Order Denying Defendants’ Rule 91a Motion (MR 0465)

Tab 2: Tex. R. Civ. P. 91a

Tab 3: Communications Decency Act, 47 U.S.C. § 230

Tab 4: Deceptive Trade Practices Act, Tex. Bus. & Com. Code §§ 17.44–.46

Tab 5: Securing Children Online through Parental Empowerment Act,
Tex. Bus & Com. Code §§ 509.001, 509.051–.057, 509.101

Tab 6: U.S. Const. amend. I

Tab 7: U.S. Const. amend. XIV

45
Appendix – Tab 1
10/01/2025 12:02:47 AM
Velva L. Price
District Clerk
Travis County
D-1-GN-25-003118
CAUSE NO. D-1-GN-25-003118

) IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF
STATE OF TEXAS,
)
Plaintiff, )
)
v. ) TRAVIS COUNTY, TEXAS
)
TIKTOK INC.; TIKTOK LTD.; TIKTOK PTE. )
LTD.; TIKTOK U.S. DATA SECURITY INC.; )
BYTEDANCE LTD.; and BYTEDANCE INC., 250th JUDICIAL DISTRICT
)
Defendants. )

ORDER DENYING DEFENDANTS’ RULE 91A MOTION TO DISMISS

Defendants’ Rule 91a motion to dismiss is DENIED.

Signed October 1, 2025.

HON. CORY LIU
JUDGE, 250TH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
TRAVIS COUNTY, TEXAS

0466
Appendix – Tab 2
91a.1. Motion and Grounds, TX R RCP Rule 91a.1

Vernon's Texas Rules Annotated
Texas Rules of Civil Procedure
Part II. Rules of Practice in District and County Courts
Section 4. Pleading
C. Pleadings of Defendant
Rule 91A. Dismissal of Baseless Causes of Action

TX Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 91a.1
Formerly cited as TX R RCP Rule 91a

91a.1. Motion and Grounds

Currentness

Except in a case brought under the Family Code or a case governed by Chapter 14 of the Texas Civil Practice and Remedies
Code, a party may move to dismiss a cause of action on the grounds that it has no basis in law or fact. A cause of action has no
basis in law if the allegations, taken as true, together with inferences reasonably drawn from them, do not entitle the claimant
to the relief sought. A cause of action has no basis in fact if no reasonable person could believe the facts pleaded.

Credits
Adopted by order of Feb. 12, 2013, eff. March 1, 2013.

Vernon's Ann. Texas Rules Civ. Proc., Rule 91a.1, TX R RCP Rule 91a.1
Current with amendments received through September 15, 2025. Some rules may be more current, see credits for details.

End of Document © 2025 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works.

© 2025 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works. 1
Appendix – Tab 3
§ 230. Protection for private blocking and screening of offensive material, 47 USCA § 230

United States Code Annotated
Title 47. Telecommunications (Refs & Annos)
Chapter 5. Wire or Radio Communication (Refs & Annos)
Subchapter II. Common Carriers (Refs & Annos)
Part I. Common Carrier Regulation

47 U.S.C.A. § 230

§ 230. Protection for private blocking and screening of offensive material

Currentness

(a) Findings

The Congress finds the following:

(1) The rapidly developing array of Internet and other interactive computer services available to individual Americans
represent an extraordinary advance in the availability of educational and informational resources to our citizens.

(2) These services offer users a great degree of control over the information that they receive, as well as the potential for
even greater control in the future as technology develops.

(3) The Internet and other interactive computer services offer a forum for a true diversity of political discourse, unique
opportunities for cultural development, and myriad avenues for intellectual activity.

(4) The Internet and other interactive computer services have flourished, to the benefit of all Americans, with a minimum
of government regulation.

(5) Increasingly Americans are relying on interactive media for a variety of political, educational, cultural, and entertainment
services.

(b) Policy

It is the policy of the United States--

(1) to promote the continued development of the Internet and other interactive computer services and other interactive media;

(2) to preserve the vibrant and competitive free market that presently exists for the Internet and other interactive computer
services, unfettered by Federal or State regulation;

© 2025 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works. 1
§ 230. Protection for private blocking and screening of offensive material, 47 USCA § 230

(3) to encourage the development of technologies which maximize user control over what information is received by
individuals, families, and schools who use the Internet and other interactive computer services;

(4) to remove disincentives for the development and utilization of blocking and filtering technologies that empower parents
to restrict their children's access to objectionable or inappropriate online material; and

(5) to ensure vigorous enforcement of Federal criminal laws to deter and punish trafficking in obscenity, stalking, and
harassment by means of computer.

(c) Protection for “Good Samaritan” blocking and screening of offensive material

(1) Treatment of publisher or speaker

No provider or user of an interactive computer service shall be treated as the publisher or speaker of any information provided
by another information content provider.

(2) Civil liability

No provider or user of an interactive computer service shall be held liable on account of--

(A) any action voluntarily taken in good faith to restrict access to or availability of material that the provider or user
considers to be obscene, lewd, lascivious, filthy, excessively violent, harassing, or otherwise objectionable, whether or not
such material is constitutionally protected; or

(B) any action taken to enable or make available to information content providers or others the technical means to restrict
access to material described in paragraph (1). 1

(d) Obligations of interactive computer service

A provider of interactive computer service shall, at the time of entering an agreement with a customer for the provision of
interactive computer service and in a manner deemed appropriate by the provider, notify such customer that parental control
protections (such as computer hardware, software, or filtering services) are commercially available that may assist the customer
in limiting access to material that is harmful to minors. Such notice shall identify, or provide the customer with access to
information identifying, current providers of such protections.

(e) Effect on other laws

(1) No effect on criminal law

Nothing in this section shall be construed to impair the enforcement of section 223 or 231 of this title, chapter 71 (relating to
obscenity) or 110 (relating to sexual exploitation of children) of Title 18, or any other Federal criminal statute.

© 2025 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works. 2
§ 230. Protection for private blocking and screening of offensive material, 47 USCA § 230

(2) No effect on intellectual property law

Nothing in this section shall be construed to limit or expand any law pertaining to intellectual property.

(3) State law

Nothing in this section shall be construed to prevent any State from enforcing any State law that is consistent with this section.
No cause of action may be brought and no liability may be imposed under any State or local law that is inconsistent with
this section.

(4) No effect on communications privacy law

Nothing in this section shall be construed to limit the application of the Electronic Communications Privacy Act of 1986 or
any of the amendments made by such Act, or any similar State law.

(5) No effect on sex trafficking law

Nothing in this section (other than subsection (c)(2)(A)) shall be construed to impair or limit--

(A) any claim in a civil action brought under section 1595 of Title 18, if the conduct underlying the claim constitutes a
violation of section 1591 of that title;

(B) any charge in a criminal prosecution brought under State law if the conduct underlying the charge would constitute
a violation of section 1591 of Title 18; or

(C) any charge in a criminal prosecution brought under State law if the conduct underlying the charge would constitute a
violation of section 2421A of Title 18, and promotion or facilitation of prostitution is illegal in the jurisdiction where the
defendant's promotion or facilitation of prostitution was targeted.

(f) Definitions

As used in this section:

(1) Internet

The term “Internet” means the international computer network of both Federal and non-Federal interoperable packet switched
data networks.

(2) Interactive computer service

© 2025 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works. 3
§ 230. Protection for private blocking and screening of offensive material, 47 USCA § 230

The term “interactive computer service” means any information service, system, or access software provider that provides
or enables computer access by multiple users to a computer server, including specifically a service or system that provides
access to the Internet and such systems operated or services offered by libraries or educational institutions.

(3) Information content provider

The term “information content provider” means any person or entity that is responsible, in whole or in part, for the creation
or development of information provided through the Internet or any other interactive computer service.

(4) Access software provider

The term “access software provider” means a provider of software (including client or server software), or enabling tools
that do any one or more of the following:

(A) filter, screen, allow, or disallow content;

(B) pick, choose, analyze, or digest content; or

(C) transmit, receive, display, forward, cache, search, subset, organize, reorganize, or translate content.

CREDIT(S)

(June 19, 1934, c. 652, Title II, § 230, as added Pub.L. 104-104, Title V, § 509, Feb. 8, 1996, 110 Stat. 137; amended Pub.L.
105-277, Div. C, Title XIV, § 1404(a), Oct. 21, 1998, 112 Stat. 2681-739; Pub.L. 115-164, § 4(a), Apr. 11, 2018, 132 Stat. 1254.)

Footnotes

1 So in original. Probably should be “subparagraph (A)”.

47 U.S.C.A. § 230, 47 USCA § 230
Current through P.L. 119-36. Some statute sections may be more current, see credits for details.

End of Document © 2025 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works.

© 2025 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works. 4
Appendix – Tab 4
§ 17.44. Construction and Application, TX BUS & COM § 17.44

Vernon's Texas Statutes and Codes Annotated
Business and Commerce Code (Refs & Annos)
Title 2. Competition and Trade Practices
Chapter 17. Deceptive Trade Practices (Refs & Annos)
Subchapter E. Deceptive Trade Practices and Consumer Protection (Refs & Annos)

V.T.C.A., Bus. & C. § 17.44

§ 17.44. Construction and Application

Currentness

(a) This subchapter shall be liberally construed and applied to promote its underlying purposes, which are to protect consumers
against false, misleading, and deceptive business practices, unconscionable actions, and breaches of warranty and to provide
efficient and economical procedures to secure such protection.

(b) Chapter 27, Property Code, prevails over this subchapter to the extent of any conflict.

Credits
Added by Acts 1973, 63rd Leg., p. 322, ch. 143, § 1, eff. May 21, 1973. Amended by Acts 1995, 74th Leg., ch. 414, § 1, eff.
Sept. 1, 1995.

V. T. C. A., Bus. & C. § 17.44, TX BUS & COM § 17.44
Current through the end of the 2025 Regular and Second Called Sessions of the 89th Legislature.

End of Document © 2025 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works.

© 2025 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works. 1
§ 17.45. Definitions, TX BUS & COM § 17.45

Vernon's Texas Statutes and Codes Annotated
Business and Commerce Code (Refs & Annos)
Title 2. Competition and Trade Practices
Chapter 17. Deceptive Trade Practices (Refs & Annos)
Subchapter E. Deceptive Trade Practices and Consumer Protection (Refs & Annos)

V.T.C.A., Bus. & C. § 17.45

§ 17.45. Definitions

Currentness

As used in this subchapter:

(1) “Goods” means tangible chattels or real property purchased or leased for use.

(2) “Services” means work, labor, or service purchased or leased for use, including services furnished in connection with
the sale or repair of goods.

(3) “Person” means an individual, partnership, corporation, association, or other group, however organized.

(4) “Consumer” means an individual, partnership, corporation, this state, or a subdivision or agency of this state who seeks
or acquires by purchase or lease, any goods or services, except that the term does not include a business consumer that has
assets of $25 million or more, or that is owned or controlled by a corporation or entity with assets of $25 million or more.

(5) “Unconscionable action or course of action” means an act or practice which, to a consumer's detriment, takes advantage
of the lack of knowledge, ability, experience, or capacity of the consumer to a grossly unfair degree.

(6) “Trade” and “commerce” mean the advertising, offering for sale, sale, lease, or distribution of any good or service, of
any property, tangible or intangible, real, personal, or mixed, and any other article, commodity, or thing of value, wherever
situated, and shall include any trade or commerce directly or indirectly affecting the people of this state.

(7) “Documentary material” includes the original or a copy of any book, record, report, memorandum, paper, communication,
tabulation, map, chart, photograph, mechanical transcription, or other tangible document or recording, wherever situated.

(8) “Consumer protection division” means the consumer protection division of the attorney general's office.

(9) “Knowingly” means actual awareness, at the time of the act or practice complained of, of the falsity, deception, or
unfairness of the act or practice giving rise to the consumer's claim or, in an action brought under Subdivision (2) of Subsection
(a) of Section 17.50, actual awareness of the act, practice, condition, defect, or failure constituting the breach of warranty,
but actual awareness may be inferred where objective manifestations indicate that a person acted with actual awareness.

© 2025 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works. 1
§ 17.45. Definitions, TX BUS & COM § 17.45

(10) “Business consumer” means an individual, partnership, or corporation who seeks or acquires by purchase or lease, any
goods or services for commercial or business use. The term does not include this state or a subdivision or agency of this state.

(11) “Economic damages” means compensatory damages for pecuniary loss, including costs of repair and replacement.
The term does not include exemplary damages or damages for physical pain and mental anguish, loss of consortium,
disfigurement, physical impairment, or loss of companionship and society.

(12) “Residence” means a building:

(A) that is a single-family house, duplex, triplex, or quadruplex or a unit in a multiunit residential structure in which title
to the individual units is transferred to the owners under a condominium or cooperative system; and

(B) that is occupied or to be occupied as the consumer's residence.

(13) “Intentionally” means actual awareness of the falsity, deception, or unfairness of the act or practice, or the condition,
defect, or failure constituting a breach of warranty giving rise to the consumer's claim, coupled with the specific intent that
the consumer act in detrimental reliance on the falsity or deception or in detrimental ignorance of the unfairness. Intention
may be inferred from objective manifestations that indicate that the person acted intentionally or from facts showing that
a defendant acted with flagrant disregard of prudent and fair business practices to the extent that the defendant should be
treated as having acted intentionally.

(14) “Vehicle protection product”:

(A) means a product or system, including a written warranty:

(i) that is:

(a) installed on or applied to a vehicle; and

(b) designed to prevent loss of or damage to a vehicle from a specific cause; and

(ii) under which, after installation or application of the product or system described by Subparagraph (i), if loss or
damage results from the failure of the product or system to perform as represented in the warranty, the warrantor, to
the extent agreed on as part of the warranty, is required to pay expenses to the person in this state who purchases or
otherwise possesses the product or system for the loss of or damage to the vehicle; and

(B) may also include identity recovery, as defined by Section 1304.003, Occupations Code, if the product or system
described by Paragraph (A) is financed under Chapter 348 or 353, Finance Code.

© 2025 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works. 2
§ 17.45. Definitions, TX BUS & COM § 17.45

(15) “Warrantor” means a person named under the terms of a vehicle protection product warranty as the contractual obligor
to a person in this state who purchases or otherwise possesses a vehicle protection product.

(16) “Loss of or damage to the vehicle,” for purposes of Subdivision (14)(A)(ii), may also include unreimbursed incidental
expenses that may be incurred by the warrantor, including expenses for a replacement vehicle, temporary vehicle rental
expenses, and registration expenses for replacement vehicles.

(17) “Building materials” includes lumber, windows, and other materials used in the construction or repair of improvements
to real property.

Credits
Added by Acts 1973, 63rd Leg., p. 322, ch. 143, § 1, eff. May 21, 1973. Amended by Acts 1975, 64th Leg., p. 149, ch. 62, §
1, eff. Sept. 1, 1975; Acts 1977, 65th Leg., p. 600, ch. 216, § 1, eff. May 23, 1977; Acts 1979, 66th Leg., p. 1327, ch. 603, §
2, eff. Aug. 27, 1979; Acts 1983, 68th Leg., p. 4943, ch. 883, §§ 2, 3, eff. Aug. 29, 1983; Acts 1995, 74th Leg., ch. 414, § 2,
eff. Sept. 1, 1995; Acts 2007, 80th Leg., ch. 411, § 1, eff. Sept. 1, 2007; Acts 2017, 85th Leg., ch. 967 (S.B. 2065), § 1.001, eff.
Sept. 1, 2017; Acts 2019, 86th Leg., ch. 759 (H.B. 1152), § 1, eff. Sept. 1, 2019.

V. T. C. A., Bus. & C. § 17.45, TX BUS & COM § 17.45
Current through the end of the 2025 Regular and Second Called Sessions of the 89th Legislature.

End of Document © 2025 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works.

© 2025 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works. 3
§ 17.46. Deceptive Trade Practices Unlawful, TX BUS & COM § 17.46

Vernon's Texas Statutes and Codes Annotated
Business and Commerce Code (Refs & Annos)
Title 2. Competition and Trade Practices
Chapter 17. Deceptive Trade Practices (Refs & Annos)
Subchapter E. Deceptive Trade Practices and Consumer Protection (Refs & Annos)

V.T.C.A., Bus. & C. § 17.46

§ 17.46. Deceptive Trade Practices Unlawful

Currentness

(a) False, misleading, or deceptive acts or practices in the conduct of any trade or commerce are hereby declared unlawful and
are subject to action by the consumer protection division under Sections 17.47, 17.58, 17.60, and 17.61 of this code.

(b) Except as provided in Subsection (d) of this section, the term “false, misleading, or deceptive acts or practices” includes,
but is not limited to, the following acts:

(1) passing off goods or services as those of another;

(2) causing confusion or misunderstanding as to the source, sponsorship, approval, or certification of goods or services;

(3) causing confusion or misunderstanding as to affiliation, connection, or association with, or certification by, another;

(4) using deceptive representations or designations of geographic origin in connection with goods or services;

(5) representing that goods or services have sponsorship, approval, characteristics, ingredients, uses, benefits, or quantities
which they do not have or that a person has a sponsorship, approval, status, affiliation, or connection which the person does
not;

(6) representing that goods are original or new if they are deteriorated, reconditioned, reclaimed, used, or secondhand;

(7) representing that goods or services are of a particular standard, quality, or grade, or that goods are of a particular style
or model, if they are of another;

(8) disparaging the goods, services, or business of another by false or misleading representation of facts;

(9) advertising goods or services with intent not to sell them as advertised;

© 2025 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works. 1
§ 17.46. Deceptive Trade Practices Unlawful, TX BUS & COM § 17.46

(10) advertising goods or services with intent not to supply a reasonable expectable public demand, unless the advertisements
disclosed a limitation of quantity;

(11) making false or misleading statements of fact concerning the reasons for, existence of, or amount of price reductions;

(12) representing that an agreement confers or involves rights, remedies, or obligations which it does not have or involve,
or which are prohibited by law;

(13) knowingly making false or misleading statements of fact concerning the need for parts, replacement, or repair service;

(14) misrepresenting the authority of a salesman, representative or agent to negotiate the final terms of a consumer transaction;

(15) basing a charge for the repair of any item in whole or in part on a guaranty or warranty instead of on the value of the
actual repairs made or work to be performed on the item without stating separately the charges for the work and the charge
for the warranty or guaranty, if any;

(16) disconnecting, turning back, or resetting the odometer of any motor vehicle so as to reduce the number of miles indicated
on the odometer gauge;

(17) advertising of any sale by fraudulently representing that a person is going out of business;

(18) advertising, selling, or distributing a card which purports to be a prescription drug identification card issued under Section
4151.152, Insurance Code, in accordance with rules adopted by the commissioner of insurance, which offers a discount on the
purchase of health care goods or services from a third party provider, and which is not evidence of insurance coverage, unless:

(A) the discount is authorized under an agreement between the seller of the card and the provider of those goods and
services or the discount or card is offered to members of the seller;

(B) the seller does not represent that the card provides insurance coverage of any kind; and

(C) the discount is not false, misleading, or deceptive;

(19) using or employing a chain referral sales plan in connection with the sale or offer to sell of goods, merchandise, or
anything of value, which uses the sales technique, plan, arrangement, or agreement in which the buyer or prospective buyer
is offered the opportunity to purchase merchandise or goods and in connection with the purchase receives the seller's promise
or representation that the buyer shall have the right to receive compensation or consideration in any form for furnishing to the
seller the names of other prospective buyers if receipt of the compensation or consideration is contingent upon the occurrence
of an event subsequent to the time the buyer purchases the merchandise or goods;

© 2025 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works. 2
§ 17.46. Deceptive Trade Practices Unlawful, TX BUS & COM § 17.46

(20) representing that a guaranty or warranty confers or involves rights or remedies which it does not have or involve,
provided, however, that nothing in this subchapter shall be construed to expand the implied warranty of merchantability as
defined in Sections 2.314 through 2.318 and Sections 2A.212 through 2A.216 to involve obligations in excess of those which
are appropriate to the goods;

(21) promoting a pyramid promotional scheme, as defined by Section 17.461;

(22) representing that work or services have been performed on, or parts replaced in, goods when the work or services were
not performed or the parts replaced;

(23) filing suit founded upon a written contractual obligation of and signed by the defendant to pay money arising out
of or based on a consumer transaction for goods, services, loans, or extensions of credit intended primarily for personal,
family, household, or agricultural use in any county other than in the county in which the defendant resides at the time of the
commencement of the action or in the county in which the defendant in fact signed the contract; provided, however, that a
violation of this subsection shall not occur where it is shown by the person filing such suit that the person neither knew or
had reason to know that the county in which such suit was filed was neither the county in which the defendant resides at the
commencement of the suit nor the county in which the defendant in fact signed the contract;

(24) failing to disclose information concerning goods or services which was known at the time of the transaction if such
failure to disclose such information was intended to induce the consumer into a transaction into which the consumer would
not have entered had the information been disclosed;

(25) using the term “corporation,” “incorporated,” or an abbreviation of either of those terms in the name of a business entity
that is not incorporated under the laws of this state or another jurisdiction;

(26) selling, offering to sell, or illegally promoting an annuity contract under Chapter 22, Acts of the 57th Legislature, 3rd
Called Session, 1962 (Article 6228a-5, Vernon's Texas Civil Statutes), with the intent that the annuity contract will be the
subject of a salary reduction agreement, as defined by that Act, if the annuity contract is not an eligible qualified investment
under that Act;

(27) subject to Section 17.4625, taking advantage of a disaster declared by the governor under Chapter 418, Government
Code, or by the president of the United States by:

(A) selling or leasing fuel, food, medicine, lodging, building materials, construction tools, or another necessity at an
exorbitant or excessive price; or

(B) demanding an exorbitant or excessive price in connection with the sale or lease of fuel, food, medicine, lodging,
building materials, construction tools, or another necessity;

(28) using the translation into a foreign language of a title or other word, including “attorney,” “immigration consultant,”
“immigration expert,” “lawyer,” “licensed,” “notary,” and “notary public,” in any written or electronic material, including an

© 2025 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works. 3
§ 17.46. Deceptive Trade Practices Unlawful, TX BUS & COM § 17.46

advertisement, a business card, a letterhead, stationery, a website, or an online video, in reference to a person who is not an
attorney in order to imply that the person is authorized to practice law in the United States;

(29) delivering or distributing a solicitation in connection with a good or service that:

(A) represents that the solicitation is sent on behalf of a governmental entity when it is not; or

(B) resembles a governmental notice or form that represents or implies that a criminal penalty may be imposed if the
recipient does not remit payment for the good or service;

(30) delivering or distributing a solicitation in connection with a good or service that resembles a check or other negotiable
instrument or invoice, unless the portion of the solicitation that resembles a check or other negotiable instrument or invoice
includes the following notice, clearly and conspicuously printed in at least 18-point type:

“SPECIMEN-NON-NEGOTIABLE”;

(31) in the production, sale, distribution, or promotion of a synthetic substance that produces and is intended to produce an
effect when consumed or ingested similar to, or in excess of, the effect of a controlled substance or controlled substance
analogue, as those terms are defined by Section 481.002, Health and Safety Code:

(A) making a deceptive representation or designation about the synthetic substance; or

(B) causing confusion or misunderstanding as to the effects the synthetic substance causes when consumed or ingested;

(32) a licensed public insurance adjuster directly or indirectly soliciting employment, as defined by Section 38.01, Penal
Code, for an attorney, or a licensed public insurance adjuster entering into a contract with an insured for the primary purpose
of referring the insured to an attorney without the intent to actually perform the services customarily provided by a licensed
public insurance adjuster, provided that this subdivision may not be construed to prohibit a licensed public insurance adjuster
from recommending a particular attorney to an insured;

(33) owning, operating, maintaining, or advertising a massage establishment, as defined by Section 455.001, Occupations
Code, that:

(A) is not appropriately licensed under Chapter 455, Occupations Code, or is not in compliance with the applicable licensing
and other requirements of that chapter; or

(B) is not in compliance with an applicable local ordinance relating to the licensing or regulation of massage establishments;
or

© 2025 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works. 4
§ 17.46. Deceptive Trade Practices Unlawful, TX BUS & COM § 17.46

(34) a warrantor of a vehicle protection product warranty using, in connection with the product, a name that includes
“casualty,” “surety,” “insurance,” “mutual,” or any other word descriptive of an insurance business, including property or
casualty insurance, or a surety business.

(c)(1) It is the intent of the legislature that in construing Subsection (a) of this section in suits brought under Section 17.47 of this
subchapter the courts to the extent possible will be guided by Subsection (b) of this section and the interpretations given by the
Federal Trade Commission and federal courts to Section 5(a)(1) of the Federal Trade Commission Act [15 U.S.C.A. § 45(a)(1) ].

(2) In construing this subchapter the court shall not be prohibited from considering relevant and pertinent decisions of courts
in other jurisdictions.

(d) For the purposes of the relief authorized in Subdivision (1) of Subsection (a) of Section 17.50 of this subchapter, the term
“false, misleading, or deceptive acts or practices” is limited to the acts enumerated in specific subdivisions of Subsection (b)
of this section.

Credits
Added by Acts 1973, 63rd Leg., p. 322, ch. 143, § 1, eff. May 21, 1973. Amended by Acts 1977, 65th Leg., p. 601, ch. 216, §§
2, 3, eff. May 23, 1977; Acts 1977, 65th Leg., p. 892, ch. 336, § 1, eff. Aug. 29, 1977; Acts 1979, 66th Leg., p. 1327, ch. 603,
§ 3, eff. Aug. 27, 1979; Acts 1987, 70th Leg., ch. 280, § 1, eff. Sept. 1, 1987; Acts 1993, 73rd Leg., ch. 570, § 6, eff. Sept. 1,
1993; Acts 1995, 74th Leg., ch. 414, § 3, eff. Sept. 1, 1995; Acts 1995, 74th Leg., ch. 463, § 1, eff. Sept. 1, 1995; Acts 2001,
77th Leg., ch. 962, § 1, eff. Sept. 1, 2001; Acts 2001, 77th Leg., ch. 1229, § 27, eff. June 1, 2002; Acts 2003, 78th Leg., ch.
1276, § 4.001(a), eff. Sept. 1, 2003; Acts 2005, 79th Leg., ch. 728, § 11.101, eff. Sept. 1, 2005; Acts 2007, 80th Leg., ch. 1230,
§ 26, eff. Sept. 1, 2007; Acts 2015, 84th Leg., ch. 1023 (H.B. 1265), § 1, eff. Sept. 1, 2015; Acts 2015, 84th Leg., ch. 1080
(H.B. 2573), § 1, eff. Sept. 1, 2015; Acts 2017, 85th Leg., ch. 324 (S.B. 1488), § 3.001, eff. Sept. 1, 2017; Acts 2017, 85th Leg.,
ch. 858 (H.B. 2552), § 1, eff. Sept. 1, 2017; Acts 2017, 85th Leg., ch. 967 (S.B. 2065), §§ 1.002, 2.001, eff. Sept. 1, 2017; Acts
2019, 86th Leg., ch. 203 (H.B. 2820), § 2.01, eff. Sept. 1, 2019; Acts 2019, 86th Leg., ch. 467 (H.B. 4170), § 3.001, eff. Sept.
1, 2019; Acts 2019, 86th Leg., ch. 759 (H.B. 1152), § 2, eff. Sept. 1, 2019.

V. T. C. A., Bus. & C. § 17.46, TX BUS & COM § 17.46
Current through the end of the 2025 Regular and Second Called Sessions of the 89th Legislature.

End of Document © 2025 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works.

© 2025 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works. 5
Appendix – Tab 5
T. 11, Subt. A, Ch. 509, Refs & Annos, TX BUS & COM T. 11, Subt. A, Ch. 509,...

Vernon's Texas Statutes and Codes Annotated
Business and Commerce Code
Title 11. Personal Identity Information
Subtitle A. Identifying Information
Chapter 509. Use of Digital Services by Minors

V.T.C.A., Bus. & C. T. 11, Subt. A, Ch. 509, Refs & Annos
Currentness

V. T. C. A., Bus. & C. T. 11, Subt. A, Ch. 509, Refs & Annos, TX BUS & COM T. 11, Subt. A, Ch. 509, Refs & Annos
Current through the end of the 2025 Regular and Second Called Sessions of the 89th Legislature.

End of Document © 2025 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works.

© 2025 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works. 1
§ 509.001. Definitions, TX BUS & COM § 509.001

Vernon's Texas Statutes and Codes Annotated
Business and Commerce Code (Refs & Annos)
Title 11. Personal Identity Information (Refs & Annos)
Subtitle A. Identifying Information
Chapter 509. Use of Digital Services by Minors (Refs & Annos)
Subchapter A. General Provisions

V.T.C.A., Bus. & C. § 509.001

§ 509.001. Definitions

Currentness

In this chapter:

(1) “Digital service” means a website, an application, a program, or software that collects or processes personal identifying
information with Internet connectivity.

(2) “Digital service provider” means a person who:

(A) owns or operates a digital service;

(B) determines the purpose of collecting and processing the personal identifying information of users of the digital service;
and

(C) determines the means used to collect and process the personal identifying information of users of the digital service.

(3) “Harmful material” has the meaning assigned by Section 43.24, Penal Code.

(4) “Known minor” means a person that a digital service provider knows to be a minor.

(5) “Minor” means a child who is younger than 18 years of age who has not had the disabilities of minority removed for
general purposes.

(6) “Personal identifying information” means any information, including sensitive information, that is linked or reasonably
linkable to an identified or identifiable individual. The term includes pseudonymous information when the information is used
by a controller or processor in conjunction with additional information that reasonably links the information to an identified
or identifiable individual. The term does not include deidentified information or publicly available information.

© 2025 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works. 1
§ 509.001. Definitions, TX BUS & COM § 509.001

(7) “Verified parent” means the parent or guardian of a known minor whose identity and relationship to the minor have been
verified by a digital service provider under Section 509.101.

Credits
Added by Acts 2023, 88th Leg., ch. 795 (H.B. 18), § 2.01, eff. Sept. 1, 2024.

V. T. C. A., Bus. & C. § 509.001, TX BUS & COM § 509.001
Current through the end of the 2025 Regular and Second Called Sessions of the 89th Legislature.

End of Document © 2025 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works.

© 2025 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works. 2
§ 509.051. Digital Service Provider Duty to Register Age of User, TX BUS & COM §...

Vernon's Texas Statutes and Codes Annotated
Business and Commerce Code (Refs & Annos)
Title 11. Personal Identity Information (Refs & Annos)
Subtitle A. Identifying Information
Chapter 509. Use of Digital Services by Minors (Refs & Annos)
Subchapter B. Digital Service Provider Duties and Prohibitions

V.T.C.A., Bus. & C. § 509.051

§ 509.051. Digital Service Provider Duty to Register Age of User

Currentness

(a) A digital service provider may not enter into an agreement with a person to create an account with a digital service unless
the person has registered the person's age with the digital service provider.

(b) A person who registers the person's age as younger than 18 years of age is considered to be a known minor to the digital
service provider until after the person's 18th birthday.

(c) A digital service provider may not allow a person who registers the person's age to alter the person's registered age, unless
the alteration process involves a commercially reasonable review process.

(d) A minor is considered to be a known minor to a digital service provider if:

(1) the minor registers the minor's age under Section 509.051 as younger than 18 years of age; or

(2) the minor's parent or guardian, including a verified parent:

(A) notifies a digital service provider that the minor is younger than 18 years of age;

(B) successfully disputes the registered age of the minor; or

(C) performs another function of a parent or guardian under this chapter.

(e) If a minor is a known minor, or if the minor's parent or guardian, including a verified parent, takes an action under Subsection
(a), a digital service provider:

(1) is considered to have actual knowledge that the minor is younger than 18 years of age; and

© 2025 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works. 1
§ 509.051. Digital Service Provider Duty to Register Age of User, TX BUS & COM §...

(2) shall treat the minor as a known minor under this chapter.

Credits
Added by Acts 2023, 88th Leg., ch. 795 (H.B. 18), § 2.01, eff. Sept. 1, 2024.

V. T. C. A., Bus. & C. § 509.051, TX BUS & COM § 509.051
Current through the end of the 2025 Regular and Second Called Sessions of the 89th Legislature.

End of Document © 2025 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works.

© 2025 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works. 2
§ 509.052. Digital Service Provider Duties Relating to..., TX BUS & COM §...

Vernon's Texas Statutes and Codes Annotated
Business and Commerce Code (Refs & Annos)
Title 11. Personal Identity Information (Refs & Annos)
Subtitle A. Identifying Information
Chapter 509. Use of Digital Services by Minors (Refs & Annos)
Subchapter B. Digital Service Provider Duties and Prohibitions

V.T.C.A., Bus. & C. § 509.052

§ 509.052. Digital Service Provider Duties Relating to Agreement With Minor

Currentness

Unless a verified parent provides otherwise under Section 509.102, a digital service provider that enters into an agreement with
a known minor for access to a digital service:

(1) shall:

(A) limit collection of the known minor's personal identifying information to information reasonably necessary to provide
the digital service; and

(B) limit use of the known minor's personal identifying information to the purpose for which the information was collected;
and

(2) may not:

(A) allow the known minor to make purchases or engage in other financial transactions through the digital service;

(B) share, disclose, or sell the known minor's personal identifying information;

(C) use the digital service to collect the known minor's precise geolocation data; or

(D) use the digital service to display targeted advertising to the known minor.

Credits
Added by Acts 2023, 88th Leg., ch. 795 (H.B. 18), § 2.01, eff. Sept. 1, 2024.

V. T. C. A., Bus. & C. § 509.052, TX BUS & COM § 509.052
Current through the end of the 2025 Regular and Second Called Sessions of the 89th Legislature.

© 2025 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works. 1
§ 509.052. Digital Service Provider Duties Relating to..., TX BUS & COM §...

End of Document © 2025 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works.

© 2025 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works. 2
§ 509.053. Digital Service Provider Duty to Prevent Harm..., TX BUS & COM §...

Vernon's Texas Statutes and Codes Annotated
Business and Commerce Code (Refs & Annos)
Title 11. Personal Identity Information (Refs & Annos)
Subtitle A. Identifying Information
Chapter 509. Use of Digital Services by Minors (Refs & Annos)
Subchapter B. Digital Service Provider Duties and Prohibitions

V.T.C.A., Bus. & C. § 509.053

§ 509.053. Digital Service Provider Duty to Prevent Harm to Known Minors

Currentness

(a) In relation to a known minor's use of a digital service, a digital service provider shall develop and implement a strategy to
prevent the known minor's exposure to harmful material and other content that promotes, glorifies, or facilitates:

(1) suicide, self-harm, or eating disorders;

(2) substance abuse;

(3) stalking, bullying, or harassment; or

(4) grooming, trafficking, child pornography, or other sexual exploitation or abuse.

(b) A strategy developed under Subsection (a):

(1) must include:

(A) creating and maintaining a comprehensive list of harmful material or other content described by Subsection (a) to
block from display to a known minor;

(B) using filtering technology and other protocols to enforce the blocking of material or content on the list under Paragraph
(A);

(C) using hash-sharing technology and other protocols to identify recurring harmful material or other content described
by Subsection (a);

(D) creating and maintaining a database of keywords used for filter evasion, such as identifiable misspellings, hash-tags,
or identifiable homoglyphs;

© 2025 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works. 1
§ 509.053. Digital Service Provider Duty to Prevent Harm..., TX BUS & COM §...

(E) performing standard human-performed monitoring reviews to ensure efficacy of filtering technology;

(F) making available to users a comprehensive description of the categories of harmful material or other content described
by Subsection (a) that will be filtered; and

(G) except as provided by Section 509.058, making available the digital service provider's algorithm code to independent
security researchers; and

(2) may include:

(A) engaging a third party to rigorously review the digital service provider's content filtering technology;

(B) participating in industry-specific partnerships to share best practices in preventing access to harmful material or other
content described by Subsection (a); or

(C) conducting periodic independent audits to ensure:

(i) continued compliance with the digital service provider's strategy; and

(ii) efficacy of filtering technology and protocols used by the digital service provider.

Credits
Added by Acts 2023, 88th Leg., ch. 795 (H.B. 18), § 2.01, eff. Sept. 1, 2024.

V. T. C. A., Bus. & C. § 509.053, TX BUS & COM § 509.053
Current through the end of the 2025 Regular and Second Called Sessions of the 89th Legislature.

End of Document © 2025 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works.

© 2025 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works. 2
§ 509.054. Digital Service Provider Duty to Create Parental..., TX BUS & COM §...

Vernon's Texas Statutes and Codes Annotated
Business and Commerce Code (Refs & Annos)
Title 11. Personal Identity Information (Refs & Annos)
Subtitle A. Identifying Information
Chapter 509. Use of Digital Services by Minors (Refs & Annos)
Subchapter B. Digital Service Provider Duties and Prohibitions

V.T.C.A., Bus. & C. § 509.054

§ 509.054. Digital Service Provider Duty to Create Parental Tools

Currentness

(a) A digital service provider shall create and provide to a verified parent parental tools to allow the verified parent to supervise
the verified parent's known minor's use of a digital service.

(b) Parental tools under this section must allow a verified parent to:

(1) control the known minor's privacy and account settings;

(2) alter the duties of a digital service provider under Section 509.052 with regard to the verified parent's known minor;

(3) if the verified parent alters the duty of a digital service provider under Section 509.052(2)(A), restrict the ability of the
verified parent's known minor to make purchases or engage in financial transactions; and

(4) monitor and limit the amount of time the verified parent's known minor spends using the digital service.

Credits
Added by Acts 2023, 88th Leg., ch. 795 (H.B. 18), § 2.01, eff. Sept. 1, 2024.

V. T. C. A., Bus. & C. § 509.054, TX BUS & COM § 509.054
Current through the end of the 2025 Regular and Second Called Sessions of the 89th Legislature.

End of Document © 2025 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works.

© 2025 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works. 1
§ 509.055. Digital Service Provider Duties Regarding..., TX BUS & COM §...

Vernon's Texas Statutes and Codes Annotated
Business and Commerce Code (Refs & Annos)
Title 11. Personal Identity Information (Refs & Annos)
Subtitle A. Identifying Information
Chapter 509. Use of Digital Services by Minors (Refs & Annos)
Subchapter B. Digital Service Provider Duties and Prohibitions

V.T.C.A., Bus. & C. § 509.055

§ 509.055. Digital Service Provider Duties Regarding Advertising and Marketing

Currentness

A digital service provider shall make a commercially reasonable effort to prevent advertisers on the digital service provider's
digital service from targeting a known minor with advertisements that facilitate, promote, or offer a product, service, or activity
that is unlawful for a minor in this state to use or engage in.

Credits
Added by Acts 2023, 88th Leg., ch. 795 (H.B. 18), § 2.01, eff. Sept. 1, 2024.

V. T. C. A., Bus. & C. § 509.055, TX BUS & COM § 509.055
Current through the end of the 2025 Regular and Second Called Sessions of the 89th Legislature.

End of Document © 2025 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works.

© 2025 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works. 1
§ 509.056. Use of Algorithms, TX BUS & COM § 509.056

Vernon's Texas Statutes and Codes Annotated
Business and Commerce Code (Refs & Annos)
Title 11. Personal Identity Information (Refs & Annos)
Subtitle A. Identifying Information
Chapter 509. Use of Digital Services by Minors (Refs & Annos)
Subchapter B. Digital Service Provider Duties and Prohibitions

V.T.C.A., Bus. & C. § 509.056

§ 509.056. Use of Algorithms

Currentness

A digital service provider that uses algorithms to automate the suggestion, promotion, or ranking of information to known
minors on the digital service shall:

(1) make a commercially reasonable effort to ensure that the algorithm does not interfere with the digital service provider's
duties under Section 509.053; and

(2) disclose in the digital service provider's terms of service, privacy policy, or similar document, in a clear and accessible
manner, an overview of:

(A) the manner in which the digital service uses algorithms to provide information or content;

(B) the manner in which algorithms promote, rank, or filter information or content; and

(C) the personal identifying information used as inputs to provide information or content.

Credits
Added by Acts 2023, 88th Leg., ch. 795 (H.B. 18), § 2.01, eff. Sept. 1, 2024.

V. T. C. A., Bus. & C. § 509.056, TX BUS & COM § 509.056
Current through the end of the 2025 Regular and Second Called Sessions of the 89th Legislature.

End of Document © 2025 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works.

© 2025 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works. 1
§ 509.057. Digital Service Provider Duty as to Harmful Material, TX BUS & COM § 509.057

Vernon's Texas Statutes and Codes Annotated
Business and Commerce Code (Refs & Annos)
Title 11. Personal Identity Information (Refs & Annos)
Subtitle A. Identifying Information
Chapter 509. Use of Digital Services by Minors (Refs & Annos)
Subchapter B. Digital Service Provider Duties and Prohibitions

V.T.C.A., Bus. & C. § 509.057

§ 509.057. Digital Service Provider Duty as to Harmful Material

Currentness

(a) A digital service provider as defined by Section 509.001 that knowingly publishes or distributes material, more than one-
third of which is harmful material or obscene as defined by Section 43.21, Penal Code, must use a commercially reasonable
age verification method to verify that any person seeking to access content on or through the provider's digital service is 18
years of age or older.

(b) If a person seeking to access content on or through the digital service of a provider for which age verification is required
under this section is not 18 years of age or older, the digital service provider may not enter into an agreement with the person
for access to the digital service.

Credits
Added by Acts 2023, 88th Leg., ch. 795 (H.B. 18), § 2.01, eff. Sept. 1, 2024.

V. T. C. A., Bus. & C. § 509.057, TX BUS & COM § 509.057
Current through the end of the 2025 Regular and Second Called Sessions of the 89th Legislature.

End of Document © 2025 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works.

© 2025 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works. 1
§ 509.101. Verification of Parent or Guardian, TX BUS & COM § 509.101

Vernon's Texas Statutes and Codes Annotated
Business and Commerce Code (Refs & Annos)
Title 11. Personal Identity Information (Refs & Annos)
Subtitle A. Identifying Information
Chapter 509. Use of Digital Services by Minors (Refs & Annos)
Subchapter C. Verified Parents

V.T.C.A., Bus. & C. § 509.101

§ 509.101. Verification of Parent or Guardian

Currentness

(a) A digital service provider shall verify, using a commercially reasonable method and for each person seeking to perform an
action on a digital service as a minor's parent or guardian:

(1) the person's identity; and

(2) the relationship of the person to the known minor.

(b) A digital service provider shall provide a process by which a person who has been verified under Subsection (a) as the
parent or guardian of a known minor may participate in the digital service as the known minor's verified parent as provided
by this chapter.

Credits
Added by Acts 2023, 88th Leg., ch. 795 (H.B. 18), § 2.01, eff. Sept. 1, 2024.

V. T. C. A., Bus. & C. § 509.101, TX BUS & COM § 509.101
Current through the end of the 2025 Regular and Second Called Sessions of the 89th Legislature.

End of Document © 2025 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works.

© 2025 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works. 1
Appendix – Tab 6
Amendment I. Establishment of Religion; Free Exercise of..., USCA CONST Amend. I

United States Code Annotated
Constitution of the United States
Annotated
Amendment I. Religion; Speech and the Press; Assembly; Petition

U.S.C.A. Const. Amend. I

Amendment I. Establishment of Religion; Free Exercise of Religion; Freedom
of Speech and the Press; Peaceful Assembly; Petition for Redress of Grievances

Currentness

Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or abridging the
freedom of speech, or of the press; or the right of the people peaceably to assemble, and to petition the Government for a redress
of grievances.

<Historical notes and references are included in the full text document for this amendment.>

<For Notes of Decisions, see separate documents for clauses of this amendment:>

<USCA Const Amend. I--Establishment clause; Free Exercise clause>

<USCA Const Amend. I--Free Speech clause; Free Press clause>

<USCA Const Amend. I--Assembly clause; Petition clause>

U.S.C.A. Const. Amend. I, USCA CONST Amend. I
Current through P.L. 119-36. Some statute sections may be more current, see credits for details.

End of Document © 2025 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works.

© 2025 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works. 1
Appendix – Tab 7
AMENDMENT XIV. CITIZENSHIP; PRIVILEGES AND..., USCA CONST Amend....

United States Code Annotated
Constitution of the United States
Annotated
Amendment XIV. Citizenship; Privileges and Immunities; Due Process; Equal Protection; Apportionment of
Representation; Disqualification of Officers; Public Debt; Enforcement

U.S.C.A. Const. Amend. XIV

AMENDMENT XIV. CITIZENSHIP; PRIVILEGES AND IMMUNITIES; DUE PROCESS; EQUAL PROTECTION;
APPOINTMENT OF REPRESENTATION; DISQUALIFICATION OF OFFICERS; PUBLIC DEBT; ENFORCEMENT

Currentness

Section 1. All persons born or naturalized in the United States, and subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United
States and of the State wherein they reside. No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or
immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due
process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.

Section 2. Representatives shall be apportioned among the several States according to their respective numbers, counting the
whole number of persons in each State, excluding Indians not taxed. But when the right to vote at any election for the choice of
electors for President and Vice President of the United States, Representatives in Congress, the Executive and Judicial officers
of a State, or the members of the Legislature thereof, is denied to any of the male inhabitants of such State, being twenty-one
years of age, and citizens of the United States, or in any way abridged, except for participation in rebellion, or other crime, the
basis of representation therein shall be reduced in the proportion which the number of such male citizens shall bear to the whole
number of male citizens twenty-one years of age in such State.

Section 3. No person shall be a Senator or Representative in Congress, or elector of President and Vice President, or hold any
office, civil or military, under the United States, or under any State, who, having previously taken an oath, as a member of
Congress, or as an officer of the United States, or as a member of any State legislature, or as an executive or judicial officer of
any State, to support the Constitution of the United States, shall have engaged in insurrection or rebellion against the same, or
given aid or comfort to the enemies thereof. But Congress may by a vote of two-thirds of each House, remove such disability.

Section 4. The validity of the public debt of the United States, authorized by law, including debts incurred for payment of
pensions and bounties for services in suppressing insurrection or rebellion, shall not be questioned. But neither the United States
nor any State shall assume or pay any debt or obligation incurred in aid of insurrection or rebellion against the United States,
or any claim for the loss or emancipation of any slave; but all such debts, obligations and claims shall be held illegal and void.

Section 5. The Congress shall have power to enforce, by appropriate legislation, the provisions of this article.

<Section 1 of this amendment is further displayed in separate documents according to subject matter,>

<see USCA Const Amend. XIV, § 1-Citizens>

<see USCA Const Amend. XIV, § 1-Privileges>

© 2025 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works. 1
AMENDMENT XIV. CITIZENSHIP; PRIVILEGES AND..., USCA CONST Amend....

<see USCA Const Amend. XIV, § 1-Due Proc>

<see USCA Const Amend. XIV, § 1-Equal Protect>

<sections 2 to 5 of this amendment are displayed as separate documents,>

<see USCA Const Amend. XIV, § 2,>

<see USCA Const Amend. XIV, § 3,>

<see USCA Const Amend. XIV, § 4,>

<see USCA Const Amend. XIV, § 5,>

U.S.C.A. Const. Amend. XIV, USCA CONST Amend. XIV
Current through P.L. 119-36. Some statute sections may be more current, see credits for details.

End of Document © 2025 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works.

© 2025 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works. 2
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The filer served this document via email generated by the efiling system
on the date and to the persons listed below. The rules governing
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certificate of service that complies with all applicable rules.

Court Services on behalf of Brandon Duke
Bar No. 24094476
ommsvc2@omm.com
Envelope ID: 108205774
Filing Code Description: Original Proceeding Petition
Filing Description: Petition for Writ of Mandamus
Status as of 11/19/2025 7:48 AM CST

Case Contacts

Name BarNumber Email TimestampSubmitted Status

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Adam Holtz adam.holtz@oag.texas.gov 11/18/2025 7:46:49 PM SENT

Brandon Duke bduke@omm.com 11/18/2025 7:46:49 PM SENT

Trial Court 250.submission@traviscountytx.gov 11/18/2025 7:46:49 PM SENT