Calvin Gary Walker D/B/A Walker's Electric Company v. Texas Department of Licensing and Regulations Enforcement Division

Affirmed and Memorandum Opinion filed August 29, 2025

In The

Fifteenth Court of Appeals

NO. 15-24-00085-CV

CALVIN GARY WALKER D/B/A WALKER’S ELECTRIC COMPANY,
Appellant

V.

TEXAS DEPARTMENT OF LICENSING AND REGULATIONS
ENFORCEMENT DIVISION, Appellee

On Appeal from the 455th District Court
Travis County, Texas
Trial Court Cause No. D-1-GN-24-002909

MEMORANDUM OPINION

After Calvin Walker was convicted in state court of fabricating invoices,
receipts, and checks to support a $1.2 million payment he received from a school
district for electrical work, his Master Electrician and Electrical Contractor’s
licenses were administratively revoked. But in his pro se appeal for judicial review,
rather than suing and serving the state agency that revoked his licenses he insisted
on suing and serving the enforcement division within that agency, despite repeated
warnings from opposing counsel and the trial judge that he could not do so. Walker’s
error was a misnomer that could have been easily corrected, but he repeatedly and
adamantly refused to do so before judgment was signed dismissing his petition.
While we try to avoid dismissing pro se claims due to a simple misunderstanding, a
deliberate refusal to follow the rules is not an excuse to start this case over from the
beginning after judgment. We affirm the trial court’s dismissal.

Background
A. The Criminal Proceedings
For more than a dozen years, Calvin Walker has been involved in protracted
criminal and appellate proceedings in various state and federal courts. He was
initially indicted in May of 2011 on federal charges arising from allegedly
submitting over $3.7 million in false or inflated invoices for electrical work charged
to the Beaumont Independent School District.1 After a mistrial in federal court, he
agreed to plead guilty to a misdemeanor count of willful failure to pay income taxes,
in return for a five-year suspended sentence and forfeiture of annuities with a face
value of $3,000,000.2
Then in 2014, he was indicted in state court on multiple counts of “Securing
Execution of a Document by Deception,”3 at the time a first-degree felony.4 Pre-trial
took several years because Walker filed unsuccessful habeas appeals, claiming in

1
See United States v. Tracts 31a, et al., 852 F.3d 385, 387 (5th Cir. 2017).
2
See id., 2015 WL 13731148, at *1 (E.D. Tex. Sept. 3, 2015), report and recommendation
adopted sub nom. United States v. Tract 31A, No. 1:12-CV-171, 2015 WL 7738021 (E.D. Tex.
Dec. 1, 2015).
3
See TEX. PENAL CODE § 32.46(a).
4
Act of May 10, 1997, 75th Leg., R.S., ch. 189, § 2, Tex. Gen. Laws 1045, 1046 (amended
2011) (current version at TEX. PENAL CODE § 32.46).

2
2014–16 that the indictments did not fall within the dual-sovereignty doctrine
allowing prosecution in both federal and state courts arising from the same
occurrence,5 and again in 2017–18 for failing to allow him to call witnesses in his
claim that the doctrine was unconstitutional.6
When the state charges finally went to trial in September of 2019, the jury
found Walker guilty, assessed punishment at ten years of imprisonment,
recommended probation, and assessed a $10,000 fine.7 After sentencing and
restitution hearings, the trial court ordered that Walker pay BISD restitution of
$1,172,656.01.8
Walker appealed his conviction to the Ninth Court of Appeals in January of
2020, which affirmed on February 9, 2022. As relevant here, the Ninth Court held
in a detailed 10,000-word opinion that Beaumont I.S.D. paid Walker’s company
$1,285,064 based on invoices and delivery receipts from Summit Electric Supply
that Walker himself had fabricated, and checks he signed allegedly to pay Summit
that were never sent or actually paid.9 According to the opinion, a manager from
Summit testified that it had no record of such deliveries, that it’s computer system
could not have generated the alleged delivery receipts, that the invoices included
items Summit does not carry and others priced “ridiculously high,” and that Summit
had never received the alleged checks or payment.10 An FBI agent involved in

5
See Ex Parte Walker, 489 S.W.3d 1, 3 (Tex. App.—Beaumont 2016, pet. ref’d), cert
denied, 581 U.S. 938 (2017).
6
See Ex parte Walker, 2018 WL 1864618, at *1 (Tex. App.—Beaumont Apr. 18, 2018, pet.
ref’d).
7
See Walker v. State, 659 S.W.3d 43, 56–57 (Tex. App.—Beaumont 2022, pet. ref’d), cert
denied, 143 S.Ct. 792 (2023).
8
Id. at 57.
9
Id. at 49–51.
10
Id. at 52.

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searching Walker’s residence testified that he found the two checks Walker
submitted to BISD as proof of payment, that his bank account had insufficient funds
to pay them at the time, and that neither was ever cashed.11 An expert for the State
testified that the combined total actual cost for the materials actually used for the
BISD job was approximately $111,000, one-tenth of what Walker had been paid.12
On the legal points in the appeal, the Ninth Court of Appeals held that the
statute under which Walker was convicted was not unconstitutionally vague, that
sufficient evidence supported the conviction, and rejected other complaints about
the submission of evidence, the jury instructions, and the restitution order.13
Walker appealed to the Court of Criminal Appeals, which refused his petition
for discretionary review on August 24, 2022.14 He then appealed to the U.S. Supreme
Court, which denied certiorari on February 21, 2023.15 Walker also filed a post-trial
habeas petition on January 24, 2023, asserting ineffective assistance of counsel.
After an evidentiary hearing the trial court denied relief, the Ninth Court of Appeals
again affirmed on April 2, 2025, and the Court of Criminal Appeals denied
discretionary review on June 18, 2025.16

B. The Administrative Proceedings
In the interim, the administrative proceedings at issue here took place.
The Texas Department of Licensing and Regulation (“TDLR”) is the “primary
state agency responsible for the oversight of businesses, industries, general trades,”

11
Id. at 53.
12
Id.
13
Id. at 57–65.
14
Walker, 659 S.W.3d at 43
15
Walker v. Tex., 143 S.Ct. 792 (2023).
16
Ex parte Walker, 2025 WL 980082, at *1 (Tex. App.—Beaumont Apr. 2, 2025, pet. ref’d).

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and other occupations assigned to it by the Legislature.17 Its governing statute, the
Texas Occupations Code, provides that “a licensing authority may suspend or revoke
a license … on the grounds that the person has been convicted of … an offense that
directly relates to the duties and responsibilities of the licensed occupation.18 After
the Court of Criminal Appeals denied review of Walker’s conviction, TDLR opened
proceedings to revoke both Walker’s Master Electrician license and his Electrical
Contractor’s license by sending him a Notice of Violation on January 17, 2023.
TDLR is governed by a seven-member commission appointed by the
Governor.19 State law requires the agency to “clearly separate the policy-making
responsibilities of the commission and the management responsibilities of the
executive director and the staff of the department,”20 so complaints to TDLR are
delegated to its enforcement division, which is subdivided into intake, investigation,
and prosecution sections.21 When the agency proposes to revoke a license, the
licensee is entitled to a hearing conducted by the State Office of Administrative
Hearings (SOAH), which issues a proposal for decision to the Commission.22 By
state law, the Commission alone makes the final decision whether to deny, revoke,
suspend, or refuse to renew a license.23
In this case, SOAH conducted a remote hearing to consider revocation of
Walker’s licenses based on testimony and evidence submitted at his criminal trial in
state court. On September 26, 2023, the presiding administrative law judge (ALJ)

17
TEX. OCC. CODE § 51.051.
18
Id. § 53.021.
19
Id. §§ 51.051, .052.
20
Id. § 51.105.
21
Id. § 51.252; TDLR Br. Appx. D at 123.
22
Id. § 51.354.
23
Id. § 51.353(a).

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issued a Proposal for Decision recommending that both licenses be revoked.24
Applying the guidelines and “additional factors” required by law for persons
convicted of crimes,25 the ALJ found that crimes “involving fraud or deceptive trade
practices are directly related to the duties and responsibilities of an electrician,” since
an electrician’s recommendations “are frequently relied upon by customers who
have no understanding of electrical workings,” and “once electrical installations are
completed, they are usually closed-in behind walls, hidden from view.”26 The ALJ
also found that Walker “did not explain whether he has learned from his experience,
nor why he should be trusted to enter contracts where customers rely on him to tell
them what is needed and to supply electrical services and equipment. Without any
assurance that he has been rehabilitated, the Department has a legitimate concern
that he may reoffend.” The ALJ recommended that both licenses be revoked.27
The Commission agreed with that recommendation and voted to revoke
Walker’s licenses on January 30, 2024.28 He filed a motion for rehearing 10 days
later, which the Commission denied in a final decision dated April 12, 2024.29

C. The Trial Court Proceedings
On May 8, 2024, Walker filed a pro se petition for judicial review in the Travis
County district court challenging the revocation. The style of Walker’s petition, the
citation, and the return of service all listed “Texas Department of Licensing and

24
Both sides attach the proposal [PFD] to their briefs.
25
See TEX. OCC. CODE §§ 53.023, .025.
26
[PFD at 9].
27
[PFD at 18].
28
This is pleaded by both sides, though the document itself is not in the appellate record.
29
This document again is not in the clerk’s record, though Walker attached an unverified
copy as an “appendix” to his brief as “Attachment 20-A.” TDLR pleaded it was denied on April
13th rather than the 12th.

6
Regulations Enforcement Division” (emphasis added) as the respondent.
TDLR’s enforcement division (“the Division”) immediately filed a plea to the
jurisdiction notifying Walker he had named the wrong party, and arguing that
Administrative Procedure Act waived immunity for review only of final decisions
made by TDLR itself:
The final decision to revoke the Petitioner’s license, which is the basis
for this suit, was made by the Commission and the state agency
responsible for administering the licensing program is the Texas
Department of Licensing and Regulation (TDLR). Texas Occupations
Code §§ 51.306(a), 51.356(a), and 51.051. As the Division did not have
any role in making the final decision … the Division is not a proper
party to a suit for judicial review in this context, and the Court should
dismiss all claims made herein against them.

Walker filed a response to the plea the very next day, adamantly insisting that
the Division was the proper party and refusing to amend to correct it. He based his
view entirely on the format of the “Notice of Violation” he had received 16 months
earlier, the heading of which listed as the issuing agency in large, bold, capital letters
“TEXAS DEPARTMENT OF LICENSING & REGULATION” —and on the
following address line in much smaller, normal font listed the agency’s contact
information: “Enforcement Division • PO Box 12157 • Austin, Texas 78711 • (512)
539-5600 • Fax (512) 539-5698.” Walker pleaded that the Division was “NOT
INDEPENDENT OF TDLR” (which is correct), and that the “final decision to
revoke petitioner’s licenses was decided by the Enforcement Division” (which is
incorrect). He asked the trial court to “place this case under the ‘trial de Novo Rule’
instead of the ‘Substantial Evidence Rule’” because the agency “was fore warned
[sic] with documented proof that the evidence they brought was flawed.” Then and
for months afterward, he continued to file pleadings insisting in florid and emphatic
text and every typeface available (including bold, italics, underlines, all caps, and
combinations of them) that he intended to sue the Division as the culprit, not
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TDLR.30
At the hearing in the trial court on the Division’s plea on August 9th, Walker
told the trial judge “I completely object to [counsel’s] statement as it relates to the
enforcement division not being a proper party to the suit.” The trial judge personally
explained the jurisdictional defect, and gave Walker a final opportunity to change
his mind:
THE COURT: I am taking judicial notice of the court’s file and looking at the
original petition … it really specifically only addresses the enforcement
division…. I think that’s the problem that we may have here, is that the entity
that can actually give you back your license is not the enforcement division
of TDLR, and that’s the issue. So even if at the end of all this I agreed with
you and issued an order, my order wouldn’t be able to get what you need
because it’s not the right entity that’s in your lawsuit. That’s my concern for
this.

MR. WALKER: Well, Your Honor, the enforcement division is an entity
within -- it is part of TDLR. It’s just the enforcement division. If they are
allowed to actually revoke my license, they are -- they should be allowed to
give them back. You know, this is all coming from the powers that be, which
is TDLR allowing the enforcement division to make those calls.

Later the same day, the trial court signed an order granting the plea to the
jurisdiction and dismissing “all claims against the TDLR” with prejudice. The next
day, August 10th, the trial court signed a nunc pro tunc order clarifying that it was
the Division whose plea to the jurisdiction was granted and that was dismissed with
prejudice.
Two days later, Walker filed a motion to modify the first order because TDLR
“was never a party to this suit,” should “not be released from a suit they were never

30
See Petitioner’s “Response to Defendents’ [sic] Notice of Hearing” filed June 6, 2024;
“Request for Injunctive Relief” filed June 25, 2024, “‘Brief’ on Judicial Review” filed July 9,
2024; “Reply: to Defendant’s Response to Request for Injunctive Relief” filed July 15, 2024; and
“Motion Objecting to Defendant’s Plea to the Jurisdiction” filed August 6, 2024.

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a party to,” that his suit “was against TDLR’S ENFORCEMENT DIVISION,” and
asking the court to modify the dismissal order “so that I may move forward with
suing the correct party’s [sic] which is [TDLR].” Later the same day, Walker filed
an Amended Petition for Judicial Review in the same cause number dropping the
“Enforcement Division” from the style of the case but making no other substantive
changes.

Discussion
Because the Division is not a separate legal entity from TDLR, this is a case
of misnomer rather than misidentification.31 “When the correct party sues or is sued
under the incorrect name, the court acquires jurisdiction after service with the
misnomer if it is clear that no one was misled or placed at a disadvantage by the
error.”32 TDLR could not have been misled here, since Walker’s petition was served
on TDLR’s general counsel. Normally, misnomers are easily corrected by amending
the pleadings to state the correct name, with the amended pleading relating back to
the date of the original filing.33
But regardless of misnomer, a trial court cannot acquire jurisdiction over a
government entity absent waiver of immunity. As the Division’s plea pointed out,
the APA waives immunity to challenge final administrative orders of a state agency,
but not actions of divisions within it. Walker repeatedly was given an opportunity to
amend his petition before judgment, but adamantly refused. Even in misnomer cases,
“at some point before judgment, the plaintiff must amend the petition to add the

31
See Chilkewitz v. Hyson, 22 S.W.3d 825, 828 (Tex. 1999) (“Misnomer arises when a
plaintiff sues the correct entity but misnames it.”).
32
Reddy P’ship/5900 N. Freeway LP v. Harris Cnty. Appraisal Dist., 370 S.W.3d 373, 376
(Tex. 2012).
33
Id. at 377; see also Levinson Alcoser Assocs., L.P. v. El Pistolon II, Ltd., 670 S.W.3d 622,
628 (Tex. 2023).

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correct legal name of the actual defendant.”34 Rule 301 of the Rules of Civil
Procedure provides “The judgment of the court shall conform to the pleadings,” so
a judgment cannot be rendered against an unnamed party.35
If “a plaintiff fails to plead facts sufficient to demonstrate the trial court’s
jurisdiction, courts generally should afford the plaintiff the opportunity to replead
unless the pleadings affirmatively negate the existence of jurisdiction.”36 But
Walker’s petition was not missing jurisdictional facts; it was missing the proper
party, and it was far beyond the deadline in the APA for adding a new defendant.37
Once a judgment is signed, courts will not correct a party’s error “by retroactively
substituting in the correct party on his behalf.”38
As the Supreme Court recently held, there is a difference between pro se
litigants whose “genuine misunderstanding” of the rules results in “a lack of
deliberate or intentional failure to comply,” versus those who make “a conscious or
strategic decision” not to comply with the rules.39 By insisting on relying on the
address line in an agency letter, Walker chose to disregard what the law, the lawyers,
and the judge were telling him. Having rejected every opportunity to amend his
petition, he was not entitled to yet another opportunity after judgment was signed
dismissing the party he insisted on suing.

34
Chilkewitz, 22 S.W.3d at 829.
35
See TEX. R. CIV. P. 124 (“In no case shall judgment be rendered against any defendant
unless upon service, or acceptance or waiver of process, or upon an appearance by the defendant,
as prescribed in these rules.”); Bailey v. Vanscot Concrete, 894 S.W.2d 757, 761 (Tex 1995).
36
Fraley v. Tex. A & M Univ. Sys., 664 S.W.3d 91, 101 (Tex. 2023)
37
See TEX. GOV’T CODE § 2001.176(a) (“A person initiates judicial review in a contested
case by filing a petition not later than the 30th day after the date the decision or order that is the
subject of complaint is final and appealable.”).
38
Bailey v. Vanscot Concrete Co., 894 S.W.2d 757, 761 (Tex. 1995).
39
In re S.V., 697 S.W.3d 659, 662 (Tex. 2024).

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Conclusion
We do not fault Walker for not being a lawyer, only for refusing to listen to
anyone who was. Pro se litigants are not exempt from the rules of procedure;
“Having two sets of rules—a strict set for attorneys and a lenient set for pro se
parties—might encourage litigants to discard their valuable right to the advice and
assistance of counsel.”40 The judgment of the trial court is affirmed.

/s/ Scott Brister
Scott A. Brister
Chief Justice

Before Chief Justice Brister and Justices Field and Farris.
Justice Farris concurs in the judgment only.

40
Wheeler v. Green, 157 S.W.3d 439, 444 (Tex. 2005).

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