Ronnetrica Coleman v. DWR Somerset 18 LP

Reversed and Remanded and Memorandum Opinion filed November 5, 2024.

In The

Fourteenth Court of Appeals

NO. 14-23-00513-CV

RONNETRICA COLEMAN, Appellant
V.
DWR SOMERSET 18 LP, Appellee

On Appeal from the 157th District Court
Harris County, Texas
Trial Court Cause No. 2022-78620

MEMORANDUM OPINION

Appellant Ronnetrica Coleman sued appellee DWR Somerset 18 LP
(“Somerset”), asserting claims stemming from her eviction. Somerset filed a
motion for summary judgment and the trial court granted the motion, rendering a
take-nothing judgment in Somerset’s favor. Coleman appealed and, for the reasons
below, we reverse the trial court’s summary judgment and remand the case for
further proceedings.
BACKGROUND

In June 2020, Coleman leased a Houston apartment from Somerset. The
lease was for a one-year term that would automatically renew on a month-to-month
basis.

Approximately one year later, Somerset pursued two separate forcible
detainer actions against Coleman. Somerset’s first forcible detainer petition
alleged that Coleman’s family committed certain conduct-based violations of her
lease agreement and its second forcible detainer petition alleged that Coleman
failed to pay rent. Both forcible detainer actions resulted in judgments for
Somerset, and Coleman appealed the judgments to the county court at law for trial
de novo.

Somerset filed a motion for non-suit in the conduct-based forcible detainer
action, which the county court granted. The second forcible detainer action was set
for trial via video conference on January 24, 2022. The trial court signed a default
judgment in Somerset’s favor after Coleman failed to appear for trial. A writ of
possession was issued for the leased premises and executed in February 2022.
Coleman did not file a supersedeas bond to stay the writ’s execution. See Tex.
Prop. Code Ann. § 24.007.

After she obtained new counsel, Coleman filed a motion to set aside the
default judgment and a motion for new trial. The county court granted the new
trial motion and, after a bench trial, signed a take-nothing judgment in Coleman’s
favor. Somerset did not appeal the judgment.

Coleman subsequently filed an original petition in the underlying proceeding
and asserted the following claims:

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1. violations of the Texas Property Code1 for “locking Coleman out of
her apartment and by preventing her from entering her apartment
without the sanction of judicial process”;
2. violations of the applicable Land Use Restriction Agreement 2 for
“evicting Coleman and her family without ‘good cause’”; and
3. wrongful eviction.3
Coleman sought to recover possession of the leased premises or its equivalent and
“actual and punitive damages caused by this wrongful eviction.”

Somerset filed a traditional summary judgment motion, challenging all
Coleman’s claims and Coleman filed a response. The trial court signed an order on
June 6, 2023, granting Somerset’s summary judgment motion. Coleman timely
filed this appeal.

ANALYSIS

A motion for summary judgment “must stand or fall on the grounds
expressly presented” therein. McConnell v. Southside Indep. Sch. Dist., 858
S.W.2d 337, 341 (Tex. 1993). Here, Somerset raised the following traditional
summary judgment grounds in its motion:

1. Coleman cannot establish “wrongfulness” because Somerset obtained
a valid and enforceable judgment in the forcible detainer action and
executed a valid and enforceable writ of possession after Coleman
failed to timely post a supersedeas bond;
1
Under the Texas Property Code, “[a] landlord may not intentionally prevent a tenant
from entering the leased premises except by judicial process.” See Tex. Prop. Code Ann.
§ 92.0081(b).
2
According to Coleman’s petition, the leased property was subject to a Land Use
Restriction Agreement filed in the Harris County real estate records.
3
The elements necessary to establish wrongful eviction are (1) the existence of an
unexpired lease, (2) the tenant’s occupancy of the premises, (3) the landlord’s eviction of the
tenant, and (4) damages suffered by the tenant. Garcia v. Galvan, No. 14-11-00338-CV, 2012
WL 1606312, at *3 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] May 8, 2012, pet. dism’d w.o.j.) (mem.
op.).

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2. Coleman’s claims are barred by Texas Property Code section
24.0061(i), which states that “[a] landlord is not liable for damages to
the tenant resulting from the execution of a writ of possession by an
officer under this section”; and
3. Coleman cannot pursue her “lockout” claim under Texas Property
Code section 92.0081 because she was evicted pursuant to a valid writ
of possession.
See Tex. R. Civ. P. 166a(c). For the reasons below, we conclude these grounds do
not warrant summary judgment on Coleman’s claims.

I. Standard of Review

A traditional motion for summary judgment requires the moving party to
show that no genuine issue of material fact exists and that it is entitled to judgment
as a matter of law. See Tex. R. Civ. P. 166a(c); Nassar v. Liberty Mut. Fire Ins.
Co., 508 S.W.3d 254, 257 (Tex. 2017) (per curiam). To prevail as a movant, a
defendant must either negate at least one of the essential elements of a cause of
action or conclusively establish each element of an affirmative defense. See
Randall’s Food Mkts., Inc. v. Johnson, 891 S.W.2d 640, 644 (Tex. 1995). Once a
movant initially establishes a right to summary judgment on the issues expressly
presented in the motion, the burden shifts to the nonmovant to present issues or
evidence precluding summary judgment. City of Houston v. Clear Creek Basin
Auth., 589 S.W.2d 671, 678-79 (Tex. 1979).

We view the evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmovant,
crediting favorable evidence if reasonable jurors could do so, and disregarding
contrary evidence unless reasonable jurors could not. Merriman v. XTO Energy,
Inc., 407 S.W.3d 244, 248 (Tex. 2013). When the trial court’s order does not
specifically state the grounds for granting judgment, we must affirm the judgment
“if any of the theories presented to the trial court and preserved for appellate
review are meritorious.” Provident Life & Acc. Ins. Co. v. Knott, 128 S.W.3d 211,
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216 (Tex. 2003).

II. The Forcible Detainer Suit and Subsequently-Executed Writ of
Possession

In its summary judgment motion, Somerset asserted that Coleman cannot
pursue her claims because the eviction was effected pursuant to a default judgment
in a forcible detainer suit that was valid when the writ of possession was issued and
executed. Somerset contends that, because Coleman did not file a supersedeas
bond to stay execution of the writ, she cannot pursue her claims stemming from the
eviction.

But this argument ignores a long line of precedent holding otherwise. A
forcible detainer action is intended to be a speedy, simple, and inexpensive means
to obtain immediate possession of property. Marshall v. Hous. Auth. of City of San
Antonio, 198 S.W.3d 782, 787 (Tex. 2006); Yarbrough v. Household Fin. Corp.
III, 455 S.W.3d 277, 280 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2015, no pet.). A
judgment of possession in a forcible detainer action is not intended to be a final
determination of whether the eviction is wrongful; rather, it is a determination only
of the right to immediate possession. Marshall, 198 S.W.3d at 787; see also Tex.
Prop. Code Ann. § 24.008 (“An eviction suit does not bar a suit for trespass,
damages, waste, rent, or mesne profits.”).

The Texas Supreme Court recently reiterated the limited scope of a forcible
detainer action and stated:

Again, we have consistently described a judgment in an eviction suit
as a final determination only of the right to immediate possession.
Such a judgment is not, by contrast, a final determination of the
parties’ ultimate rights, the wrongfulness of the eviction, or any other
question. And such a judgment does not have a preclusive effect on a
subsequent action in district court or bar a suit for damages.

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Westwood Motorcars, LLC v. Virtuolotry, LLC, 689 S.W.3d 879, 885 (Tex. 2024).
Applying these principles in Westwood Motorcars, the court held that the
plaintiff’s previous consent to the landlord’s obtaining a writ of possession in
justice court did not preclude the plaintiff’s subsequent claims against the landlord
in district court for breach of contract and constructive eviction. Id. at 884-85; see
also, e.g., Garcia v. Galvan, No. 14-11-00338-CV, 2012 WL 1606312, at *4 (Tex.
App.—Houston [14th Dist.] May 8, 2012, writ dism’d w.o.j.) (mem. op.) (“a
judgment for a landlord in a forcible detainer action does not bar a tenant’s suit for
wrongful eviction”); Bergstrom v. Winrock-Houston Assocs. Ltd. P’ship, No. 01-
95-00024-CV, 1995 WL 477552, at *3 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] Aug. 10,
1995, no writ) (“a party may assert a separate action for money damages, either
during or after a forcible detainer action, that arises from the same facts that gave
rise to the forcible detainer action”).

Therefore, the default judgment in the forcible detainer action and
subsequently-executed writ of possession do not bar Coleman’s claims stemming
from her eviction. See Tex. Prop. Code Ann. § 24.008; Westwood Motorcars,
LLC, 689 S.W.3d at 885. This argument does not provide a basis to sustain the
trial court’s summary judgment.

III. Texas Property Code Section 24.0061(i)

In its summary judgment motion, Somerset also asserted that Coleman was
“barred from recovery by operation of Texas law” under Texas Property Code
section 24.0061(i), which states:

A landlord is not liable for damages to the tenant resulting from the
execution of a writ of possession by an officer under this section.
Tex. Prop. Code Ann. § 24.0061(i). Section 24.0061(i), argued Somerset, provides
it with “immunity from damages resulting from the execution of a writ of

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possession.”

Statutory construction is a legal question we review de novo. City of
Rockwall v. Hughes, 246 S.W.3d 621, 625 (Tex. 2008); Zachry Eng’g Corp. v.
Encina Dev. Grp., LLC, 672 S.W.3d 534, 537 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.]
2023, pet. abated). Our fundamental goal when reading statutes “is to ascertain
and give effect to the Legislature’s intent.” Tex. Mut. Ins. Co. v. Ruttiger, 381
S.W.3d 430, 452 (Tex. 2012). We use definitions prescribed by the Legislature
and any technical or particular meanings the words have acquired. Tex. Gov’t
Code Ann. § 311.011. Otherwise, we construe a statute’s words according to their
plain and common meanings, unless a contrary intention is apparent from the
context or unless such a construction leads to absurd results. Cadena Comercial
USA Corp. v. Tex. Alcoholic Beverage Comm’n, 518 S.W.3d 318, 325 (Tex. 2017).

Three reasons compel us to disagree with Somerset’s broad interpretation of
this provision’s application. First, the statute insulates a landlord only from those
damages arising from “the execution of a writ of possession by an officer” — a
qualification that suggests the statute’s reach is limited to those damages stemming
from an officer’s physical execution of the eviction. See Tex. Prop. Code Ann.
§ 24.0061(i) (emphasis added). This interpretation is supported by other
provisions in section 24.0061, which set out the technical requirements governing
an officer’s execution of a writ of possession. See id. at (d)(1) (the officer
executing the writ must “post a written warning of at least 8 ½ by 11 inches on the
exterior of the front door of the rental unit”), (d)(2)(D) (a tenant’s personal
property may not be placed so that it “block[s] a public sidewalk, passageway, or
street”). Read in this statutory context, subsection (i) does not indicate an intent to
broadly insulate landlords from all damages stemming from the execution of a writ
of possession.

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Second, a limited reading of section 24.0061(i) finds additional support in
the statute’s legislative history. Subsection (i) was added to section 24.0061
effective September 1, 2021. See Act of May 30, 2021, 87th Leg., R.S. ch. 641,
§ 1, sec. 24.0061, 2021 Tex. Gen. Laws 1288, 1289. In the bill analysis prepared
for this subsection, the Judiciary & Civil Jurisprudence Committee reasoned:

Upon receipt of an eviction notice, a tenant has a certain time frame
within which to remove their possessions from the premises. If the
tenant fails to remove their belongings, the court will order a writ of
possession in which an officer may enter the premises, remove the
tenant’s belongings, and place them on the curb to be picked up by the
evicted tenant. It has been noted that landlords are currently held
responsible for any damages inflicted upon these belongings while
sitting on the curb. H.B. 900 seeks to remedy this situation by
exempting a landlord from liability for certain damages.

See House Judiciary & Civil Jurisprudence Comm., Bill Analysis, Tex. H.B. 900,
87th Leg. R.S. (2021) (emphasis added). This bill analysis suggests a limited reach
for subsection (i) that applies to the actual physical execution of the writ. See id.

Finally, Somerset’s suggested interpretation of section 24.0061(i) would
eviscerate the line of authority discussed above in Section II regarding the limited
effects of a forcible detainer action on subsequently-pursued claims such as
wrongful eviction. See Tex. Prop. Code Ann. § 24.008; Westwood Motorcars,
LLC, 689 S.W.3d at 885; Marshall, 198 S.W.3d at 787. We decline to adopt this
interpretation of section 24.0061(i) without clear indication from the Legislature
that its broad preclusive effect indeed was intended. Therefore, this argument does
not provide a basis to sustain the trial court’s summary judgment.

IV. Coleman’s Lockout Claim Under Section 92.0081

In her original petition, Coleman asserted a “lockout” claim under section
92.0081, which states that “[a] landlord may not intentionally prevent a tenant

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from entering the leased premises except by judicial process.” See Tex. Prop.
Code Ann. § 92.0081. Somerset argued in its summary judgment motion that
Coleman’s lockout claim failed as a matter of law because “dispossession was
performed by and as a part of the judicial process,” i.e., execution of the writ
following the default judgment.

We conclude that this argument fails to establish as a matter of law
Somerset’s entitlement to judgment on Coleman’s lockout claim. As discussed
above, Texas precedent is clear that the effects of a forcible detainer action are
limited to determining only the right to immediate possession. See Westwood
Motorcars, LLC, 689 S.W.3d at 885; Marshall, 198 S.W.3d at 787. But remedies
for a lockout claim are broader than just immediate possession and include a civil
penalty, actual damages, court costs, and reasonable attorney’s fees. See Tex.
Prop. Code Ann. § 92.0081(h)(2). Given this disparity, we decline to hold as a
matter of law that execution of a writ of possession precludes a subsequent lockout
claim — particularly where, as here, the underlying default judgment later was
vacated and a final judgment entered for the plaintiff in the forcible detainer action.
Therefore, this argument does not provide a basis for maintaining the trial court’s
summary judgment with respect to Coleman’s lockout claim.

CONCLUSION

None of the grounds asserted in Somerset’s summary judgment motion
provide a basis to sustain judgment with respect to Coleman’s claims. Therefore,
we reverse the trial court’s summary judgment with respect to Coleman’s three
claims and remand the case for further proceedings.

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/s/ Meagan Hassan
Justice

Panel consists of Chief Justice Christopher and Justices Wise and Hassan.

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