Damion Gage Bedford v. the State of Texas

NUMBER 13-25-00566-CR

COURT OF APPEALS

THIRTEENTH DISTRICT OF TEXAS

CORPUS CHRISTI – EDINBURG

DAMION GAGE BEDFORD, Appellant,

v.

THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee.

ON APPEAL FROM THE 413TH DISTRICT COURT
OF JOHNSON COUNTY, TEXAS

MEMORANDUM OPINION

Before Justices Silva, Peña, and Fonseca
Memorandum Opinion by Justice Silva

Appellant Damion Gage Bedford pleaded guilty to two counts of possession with

intent to deliver a controlled substance in Penalty Group 2 or 2-A in the amount of four
grams or more but less than 400 grams, both first-degree felonies. 1 See TEX. HEALTH &

SAFETY CODE § 481.113(a), (d). Following a punishment trial, appellant was sentenced to

fifty-five years’ confinement in the Texas Department of Criminal Justice Institutional

Division on each count to run concurrently. Id. § 481.113(e). Appellant’s court-appointed

counsel has filed an Anders brief stating that there are no arguable grounds for appeal.

See Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738, 744 (1967). We affirm.

I. ANDERS BRIEF

Pursuant to Anders v. California, appellant’s court-appointed appellate counsel

filed a brief and a motion to withdraw with this Court, stating that her review of the record

yielded no grounds of reversible error upon which an appeal could be predicated. See id.

Counsel’s brief meets the requirements of Anders as it presents a professional evaluation

demonstrating why there are no arguable grounds to advance on appeal. See In re

Schulman, 252 S.W.3d 403, 406 n.9 (Tex. Crim. App. 2008) (orig. proceeding) (“In Texas,

an Anders brief need not specifically advance ‘arguable’ points of error if counsel finds

none, but it must provide record references to the facts and procedural history and set

out pertinent legal authorities.” (citing Hawkins v. State, 112 S.W.3d 340, 343–44 (Tex.

App.—Corpus Christi–Edinburg 2003, no pet.))); Stafford v. State, 813 S.W.2d 503, 510

n.3 (Tex. Crim. App. 1991).

In compliance with High v. State, 573 S.W.2d 807, 813 (Tex. Crim. App. [Panel

Op.] 1978) and Kelly v. State, 436 S.W.3d 313, 319–22 (Tex. Crim. App. 2014),

1 This case is before the Court on transfer from the Tenth Court of Appeals pursuant to a docket-

equalization order issued by the Supreme Court of Texas. See TEX. GOV’T CODE §§ 22.220(a) (delineating
the jurisdiction of appellate courts), 73.001 (granting the supreme court the authority to transfer cases from
one court of appeals to another at any time that there is “good cause” for the transfer). We are bound by
the precedent of the transferring court to the extent that it differs from our own. See TEX. R. APP. P. 41.3.

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appellant’s counsel carefully discussed why, under controlling authority, there is no

reversible error in the trial court’s judgment. Appellant’s counsel also informed this Court

in writing that she: (1) notified appellant that counsel has filed an Anders brief and a

motion to withdraw; (2) provided him with copies of both pleadings; (3) informed him of

his rights to file a pro se response, to review the record prior to filing the response, and

to seek discretionary review if we conclude that the appeal is frivolous; and (4) provided

him with the appellate record. See Anders, 386 U.S. at 744; Kelly, 436 S.W.3d at 319–

20; see also In re Schulman, 252 S.W.3d at 408–09. In this case, appellant neither filed

a timely motion seeking pro se access to the appellate record nor a motion for extension

of time to do so. Appellant did not file a pro se response in the case.

II. INDEPENDENT REVIEW

Upon receiving an Anders brief, we must conduct a full examination of all the

proceedings to determine whether the case is wholly frivolous. Penson v. Ohio, 488 U.S.

75, 80 (1988). We have reviewed the record and counsel’s brief, and we have found

nothing that would arguably support an appeal. See Bledsoe v. State, 178 S.W.3d 824,

827–28 (Tex. Crim. App. 2005) (“Due to the nature of Anders briefs, by indicating in the

opinion that it considered the issues raised in the briefs and reviewed the record for

reversible error but found none, the court of appeals met the requirements of Texas Rule

of Appellate Procedure 47.1.”); Stafford, 813 S.W.2d at 511.

III. MOTION TO WITHDRAW

In accordance with Anders, appellant’s counsel has asked this Court for

permission to withdraw as counsel. See Anders, 386 U.S. at 744; see also In re

Schulman, 252 S.W.3d at 408 n.17. We grant counsel’s motion to withdraw. Within five

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days from the date of this Court’s opinion, counsel is ordered to send a copy of this opinion

and this Court’s judgment to appellant and to advise him of his right to file a petition for

discretionary review. 2 See TEX. R. APP. P. 48.4; see also In re Schulman, 252 S.W.3d at

411 n.35; Ex parte Owens, 206 S.W.3d 670, 673 (Tex. Crim. App. 2006).

IV. CONCLUSION

We affirm the trial court’s judgment.

CLARISSA SILVA
Justice

Do not publish.
TEX. R. APP. P. 47.2(b).

Delivered and filed on the
30th day of April, 2026.

2 No substitute counsel will be appointed. Should appellant wish to seek further review of this case

by the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals, he must either retain an attorney to file a petition for discretionary
review or file a pro se petition for discretionary review. Any petition for discretionary review must be filed
within thirty days from the date of either this opinion or the last timely motion for rehearing or timely motion
for en banc reconsideration that was overruled by this Court. See TEX. R. APP. P. 68.2. Any petition for
discretionary review must be filed with the Clerk of the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals. See id. R. 68.3.
Any petition for discretionary review should comply with the requirements of Texas Rule of Appellate
Procedure 68.4. See id. R. 68.4.
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