Richard Flores v. the State of Texas

NUMBER 13-25-00023-CR

COURT OF APPEALS

THIRTEENTH DISTRICT OF TEXAS

CORPUS CHRISTI – EDINBURG

RICHARD FLORES, Appellant,

v.

THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee.

ON APPEAL FROM THE 117TH DISTRICT COURT
OF NUECES COUNTY, TEXAS

MEMORANDUM OPINION

Before Justices Silva, Peña, and Cron
Memorandum Opinion by Justice Silva

Appellant Richard Flores pled guilty to the offense of assault of a pregnant person,

a third-degree felony, enhanced by appellant’s two prior felony convictions. See TEX.

PENAL CODE ANN. §§ 22.01(b)(8), 12.42(d). Appellant was placed on deferred adjudication

community supervision for ten years. The State subsequently filed a motion to adjudicate
guilt, alleging in its motion that appellant violated the terms and conditions of his

community supervision. Appellant entered pleas of “true” to all allegations raised in the

State’s motion. After conducting a hearing, the trial court revoked appellant’s deferred

adjudication community supervision, adjudicated him guilty, and sentenced him to twenty-

five years’ confinement in the Institutional Division of the Texas Department of Criminal

Justice. Appellant’s court-appointed counsel has filed an Anders brief stating that there

are no arguable grounds for appeal. See Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738, 744 (1967).

We affirm the trial court’s judgment.

I. ANDERS BRIEF

Pursuant to Anders v. California, appellant’s court-appointed appellate counsel

filed a brief and a motion to withdraw with this Court, stating that his review of the record

yielded no grounds of reversible error upon which an appeal could be predicated. See id.

Counsel’s brief meets the requirements of Anders as it presents a professional evaluation

demonstrating why there are no arguable grounds to advance on appeal. See In re

Schulman, 252 S.W.3d 403, 406 n.9 (Tex. Crim. App. 2008) (orig. proceeding) (“In Texas,

an Anders brief need not specifically advance ‘arguable’ points of error if counsel finds

none, but it must provide record references to the facts and procedural history and set

out pertinent legal authorities.” (citing Hawkins v. State, 112 S.W.3d 340, 343–44 (Tex.

App.—Corpus Christi–Edinburg 2003, no pet.))); Stafford v. State, 813 S.W.2d 503, 510

n.3 (Tex. Crim. App. 1991).

In compliance with High v. State, 573 S.W.2d 807, 813 (Tex. Crim. App. [Panel

Op.] 1978) and Kelly v. State, 436 S.W.3d 313, 319–22 (Tex. Crim. App. 2014),

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appellant’s counsel carefully discussed why, under controlling authority, there is no

reversible error in the trial court’s judgment. Appellant’s counsel also informed this Court

in writing that he: (1) notified appellant that counsel has filed an Anders brief and a motion

to withdraw; (2) provided appellant with copies of both pleadings; (3) informed appellant

of his rights to file pro se responses, to review the record prior to filing those responses,

and to seek discretionary review if we conclude that the appeal is frivolous; and (4)

provided appellant with a form motion for pro se access to the appellate record that only

requires appellant’s signature and date with instructions to file the motion. See Anders,

386 U.S. at 744; Kelly, 436 S.W.3d at 319–20; see also In re Schulman, 252 S.W.3d at

408–09. In this case, appellant neither filed a timely motion seeking pro se access to the

appellate record nor a motion for extension of time to do so. Appellant did not file a pro

se response in the case.

II. INDEPENDENT REVIEW

Upon receiving an Anders brief, we must conduct a full examination of all the

proceedings to determine whether the case is wholly frivolous. Penson v. Ohio, 488 U.S.

75, 80 (1988). We have reviewed the record and counsel’s brief, and we have found

nothing that would arguably support an appeal. See Bledsoe v. State, 178 S.W.3d 824,

827–28 (Tex. Crim. App. 2005) (“Due to the nature of Anders briefs, by indicating in the

opinion that it considered the issues raised in the briefs and reviewed the record for

reversible error but found none, the court of appeals met the requirements of Texas Rule

of Appellate Procedure 47.1.”); Stafford, 813 S.W.2d at 511.

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III. MOTION TO WITHDRAW

In accordance with Anders, appellant’s counsel has asked this Court for

permission to withdraw as counsel. See Anders, 386 U.S. at 744; see also In re

Schulman, 252 S.W.3d at 408 n.17. We grant counsel’s motion to withdraw. Within five

days from the date of this Court’s opinion, counsel is ordered to send a copy of this opinion

and this Court’s judgment to appellant and to advise him of his right to file a petition for

discretionary review. 1 See TEX. R. APP. P. 48.4; see also In re Schulman, 252 S.W.3d at

411 n.35; Ex parte Owens, 206 S.W.3d 670, 673 (Tex. Crim. App. 2006).

IV. CONCLUSION

We affirm the trial court’s judgment.

CLARISSA SILVA
Justice

Do not publish.
TEX. R. APP. P. 47.2(b).

Delivered and filed on the
12th day of August, 2025.

1 No substitute counsel will be appointed. Should appellant wish to seek further review of this case

by the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals, he must either retain an attorney to file a petition for discretionary
review or file a pro se petition for discretionary review. Any petition for discretionary review must be filed
within thirty days from the date of either this opinion or the last timely motion for rehearing or timely motion
for en banc reconsideration that was overruled by this Court. See TEX. R. APP. P. 68.2. Any petition for
discretionary review must be filed with the Clerk of the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals. See id. R. 68.3.
Any petition for discretionary review should comply with the requirements of Texas Rule of Appellate
Procedure 68.4. See id. R. 68.4.
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