Richard Arismendez Gonzales v. the State of Texas

NUMBER 13-24-00454-CR

COURT OF APPEALS

THIRTEENTH DISTRICT OF TEXAS

CORPUS CHRISTI – EDINBURG

RICHARD ARISMENDEZ GONZALES, Appellant,

v.

THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee.

ON APPEAL FROM THE 36TH DISTRICT COURT
OF SAN PATRICIO COUNTY, TEXAS

MEMORANDUM OPINION

Before Chief Justice Tijerina and Justices West and Fonseca
Memorandum Opinion by Chief Justice Tijerina

A jury convicted appellant Richard Arismendez Gonzales of murder, a first-degree

felony, tampering with evidence, a third-degree felony, and unlawful possession of firearm

by a felon, a third-degree felony. See TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. §§ 19.02, 37.09(c), 46.04(e).

Gonzales was sentenced to ninety-nine years’ imprisonment for murder, ten years for

tampering with evidence, and ten years for the unlawful possession of a firearm by a
felon. The sentences were ordered to run concurrently. By three issues, Gonzales argues

the evidence was insufficient to show that: (1) “he was the shooter”; (2) he knew an

investigation was pending and concealed a firearm from investigation; and (3) he

“possessed a firearm” in violation of Texas Penal Code § 46.04. We affirm.

I. BACKGROUND

On July 18, 2023, Gonzales was charged with the murder of Michael Doria,

tampering with physical evidence, and unlawful possession of a firearm by a felon. The

following evidence was produced at trial.

Doria’s grandson, Michael Anthony Doria (Michael), testified that on June 3, 2022,

he was at Doria’s home having dinner with Doria and his wife Margaret. According to

Michael, around 7:40 p.m., there was a knock on the door shortly after the family sat down

to eat. Michael testified that when Doria went to answer the door, he heard “a loud

popping” sound. Michael witnessed Doria collapse onto the front door, and blood was

oozing from his mouth. Doria suffered multiple gunshot wounds and died on the scene.

Michael clarified that Doria was unarmed at the time of the shooting.

Margaret testified that after Doria answered the door, Doria began “yelling at

[Gonzales],” and yelled, “Ya Ricky!” To Margaret, this indicated that Doria was asking

Gonzales to stop. Maragaret stated that immediately after the shooting, she saw the top

of Gonzales’s head as he was leaving the scene. She explained that she believed

Gonzales was the perpetrator and that he was also known as “Ricky G.” Responding

Sinton Police Department (SPD) Officer, Joshua Serrano, testified that upon arrival to the

scene, Margaret cried out, “It’s Ricky G!” Margaret explained to police that Gonzales and

Doria had a history of ongoing disputes. Margaret testified, “[A]ll I know is his son was in

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a really bad accident and he blamed my husband and the family.” Margaret said that after

Gonzales’s son’s accident, Doria began carrying a gun.

SPD Lieutenant Daniel Alcala obtained video surveillance from an adjacent bar,

which was entered into evidence. According to Lieutenant Alcala, the video shows

Gonzales at the bar drinking then walking towards Doria’s home while “pulling something

or he had his hand in the front area by his waistline” around 7:34 p.m. The video

corroborates Lieutenant’s Alcala’s testimony.

Lieutenant Alcala further testified that a forensic search of Gonzales’s phone

revealed text messages and phone calls with a specific phone number wherein Gonzales

was discussing the purchase of firearms. The messages, which were sent to Gonzales

on May 20th, 27th, and May 28th of 2022, included pictures of different firearms and

prices. According to Lieutenant Alcala, there were also multiple phone calls between

Gonzales and the unknown number a few days before the murder.

Jeremiah Doria, Doria’s son, testified that Gonzales and Doria had several

unresolved issues. He further testified that Gonzales was “a character,” and “he can come

at you kind of . . . aggressive.” According to Jeremiah, Gonzales and his son were “known

to backstab or hit you from the back.” Jeremiah said that Gonzales and Doria had gotten

into a physical altercation, which caused the conflict between the families. Jeremiah also

said that Gonzales appeared visibly distraught a short time before the murder because

Gonzales’s son had suffered serious physical injuries in a car accident.

Gonzales’s wife, Denise Guerra, testified that, shortly after the murder occurred,

she called Gonzales on his cellphone asking him to turn himself in. Guerra testified that

she specifically informed Gonzales that officers were searching for him.

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Thomas White, a forensic scientist with the Department of Public Safety Crime

Lab, analyzed a gunshot residue (GSR) test that was conducted on Gonzales’s hands

and a single particle of GSR was found on both of Gonzales’s hands. White testified that

the GSR findings were “consistent with a person having recently[] discharged a firearm,

been in immediate proximity of a firearm as it is being discharged [or] come into contact

with a surface containing gunshot primer residue particles.”

At the conclusion of trial, the jury convicted Gonzales of the charges and

sentenced him as stated above. This appeal followed.

II. STANDARD OF REVIEW

Because Gonzales challenges the sufficiency of the evidence for all three issues,

the same standard of review applies to each issue. In a sufficiency of the evidence review,

the Court must view all the evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict and then

determine whether a rational fact finder could have found the essential elements of the

offense beyond a reasonable doubt. Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319 (1979);

Whatley v. State, 445 S.W.3d 159, 166 (Tex. Crim. App. 2014). This standard of review

applies equally to both direct and circumstantial evidence. Hooper v. State, 214 S.W.3d

9, 13 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007). We must defer to the jury’s analysis of witness and evidence

credibility. Clayton v. State, 235 S.W.3d 772, 778 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007). Our role as an

intermediate appellate court is restricted to guarding against the “rare occurrence when

a factfinder does not act rationally.” Isassi v. State, 330 S.W.3d 633, 638 (Tex. Crim. App.

2010) (quoting Laster v. State, 275 S.W.3d 512, 518 (Tex. Crim. App. 2009)). The

elements of the offense are measured against a hypothetically correct jury charge.

Braughton v. State, 569 S.W.3d 592, 608 (Tex. Crim. App. 2018); Malik v. State, 953

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S.W.2d 234, 240 (Tex. Crim. App. 1997). A hypothetically correct jury charge “accurately

sets out the law, is authorized by the indictment, does not unnecessarily increase the

State’s burden of proof or unnecessarily restrict the State’s theories of liability, and

adequately describes the particular offense for which the defendant was tried.” Malik, 953

S.W.2d at 240.

III. MURDER

By his first issue, Gonzales argues the evidence is insufficient to show he “was the

shooter as both the forensic evidence and eyewitness testimony were highly unreliable.”

Under the Texas Penal Code, a person commits murder when the person knowingly or

intentionally causes the death of another or commits a dangerous act with the intention

to cause serious bodily injury which results in the death of another. TEX. PENAL CODE ANN.

§ 19.02(b)(1), (b)(1)(2).

Here, there was evidence that Gonzales and Doria had a history of ongoing

physical altercations and unresolved issues. Margaret identified Gonzales as the

perpetrator. Margaret testified that Doria was yelling at Gonzales right before he was shot,

that Doria had specifically identified Gonzales before being shot by yelling, “Ya Ricky,”

and that she witnessed Gonzales leaving the scene immediately following the murder.

Officers testified that when they arrived at the scene, Margaret exclaimed, “It’s Ricky G!”

Video surveillance shows Gonzales stumbling out of an adjacent bar and walking

towards Doria’s home only eight minutes prior to Doria’s death. Furthermore, Gonzales

appears to be holding his waistband on his way to Doria’s home. White testified that

Gonzales tested positive for a GSR particle on each hand.

Gonzales argues the evidence is insufficient because Margaret claimed he was

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wearing a white shirt, but he was wearing a black shirt at the time of the murder. However,

Margaret clarified that she only saw the top of Gonzales’s head when he was leaving the

crime scene, and that Gonzales always wore a white shirt. Margaret testified that it was

possible she was confused because Gonzales always wears a white shirt, and she was

extremely distraught and disoriented when she saw Gonzales walking away from the

scene. Nonetheless, it is the jury’s sole province to assess the credibility of the witnesses

and their testimony, and we presume the jury reconciled any conflicts in favor of its verdict.

See Joe v. State, 663 S.W.3d 728, 732 (Tex. Crim. App. 2022).

Regardless, all the other circumstantial evidence introduced allowed for the jury to

determine that Gonzales discharged a firearm and intentionally caused the death of Doria.

See Dobbs v. State, 434 S.W.3d 166, 170 (Tex. Crim. App. 2014). In analyzing the

evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict, a reasonable fact finder could clearly

find that Gonzales intentionally caused the death of the victim. See Jackson, 443 U.S. at

319. We overrule Gonzales’s first issue.

IV. TAMPERING WITH EVIDENCE

By his second issue, Gonzales argues the evidence is insufficient to show he had

knowledge of a pending investigation or that he concealed a firearm from investigation.

Gonzales states, “Hypothetically only, if [Gonzales] did possess a firearm on this day, and

discarded it prior to speaking with [Guerra], then [Gonzales] did not know there was a

pending criminal investigation when he discarded the firearm.”

A hypothetically correct jury charge consistent with the indictment would instruct

the jury to find Gonzales guilty of tampering with evidence if: (1) knowing that a murder

investigation was pending, (2) he intentionally or knowingly concealed a firearm, (3) with

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intent to impair its availability as evidence in the investigation. See TEX. PENAL CODE ANN.

§ 37.09(a)(1); Stahmann v. State, 602 S.W.3d 573, 576 (Tex. Crim. App. 2020). A person

has knowledge of the commission of a murder where that person is aware at the time of

his alleged acts that someone intentionally or knowingly caused the death of another

individual. See Barron v. State, 629 S.W.3d 557, 563 (Tex. App. 2021). Proof of actual

concealment “requires a showing that the allegedly concealed item was hidden, removed

from sight or notice, or kept from discovery or observation.” Stahmann, 602 S.W.3d at

581. A person acts with the intention to impair the availability of the evidence in a

subsequent investigation or proceeding related to the offense when it is the person's

conscious objective or desire to impair the availability of the evidence. See TEX. PENAL

CODE ANN. § 6.03(a).

Here, the crime scene location was conclusively established by eye-witness

testimony as well as circumstantial evidence. Margaret and Michael heard gunshots, and

Doria suffered multiple gunshot wounds. Law enforcement arrived immediately after the

shooting, searched the area with a K-9, but no weapon was recovered at the scene.1

Thus, a jury could have concluded that Gonzales removed with weapon “with intent to

impair its availability as evidence.” See id.

Furthermore, Margaret identified a single suspect leaving the scene on foot, which

she identified as Gonzales. Video surveillance depicts Gonzales physical presence near

the scene of the shooting at the approximate time of the shooting while holding his

waistband. There was evidence that Gonzales tested positive for GSR on both hands.

Thus, a rational jury could reasonably infer Gonzales possessed the firearm used to shoot

1 Gonzales lived a mere three blocks from the crime scene.

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Doria and concealed the weapon to hinder the investigation. See Stahmann, 602 S.W.3d

at 581 (providing that proof of actual concealment “requires a showing that the allegedly

concealed item was hidden, removed from sight or notice, or kept from discovery or

observation”); Barron, 629 S.W.3d at 562 (“circumstantial evidence is as probative as

direct evidence in establishing a defendant’s guilt, and circumstantial evidence can alone

be sufficient to establish guilt”).

Gonzales generally states that there was no evidence he “concealed” the firearm.

However, Gonzales did not need to be observed concealing the firearm. See TEX. PENAL

CODE ANN. § 37.09(a)(1). That his effort in concealing the firearm was ultimately

successful matters little; the factfinder had before it some evidence from which it could

legitimately deduce that Gonzales concealed the firearm shortly after firing it. See Gaitan

v. State, 393 S.W.3d 400, 402 (Tex. App.—Amarillo 2012, pet. ref’d). Additionally, there

was evidence that he knew an investigation was pending because Guerra testified that

she called Gonzales shortly after the murder, informed him law enforcement was looking

for him, and asked him to turn himself in. See Barron, 629 S.W.3d at 563.

“Our task under the pertinent standard of review is to defer to what a factfinder

could legitimately infer from the evidence.” Gaitan, 393 S.W.3d at 402. Viewing the

evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict, we conclude that sufficient evidence

exists to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that Gonzales was aware that a murder had

been committed, that he actually concealed the murder weapon, and that he did so

intending to impair the availability of it as evidence in a subsequent investigation. See

TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 37.09(a)(1); Jackson, 443 U.S. at 319. We overrule his second

issue.

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V. UNLAWFUL POSSESSION OF A FIREARM BY A FELON

By his third issue, Gonzales argues that there is insufficient evidence he

“possessed” a firearm in violation of § 46.04 of the penal code. A hypothetically correct

jury charge would instruct the jury to find Gonzales guilty of unlawful possession of a

firearm by a felon if he: (1) knowingly or intentionally possessed a firearm (2) after

conviction and before the fifth anniversary of his release from confinement. See TEX.

PENAL CODE ANN. § 46.04 (a)(1). Gonzales only challenges the first element.

“If the firearm is not found on the defendant or is not in his exclusive possession,

the evidence must affirmatively link him to the firearm.” James v. State, 264 S.W.3d 215,

218–19 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2008, pet. ref’d). As previously discussed, the

evidence at trial established that Gonzales committed murder with a firearm and therefore

exclusively possessed the firearm so to support his conviction for unlawful possession of

a firearm by a felon. See id.; see also Greer v. State, 436 S.W.3d 1, 5 (Tex. App.—Waco

2014, no pet.) (providing that the State can meet its burden with direct or circumstantial

evidence as long as it establishes the appellant’s connection with the firearm was more

than fortuitous). The jury could have inferred that, having used a firearm in a murder,

Gonzales intentionally or knowingly had exclusive possession of the firearm. Gonzales

was convicted of a felony in 2008 and released in 2020, and he does not dispute this fact.

Therefore, there was sufficient evidence that Gonzales was in possession of a firearm

prior to the fifth anniversary of his release from confinement. See TEX. PENAL CODE ANN.

§ 46.04(a)(1).

Reviewing all the evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict, we conclude

a rational factfinder could have found all the elements of unlawful possession of a firearm

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by a felon beyond a reasonable doubt. See Jackson, 443 U.S. at 319. We overrule

Gonzales’s third issue.

VI. CONCLUSION

We affirm the trial court’s judgment.

JAIME TIJERINA
Chief Justice

Do not publish.
TEX. R. APP. P. 47.2(b).

Delivered and filed on the
10th day of July, 2025.

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