Willie James Campbell v. the State of Texas

NO. 12-22-00066-CR

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS

TWELFTH COURT OF APPEALS DISTRICT

TYLER, TEXAS

WILLIE JAMES CAMPBELL, § APPEAL FROM THE 241ST
APPELLANT

V. § JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT

THE STATE OF TEXAS,
APPELLEE § SMITH COUNTY, TEXAS

MEMORANDUM OPINION
Appellant Willie James Campbell was indicted for possession of a controlled substance
with intent to deliver. 1 After the trial court denied Appellant’s motion to suppress, Appellant
entered an open plea of “guilty,” and the trial judge found Appellant “guilty” and assessed
punishment at thirty years of confinement. In his sole issue, Appellant challenges the trial court’s
denial of his motion to suppress. We affirm the trial court’s judgment.

BACKGROUND
At the hearing on the motion to suppress, Officer Cory Chamberlain of the Tyler Police
Department testified that he was dispatched to a residence on Tol Avenue based upon a 9-1-1 call.
The woman who called 9-1-1 related that Appellant “shot at her[,]” but the call was disconnected
and dispatch was unsuccessful in reconnecting with the victim, so Chamberlain went to the
residence. Chamberlain explained that when dispatch makes multiple attempts to call a victim
back and no one answers, he assumes the worst, so when he arrived at the residence, he wanted to
know if the threat still existed and “to make sure everybody is okay.” When Chamberlain arrived,
he saw Appellant walking away from a group of people outside the house. Chamberlain testified
that he then entered the home for a protective sweep to determine whether a victim was inside, and

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See TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN. § 481.112(d) (West 2017).
he observed a pistol in “plain sight[.]” Chamberlain explained that when he returned outside,
Sergeant David Hall had arrived at the scene. Chamberlain saw Appellant speaking with Hall, and
Appellant then led Hall into the house. Chamberlain told Hall about seeing a pistol inside the
residence. According to Chamberlain, Appellant wanted to show officers the pistol and get his
cell phone, so Chamberlain assumed that Appellant consented to officers entering the residence.
Chamberlain reentered the house and observed a jar that appeared to contain marijuana, but he did
not seize the jar. Chamberlain explained that officers then obtained a search warrant.
During cross-examination, Chamberlain testified that although the person who called
dispatch gave the address as 2427 Tol Avenue, Appellant’s address was actually 2724 Tol Avenue.
Chamberlain explained that as a patrol officer, he knew that Tol Avenue is only one block long,
and it “encompasses the 2700 block.” According to Chamberlain, 2427 Tol Avenue does not exist,
but using the information the caller provided regarding Appellant’s name, “dispatch was able to
see that there is a Willie Campbell associated [with] 2724 Tol [Avenue].” Chamberlain testified
that he does not recall when dispatch told him Appellant’s correct address.
Hall testified that he was dispatched to the scene in reference to a report that shots had been
fired. Other officers had told Hall that they saw a firearm when they entered the residence. When
Hall arrived, he asked Appellant about the gun, and Appellant said he had been shooting at a dog.
Hall testified that he asked Appellant for consent to secure the weapon, and Appellant gave his
consent and entered the home with Hall, Chamberlain, and another officer. Appellant had been
detained by Chamberlain and was handcuffed. After securing the firearm, Appellant and the
officers returned outside, and Hall contacted the vice unit and asked them to obtain a search
warrant because officers saw a jar of what appeared to be marijuana. Officers obtained a search
warrant and found cocaine in Appellant’s residence.
The trial court signed an order denying Appellant’s motion to suppress and made findings
of fact and conclusions of law. The trial court found, in pertinent part, that Chamberlain entered
Appellant’s home “to perform a sweep, looking for any person who may[]be seriously injured or
deceased[,]” and Appellant admitted to Hall that he possessed a firearm and “consented to officers
entering the home with him present to retrieve the firearms.” The trial court concluded that “[t]he
Fourth Amendment does not bar police officers from making warrantless entries and searches
when they reasonably believe that a person within is in need of immediate aid[,]” but any such

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search “must be ‘strictly circumscribed by the exigencies which justify its initiation.’” 2 In addition,
the trial court concluded that if a search is justified under the emergency doctrine, the police may
seize evidence that is in plain view, but the emergency doctrine does not apply when the police are
“conducting a search based on probable cause to gather evidence of a crime[.]” Moreover, the
trial court concluded that the emergency doctrine “allows the police to engage in conduct that
would otherwise violate the Fourth Amendment if they are acting on a reasonable belief that doing
so is immediately necessary ‘to protect or preserve life or avoid serious injury.’” The trial court
further concluded that in determining whether the objective standard of reasonableness is met, the
court may “look at the facts that were known to the officers at the time[]” and consider the officers’
training and experience in similar situations. The trial court stated that “[c]onsidering the facts
propounded during the hearing, and the application of the law, this Court is of the opinion that the
Defendant’s motion should be denied.”
Appellant subsequently pleaded “guilty” in an open plea, and the trial court found
Appellant “guilty” and imposed a sentence of thirty years of confinement. This appeal followed.

MOTION TO SUPPRESS
In his sole issue, Appellant argues that the trial court erred by denying his motion to
suppress because the State did not meet its burden of proving an applicable exception to the
requirements of the Fourth Amendment. Specifically, Appellant contends that the warrantless
searches of his home were not justified as lawful protective sweeps under the emergency doctrine,
and because evidence was unlawfully obtained, the affidavit supporting the issuance of the search
warrant lacked probable cause. Appellant further asserts that the evidence confiscated as a result
of the search warrant therefore constituted fruit of the poisonous tree.
Standard of Review and Applicable Law
We review a trial court’s ruling on a motion to suppress under a bifurcated standard of
review. State v. Kerwick, 393 S.W.3d 270, 273 (Tex. Crim. App. 2013); Hubert v. State, 312
S.W.3d 554, 559 (Tex. Crim. App. 2010). We give almost total deference to the trial court’s
determination of historical facts, especially if those determinations turn on witness credibility or
demeanor, but we review de novo the trial court’s application of the law to facts not based on an
evaluation of credibility and demeanor. Neal v. State, 256 S.W.3d 264, 281 (Tex. Crim. App.

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The trial court’s order quoted from Shepherd v. State, 273 S.W.3d 681, 683-84 (Tex. Crim. App. 2008).

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2008); see also Kerwick, 393 S.W.3d at 273. At a hearing on a motion to suppress, the trial court
is the exclusive trier of fact and judge of the credibility of witnesses. Maxwell v. State, 73 S.W.3d
278, 281 (Tex. Crim. App. 2002). Therefore, a trial court may choose to believe or to disbelieve
all or any part of a witness’s testimony. State v. Ross, 32 S.W.3d 853, 855 (Tex. Crim. App. 2000).
We must uphold the trial court’s ruling on a motion to suppress if the ruling was supported by the
record and was correct under any theory of law applicable to the case. Alford v. State, 400 S.W.3d
924, 929 (Tex. Crim. App. 2013); Armendariz v. State, 123 S.W.3d 401, 404 (Tex. Crim. App.
2003).
In reviewing a trial court’s ruling on a motion to suppress, we must view the evidence in
the light most favorable to the trial court’s ruling. State v. Kelly, 204 S.W.3d 808, 818 (Tex. Crim.
App. 2006). When, as here, a trial court files findings of fact with its ruling on a motion to
suppress, we view the evidence in the light most favorable to the ruling and determine whether the
record supports the trial court’s findings. Valtierra v. State, 310 S.W.3d 442, 447 (Tex. Crim.
App. 2010); Romero v. State, 800 S.W.2d 539, 543 (Tex. Crim. App. 1990). Unless the trial court
abused its discretion by making a finding that is not supported by the record, we will defer to the
trial court’s fact findings and not disturb them on appeal. Cantu v. State, 817 S.W.2d 74, 77 (Tex.
Crim. App. 1991); Self v. State, 709 S.W.2d 662, 664-65 (Tex. Crim. App. 1986). We address
only the question of whether the trial court properly applied the law to the facts. Romero, 800
S.W.2d at 543.
Under both the United States and Texas constitutions, a warrantless search of either a
person or property is presumed unreasonable subject to certain exceptions. Brigham City, Utah
v. Stuart, 547 U.S. 398, 403, 126 S. Ct. 1943, 1947, 164 L. Ed. 2d 650 (2006); Estrada v. State,
154 S.W.3d 604, 608 n.12 (Tex. Crim. App. 2005). The notion that officers perform certain
community caretaking functions forms the basis of three separate doctrines created by the United
States Supreme Court: (1) the emergency aid doctrine, (2) the automobile impoundment and
inventory doctrine, and (3) the community caretaking doctrine. Laney v. State, 117 S.W.3d 854,
860 (Tex. Crim. App. 2003). “The common thread in each of these three exceptions to the warrant
and probable cause requirements is the officer’s purpose.” Id.
Under the emergency doctrine, officers may enter a residence without a warrant if “they
reasonably believe that a person within is in need of immediate aid.” Shepherd v. State, 273
S.W.3d 681, 684 (Tex. Crim. App. 2008) (citing Mincey v. Arizona, 437 U.S. 385, 392, 98 S. Ct.

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2408, 57 L. Ed. 2d 290 (1978)); see Laney, 117 S.W.3d at 860 (holding that the emergency
doctrine justifies a warrantless entry if officers have an immediate, reasonable belief that they must
act to protect or preserve life or to avoid serious injury). “[T]he emergency doctrine does not apply
when the police are carrying out their ‘crime-fighting’ role by conducting a search based on
probable cause to gather evidence of a crime.” Shepherd, 273 S.W.3d at 684. In determining
whether a warrantless search is justified under the emergency doctrine, courts apply an objective
standard of reasonableness. Laney, 117 S.W.3d at 862. The objective standard examines the
police officer’s conduct and “takes into account the facts and circumstances known to the police
at the time of the search.” Id. (quoting Brimage v. State, 918 S.W.2d 466, 501 (Tex. Crim. App.
1994)). Additionally, courts “look to ensure that the warrantless search is ‘strictly circumscribed
by the exigencies which justify its initiation.’” Id. (quoting Mincey, 437 U.S. at 393, 98 S. Ct. at
2413, and Bass v. State, 732 S.W.2d 632, 635 (Tex. Crim. App. 1987)). A search conducted
pursuant to consent is an exception to the warrant requirement. Juarez v. State, 758 S.W.2d 772,
776 (Tex. Crim. App. 1998).
Analysis
As discussed above, a 9-1-1 caller reported that Appellant fired a gun at her. Although the
caller provided a transposed address, based upon Chamberlain’s experience as a patrol officer, he
knew that no such address existed. In addition, because the caller reported Appellant’s name,
dispatch learned that Appellant was associated with the residence at 2724 Tol Avenue. Dispatch
informed Chamberlain that the call was disconnected. Chamberlain explained that he entered the
residence to ascertain whether the threat still existed and someone inside needed assistance. Upon
entering the residence, Chamberlain saw a firearm, and when he exited the residence, Hall had
arrived and was speaking with Appellant outside the house. Hall testified that Appellant consented
to officers entering the residence to secure the weapon, and when officers did so, they observed a
jar of what appeared to be marijuana. The officers then secured a search warrant and discovered
cocaine.
Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the trial court’s finding and giving
almost total deference to the trial court’s findings on questions of historical fact and application-
of-law-to-fact questions, we conclude that the trial court did not err by concluding that
Chamberlain reasonably believed that a person inside the residence might need assistance and that
Appellant consented to the second entry into the residence to secure the weapon. See Kerwick,

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393 S.W.3d at 273; Shepherd, 273 S.W.3d at 684; Neal, 256 S.W.3d at 281; Laney, 117 S.W.3d
at 860; Maxwell, 73 S.W.3d at 281; Ross, 32 S.W.3d at 855; Juarez, 758 S.W.2d at 776. We
overrule issue one.

DISPOSITION
Having overruled Appellant’s sole issue, we affirm the trial court’s judgment.

BRIAN HOYLE
Justice

Opinion delivered January 11, 2023.
Panel consisted of Worthen, C.J., Hoyle, J., and Neeley, J.

(DO NOT PUBLISH)

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COURT OF APPEALS

TWELFTH COURT OF APPEALS DISTRICT OF TEXAS

JUDGMENT

JANUARY 11, 2022

NO. 12-22-00066-CR

WILLIE JAMES CAMPBELL,
Appellant
V.
THE STATE OF TEXAS,
Appellee

Appeal from the 241st District Court
of Smith County, Texas (Tr.Ct.No. 241-0906-21)

THIS CAUSE came to be heard on the appellate record and briefs filed herein,
and the same being considered, it is the opinion of this court that there was no error in the judgment.
It is therefore ORDERED, ADJUDGED and DECREED that the judgment of
the court below be in all things affirmed, and that the decision be certified to the court below for
observance.
Brian Hoyle, Justice.
Panel consisted of Worthen, C.J., Hoyle, J., and Neeley, J.