Julio Cesar Galindo Mancha v. Lorena Campos Mancha

Opinion filed January 8, 2026

In The

Eleventh Court of Appeals
__________

No. 11-25-00167-CV
__________

JULIO CESAR GALINDO MANCHA, Appellant
V.
LORENA MANCHA, Appellee

On Appeal from the 446th District Court
Ector County, Texas
Trial Court Cause No. E-23-10-1428-FM

MEMORANDUM OPINION
Pro se Appellant, Julio Cesar Galindo Mancha, appeals the entry of the trial
court’s final decree of divorce. Appellant contends that the trial court abused its
discretion by awarding Lorena Mancha, Appellee, spousal maintenance. See TEX.
FAM. CODE ANN. § 8.051 (West 2020). In several issues, Appellant challenges
Appellee’s eligibility for spousal maintenance, as well as the amount ordered.
Appellant likewise asserts that the trial court abused its discretion by failing to
include a provision in the final decree of divorce granting Appellee’s request to
change her last name.
I. Factual Background
Appellant and Appellee were married on December 23, 1995. Appellant was
eighteen years old, and Appellee had just turned seventeen. Appellee dropped out
of the eighth grade because Appellant “didn’t want [her] to be talking to boys,” and
she never finished school.
Appellant began his spousal abuse of Appellee “[r]ight after [they] got
married.” In February or March 1996, when Appellee was about seven months
pregnant with their oldest daughter, Appellant dragged her by her hair and choked
her. Appellee endured physical abuse for the first decade of the marriage, including
during both pregnancies with the parties’ daughters. Appellant’s physical abuse
halted around 2006 when their youngest daughter was three years old, but according
to Appellee, the verbal and emotional abuse “never stopped.” For instance,
Appellant called Appellee ugly and lazy throughout the marriage.
According to Appellee, Appellant’s physical abuse resumed in 2022 and
2023, which resulted in Appellee calling police multiple times. The parties
separated, and Appellant moved out of their shared home in September 2023.
Appellant immediately moved in with his girlfriend, whom he had been dating since
2022. Appellee learned that, prior to their separation, Appellant had opened a
personal checking account in his name and had been secretly paying for gifts and
vacations for his girlfriend and her children.
In October 2023, Appellant filed an original petition for divorce. Appellee
filed an answer and counterpetition in which she requested temporary spousal
maintenance while the suit was pending as well as maintenance payments upon
dissolution of the marriage.
By the hearing in December 2023, Appellant testified that he had added his
new girlfriend to his car insurance and removed Appellee from his health insurance,
which Appellee testified caused her financial hardship due to ongoing health issues.
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Appellee testified that her only source of income was her children’s entertainment
business, Choo Choo Charlie, which operates in the mall, when the mall is open.
She also owns a jewelry and crafts business with her oldest daughter, but the sale
proceeds go to her granddaughter. Appellee testified that she worked only part-time
at Choo Choo Charlie due to health issues and caring for her granddaughter and that
she paid a “co-worker” to manage day-to-day operations in her absence.
Appellee lived in a home owned by Appellant’s brother and was still living
there when trial commenced in May 2025. Living with Appellee were the parties’
twenty-one-year-old daughter and her newborn baby, and their twenty-eight-year-
old daughter and granddaughter. Appellee and her daughters did not pay rent.
However, Appellant’s brother wrote a letter to the trial court in June 2025 expressing
his desire to start collecting rent from Appellee.
Both parties introduced financial information detailing their earnings and
expenses. Neither party owned real property or retirement accounts, and both had
significant credit card debt. Appellee also testified that she owed the Internal
Revenue Service (IRS) $7,000 in back taxes.
Appellee requested spousal maintenance payments in the amount of $2,500
per month for seven years. Appellant asked the trial court to deny Appellee’s request
to order spousal maintenance.
At the conclusion of trial, the trial court dissolved the marriage, observed that
Appellee was eligible for a name change, and divided the property and debts.
Appellee was given sole control and value of her businesses, Choo Choo Charlie and
Pretty Little Crafters. She was also awarded her personal possessions such as her
clothing, jewelry, and other personal effects, and the furniture in her possession,
which was valued at around $2,000. In addition to the money she owed the IRS,
Appellee was assigned debts totaling $10,200. Appellant was awarded the 2022
Toyota Camry that his daughter paid for and drives, his tools valued at $20,000, and
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his bank accounts. As reflected in the divorce decree, Appellant’s assigned debts
amounted to $23,064. Finally, the trial court ordered Appellant to pay spousal
maintenance in the amount of $1,000 per month for twenty-four months.
Appellant filed a notice of appeal and a pro se motion to stay enforcement of
the spousal maintenance order. On October 9, 2025, the trial court heard testimony
from both parties regarding their income and expenses, then denied Appellee’s
motion to stay the order pending appeal.
II. Spousal Maintenance: Governing Law & Standard of Review
Appellant raises several challenges to the trial court’s spousal maintenance
award. In addition to contesting Appellee’s eligibility, Appellant asserts that the
trial court abused its discretion when it: (1) considered “an unsupported implication
of ‘domestic violence’”; (2) failed to consider Appellant’s inability to pay;
(3) calculated the amount using Appellant’s gross annual income rather than his net
monthly income, debt repayment, and living expenses; and (4) considered
“incomplete or misleading testimony regarding Appellant’s travel expenses.”
A. Governing Law
Spousal maintenance is “an award in a suit for dissolution of a marriage of
periodic payments from the future income of one spouse for the support of the other
spouse.” FAM. § 8.001(1). It is “intended to provide temporary and rehabilitative
support for a spouse whose ability to support herself has eroded over time while
engaged in homemaking activities and whose capital assets are insufficient to
provide support.” Mehta v. Mehta, 716 S.W.3d 126, 133 (Tex. 2025) (quoting
Sherman v. Sherman, 650 S.W.3d 897, 899 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2022, no pet.));
In re Marriage of McCoy, 567 S.W.3d 426, 428–29 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 2018,
no pet.). “Its purpose is to ameliorate the ‘very real hardships’ that would otherwise
exist as the result of a divorce.” Mehta, 716 S.W.3d at 133 (quoting Dalton v.
Dalton, 551 S.W.3d 126, 143 (Tex. 2018) (Lehrmann, J., concurring) (quoting
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James W. Paulsen, Remember the Alamo[ny]! The Unique Texas Ban on Permanent
Alimony and the Development of Community Property Law, 56 LAW & COMTEMP.
PROBS. 7, 8 (1993))).
Section 8.051(2) of the Family Code permits a trial court to order maintenance
only if the spouse seeking maintenance will lack sufficient property, including the
spouse’s separate property, on dissolution of the marriage to provide for the spouse’s
minimum reasonable needs, and the spouse seeking maintenance:
(A) is unable to earn sufficient income to provide for the spouse’s
minimum reasonable needs because of an incapacitating physical
or mental disability;
(B) has been married to the other spouse for 10 years or longer and
lacks the ability to earn sufficient income to provide for the
spouse’s minimum reasonable needs; or
(C) is the custodian of a child of the marriage of any age who requires
substantial care and personal supervision because of a physical
or mental disability that prevents the spouse from earning
sufficient income to provide for the spouse’s minimum reasonable
needs.
FAM. § 8.051(2). 1 A spouse who proves eligibility for maintenance under
Section 8.051(2)(B) must also rebut the presumption that maintenance is not
warranted by demonstrating that he or she “has exercised diligence in: (1) earning
sufficient income to provide for the spouse’s minimum reasonable needs; or
(2) developing the necessary skills to provide for the spouse’s minimum reasonable
needs during a period of separation and during the time the suit for the dissolution
of the marriage is pending.” Id. § 8.053(a).

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Section 8.051(1) requires proof that, either while the divorce suit was pending or within two years
before suit was filed, the spouse from whom maintenance is sought was convicted of or received deferred
adjudication for committing family violence, as defined by Section 71.004 of the Family Code, against the
spouse seeking maintenance or the spouse’s child. FAM. § 8.051(1). That subsection is inapplicable here,
as is subsection 8.051(2)(C).
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Once a trial court finds that a spouse is eligible to receive maintenance, the
trial court “shall determine the nature, amount, duration, and manner of periodic
payments by considering all relevant factors.” FAM. § 8.052. Section 8.052 sets out
a non-exhaustive list of eleven factors to consider, including “each spouse’s ability
to provide for that spouse’s minimum reasonable needs independently, considering
that spouse’s financial resources on dissolution of the marriage” and “the age,
employment history, earning ability, and physical and emotional condition of the
spouse seeking maintenance.” Id. § 8.052(1), (4). The Family Code further limits
the amount and duration of maintenance awards based on the obligor spouse’s
average gross monthly income and the length of the marriage between the
parties. See id. §§ 8.054–.055 (West Supp. 2025).
B. Standard of Review
“A trial court’s decision to award spousal maintenance is reviewed for an
abuse of discretion.” Mehta, 716 S.W.3d at 131. “A [trial] court abuses its discretion
if it acts arbitrarily or unreasonably or fails to analyze or apply the law correctly.”
Id. (citing Iliff v. Iliff, 339 S.W.3d 74, 78 (Tex. 2011)). “While insufficiency of the
evidence is not an independent ground on which to challenge a spousal-maintenance
award, an award that is not supported by legally sufficient evidence may constitute
an abuse of discretion.” Id.; see also In re J.Y.O., 709 S.W.3d 485, 497 n.92 (Tex.
2024) (noting that legal and factual insufficiency are relevant factors in assessing
whether the trial court abused its discretion); Henry v. Cox, 520 S.W.3d 28, 34 (Tex.
2017) (“No abuse of discretion exists if some evidence reasonably supports the
court’s ruling.”).
Evidence is legally sufficient if there is “more than a mere scintilla” to support
a vital fact-finding, i.e., “the evidence rises to a level that would enable reasonable
and fair-minded people to differ in their conclusions.” Gunn v. McCoy, 554 S.W.3d
645, 658 (Tex. 2018). Reviewing courts must consider evidence in the light most
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favorable to the judgment and its findings, “indulg[ing] every reasonable inference
that would support it.” City of Keller v. Wilson, 168 S.W.3d 802, 822 (Tex. 2005).
When, as here, the trial court does not enter findings of fact and conclusions
of law following a nonjury trial, all fact findings necessary to support the trial court’s
judgment are implied. Shields Ltd. P’ship v. Bradberry, 526 S.W.3d 471, 480 (Tex.
2017). We will affirm the trial court’s judgment if it can be upheld on any legal
theory supported by the evidence. Dowtech Specialty Contractors, Inc. v. City of
Weinert, 630 S.W.3d 206, 215 (Tex. App.—Eastland 2020, pet. denied) (citing
Worford v. Stamper, 801 S.W.2d 108, 109 (Tex. 1990) (per curiam)); see Diaz v.
Diaz, 350 S.W.3d 251, 256 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2011, pet. denied) (“Under an
abuse of discretion standard, we will not reverse the trial court’s judgment if the trial
court reaches a correct result even for a wrong reason.”).
III. Discussion
A. Eligibility
Appellant challenges Appellee’s eligibility for spousal maintenance. He also
contends that Appellee failed to rebut the presumption under Section 8.053. As the
spouse seeking maintenance, Appellee bore the burden to establish the statutory
requirements for eligibility, and, if applicable, overcome the presumption that
maintenance is not warranted. Boothe v. Boothe, 681 S.W.3d 916, 927 (Tex. App.—
Houston [14th Dist.] 2023, no pet.). That the parties were married for more than ten
years is not in dispute. Considering the totality of the record evidence in the light
most favorable to the trial court’s judgment, we hold that Appellee presented
sufficient evidence that she lacked sufficient property and earning ability to provide
for her minimum reasonable needs. See FAM. § 8.051(2)(B); Mehta, 716 S.W.3d at
134–35. Additionally, the record supports the trial court’s finding that Appellee
exercised diligence in either earning sufficient income or developing the necessary
skills to provide for her minimum reasonable needs. See FAM. § 8.053(a).
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1. Appellee’s Property and Minimum Reasonable Needs
The Family Code neither defines “minimum reasonable needs” nor expressly
states what property should be considered as available to provide therefor. FAM.
§ 8.051; Mehta, 716 S.W.3d at 132. The term necessarily includes the basic essential
needs such as food, utilities, and medical expenses. See Mehta, 716 S.W.3d at 132;
see also In re Marriage of Hale, 975 S.W.2d 694, 698 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 1998,
no pet.) (“The schedule of [the wife’s] expenses, however, is just a generalized list
and does not include other essential needs that everyone has, such as her portion of
health premiums, uncovered medical expenses, drugs and medicines, clothing, and
the like.”). Trial courts generally have discretion to determine a spouse’s minimum
reasonable needs on a case-by-case, fact-specific basis, and may factor in all the
spouse’s available assets and expenses. See Mehta, 716 S.W.3d at 132, 134–35;
Martinez v. Martinez, No. 02-21-00353-CV, 2022 WL 17986023, at *2 (Tex.
App.—Fort Worth Dec. 29, 2022, no pet.) (mem. op.) (“[T]he minimum reasonable
needs for a particular individual is a fact-specific determination that should be made
by the trial court on a case-by-case basis.”). Courts may also consider the liquidity
of assets awarded and their ability to produce income. Schafman v. Schafman,
No. 01-20-00231-CV, 2022 WL 962466, at *6 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.]
Mar. 31, 2022, no pet.) (mem. op.). However, “the law does not require the spouse
to spend down long-term assets, liquidate all available assets, or incur new debt
simply to obtain job skills and meet short-term needs.” Id.
Although an itemized list of monthly income and expenses is the most helpful
evidence to establish eligibility, neither the Family Code nor precedent requires such
exactitude. Mehta, 716 S.W.3d at 132, 135. When the quantitative evidence is
incomplete or otherwise imperfect, a trial court can credit qualitative testimony
about a spouse’s inability to pay essential, basic living expenses to conclude that a

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spouse seeking maintenance will lack sufficient property to provide for his or her
minimum reasonable needs. Id. at 135.
Based on the final divorce decree, the property available “to provide for
[Appellee’s] minimum reasonable needs” included household furniture valued at
$2,000, her personal possessions such as her clothing, jewelry, and other personal
effects, and her business revenue. See FAM. § 8.051. At trial, Appellee introduced
a financial information sheet, her tax returns for 2023 and 2024, and other
documentation as evidence of her minimum reasonable needs. Her net business
income in 2023 was $28,126, and an adjusted gross income of $26,139. Appellee
reported a net business income of $9,391 for 2024, which reduced her average
monthly income to $1,563.21. Neither party owned real property or retirement
accounts, and there was no indication that Appellee had a savings account or
significant funds in her checking account.
Appellee presented evidence that her minimum living expenses and personal
debts were approximately $3,324 per month. This amount does not include rent,
health insurance, a car payment, and factors in the contributions from her daughters.
Despite Appellant’s implication that Appellee had “time to go to concerts [and] go
out drinking,” her financial information sheet allotted just $250 per month for
“dining out” and “entertainment.” We did not incorporate that amount in assessing
Appellee’s minimum reasonable needs but cannot say the trial court would have
abused its discretion by doing so. See Czarkowski-Golejewski v. Wilson, No. 07-24-
00127-CV, 2025 WL 20566, at *2 (Tex. App.—Amarillo Jan. 2, 2025, no pet.)
(mem. op.) (In determining minimum reasonable needs, “a reasonable trial court
can[not] ignore the indisputable fact that people must physically nourish themselves
to survive. They must eat.”).
Appellee presented evidence that she incurred debt to pay her living expenses
following the separation. Among other debts, Appellee will need to pay for a car
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and her own health insurance without coverage through Appellant’s employer. As
previously noted, the trial court ordered Appellant, who was aware of Appellee’s
health issues when he removed her from his health insurance, to resume paying for
her health insurance and her uninsured medical payment as temporary spousal
support. See Matter of Marriage of Cooper, No. 06-22-00093-CV, 2023 WL
3766574, at *3 (Tex. App.—Texarkana June 2, 2023, no pet.) (mem. op.)
(considering the trial court’s award of temporary spousal maintenance before trial as
some evidence that the spouse lacked sufficient income to provide for her minimum
reasonable needs). Considering Appellee’s substantially lower income compared to
her minimum expenses, the trial court did not abuse its discretion by finding that
Appellee’s income and assets are insufficient to meet her minimum reasonable
needs. See FAM. § 8.051.
2. Appellee’s ability to earn sufficient income and exercise of diligence
With respect to Appellee’s lack of ability to earn sufficient income and
diligence in that regard, the evidence demonstrated that the parties were married in
1995, and Appellee stopped attending school shortly thereafter. The highest level
of education she completed was the eighth grade. At the time of trial, her only source
of income was from her business, Choo Choo Charlie, which operates when the mall
is open and at which she worked as much as thirty hours per week. While she does
own and operate a jewelry and crafts business with her oldest daughter, she described
it as a hobby and testified that the sale proceeds go to her granddaughter. Appellee
worked part-time at Choo Choo Charlie—sometimes as much as thirty hours per
week—and paid another person to cover the remaining hours.
Appellant contends that Appellee’s decision to work part-time is a
discretionary lifestyle choice that should preclude spousal maintenance. He claims
that Appellee did not work full time during their marriage due to “[l]aziness,” and
that her current underemployment is intentional. He directs our attention to the trial
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court’s remarks at the close of evidence: “[Appellee] testified a week ago today that
the only reason she did not work full time was because she was taking care of her
grandbabies. . . . [Appellee] could work a full-time job, and chooses not to.”
However, a judge’s comments at the conclusion of a bench trial are not a substitute
for findings of fact and conclusions of law. RSL Funding, LLC v. Metropolitan Life
Ins. Co., No. 01-23-00190-CV, 2025 WL 920767, at *26 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st
Dist.] Mar. 27, 2025, no pet.) (citing In re W.E.R., 669 S.W.2d 716, 716 (Tex. 1984)
(per curiam)); see also In re Doe 10, 78 S.W.3d 338, 340 n.2 (Tex. 2002) (“Oral
comments from the bench are not written findings of fact.”). “Statements made by
a trial court outside of properly filed written findings and conclusions do not limit
an appellate court’s review.” RSL Funding, 2025 WL 920767, at *26 (quoting
Tamuno Ifiesimama v. Haile, 522 S.W.3d 675, 684 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.]
2017, pet. denied)). Consequently, we are not bound by the trial court’s comments
in our review of the record, which supports the spousal maintenance award. See id.
Appellee consistently maintained that, in addition to caring for her
grandchildren, her health issues prevented her from working full time. Appellee
testified at a hearing in December 2023 that she “always [felt] ill” and unwell
because of her underactive thyroid. She described “feel[ing] ill most of the time” as
including “pain,” “body aches,” and “migraine headaches.” When trial commenced
on May 8, 2025, Appellee cited her health and that she “was not doing well” as part
of the reason for her inability to run her business during all of its hours of operation.
She reiterated on the final day of trial, May 15, 2025, that her health issues, including
osteoarthritis “[w]ith spurring in [her] left hip joint,” affected her ability to meet her
minimum reasonable needs.
Although the trial court observed that there was “no testimony . . . from an
expert showing that [Appellee] is unable to work,” the Family Code does not require
medical evidence of an incapacitating physical or mental disability, and “testimony
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on incapacity need not be limited to experts.” Kelly v. Kelly, 634 S.W.3d 335, 367
(Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2021, no pet.) (quoting Pickens v. Pickens, 62
S.W.3d 212, 215 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2001, pet. denied)). According to the medical
records Appellee introduced, she sought medical treatment in 2024 and 2025 for
pain in her pelvis, abdomen, chest, and lower back. The records also showed that
she was diagnosed with osteoarthritis and “[a]cute pancreatitis,” and she had a “[l]eft
adrenal mass.” Thus, even if the trial court did not find that Appellee suffered an
incapacitating disability, Appellee’s health issues were nevertheless a limitation on
her ability to earn sufficient income to meet her minimum reasonable needs. See
FAM. § 8.051(2)(A), (B); Slicker v. Slicker, 464 S.W.3d 850, 863 (Tex. App.—
Dallas 2015, no pet.) (considering wife’s low self-esteem, high anxiety, and
depression in assessing earning ability); Matter of Marriage of Willis, No. 06-25-
00007-CV, 2025 WL 2433204, at *7–8 (Tex. App.—Texarkana Aug. 25, 2025, pet.
filed) (mem. op.) (trial court’s finding that ex-wife lacked ability to earn sufficient
income supported by evidence of her deteriorating mental health, trouble sleeping,
panic attacks, inability to concentrate and perform daily tasks); Wilson, 2025 WL
20566, at *3 (affirming maintenance award based on appellee’s disability, no current
income, that she was seeking higher education, and would “hav[e] to eventually
maintain a house and car in Austin and buy her clothes and food”).
Finally, even had Appellee worked full time, her income would still be
insufficient to meet her minimum reasonable needs. She paid her employee $15,730
in 2023 for the hours she was unable to cover, and $13,145 in 2024. Had Appellee
worked those hours rather than paying an employee, her average monthly income
for 2023 and 2024 would have been, at the most, $2,766.33. This falls below her
minimum reasonable needs, especially considering that she will bear the
responsibility for health insurance, a car payment, and car insurance after the
divorce. See Cooper, 2023 WL 3766574, at *3 (considering ex-wife’s testimony
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that she would have to pay for car insurance after the divorce in affirming spousal
maintenance award). And while we do not account for a monthly rent payment, we
cannot ignore Appellant’s brother’s June 2025 letter to the trial court in which he
expressed his desire to collect rent from Appellee in the future. See Wilson, 2025
WL 20566, at *3.
The evidence therefore supports the trial court’s finding that Appellee lacked
both sufficient property and sufficient earning ability to meet her minimum
reasonable needs. FAM. § 8.051(2)(B). For the same reasons, the trial court did not
abuse its discretion by finding that Appellee presented evidence to rebut the
presumption that maintenance was not warranted. Id. § 8.053(a); See Diaz, 350
S.W.3d at 254–55 (ex-wife rebutted presumption that maintenance was not
warranted by demonstrating that she was running a janitorial business, caring for her
children, and did not speak English). Having found that Appellee was eligible for
spousal maintenance under Section 8.051(2)(B), we need not address her eligibility
under Section 8.051(2)(A). See TEX. R. APP. P. 47.1.
B. Amount & Duration
Appellant likewise contests the amount of spousal maintenance awarded to
Appellee, and the evidence on which the trial court relied. Section 8.052 sets out a
non-exclusive list of eleven factors for courts to consider in determining the nature,
amount, duration, and manner of maintenance payments:
(1) each spouse’s ability to provide for that spouse’s minimum
reasonable needs independently, considering that spouse’s
financial resources on dissolution of the marriage;
(2) the education and employment skills of the spouses, the time
necessary to acquire sufficient education or training to enable the
spouse seeking maintenance to earn sufficient income, and the
availability and feasibility of that education or training;
(3) the duration of the marriage;

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(4) the age, employment history, earning ability, and physical and
emotional condition of the spouse seeking maintenance;
(5) the effect on each spouse’s ability to provide for that spouse’s
minimum reasonable needs while providing periodic child support
payments or maintenance, if applicable;
(6) acts by either spouse resulting in excessive or abnormal
expenditures or destruction, concealment, or fraudulent
disposition of community property, joint tenancy, or other
property held in common;
(7) the contribution by one spouse to the education, training, or
increased earning power of the other spouse;
(8) the property brought to the marriage by either spouse;
(9) the contribution of a spouse as homemaker;
(10) marital misconduct, including adultery and cruel treatment, by
either spouse during the marriage; and
(11) any history or pattern of family violence, as defined by
Section 71.004.
FAM. § 8.052. The Family Code likewise limits the duration and amount of spousal
maintenance. Id. § 8.054–.055. Here, because the parties were married to each other
for twenty-eight years, the trial court could have ordered Appellant to pay spousal
maintenance for up to seven years. Id. § 8.054. Moreover, the amount of monthly
maintenance payments must not have exceeded twenty percent of Appellant’s
average monthly gross income. Id. § 8.055(a)(2).
Appellant argues that the trial court ignored his $42,000 debt repayment
obligation, and his other monthly expenses when determining the amount of spousal
maintenance. Appellant testified at trial that he earned a gross annual income of
$100,000 in 2024, but his hourly wage increased in 2025. His checking and savings
accounts had a combined total of $1,900 at the time of trial, and he was awarded his
tools, valued at $20,000, in the divorce decree. Appellant declared in June 2025 that
his monthly income was $5,660.28, and that his monthly expenses including spousal
maintenance were $5,237.99.
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At the post-trial hearing on Appellant’s motion to stay enforcement of the
maintenance order, he testified that he makes $5,000 per month. Attached to his
motion were paystubs for four weeks, May 22 through June 18, 2025, that totaled
$6,707.63 in gross pay. As of June 18, Appellant’s gross income for the first twenty-
four weeks of 2025 was $53,416.79, or an average of $8,902.79 every four weeks.
When the trial court asked about his expenses, he purported to pay $600 a month to
rent a mobile home, about $360 a month in utilities, $47 for internet, $140 for his
cell phone, $377.89 for automobile insurance, and $228 for life insurance. His
monthly expenses, without payments toward his credit card debt and spousal
maintenance, total approximately $1,700. Factoring in the $1,000 maintenance
payments, Appellant is left with around $2,300 per month to cover his debts and
discretionary expenditures.
Even with Appellant’s conflicting financial information, there is no scenario
in which the spousal maintenance payment would affect his ability to meet his own
minimum reasonable needs. See FAM. § 8.052(1), (5). In fact, Appellant agreed that
he has “a little bit leftover” each month. Moreover, the trial court was permitted to
conclude based on the evidence presented that Appellant earned an average gross
monthly income of $5,000, and $1,000 monthly spousal maintenance award is within
the discretionary bounds of the statutory limit. FAM. § 8.055(a)(2).
Appellant claimed that Appellee did not work full-time during their marriage.
While Appellant attributed it to “[l]aziness,” the trial court was permitted to infer
that Appellee, age forty-six at the time of trial, was raising the parties’ daughters for
the majority of the marriage. Such a gap in employment undoubtedly affected
Appellee’s earning ability. See FAM. § 8.052(2), (4), (9). And evidence that
Appellant had sufficient income to provide for himself, Appellee, and their
daughters for the duration of the marriage permits the rational inference that he was

15
able to pay maintenance of $1,000 per month for two years. See Cooper, 2023 WL
3766574, at *4.
Appellant argues that the trial court improperly considered Appellee’s
testimony regarding Appellant’s infidelity, post-separation spending, and domestic
violence committed against her throughout the marriage. Appellant conceded that
he physically abused Appellee by “hitting her and things of that nature” when they
were younger. Appellant corroborated Appellee’s testimony that the physical abuse
stopped when their youngest daughter was three years old. He initially admitted to
being “violent” toward Appellee “maybe three, four years” before trial, but retracted
his concession and claimed that the abuse was only verbal. He then accused
Appellee of abusing him during “a physical altercation” in 2023, and denied any
other physical violence.
Appellant further corroborated Appellee’s testimony that he had a secret
checking account prior to their separation. According to Appellant, he had been
dating his girlfriend since 2022, moved in with her in 2023, had spent up to $3,000
on her, and a few hundred dollars on her children. He admitted to traveling with his
girlfriend multiple times while the suit was pending, including a trip to Kalahari
Resort in Round Rock with her children. He has also bought his girlfriend gifts such
as jewelry, among other things.
On this record, we find no abuse of discretion in the trial court’s determination
of the amount and duration of spousal maintenance. The maintenance awarded in
this case is limited to two years, well below the statutorily permitted seven-year
period. Furthermore, $1,000 per month is a modest sum relative to Appellee’s
monthly shortfall, the duration of the marriage, and Appellant’s gross income and
living expenses. Consequently, the trial court’s award of spousal maintenance
cannot be characterized as arbitrary, capricious, or unsupported by the record.

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Accordingly, we overrule Appellant’s issues in which he contests the amount and
duration of spousal maintenance, and the evidence upon which the trial court relied.
IV. Lack of Name Change Provision
In Appellant’s final issue, he asserts that the trial court erroneously omitted
Appellee’s name change from the divorce decree. As Appellant correctly points out,
the trial court stated that Appellee was eligible for a name change, but it was not
reflected in the final decree of divorce.
Section 6.706 of the Family Code requires a trial court to “change the name
of a party specifically requesting the change to a name previously used by the party
unless the court states in the decree a reason for denying the change of name.” FAM.
§ 6.706(a). A trial court’s ruling on a name change is reviewed for an abuse of
discretion. In re Mayol, 137 S.W.3d 103, 105 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2004,
no pet.); see also Downer v. Aquamarine Operators, Inc., 701 S.W.2d 238, 241–42
(Tex. 1985).
A judgment, absent issues tried by consent, must conform to the
pleadings. TEX. R. CIV. P. 301 (the judgment of the court “shall conform to the
pleadings”); In re P.M.G., 405 S.W.3d 406, 417 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 2013, no
pet.). Thus, in the absence of pleadings to support requested relief, such relief may
not be granted. P.M.G., 405 S.W.3d at 417 (citing Cunningham v. Parkdale Bank,
660 S.W.2d 810, 813 (Tex. 1983)); Rodriguez v. Rodriguez, No. 05-22-00056-CV,
2022 WL 17974631, at *3 (Tex. App.—Dallas Dec. 28, 2022, no pet.) (mem. op.).
We have found no pleading in the record in which Appellee requested a name
change. The first mention of a name change was on May 15, 2025, the second day
of trial. Appellee’s attorney asked on direct examination: “Are you asking the [trial]
[c]ourt for a name change?” Appellee stated that she was and provided her maiden
name. Without a pleading requesting a name change, the trial court could not include

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such unrequested relief in the judgment. See TEX. R. CIV. P. 301; Rodriguez, 2022
WL 17974631, at *3.
We further observe that Appellant has not demonstrated how he was harmed
by the lack of a provision in the final divorce decree changing his ex-wife’s name.
Appellant has therefore failed to carry his burden to show that the trial court’s
alleged error prevented him from properly presenting the case to this court or
“probably caused the rendition of an improper judgment.” TEX. R. APP. P. 44.1(a).
Accordingly, we overrule Appellant’s final issue.
V. This Court’s Ruling
We affirm the judgment of the trial court. All pending motions in this
proceeding are denied or otherwise overruled.

W. BRUCE WILLIAMS
JUSTICE

January 8, 2026
Panel consists of: Bailey, C.J.,
Trotter, J., and Williams, J.

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