United States Gypsum Company v. Burt Lee Burnett

Opinion filed May 30, 2025

In The

Eleventh Court of Appeals
__________

No. 11-24-00053-CV
__________

UNITED STATES GYPSUM COMPANY, Appellant
V.
BURT LEE BURNETT, Appellee

On Appeal from the 1st Multicounty Court at Law
Nolan County, Texas
Trial Court Cause No. 6423

MEMORANDUM OPINION
Appellant United States Gypsum Company (U.S. Gypsum) appeals from a
default judgment in favor of Appellee Burt Lee Burnett 1 on causes of action for suit
to quiet title, trespass to try title, and declaratory judgment regarding a disputed tract

1
Burt Lee Burnett (Burt) died on November 22, 2024, while this case was on appeal. Pursuant to
Rule 7.1(a)(1) of the Texas Rules of Appellate Procedure, we will proceed to adjudicate the appeal as if
Burt were still alive and will identify Burt as Appellee. See TEX. R. APP. P. 7.1(a)(1).
of land (the property). In two issues, U.S. Gypsum challenges (1) the trial court’s
subject-matter jurisdiction and (2) the trial court’s denial of its motion for new trial,
which sought to set aside the default judgment. We reverse and render.
Factual and Procedural History
This suit arises from litigation filed in a probate proceeding. On June 6, 2018,
Sheila Rhea Burnett (Sheila) filed an application to probate S. Dale Burnett’s (Dale)
will in the Nolan County Court, alleging that Dale passed away on March 9, 2018.
On July 25, 2023, Sheila and Dale’s son, Burt, moved to transfer the probate case
under Section 32.004 of the Texas Estates Code to the 1st Multicounty Court at Law
of Nolan County. See TEX. EST. CODE ANN. § 32.004 (West 2020). The county court
granted the transfer on August 8, 2023.
Burt filed his live pleading in this matter on September 19, 2023, against U.S.
Gypsum asserting claims of trespass to try title, to quiet title, and to obtain
declaratory relief. Burt alleged that on July 31, 2012, over five years before his
father’s death, Burt acquired the property via general warranty deed from his parents:
Dale and Sheila. That deed was filed in the Nolan County Clerk’s Office on July 31,
2012. Burt allowed his family to continue using and enjoying the property, which
included allowing his brother and nephew to dispose of scrap tires, metal, and
plastic waste on the northern part of the property, next to Sweetwater Creek. On
February 22, 2022, however, U.S. Gypsum filed suit in the 32nd District Court of
Nolan County against Burt’s brother and nephew to recover costs, alleging
ownership of the property and asserting claims for negligence, trespass, and
nuisance. The parties in the district court litigation agreed to the entry of an
injunction.
On November 9, 2023, Burt moved in the transferred probate proceeding for
a no-answer default judgment against U.S. Gypsum. The trial court granted Burt’s

2
motion and signed a default judgment on November 30, 2023. U.S. Gypsum filed a
motion for new trial on December 20, 2023, alleging that its failure to answer was
the result of the registered agent e-mailing notice of service to a paralegal who, at
the time, was on medical leave for brain cancer. U.S. Gypsum also alleged that it
was the owner of the land in question, and it provided supporting exhibits, including
a 1923 deed from U.S. Gypsum’s purchase, a title report, and property tax statements
of receipt. U.S. Gypsum also alleged that the attorney representing Burt in the
1st Multicounty Court at Law also represented Burt’s brother in the ongoing lawsuit
in the district court regarding the same property. U.S. Gypsum alleged that the
attorney had not contacted U.S. Gypsum about this second suit until after a default
judgment was taken, even though it had been in communication with the attorney’s
office during that period to schedule depositions in the district court case.
Burt opposed the motion for new trial, arguing that U.S. Gypsum received
notice of the suit through its registered agent, as acknowledged by U.S. Gypsum in
its motion. Burt broadly argued that “US Gypsum wholly fail[ed] to plead facts or
present any competent evidence that would support the first element of the Craddock
Test.” See Craddock v. Sunshine Bus Lines, Inc., 133 S.W.2d 124, 126 (Tex. 1939).
Burt similarly asserted that U.S. Gypsum failed to satisfy the remaining two
elements of the Craddock test. Id. Burt moved to strike the affidavit of Brad Nerad,
U.S. Gypsum’s assistant general counsel, on the basis that Nerad did not specifically
state in the affidavit that the facts he relied upon were within his personal knowledge.
The trial court sustained Burt’s objections, struck Nerad’s affidavit, and
denied U.S. Gypsum’s motion for new trial.
U.S. Gypsum asserts in its first issue that the 1st Multicounty Court at Law
lacked subject-matter jurisdiction to adjudicate Burt’s claims for the recovery of real
property. In a nutshell, U.S. Gypsum contends that, despite Burt’s attempt to cast

3
his lawsuit as a probate proceeding, the 1st Multicounty Court at Law lacked subject-
matter jurisdiction to adjudicate a title dispute to real property, and that the action
could only have been brought in district court.
Standard of Review
“[S]ubject-matter jurisdiction is never presumed and cannot be waived.” Tex.
Dep’t of Transp. v. Self, 690 S.W.3d 12, 20 (Tex. 2024) (citing Tex. Ass’n of Bus. v.
Tex. Air Control Bd., 852 S.W.2d 440, 443–44 (Tex. 1993)). “[T]he issue can ‘be
raised for the first time on appeal by the parties or by the court,’ [and] a court is
obliged to ascertain that subject matter jurisdiction exists regardless of whether the
parties have questioned it.” Id. (quoting Univ. of Tex. Sw. Med. Ctr. at Dallas v.
Loutzenhiser, 140 S.W.3d 351, 358–59 (Tex. 2004) (citations omitted)).
Whether a trial court has subject-matter jurisdiction over a case is a question
of law that we review de novo. Tex. Dep’t of Parks & Wildlife v. Miranda,
133 S.W.3d 217, 226 (Tex. 2004). The plaintiff bears the burden to allege facts that
affirmatively establish the trial court’s subject-matter jurisdiction to hear and decide
a case. Tex. Ass’n of Bus., 852 S.W.2d at 446; Abdullatif v. Erpile, LLC, 460 S.W.3d
685, 691 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2015, no pet.). “In assessing whether a
court has subject matter jurisdiction over particular claims, we construe the
pleadings liberally in favor of the pleader, look to the pleader’s intent, and accept as
true the factual allegations in the pleadings except to the extent negated by
evidence.” San Jacinto River Auth. v. Ogletree, 594 S.W.3d 833, 838 (Tex. App.—
Houston [14th Dist.] 2020, no pet.) (citing Miranda, 133 S.W.3d at 226–27). “Lack
of subject-matter jurisdiction is a nonwaivable defect and can be raised at any point
of an appeal, by any litigant or by the court sua sponte, regardless of whether the
complaint was preserved in the trial court.” Tex. Dep’t of Pub. Safety v. Jenkins,
262 S.W.3d 811, 812 (Tex. App.—Eastland 2008, no pet.).

4
The Texas Supreme Court has set out “the five-step process” for determining
the jurisdiction of a trial court.
[R]ecourse must be had first to the Constitution, second to the general
statutes establishing jurisdiction for that level of court, third to the
specific statute authorizing the establishment of the particular court in
question, fourth to statutes creating other courts in the same county
(whose jurisdictional provisions may affect the court in question), and
fifth to statutes dealing with specific subject matters (such as the Family
Code, which requires, for example, that judges who are lawyers hear
appeals from actions by non-lawyer judges in juvenile cases).
In re United Services Auto. Ass’n, 307 S.W.3d 299, 303–04 (Tex. 2010) (quoting
Office of Court Administration, Subject-Matter Jurisdiction of the Courts, at 1).
Courts should be hesitant to construe a statute in a manner that curtails a trial court’s
jurisdiction absent manifestation of legislative intent to that effect. In re
Panchakarla, 602 S.W.3d 536, 540 (Tex. 2020).
We review questions of statutory interpretation de novo. Youngkin v. Hines,
546 S.W.3d 675, 680 (Tex. 2018). Our primary objective is ascertaining and giving
effect to the Legislature’s intent. City of Stephenville v. Belew, 692 S.W.3d 347, 362
(Tex. App.—Eastland 2024, pet. denied). To do so, we examine the plain meaning
of the statute’s language and read it as a whole rather than isolated portions of it.
TEX. GOV’T CODE ANN. § 311.011 (West 2013) (“Words and phrases shall be read in
context and construed according to the rules of grammar and common usage.”);
Belew, 692 S.W.3d at 362 (first citing Crosstex Energy Servs., L.P. v. Pro Plus, Inc.,
430 S.W.3d 384, 389–90 (Tex. 2014) then citing City of San Antonio v. City of
Boerne, 111 S.W.3d 22, 25 (Tex. 2003)). “That is, we read statutes contextually to
give effect to every word, clause, and sentence because every word and phrase is
presumed to have been used intentionally, with a meaning and a purpose.” Belew,
692 S.W.3d at 362.

5
“If the statute is clear and unambiguous, we must read the language according
to its common meaning ‘without resort to rules of construction or extrinsic aids.’”
Id. (quoting Crosstex Energy Servs., 430 S.W.3d at 389); but see GOV’T § 311.023
(permitting courts to consider legislative history and other construction aids
regardless of ambiguity). “And if a statute is unambiguous, we adopt the
interpretation that is supported by the statute’s plain language unless such an
interpretation would yield an absurd result.” Id. (citing TGS-NOPEC Geophysical
Co. v. Combs, 340 S.W.3d 432, 439 (Tex. 2011)). “A statute is ambiguous if its
words are susceptible to two or more reasonable interpretations and we cannot
discern legislative intent from the language alone.” Id. (quoting Fort Worth Transp.
Auth. v. Rodriguez, 547 S.W.3d 830, 838 (Tex. 2018)).
Applicable Law
In Texas, district courts have exclusive and original jurisdiction in all cases
unless otherwise designated by the Texas constitution or by other law. TEX. CONST.
art. V, § 8; GOV’T § 24.007(a) (West 2023). District courts are presumed to have
subject-matter jurisdiction unless otherwise shown; “[t]hus, all claims are presumed
to fall within the jurisdiction of the district court unless the Legislature or Congress
has provided that they must be heard elsewhere.” Dubai Petroleum Co. v. Kazi,
12 S.W.3d 71, 75 (Tex. 2000).
The 1st Multicounty Court at Law’s specific jurisdictional statute,
Section 25.2702, provides that, “[i]n addition to the jurisdiction provided by
Section 25.0003,” the court has concurrent jurisdiction with the district court,
but only in family law cases and proceedings and in felony criminal cases. GOV’T
§ 25.2702(a) (West Supp. 2024); see id. 25.0003(a) (noting that statutory county
courts have jurisdiction over the same causes and proceedings as constitutional

6
county courts 2); id. § 26.042 (setting out civil jurisdiction for constitutional county
courts). Because Section 25.2702 does not provide that the court has concurrent
jurisdiction with the district court in civil cases up to a certain amount in controversy,
nor does it otherwise confer jurisdiction over real property title disputes, the
1st Multicounty Court at Law is subject to the county courts’ jurisdictional
limitations set forth in Section 26.043. See GOV’T § 26.043 (West 2019); cf. Ditech
Servicing, LLC v. Perez, 669 S.W.3d 188, 194 (Tex. 2023) (“[T]he limitations on
county courts necessarily apply to county courts at law” absent an independent
jurisdictional grant.); compare GOV’T § 25.1102 (Hidalgo County Court at Law has
concurrent jurisdiction with the district court in civil cases in which the matter in
controversy does not exceed $750,000, regardless of type.), with 25.2702 (1st
Multicounty Court at Law only has concurrent jurisdiction with the district court in
family law cases and proceedings and in felony criminal cases.). Consequently, the
1st Multicounty Court at Law, like other statutory county courts, does not have
jurisdiction to determine real property title disputes. See GOV’T § 26.043(8) (county
courts lack jurisdiction over suits for the recovery of land); Ditech Servicing,
669 S.W.3d at 191, 194; In re Riley, 339 S.W.3d 216, 220 (Tex. App.—Waco 2011,
no pet.) (noting that county courts lack jurisdiction over suits to quiet title);
Chambers v. Pruitt, 241 S.W.3d 679, 684 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2007, no pet.)
(“District courts generally have exclusive jurisdiction to determine title to real
property.”). “Absent a compelling showing to the contrary, we presume that
remedies remain intact and that the jurisdiction of a district court—our state’s sole

2
“The term ‘county courts’ as used in [Section 25.0003] refers to the constitutional county courts.”
Dailing v. State, 546 S.W.3d 438, 445 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2018, no pet.).

7
court of general jurisdiction—remains undisturbed.” S.C. v. M.B., 650 S.W.3d 428,
436 (Tex. 2022).
However, the Texas Estates Code provides statutory county courts with
jurisdiction over real property in certain situations related to probate proceedings:
(a) For purposes of [the Estates Code], in a county in which there is no
statutory probate court or county court at law exercising original
probate jurisdiction, a matter related to a probate proceeding includes:
(1) an action against a personal representative or former personal
representative arising out of the representative’s performance of
the duties of a personal representative;
(2) an action against a surety of a personal representative or
former personal representative;
(3) a claim brought by a personal representative on behalf of an
estate;
(4) an action brought against a personal representative in the
representative’s capacity as personal representative;
(5) an action for trial of title to real property that is estate
property, including the enforcement of a lien against the
property; and
(6) an action for trial of the right of property that is estate
property.
EST. § 31.002(a).
The independent executor of the estate is its personal representative. EST.
§ 22.017 (defining “independent executor”). Ordinarily, the personal representative
of the estate of a decedent is the only person entitled to sue for the recovery of
property belonging to the estate. Moody v. Moody, 613 S.W.3d 707, 718 (Tex.
App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2020, pet. denied) (citing Shepherd v. Ledford, 962
S.W.2d 28, 31 (Tex. 1998); Frazier v. Wynn, 472 S.W.2d 750, 752 (Tex. 1971);
Chandler v. Welborn, 294 S.W.2d 801, 806 (Tex. 1956)); In re Est. of Preston,
346 S.W.3d 137, 163 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2011, no pet.). There is an exception

8
to this general rule, however, when the personal representative cannot, or will not,
bring the suit or when the personal representative’s interests are antagonistic to those
of the estate. Moody, 613 S.W.3d at 718 (citing Chandler, 294 S.W.2d at 806); Est.
of Preston, 346 S.W.3d at 163.
The Fourteenth Court of Appeals has construed Section 31.002 as an
exhaustive list of “matter[s] related to a probate proceeding.” See In re Hannah, 431
S.W.3d 801, 809–10 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2014, no pet.). There, the
court noted that the county court lacked jurisdiction over the plaintiff’s claim
because it was solely for money damages and did not seek title to “property that is
estate property.” Id. at 810; see EST. § 22.012(1) (defining “estate”); Mariner Health
Care of Nashville, Inc. v. Robins, 321 S.W.3d 193, 200–01 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st
Dist.] 2010, no pet.) (“When a person dies, all of the decedent’s real and personal
property become part of an estate, including any actual or potential cause of
action.”). The Twelfth Court of Appeals held similarly and concluded that
Section 31.002 did not expand the county court’s jurisdiction to cover non-probate
assets. In re Est. of Rushing, 644 S.W.3d 383, 388 (Tex. App.—Tyler 2022, pet.
denied) (determining that the county court lacked jurisdiction to create constructive
trust for a life insurance policy). The reasoning of the court in Estate of Rushing is
instructive because, as here, “this is not a claim against the personal representative
or his surety based on the performance of his duties in his capacity as personal
representative, nor is it a claim brought on behalf of an estate for trial of title to real
property or other estate property.” Id. at 388.
A probate court may exercise pendent and ancillary jurisdiction over non-
probate claims as necessary to promote judicial efficiency and economy. EST.
§ 32.001(b). “Typically, probate courts exercise ancillary or pendent jurisdiction
when a close relationship exists between the non-probate claims and the claims

9
against the estate.” In re Est. of Hallmark, 629 S.W.3d 433, 438 (Tex. App.—
Eastland 2020, no pet.) (quoting Narvaez v. Powell, 564 S.W.3d 49, 57 (Tex. App.—
El Paso 2018, no pet.)). The fundamental question when reviewing a probate court’s
exercise of pendant and ancillary jurisdiction is whether there was a close
relationship between the non-probate claims and the probate proceeding such that
the probate court’s exercise of jurisdiction will aid it in the efficient administration
of the estate. Id. (citing Schuchmann v. Schuchmann, 193 S.W.3d 598, 603 (Tex.
App.—Fort Worth 2006, pet. denied)). “A probate court has jurisdiction ‘to resolve
ancillary claims against third parties only to the extent that such claims were
necessary to resolve claims within its original jurisdiction.’” Id. (quoting
Goodman v. Summit at W. Rim, Ltd., 952 S.W.2d 930, 934 (Tex. App.—Austin 1997,
no pet.)).
Analysis
U.S. Gypsum argues that, while subsections 31.002(a)(5) and (6) of the
Estates Code require that the property be “estate property,” the disputed tract is not
estate property because the property was allegedly obtained by Burt in 2012, over
five years before Dale passed away. Burt advances three arguments for his position
that the 1st Multicounty Court at Law possessed jurisdiction over his claims:
(1) subsections 31.002(a)(3), (5), and (6) provide the trial court with jurisdiction;
(2) Section 31.002’s use of the word “including” before the enumerated items makes
it a non-exhaustive list; and (3) the trial court possessed pendant and ancillary
jurisdiction because if U.S. Gypsum “were to prevail on its assertion and have a
declaration that the 2012 Deed to [Burt] is void, the issue of title to the Property
remains.” U.S. Gypsum counters by pointing out that subsection 31.002(a)(3)
provides jurisdiction for suits brought by the estate’s personal representative—

10
which has not happened here 3—and that the trial court lacked pendant and ancillary
jurisdiction because Burt’s suit does not involve the settlement, partition, or
distribution of Dale’s estate. For the reasons stated below, we agree with U.S.
Gypsum.
First, subsection 31.002(a)(3) provides for jurisdiction for “a claim brought
by a personal representative on behalf of an estate.” EST. § 31.002(a)(3). It is
undisputed that Sheila is the personal representative of Dale’s estate. However, it
was not Sheila, individually or in her capacity as personal representative, that
brought the claim; rather, it was Burt. Accordingly, subsection 31.002(a)(3) is
inapplicable and does not provide the 1st Multicounty Court at Law with subject-
matter jurisdiction to hear and decide this case. See EST. 31.002(a)(3); Abdullatif,
460 S.W.3d at 691.
Further, Burt’s own pleadings defeat the trial court’s jurisdiction under
subsection 31.002(a)(5) and (6). See Miranda, 133 S.W.3d at 226–27; Abdullatif,
460 S.W.3d at 691. According to Burt’s live pleading, his first amended petition, he
allegedly acquired title to the disputed property from Sheila and Dale in 2012,
over five years before Dale’s death and the probate of his estate. As used in
subsections 31.002(a)(5) and (6), the term “estate property” refers to property owned
by the decedent at the time of his death and subject to distribution through probate.
See EST. § 31.002(a)(5), (6); GOV’T § 311.011; Belew, 692 S.W.3d at 362. Burt’s
pleading makes no allegation that Sheila, neither individually nor as the executor of
the estate, ever claimed that the property was part of the estate or had not been
conveyed to Burt in 2012, or contended that there was any reversion of that
conveyance. Importantly, Burt prayed for no declaration as to the estate, and sought

3
Moreover, it appears that Burt was not a beneficiary of the estate in that Dale’s will bequeathed
all of his estate assets to Shelia, who survived him.

11
no damages or remedy from it. As such, the disputed property is not “estate
property” as Burt suggests, according to his own pleadings. See EST. § 31.002(a)(5),
(6); In re Hannah, 431 S.W.3d at 810 (holding that the plaintiff did not seek “estate
property” when they sought monetary damages from individual defendants, not the
estate); see also D’Olivio v. Hutson, No. 05-20-00969-CV, 2022 WL 2800836, at *2
(Tex. App.—Dallas July 18, 2022, pet. denied) (mem. op.) (holding that because the
property was conveyed before the decedent’s death, “[t]he property, therefore,
passed outside of the estate and is not a part of, or related to, the probate proceeding”)
(citing Wallace v. Wallace, No. 05-17-00447-CV, 2017 WL 4479653, at *4 (Tex.
App.—Dallas Oct. 9, 2017, no pet.) (mem. op.) (probate court did not have exclusive
jurisdiction where former wife was seeking to partition property as a tenant in
common and not as an heir)). As such, subsections 31.002(a)(5) and (6) are
inapplicable and do not afford the trial court subject-matter jurisdiction to hear and
decide the case. See EST. § 31.002(a)(5), (6); Abdullatif, 460 S.W.3d at 691.
We need not directly opine as to Burt’s argument that Section 31.002’s use of
the word “including” before the enumerated items establishes a non-exhaustive list
because Burt’s claims are not otherwise “related to a probate proceeding.” See EST.
§ 31.002(a); see also GOV’T § 311.005(13) (“‘Includes’ and ‘including’ are terms of
enlargement and not of limitation or exclusive enumeration, and use of the terms
does not create a presumption that components not expressed are excluded.”). Burt
relies on decisions from three of our sister courts to support his position that his suit
is “related to a probate proceeding”; however, those cases are inapposite for the
reasons explained below.
In Saenz v. Saenz, the decedent executed a will in 1986 and executed three
deeds relating to real property within the will in 1987, 1988, and 1992. 49 S.W.3d
447, 448 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2001, no pet.). Plaintiffs, presumably those who

12
purchased or received the three deeds, filed suit against the estate’s independent
executor. Id. The procedural and factual history of this case is scant, but a dispute
arose whether the estate was the owner of the property or the other individuals. Id.
at 448–49. The Fourth Court of Appeals affirmed the district court’s dismissal of
the plaintiffs’ petition, holding that “[t]itle to the land conveyed both by [the
decedent]’s will and by subsequent deeds is a matter appertaining to [the decedent]’s
estate.” Id. at 449. Thus, this case involved a dispute as to whether the estate owned
the property such that it could distribute it. See id. at 448–49.
In In re Frank Schuster Farms, Incorporated, a dispute arose relating to tracts
of land that heirs believed to have been owned by Schuster Farms, a corporation.
No. 13-10-00225-CV, 2010 WL 2638481, at *1 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi–
Edinburg June 29, 2010, no pet.) (mem. op.). The decedent had previously
transferred several tracts of land that he owned individually to Schuster Farms but
not all. Id. After the decedent passed, his estate was divided amongst his heirs, his
three children, and settled by arbitration. Id. However, sometime later, the heirs
discovered that a portion of the property had not been distributed under the estate
even though it was owned by decedent individually because they had believed that
it belonged to the corporation. Id. One of their heirs filed suit in the probate court,
which transferred it to the district court at the motion of the executor. Id. The
Thirteenth Court of Appeals held that the probate court, not the district court, had
jurisdiction because, although the property was not distributed in the original
probate, it should have been, and thus an ownership dispute existed between the
corporation, estate, and would-be heirs. Id. at *6. Accordingly, the property was
“estate property” because the decedent owned the property at the time of his death,
and it was subject to distribution through his estate, regardless of the heirs mistaken
belief that it was owned by Schuster Farms. See id. at 6–7.

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In Barton v. Buchanan, a property-line dispute arose between two tracts of
land owned by two brothers who had since passed. No. 03-02-00596-CV, 2003
WL 21939725, at *1 (Tex. App.—Austin Aug. 14, 2003, no pet.) (mem. op.). The
brothers acquired the two adjoining tracts, which had been subdivided, and merged
them into common ownership where each brother held an undivided one-half
interest. Id. The brothers later executed a partition deed, again splitting the property
in two, with each brother taking one half. Id. After their passing and during the
administration of their estates, a dispute arose regarding the property line separating
the two tracts. Id. While the estates were pending, one of the heirs filed a trespass-
to-try-title suit in a statutory county court. Id. The Third Court of Appeals held that
the statutory county court possessed jurisdiction to determine the trespass-to-try-title
suit, despite the fact that the properties had already been distributed to the heirs,
because the heirs received the property through probate and each estate “ostensibly
sought to distribute the same piece of property to different heirs” through probate.
Id. at *3–4. Accordingly, this property was also “estate property.”
Because each of these cases involved “estate property,” they do not support
Burt’s contention that his suit is nonetheless “related to a probate proceeding.” See
EST. § 31.002(a). To be clear, Burt’s suit filed in the 1st Multicounty Court at Law
does not identify any circumstance that would impact the estate as his pleadings
allege that the property belongs to him individually. None of his pleaded causes of
action nor his requested relief would affect the estate or its distribution and
settlement; resolution of his suit requires no involvement from or impact to the
estate. See id.
Finally, Burt argues that the trial court possessed pendant and ancillary
jurisdiction because if U.S. Gypsum succeeded on a claim that Burt’s 2012 deed was
void, the issue of title to the property remains. Burt argues that “[t]rying the

14
boundary line dispute and the validity of the 2012 Deed in one lawsuit no doubt
promotes judicial efficiency and economy.” These arguments do not confer
jurisdiction on the 1st Multicounty Court at Law to hear his claims that, by his own
pleadings, do not relate to the estate. Nothing in the pleadings indicate that the
boundary line dispute would be against the estate. See Abdullatif, 460 S.W.3d at 691
(holding that a party must file pleadings that affirmatively demonstrate the trial
court’s subject-matter jurisdiction). Moreover, if Burt were to succeed on his claims,
he would be the owner of the property, not the estate; similarly, if he failed,
U.S. Gypsum would have superior title to the property, not the estate. See TEX. CIV.
PRAC. & REM. CODE § 37.004(a) (West 2020) (A person with rights under a deed,
contract, or instrument “may have determined any question of construction or
validity arising under the instrument . . . and obtain a declaration of rights, status, or
other legal relations thereunder.”); Essex Crane Rental Corp. v. Carter, 371 S.W.3d
366, 388 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2012, pet. denied) (“A suit to clear title or
quiet title—also known as a suit to remove cloud from title—relies on the invalidity
of the defendant’s claim to the property.”); MEI Camp Springs, LLC v. Clear Fork,
Inc., 623 S.W.3d 83, 90 (Tex. App.—Eastland 2021, no pet.) (“The plaintiff in a
trespass to try title action is required to prove its title by proving (1) a regular chain
of conveyances from the sovereign to the plaintiff, (2) a superior title to that of the
defendant out of a common source, (3) title by limitations, or (4) prior possession
that has not been abandoned.”). Accordingly, Burt’s claims do not bear a close
relationship with the probate proceeding such that the probate court’s jurisdiction
would aid in the efficient administration of the estate. See Hallmark, 629 S.W.3d at
438.
Because Burt’s claimed grounds for jurisdiction in the 1st Multicounty Court
at Law do not apply to the claims or disputes at hand, we sustain U.S. Gypsum’s first

15
issue; it is the district court that has exclusive jurisdiction to determine this action.
See TEX. CONST. art. V, § 8; GOV’T § 26.043 (8) (“A county court does not have
jurisdiction in a suit for the recovery of land.”); Chambers, 241 S.W.3d at 684.
Because the 1st Multicounty Court at Law lacked subject-matter jurisdiction to hear
and decide this case, its default judgment in favor of Burt is void and must be set
aside. As such, we need not address U.S. Gypsum’s second issue in which it
argues that the trial court abused its discretion in denying its motion for new trial.
See TEX. R. APP. P. 47.1.
This Court’s Ruling
We reverse the trial court’s judgment and render judgment dismissing the case
for want of subject-matter jurisdiction. See id. R. 43.2(c).

W. BRUCE WILLIAMS
JUSTICE

May 30, 2025
Panel consists of: Bailey, C.J.,
Trotter, J., and Williams, J.

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