Roger Dale May v. the State of Texas

Court of Appeals
Tenth Appellate District of Texas

10-24-00231-CR

Roger Dale May,
Appellant

v.

The State of Texas,
Appellee

On appeal from the
13th District Court of Navarro County, Texas
Judge H. D. Black Jr., presiding
Trial Court Cause No. D42,611-CR

JUSTICE SMITH delivered the opinion of the Court.

MEMORANDUM OPINION

Roger Dale May appeals his convictions for trafficking of persons and

sexual performance by a child. After the jury found him guilty, the trial court

assessed punishment at fifteen years of confinement in the Texas Department

of Corrections—Institutional Division on each count, to run concurrently. In

three issues, May contends the evidence is insufficient to support his
convictions and the trial court erred in admitting extraneous offense evidence.

We affirm.

BACKGROUND

During a Johnson County Sheriff’s office investigation in an unrelated

case, investigators seized a phone owned by William Junkert. Examination of

the data on the phone revealed a photo of Junkert engaging in sexual contact

with a young boy. Investigators determined that the photo had been sent to

Junkert’s phone from a phone owned by May. They arrested May and seized

his phone. After the child was identified as C.R., a resident of Navarro County,

the case was transferred.

C.R. is a non-verbal autistic boy, who was nine years old at the time the

photo was taken. He lived with his mother, Michelle Cannon and

grandmother, Mary Rainey in a house owned by Rainey. The photo was taken

in one of the bedrooms of their house. Rainey is May’s aunt. Junkert is May’s

boyfriend.

Sergeant Rex Kiser, a forensics computer examiner with the Fort Worth

Police Department, downloaded the data on May’s phone. He found several

photos but could not say if the photos were taken with May’s phone. The photo

of Junkert and C.R., introduced as State’s Exhibit 5, was a screenshot, a

picture of a picture, that was taken on April 30, 2019 at 1:33 a.m. and 38

May v. State Page 2
seconds. It was sent to Junkert’s phone by text message on the same date at

1:34 a.m. Kiser explained that taking a screen shot of a picture and texting it

is a way to avoid detection because the metadata is stripped in the process.

The photo was manually backed up to a microSD card on September 23, 2019

by way of the Smart Switch Back Up app. The Smart Switch app allows one

to back up data from one Samsung phone to another Samsung phone.

Cannon, Rainey, and Junkert each testified, providing their perspective

about who took the photo and how that person obtained access to C.R. The

jury determined May was guilty of both offenses. After sentencing, May

appealed the judgments.

SUFFICIENCY OF THE EVIDENCE

In his first and second issues, May contends the evidence is insufficient

to support a finding of guilty of trafficking of persons or sexual performance by

a child. Asserting there is no physical evidence tying him to the charges, he

contends the witnesses’ testimony was conflicting and their credibility was

questionable. He also contends that Junkert, and possibly a second individual,

Johnny Frost, a friend of Cannon’s, had access to his phone. Further, he argues

the weak and compromised nature of the State’s evidence should be considered.

May v. State Page 3
Standard of Review

In reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence, we view the evidence in the

light most favorable to the prosecution, to determine whether any rational trier

of fact could have found the essential elements of the offense beyond a

reasonable doubt. Isassi v. State, 330 S.W.3d 633, 638 (Tex. Crim. App. 2010);

Brooks v. State, 323 S.W.3d 893, 912 (Tex. Crim. App. 2010). Because the jury

is the sole judge of the witnesses' credibility and the weight to be given their

testimony, we defer to those determinations. Brooks, 323 S.W.3d at 899. We

give deference to the trier of fact's responsibility to fairly resolve conflicts in

testimony and to draw reasonable inferences from basic facts to ultimate facts.

Hooper v. State, 214 S.W.3d 9, 13 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007). If the record supports

conflicting inferences, we presume that the fact finder resolved the conflict in

favor of the prosecution and defer to that determination. Garcia v. State, 367

S.W.3d 683, 687 (Tex. Crim. App. 2012).

It is not necessary that the evidence directly prove the defendant's guilt;

circumstantial evidence is as probative as direct evidence in establishing a

defendant's guilt, and circumstantial evidence can alone be sufficient to

establish guilt. Carrizales v. State, 414 S.W.3d 737, 742 (Tex. Crim. App.

2013). Each fact need not point directly and independently to guilt if the

cumulative force of all incriminating circumstances is sufficient to support the

May v. State Page 4
conviction. Hooper, 214 S.W.3d at 13. Evidence may be legally insufficient

when the record contains either no evidence of an essential element, merely a

modicum of evidence of one element, or if it conclusively establishes a

reasonable doubt. Britain v. State, 412 S.W.3d 518, 520 (Tex. Crim. App. 2013).

Applicable Law

A person commits the offense of trafficking of persons if he knowingly

traffics a child and by any means causes the trafficked child to engage in, or

become the victim of, conduct prohibited by Texas Penal Code Section 21.11,

indecency with a child. TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 20A.02(a)(7)(B). A person

commits indecency with a child if, with a child younger than seventeen, he

engages in sexual contact with the child or causes the child to engage in sexual

contact. Id. § 21.11(a)(1). “Sexual contact” means any touching of the anus,

breast, or any part of the genitals of a child, if committed with the intent to

arouse or gratify the sexual desire of any person. Id. § 21.11(c)(1). In Chapter

20A, to “traffic” means to transport, entice, recruit, harbor, provide, or

otherwise obtain another person by any means. Id. § 20A.01(4).

A person commits the offense of sexual performance by a child if,

knowing the character and content thereof, he employs, authorizes or induces

a child younger than eighteen years of age to engage in sexual conduct or a

sexual performance. Id. § 43.25(b). Performance means any play, motion

May v. State Page 5
picture, photograph, dance, or other visual representation that can be

exhibited before an audience of one or more persons. Id. § 43.25(a)(3).

Analysis

May contends the evidence is insufficient to prove either offense.

Recognizing that the only physical evidence was a photo of the child with

Junkert that was on his phone, May contends someone else used his phone to

take the screen shot and text it to Junkert. May argues that the jury’s verdict

turns on the credibility of Cannon, Rainey, and Junkert. He argues that the

witnesses’ testimony conflicted regarding May’s, Junkert’s, and Frost’s access

to Rainey’s home and to the child. He contends Cannon’s and Rainey’s

credibility should be questioned because of the drug use in the home. He

implies that Cannon is not believable because she has been investigated by

Child Protective Services multiple times and that Rainey’s testimony is

undermined by the fact that she was convicted of possession of marijuana two

years after the offenses in this case were committed.

The Family’s Explanation

Michelle Cannon testified that the only time Junkert was at her house

was when he came with May. They came over once every couple of months, or

maybe every four months. When she was there, they did not stay in the house.

They stayed in one of the outbuildings on the property.

May v. State Page 6
She testified that she was always home with her children, except on

Saturday nights when she stayed with her boyfriend. Her mother is the only

person she would leave her children with. She denied leaving her children

with May or Junkert. To her knowledge, her mother never left them with May

or Junkert. Cannon denied going somewhere with May and leaving her

children at home with Junkert, saying “[t]hat’s never happened.” When

counsel pressed, asking if she and May went anywhere together and left

“anybody else” at the house with her children, Cannon replied, “No, ma’am.

Not that I can recall.” At times, she picked up May and took him to her home

without Junkert. She testified that, “Most every time they were at the house,

they were there with my mom.” Counsel asked, “So usually, when William and

Roger were there at the house, they were there with your mom but you weren’t

there, fair?” Cannon responded with “fair enough.”

Cannon explained that her sister lived at the house, along with her three

children, from possibly January 2019 until possibly August 2019. Cannon

thinks the photo was taken in June 2019. She explained that one night her

sister was there when Cannon left the house, but she was not there when

Cannon got home.

Mary Rainey testified that she owns the house where the photo was

taken. She explained that from late April until late May 2019, she was in Port

May v. State Page 7
Aransas. While she was gone, her daughter Kimberly stayed in her bedroom.

When she came back home, Rainey slept in the living room because her

daughter was still in her room. She explained that May, her nephew, did not

have a car or a driver’s license. May rode with Junkert. May visited her at

her house but usually stayed in the shed, not in the house. There was,

however, one night in early June when Kimberly went out and Kimberly

allowed May and Junkert to stay in Rainey’s room. That night Rainey and her

grandchildren slept on the living room floor. Cannon was not home that night.

Kimberly’s children were with their dad. Rainey testified that “there was

nobody else with me but Roger and Will was there.” She believes the photo

was taken that night.

Defense’s Explanation

William Junkert testified that May is his fiancé, and he loves him,

although he denied lying to protect May. Junkert was at Rainey’s house many

times, and sometimes May was not there with him. He said that he and other

people in the house did a lot of meth. He explained that there were times when

May left with someone, leaving Junkert there with the children. May and

Cannon, or May and Rainey, would go get methamphetamines or marijuana.

Junkert testified that, on the day the photo was taken, he was in

Rainey’s bedroom. He used methamphetamines either late the night before or

May v. State Page 8
earlier that morning, and then he and May “messed around.” After that, he

testified, he went to sleep, and May went outside to work on a fence. Because

he was asleep, he does not know when C.R. got in bed with him or how he came

to be in bed with him. He later testified that when he woke up, C.R. was on

the bed right next to him. Junkert testified that May was outside when he

woke up. At that point he jumped up, went outside, and told May that he was

going to the store. He testified that he went to Family Dollar sometime in the

afternoon. He received the text message with the photo from May’s phone

when he went to the store. He said he did not know who took the photo of him

with C.R. However, he testified that May had no involvement whatsoever.

Junkert explained that sometimes he sleeps in his glasses. He explained

that, although his eyes are open in the picture, he was asleep. He stated that

he can talk, and even have sex, while asleep. He’s done it several times.

Junkert did not notice that the person in bed with him was not May.

Jonathan May, May’s brother, testified that he has been at Rainey’s

house when Junkert was there and May was not.

Johnny Frost

Cannon explained that her childhood friend, Johnny Frost, stayed at her

house for two weeks in 2017 when he got out of prison. She claimed that Frost

was never at her house when she was not there. One time, in 2017, she and

May v. State Page 9
Frost took May and Junkert to Junkert’s mother’s house. That was the only

time May and Junkert were around Frost. She did not see Frost at all between

2017 and 2020, which includes the time period the photo was believed to have

been taken. Frost is now deceased.

Rainey testified that she met Frost once. She said he was at her house

during the month she was gone. He was there when she got home at the end

of the month of May. She talked to Frost, and he left. Frost never spent the

night, and May and Junkert were not there when Frost was there. She later

testified that, since she was not there, she did not know whether Frost was at

her house during the time she was gone. Rainey stated that Frost would “dub

pictures for Roger.” She explained, “That means, look on his Facebook and

you’ll see the difference in the picture he took and the picture he made look

good.” Counsel then asked if Frost liked to make pictures look better. Rainey

said she did not know.

Junkert testified that he was at Rainey’s house at the same time Frost

was there. He specifically remembers that Frost “was there when [he] woke

up.” Before Junkert went to sleep, May’s phone was lying next to the bed on

the charger. Junkert testified that when he woke up, Frost had May’s phone

in his hand. Junkert assumed Frost took the photo with May’s phone. Then,

Junkert testified, Frost sent the text message from May’s phone to Junkert’s.

May v. State Page 10
He also testified that the photo could have been taken by Frost on someone

else’s phone. Junkert explained that May’s phone was unlocked when Frost

got it. Junkert knows the passcode to May’s phone. He said he had gone

through the phone and had turned off the lock, “turned it to like 30 minutes.”

When questioned by the prosecutor, he admitted he does not know how long he

was asleep, so he does not know if the phone was still unlocked when he woke

up.

Junkert testified that he had conversations with Frost about the photo.

According to Junkert, Frost shared the photo with Junkert, but Junkert did

not know if Frost shared it with anyone else. Junkert was afraid of what Frost

was going to do with the photo.

May’s twin brother, Jonathan, testified that he had been at Rainey’s

house in the spring and summer of 2019. Jonathan said he was there when

May, Junkert, and Frost were there. He claimed that Frost was around there

during that time.

Personal Circumstances

Cannon denied that drugs interfered with her life, saying she only

smokes marijuana on an occasional basis, and she has never done any other

drugs. She admitted that her mother has used methamphetamines, but not in

May v. State Page 11
front of Cannon’s children. Cannon testified that she has had ten open Child

Protective Services cases, but she would not classify that as trouble.

Rainey admitted that she used methamphetamines frequently in 2019.

She said she never “used anything” in front of the children. She also admitted

to going to jail in 2021 for possession of marijuana.

Application of Standard of Review

Cannon and Rainey testified that May and Junkert did not ordinarily

stay in the house. However, they each identified one night when Kimberly

allowed May and Junkert to stay in Rainey’s room. Cannon was not home that

night, and Rainey was asleep. As the sole judge of the credibility of the

witnesses, the jury could have believed this explanation of May’s and Junkert’s

access to C.R. See Brooks, 323 S.W.3d at 899.

Rainey testified that she believed the photo was taken one night in early

June 2019. This would have been impossible in light of Kiser’s testimony that

the screenshot of the photo was taken on April 30, 2019. However, the jury

was responsible for resolving conflicts in the testimony and could infer that

Rainey misremembered the date, especially in light of her admitted drug use.

See Hooper, 214 S.W.3d at 13. As sole judge of witnesses’ credibility, the jury

could reject May’s theory that Cannon and Rainey were simply not credible

witnesses due to their drug use. See Brooks, 323 S.W.3d at 899. Likewise, as

May v. State Page 12
the sole judge of weight to be given to a witness’s testimony, the jury could

determine that Cannon’s interactions with Child Protective Services were

immaterial to the question of May’s guilt. See id.

Cannon said she would never leave her children with May or Junkert.

She said Junkert was never at the house without May. Although Junkert and

Jonathan testified that, at times, Junkert was at the house when May was not

there, the jury could have chosen not to believe them. See id. Further, even if

true, that is not inconsistent with the explanation that both were there on the

night the photo was taken. Additionally, and significantly, Junkert testified

that May was there the night the photo was taken.

Critical to the verdict is the evidence concerning Johnny Frost. Cannon

said May and Junkert were around Frost only once. While Jonathan testified

that Frost was at Rainey’s house during the spring and summer of 2019,

Cannon testified that she did not see Frost at all during that time period.

Rainey testified that Frost was there once at the end of May, but he never spent

the night, and May and Junkert were not there when Frost was there. Again,

the jury could have disbelieved Jonathan and determined that either Cannon

or Rainey was mistaken about the date Frost was in their home. See id. Still,

the jury was not required to believe that meant Frost was there when the photo

was taken. It is the jury’s responsibility to draw reasonable inferences from

May v. State Page 13
basic facts to ultimate facts. See Hooper, 214 S.W.3d at 13. The jury could have

determined that was not a reasonable inference.

On the other hand, May’s defense was presented through Junkert’s

testimony that Frost was in the room when he woke up with C.R. beside him,

and Frost was holding May’s phone. The jury could have rejected Junkert’s

testimony that Frost was there, as well as his explanation about the phone

being unlocked. See Brooks, 323 S.W.3d at 899. Furthermore, the jury could

have discounted Junkert’s testimony because he said he received the text

containing the photo while at Family Dollar in the afternoon. The jury had

previously heard Kiser’s testimony that the text containing the photo was sent

to Junkert’s phone at 1:34 a.m., not p.m. The jury could resolve that conflict

against the defense. See Hooper, 214 S.W.3d at 13.

The record shows that May was at Rainey’s house when the photo was

taken. The photo shows May’s nine-year-old family member on a bed with

May’s fiancé while the fiancé engaged in sexual contact with the child. A

screenshot of the photo was on May’s phone and sent by text to Junkert’s phone

on April 30, 2019. The cumulative force of all of the incriminating

circumstances is sufficient to support the convictions for trafficking of persons

and sexual performance by a child. See TEX. PENAL CODE ANN.

May v. State Page 14
§§ 20A.02(a)(7)(B), 43.25(b); Hooper, 214 S.W.3d at 13. We overrule May’s first

and second issues.

EXTRANEOUS OFFENSE EVIDENCE

In his third issue, May asserts the trial court abused its discretion in

refusing to exclude extraneous offense evidence. He complains that the trial

court erred by admitting evidence of photos of a young boy, not the victim in

this case, found on his phone.

Standard of Review

We review the trial court's decision to admit contested testimony under

an abuse of discretion standard. Walters v. State, 247 S.W.3d 204, 217 (Tex.

Crim. App. 2007). We will uphold the trial court's decision if it is within the

zone of reasonable disagreement. Id. The trial court's evidentiary ruling must

be upheld if it is correct under any applicable theory of law. Johnson v. State,

490 S.W.3d 895, 908 (Tex. Crim. App. 2016).

Applicable Law

Because an accused must be tried only for the offense for which he is

charged and may not be tried for a collateral crime or for being a criminal

generally, extraneous offense evidence is usually not admissible "to prove a

person's character in order to show that on a particular occasion the person

acted in accordance with the character." TEX. R. EVID. 404(b)(1); Stafford v.

May v. State Page 15
State, 813 S.W.2d 503, 506 (Tex. Crim. App. 1991). However, in prosecutions

for sexual offenses against children under the age of seventeen Texas Code of

Criminal Procedure article 38.37 permits the admission of evidence concerning

specified extraneous offenses committed by the defendant against a child. See

TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 38.37. The unique nature of sexual assault

crimes justifies admitting extraneous offense evidence. See Jenkins v. State,

993 S.W.2d 133, 136 (Tex. App.—Tyler 1999, pet. ref'd).

Article 38.37, Section 2(b) provides that:

Notwithstanding Rules 404 and 405, Texas Rules of Evidence, and
subject to Section 2-a, evidence that the defendant has committed
a separate offense described by Subsection (a)(1) or (2) may be
admitted in the trial of an alleged offense described by Subsection
(a)(1) or (2) for any bearing the evidence has on relevant matters,
including the character of the defendant and acts performed in
conformity with the character of the defendant.

TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 38.37, § 2(b). Subsection 2(b) applies to

specified offenses. See id. art. 38.37, § 2(a)(1).

When evidence of a defendant’s commission of one of the offenses listed

in article 38.37, section 2(a) is relevant under article 38.37, the trial court must

conduct a Rule 403 balancing test upon proper objection or request. West v.

State, 554 S.W.3d 234, 239 (Tex. App.--Houston [14th Dist.] 2018, no pet.).

Relevant evidence means evidence having any tendency to make the existence

of any fact that is of consequence to the determination of the action more

May v. State Page 16
probable or less probable than it would be without the evidence. TEX. R. EVID.

401. Pursuant to Rule of Evidence 403, the trial court must weigh the

probative value of the evidence against the potential for unfair prejudice. TEX.

R. EVID. 403.

“Probative value” is the measure of “how strongly [the evidence] serves

to make more or less probable the existence of a fact of consequence to the

litigation—coupled with the proponent’s need for that item of evidence.”

Gigliobianco v. State, 210 S.W.3d 637, 641 (Tex. Crim. App. 2006). Unfair

prejudice refers to a “tendency to tempt the jury into finding guilt on grounds

apart from proof of the offense charged.” State v. Mechler, 153 S.W.3d 435, 440

(Tex. Crim. App. 2005). “Evidence might be unfairly prejudicial if, for example,

it arouses the jury’s hostility or sympathy for one side without regard to the

logical probative force of the evidence.” Gigliobianco, 210 S.W.3d at 641.

When a trial court conducts a Rule 403 balancing test, it must balance

(1) the inherent probative force of the proffered item of evidence along with (2)

the proponent’s need for that evidence against (3) any tendency of the evidence

to suggest a decision on an improper basis, (4) any tendency of the evidence to

confuse or distract the jury from the main issues, (5) any tendency of the

evidence to be given undue weight by a jury that has not been equipped to

evaluate the probative force of the evidence, and (6) the likelihood that

May v. State Page 17
presentation of the evidence will consume an inordinate amount of time or

merely repeat evidence already admitted. Id. at 641-42.

Analysis

Kiser, the forensics computer examiner, testified that the Johnson

County investigator told him she was looking for photos of a juvenile

undressing. He found thirteen images he believed she was referring to. He

also found the photo of C.R. and an image that appears to be little snapshots

of child pornography, “but it’s too small to really delineate whether it was

children or not.” Those small pictures are known as thumbnails.

May contends there was no probative value from the extraneous offenses,

and if there was, it was outweighed by the extremely prejudicial information.

He contends the extraneous offense evidence did not compellingly make a

nexus more probable because it was vague and generalized. Finally, he argues

the evidence impacted the jury in an irrational way.

The first factor we consider is the inherent probative force of the

extraneous offense testimony. Because evidence of separate sexual offenses is

probative on the issues of intent and a defendant’s character or propensity to

commit sexual assaults on children if sufficient evidence is provided regarding

the extraneous offense, the probative value of sexual offenses committed

against other children is generally not substantially outweighed by the danger

May v. State Page 18
of one or more of the following: unfair prejudice, confusing the issues,

misleading the jury, undue delay, or needlessly presenting cumulative

evidence. TEX. R. EVID. 403; Deggs v. State, 646 S.W.3d 916, 925 (Tex. App.--

Waco 2022, pet. ref’d). Here, evidence that other pornographic images were on

May’s phone is highly probative of his character or propensity to cause children

to engage in sexual contact, conduct, or performance. See Deggs, 646 S.W.3d

at 926; Price v. State, 594 S.W.3d 674, 680 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 2019, no

pet.).

The second factor, the State’s need for the evidence weighs in favor of

admission. There was no direct evidence of May’s involvement. Thus,

additional circumstantial evidence increases the cumulative force of evidence

and is needed “for any bearing the evidence has on relevant matters.” See TEX.

CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 38.37, § 2(b).

With respect to the third factor, we recognize the inherently

inflammatory and prejudicial nature of evidence of extraneous acts and

misconduct involving children does tend to create the potential for a verdict on

an improper basis. See Deggs, 646 S.W.3d at 926. However, the additional

images were thumbnails, rather than full size, and Kiser testified that they

were too small to determine if they depicted children. Also, the State offered a

relatively small number of images. See Cox v. State, 495 S.W.3d 898, 908-09

May v. State Page 19
(Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2016, pet. ref’d) (comparing the prejudicial

effect of 10,000 pornographic images to the prejudicial effect of 2,000

pornographic images, in relation to the State’s need to present the evidence).

Regarding the fourth factor, we consider whether there was a tendency

of the evidence to confuse or distract the jury from the main issue in this case.

Just prior to Kiser’s testimony, the trial court instructed the jury that they

cannot consider the extraneous offense testimony for any purpose unless they

find beyond a reasonable doubt that May committed the other offenses. The

court further instructed the jury that it may only consider the extraneous

offense evidence in determining the motive, opportunity, intent, preparation,

plan, knowledge, identity, or absence of mistake, or accident of May, in

connection with the offense alleged against him in the indictment and for no

other purpose. That limiting instruction was also included in the jury charge.

Additionally, the charge included the article 38.37 instruction that the

extraneous offense evidence may be considered if the jury believes beyond a

reasonable doubt that May committed such other offenses, and then it may

consider said evidence for any bearing the evidence has on relevant matters,

including the character of the defendant and acts performed in conformity with

the character of the defendant. Then the trial court identified the elements

the State was required to prove by its indictment, thereby redirecting the jury

May v. State Page 20
to the main issues in the case. The jury instructions mitigated the tendency of

the extraneous offense evidence to confuse or distract the jury. We find the

fourth factor weighed in favor of admission.

The fifth factor refers to evidence such as highly technical or scientific

evidence that might mislead the jury because it is not equipped to weigh the

probative force of the evidence. See Gigliobianco, 210 S.W.3d at 641. Here,

while Kiser’s testimony explaining how he extracted the photos is highly

technical, the photos themselves do not require special expertise to consider

and weigh their probative force. We find the fifth factor weighed in favor of

admission.

As to the sixth factor, the extraneous offense direct testimony was

presented in approximately five pages of testimony. We find the presentation

of the extraneous offense evidence did not consume an inordinate about of time.

The last factor favored admission.

We find that the trial court, after balancing the Rule 403 factors, could

have reasonably concluded the probative value of the extraneous offense

evidence was not substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice.

See TEX. R. EVID. 403; Deggs, 646 S.W.3d at 927. We find that the trial court

did not abuse its discretion in admitting the extraneous offense evidence. See

Walters, 247 S.W.3d at 217. Therefore, we overrule May’s third issue.

May v. State Page 21
CONCLUSION

The trial court did not err in admitting extraneous offense testimony.

Further, the evidence is sufficient to support May’s convictions for trafficking

of persons and sexual performance by a child.

We affirm the trial court’s judgment.

STEVE SMITH
Justice

OPINION DELIVERED and FILED: August 14, 2025
Before Chief Justice Johnson,
Justice Smith, and
Justice Harris
Affirmed
Do not publish
CR25

May v. State Page 22