Scarlett Robbins v. State Farm Life Insurance Company

Court of Appeals
Tenth Appellate District of Texas

10-24-00047-CV

Scarlett Robbins,
Appellant

v.

State Farm Life Insurance Company,
Appellee

On appeal from the
13th District Court of Navarro County, Texas
Judge James E. Lagomarsino, presiding
Trial Court Cause No. D23-31789-CV

JUSTICE SMITH delivered the opinion of the Court.

MEMORANDUM OPINION

Scarlett Robbins appeals from the trial court’s order granting State

Farm Life Insurance Company’s Rule 91a motion to dismiss and dismissing

with prejudice all of Scarlett’s claims against State Farm. In five issues

Scarlett argues that: (1) her claims have a basis in law and fact, (2) the trial

court erred by finding State Farm’s affirmative defense was established by her

first amended petition, (3) she did not receive proper notice of the hearing on
State Farm’s motion to dismiss, (4) State Farm’s motion to dismiss does not

comply with Rule 91a of the Texas Rules of Civil Procedure, and (5) the trial

court erred by severing her claims against State Farm. We affirm.

Background

There is an ongoing dispute between Scarlett Robbins, James Robbins,

and Howard LeJeune. LeJeune was insured under two State Farm life

insurance policies—Policy LF-1197-8322 with a face value of $201,592 and

Policy LF-1272-6541 with a face value of $200,000. In 2009, LeJeune signed

over ownership of both policies to Scarlett, and she designated herself as

beneficiary of both policies. LeJeune later filed suit against Scarlett and James

alleging several causes of action and seeking monetary damages, a declaratory

judgment, and temporary and permanent injunctive relief. LeJeune v.

Robbins, No. 10-16-00360-CV, 2021 WL 824991, at *1 (Tex. App.—Waco Mar.

3, 2021, no pet.) (mem. op.). On March 21, 2016, Scarlett, James, and LeJeune,

entered into a written contract that provided LeJeune would pay Scarlett

$75,000 for Policy 6541 and Policy 8322 would remain as Scarlett’s property.

LeJeune appealed to this court arguing that the trial court erred in rendering

judgment on the Settlement Agreement because the Settlement Agreement

was incomplete and contested. Id. at *2. This court held that the trial court

Robbins v. State Farm Life Ins. Co. Page 2
erred in rendering judgment on the Settlement Agreement and remanded the

case to the trial court. Id. at *4.

In 2021, Scarlett filed suit against James and LeJeune for breach of

contract. LeJeune died on November 2, 2022, while that case was still pending.

There are also pending probate proceedings for LeJeune in Dallas County.

At the time of LeJeune’s death, the payable benefits for the State Farm

policies were $402,920.84 for Policy 6541 and $408,032.85 for Policy 8322. The

policies accrue interest daily. On November 15, 2022, State Farm received

notice from a representative of LeJeune’s estate requesting that State Farm

not pay any claims under Policy 6541 and Policy 8322. Subsequently on

December 6, 2022, Scarlett submitted a claim to State Farm for the proceeds

of both policies. After receiving the competing claims, State Farm filed a

federal interpleader action on March 17, 2023, in the U.S. District Court for

the Northern District of Texas. Scarlett then filed an amended petition in her

suit against James and LeJeune, adding State Farm as a defendant and

alleging causes of action for breach of contract, violation of the Texas Prompt

Pay Act, and declaratory judgment.

State Farm filed a Rule 91a motion to dismiss arguing that Scarlett’s

pleading openly admits facts that bar recovery and that the interpleader action

is a defense to Scarlett’s claims. After a hearing, the trial court signed an order

Robbins v. State Farm Life Ins. Co. Page 3
granting State Farm’s Rule 91a motion to dismiss. The trial court further

signed an order severing Scarlett’s claims against State Farm from those

against James and LeJeune.

Scarlett filed a motion to reconsider, and the trial court held a hearing

on her motion. The trial court sent a letter granting Scarlett’s motion to

reconsider but did not sign an order to that effect.1 Scarlett filed a notice of

appeal from the trial court’s order granting State Farm’s Rule 91a motion to

dismiss and from the trial court’s severance order. This court determined that

we have jurisdiction of Scarlett’s appeal.

Standard of Review

Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 91a allows a party to “move to dismiss a

cause of action on the grounds that it has no basis in law or fact.” TEX. R. CIV.

P. 91a.1. “A cause of action has no basis in law if the allegations, taken as true,

together with inferences reasonably drawn from them, do not entitle the

claimant to the relief sought.” Id. “A cause of action has no basis in fact if no

reasonable person could believe the facts pleaded.” Id. We review the merits

of a Rule 91a motion de novo because the availability of a remedy under the

facts as alleged is a question of law. City of Dallas v. Sanchez, 494 S.W.3d 722,

724-25 (Tex. 2016) (per curiam).

1 The parties agree that trial court’s letter granting the motion to reconsider occurred after the trial

court’s plenary power expired. See TEX. R. CIV. P. 329b.

Robbins v. State Farm Life Ins. Co. Page 4
Dismissal of Scarlett’s Claims

In her first issue, Scarlett argues that the trial court erred in dismissing

her claims under Rule 91a because the claims have a basis in law and in fact.

In her second issue, she argues that the trial court erred in finding State

Farm’s affirmative defense was established by her amended petition.

In her amended petition, Scarlett alleged a claim for breach of contract

stating that (1) State Farm entered into two contracts for life insurance by

which it agreed to insure the life of LeJeune, (2) by the terms of the agreement,

State Farm agreed to pay her the benefits under both policies, (3) LeJeune

died, (4) she submitted a claim for the proceeds of both policies, and (5) State

Farm refused to pay the benefits to her. She also alleged that the failure of

State Farm to pay her the proceeds violated the Texas Prompt Pay Act. She

further sought declaratory relief arguing that she is entitled to receive the

policy benefits rather than James or LeJeune’s estate. Scarlett’s amended

petition acknowledged that State Farm had received a letter from an attorney

representing LeJeune’s estate requesting that State Farm not pay any claims

under the policies and that she had filed a claim with State Farm for the

proceeds of the policies. She further admitted that State Farm had filed a

federal interpleader action on March 17, 2023, after receiving her claim to the

policies and notice from LeJeune’s estate not to pay under the policies.

Robbins v. State Farm Life Ins. Co. Page 5
A cause of action has no basis in law under Rule 91a in at least two

situations: (1) the petition alleges too few facts to demonstrate a viable, legally

cognizable right to relief, and (2) the petition alleges additional facts that, if

true, bar recovery. Stallworth v. Ayers, 510 S.W.3d 187, 190 (Tex. App.—

Houston [1st Dist.] 2016, no pet.). State Farm alleged in its Rule 91a motion

to dismiss that Scarlett’s amended petition alleged facts that bar recovery.

State Farm argued in its motion to dismiss that because Scarlett’s

amended petition showed that interpleader was proper, the interpleader

operated as a defense to her claims. Rule 91a limits a court's factual inquiry

to the plaintiff’s pleadings but does not so limit the court’s legal inquiry. Bethel

v. Quilling, Selander, Lownds, Winslett & Moser, P.C., 595 S.W.3d 651, 656

(Tex. 2020). In deciding a Rule 91a motion, a court may consider the

defendant’s pleadings if doing so is necessary to make the legal determination

of whether an affirmative defense is properly before the court. Id. Rule 91a

permits motions to dismiss based on affirmative defenses “if the allegations,

taken as true, together with inferences reasonably drawn from them, do not

entitle the claimant to the relief sought.” Id. (quoting TEX. R. CIV. P. 91a.1).

The purpose of interpleader is to allow an innocent stakeholder facing

rival claims to let the courts decide who is entitled to the funds and relieve

itself of the risk of multiple liability. Petro Source Partners, Ltd. v. 3-B

Robbins v. State Farm Life Ins. Co. Page 6
Rattlesnake Ref. (1990), Ltd., 905 S.W.2d 371, 375 (Tex. App.—El Paso 1995,

writ denied). A party faced with competing claims obtains a discharge of

liability to the competing claimants by interpleading the funds. Id.

State Farm’s Rule 91a motion to dismiss stated that it had filed an

interpleader in federal court as well as an unconditional tender of the disputed

funds. The motion explained that if the disputed funds are not actually paid

into the registry of the court, they must be tendered and the tender must be

unconditional to be valid. Cockrum v. Cal-Zona Corp., 373 S.W.2d 572, 574

(Tex. Civ. App.—Dallas 1963, no writ). However, only an unconditional tender,

not an actual deposit is required. Heggy v. Am. Trading Employee Ret. Account

Plan, 123 S.W.3d 770, 776 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2003, pet. denied).

Rule 91a permits motions to dismiss based on affirmative defenses if the

allegations in the plaintiff’s petition, taken as true, together with inferences

reasonably drawn from them, do not entitle the claimant to the relief sought.

See Bethel, 595 S.W.3d at 656. Therefore, we must determine whether the facts

in Scarlett’s amended petition entitle her to relief. Id. Scarlett’s amended

petition acknowledges that State Farm received both a letter from an attorney

representing LeJeune’s estate requesting that State Farm not pay any claims

on the insurance policies and her claim requesting the proceeds from the

insurance policies. Her petition states that after receiving the competing

Robbins v. State Farm Life Ins. Co. Page 7
requests, State Farm filed a federal interpleader action. A party faced with

competing claims obtains a discharge of liability to the competing claimants by

interpleading the funds. Heggy, 123 S.W.3d at 775. Thus, the interpleader

action and unconditional tender discharged State Farm from liability to the

competing claims. Id. Taking Scarlett’s allegations as true, the trial court

determined that she was not entitled to the relief sought because the federal

interpleader barred her claims. See Bethel, 595 S.W.3d at 656.

Although Scarlett argues that the trial court was required to accept as

true her statements that the federal interpleader was improper because State

Farm was not in the position of an innocent stakeholder, the trial court was

not required to take as true her legal conclusion. Reaves v. City of Corpus

Christi, 518 S.W.3d 594, 605 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi-Edinburgh 2017, no

pet.). Moreover, after the trial court’s order granting State Farm’s Rule 91a

motion to dismiss, the federal court determined that State Farm met the

requirements of an interpleader and granted State Farm’s request to deposit

the interpleaded funds from the two policies into the registry of the court.

Order Granting Interpleader, State Farm Life Ins. Co. v. Wisocki, No. 3:23-cv-

00597 (N.D. Tex. Mar. 28, 2024), ECF No. 37.

Robbins v. State Farm Life Ins. Co. Page 8
We hold that the trial court did not err by finding that State Farm’s

affirmative defense was established and granting the Rule 91a motion to

dismiss. We overrule Scarlett’s first and second issues.

Notice of Hearing

In her third issue, Scarlett argues that she did not receive proper notice

of the hearing on State Farm’s Rule 91a motion to dismiss. Each party is

entitled to at least 14 days’ notice of the hearing on the motion to dismiss. TEX.

R. CIV. P. 91a.6. The court may, but is not required to, conduct an oral hearing

on the motion. Id.

State Farm filed its Rule 91a motion to dismiss on June 12, 2023, and

served the motion on Scarlett that same day. Scarlett’s counsel stated on the

record that he received the motion on June 12, 2023, and read the motion that

day. The motion contained a blank notice of hearing. The record indicates that

on June 20, 2023, the motion was set for a hearing on July 5, 2023. That notice

was filed on June 20, 2023, but the certificate of service for that notice indicates

it was served on June 12, 2023. Scarlett contends that she did not receive

notice that the hearing was set until July 3, 2023—two days before the hearing.

Scarlett’s counsel filed a response to the Rule 91a motion to dismiss on July 3,

2023, and appeared at the hearing.

Robbins v. State Farm Life Ins. Co. Page 9
“To preserve a notice complaint, a party must bring the lack of adequate

notice to the trial court's attention at the hearing and object to the hearing

going forward or move for a continuance.” Odam v. Texans Credit Union, No.

05-16-00077-CV, 2017 WL 3634274, at *4 (Tex. App.—Dallas Aug. 24, 2017, no

pet.) (mem. op.). “If a party receives notice that is untimely, but is sufficient

to enable the party to attend the hearing, the party must file a motion for

continuance or raise the complaint of late notice before the trial court during

the hearing.” Id. “Only when a party is not given notice of the hearing, or a

party is deprived of its right to seek leave to file affidavits or other written

response, may he preserve error in a post-trial motion.” Id. If a party preserves

its complaint of late notice for appeal, then the party must also be able to show

on appeal that harm resulted. See TEX. R. APP. P. 44.1; Lempar v. Ballantyne,

No. 04-22-00621-CV, 2023 WL 8896917, at *5 (Tex. App.—San Antonio Dec.

27, 2023, no pet.) (mem. op); Davis v. Kaufman Cnty., 195 S.W.3d 847, 852

(Tex. App.—Dallas 2006, no pet.).

At the hearing, Scarlett’s counsel objected that he did not receive 14 days’

notice of the hearing, but did not request a continuance or object to the hearing

going forward. Scarlett’s counsel admitted that he received State Farm’s Rule

91a motion to dismiss on June 12, 2023, 23 days before the hearing, and that

he read the motion on that day. Counsel filed a response to the motion,

Robbins v. State Farm Life Ins. Co. Page 10
appeared at the hearing, and presented a lengthy argument in opposition to

the Rule 91a motion to dismiss. On this record, Scarlett has not demonstrated

that she was harmed by any error in the failing to provide 14 days’ notice of

the hearing. See Lempar, 2023 WL 8896917, at *5. We overrule Scarlett’s

third issue.

Sufficiency of the Rule 91a Motion to Dismiss

In her fourth issue, Scarlett argues that State Farm’s Rule 91a motion

to dismiss did not specifically state the reasons that her cause of action has no

basis in law, no basis in fact, or both. A motion to dismiss must (1) state that

it is made pursuant to Rule 91a, (2) identify each cause of action to which it is

addressed, and (3) must state specifically the reasons the cause of action has

no basis in law, no basis in fact, or both. TEX. R. CIV. P. 91a.2.

Scarlett first argues that State Farm’s motion was deficient because it

did not specifically identify the cause of action for her claim under the Texas

Prompt Pay Act. In its motion, State Farm argued that interpleader was a

complete defense to Scarlett’s claims and that the trial court should dismiss

her claims against State Farm. State Farm specifically stated that Scarlett’s

“claims and causes of action against State Farm Insurance Company” should

be dismissed pursuant to Rule 91a. State Farm was not required to list each

cause of action separately because it challenged their collective viability.

Robbins v. State Farm Life Ins. Co. Page 11
Cooper v. Trent, 551 S.W.3d 325, 331 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2018,

pet. denied).

Scarlett next contends that State Farm did not argue that the claims had

no basis in law or fact. State Farm argued that the federal interpleader action

barred recovery for Scarlett’s claims. A cause of action has no basis in law

under Rule 91a when the petition alleges additional facts that, if true, bar

recovery. Stallworth, 510 S.W.3d at 190. Thus, State Farm’s motion argued

that Scarlett’s claims had no basis in law. Rule 91a does not require magic

words to meet the requirement to specifically state the reasons the cause of

action has no basis in law, fact, or both. Cooper, 551 S.W.3d at 330. We

conclude that State Farm sufficiently complied with the requirements of Rule

91a.2. Id. at 331. We overrule Scarlett’s fourth issue.

Severance

In her fifth issue, Scarlett maintains that the trial court erred by

severing her claims against State Farm into a separate cause of action. The

trial court ordered that Scarlett’s claims against State Farm be severed from

the cause of action against James and LeJeune and placed under a new cause

number.

Under the Texas Rules of Civil Procedure, any claim against a party may

be severed and proceeded with separately. TEX. R. CIV. P. 41. We review the

Robbins v. State Farm Life Ins. Co. Page 12
trial court’s decision to grant State Farm’s motion to sever for an abuse of

discretion. See Liberty Nat’l Fire Ins. Co. v. Akin, 927 S.W.2d 627, 629 (Tex.

1996). A claim is properly severable if (1) the controversy involves more than

one cause of action, (2) the severed claim is one that would be the proper subject

of a lawsuit if independently asserted, and (3) the severed claim is not so

interwoven with the remaining action that they involve the same facts and

issues. Guar. Fed. Sav. Bank v. Horseshoe Oper. Co., 793 S.W.2d 652, 658 (Tex.

1990).

Scarlett specifically argues that her claims against State Farm are

interwoven with the remaining cause of action because they arise from the

same facts as those against LeJeune and James; who is entitled to the proceeds

of the insurance policies? However, State Farm does not claim it is entitled to

the funds. State Farm filed an interpleader action to deposit the proceeds of

the insurance policies into the court’s registry. A party faced with competing

claims obtains a discharge of liability to the competing claimants by

interpleading the funds. Petro Source Partners, 905 S.W.2d at 375.

Therefore, Scarlett’s claim against State Farm is not so interwoven with her

remaining claims against LeJeune and James as to make severance improper.

We conclude that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in severing

Robbins v. State Farm Life Ins. Co. Page 13
Scarlett’s claims against State Farm into a separate cause of action. We

overrule Scarlett’s fifth issue.

Conclusion

Having overruled all of Scarlett’s issues, we affirm the trial court’s

judgment.2

STEVE SMITH
Justice

OPINION DELIVERED and FILED: April 17, 2025
Before Chief Justice Johnson,
Justice Smith, and
Justice Harris
Affirmed
CV06

2 All pending motions are dismissed as moot.

Robbins v. State Farm Life Ins. Co. Page 14