Cameron Davis v. the State of Texas

Opinion issued April 28, 2026

In The

Court of Appeals
For The

First District of Texas
————————————
NO. 01-24-00301-CR
———————————
CAMERON DAVIS, Appellant
V.
THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee

On Appeal from the 182nd District Court
Harris County, Texas
Trial Court Case No. 1740809

O P I N I O N

A jury found Cameron Davis guilty of murdering his girlfriend, and the trial

court sentenced him to life in prison. Davis seeks reversal. In doing so, Davis makes

the following three arguments:

1) the evidence is legally insufficient to prove beyond a reasonable doubt
that he is the person who murdered his girlfriend (in spite of eyewitness
testimony, including one eyewitness who said she saw him murder the
victim);
2) a pretrial photo array shown to one eyewitness was impermissibly
suggestive, and this suggestiveness led to the misidentification of Davis
as the murderer; and
3) the trial court violated the requirement that the jury unanimously find
him guilty because the court instructed the jury on two ways in which
Davis could be guilty of murder, accompanied only by a general verdict
form that did not distinguish between these two ways.

We hold that the evidence is legally sufficient to support the jury’s finding of

guilt. In addition, well-settled Texas law shows both that the photo array was not

impermissibly suggestive and that the trial court’s instructions did not violate the

unanimity requirement. Accordingly, we affirm the trial court’s judgment.

BACKGROUND

A grand jury indicted Davis for murdering Ryniscia Sanford by shooting her

with a firearm. The indictment alleged that he (1) intentionally or knowingly caused

her death or (2) intended to cause her serious bodily injury and committed an act

clearly dangerous to human life that caused her death. See TEX. PENAL CODE

§ 19.02(b)(1), (2).

Davis pled not guilty. The parties then tried guilt–innocence to a jury.

At trial, Margaret Washington (Sanford’s friend) testified that she was talking

with Sanford on the phone when she unwittingly provoked Davis’s ire. Washington

told Sanford she was going to set her up on a date. Unbeknownst to Washington,

Sanford had the call on speakerphone, and Davis was with her.
2
At this point, Washington heard Sanford scream. The call abruptly ended, and

Washington tried to call Sanford. Eventually, Davis answered the phone.

Washington knew Davis by Sanford’s nickname for him: “King.” Sanford and

Davis were dating one another, and apparently had been off and on for years.

Washington said she recognized Davis’s voice from prior interactions with him.

Davis was angry, and he told Washington to come pick up Sanford.

Washington could hear Sanford screaming in the background during the call.

Washington did not pick up Sanford, and at some point, the call ended.

When this unfolded, Sanford and Davis had been in her car in the parking lot

of an apartment complex. The complex has surveillance cameras.

Surveillance footage showed Sanford getting out of the car and fleeing from

a male passenger. Detective E. Wyatt, the lead homicide detective assigned to

investigate the case, testified that this man looked like Davis, apart from having

shorter hair than Davis did at trial. In Wyatt’s opinion, the man in the footage was

Davis.

At one point during her flight, Sanford sought refuge in an apartment that was

open for carpet cleaning. One of the cleaners, Carlos Umana, testified at trial.

Umana said that Sanford ran into the apartment fast, as if she was in danger.

Due to a language barrier, Umana was not able to talk with her much. But Sanford

seemed upset or nervous, and Umana understood that she was asking for help.

3
Sanford hid behind the apartment door for a minute or less. Then a man with

a handgun entered the apartment and took Sanford outside. On the stand, Umana

described the man in question as having a dark complexion and “wavy” hair,

testifying that the man’s hair was braided.

Umana did not see the man or Sanford after they left the apartment. But

Umana testified he heard gunshots a few minutes after the man took her away.

As part of their investigation, investigators showed Umana a photo array

about six days afterward; the array was comprised of six men. Based on Umana’s

description, the men in the array, including Davis, were African-American and had

braided hair. Umana identified Davis as the man who entered the apartment and took

Sanford away.

Umana also identified Davis as the man in question in open court.

Samantha Wyble, who resided at the apartment complex, testified to

witnessing the shooting. She was on her second-floor balcony drinking coffee and

reading a book when she noticed a man arguing with Sanford in the courtyard below.

They were about 30 to 35 feet away from where Wyble sat. According to Wyble, it

was obvious that Sanford was scared of the man, who seemed to be trying to herd

her in a particular direction, which she was resisting. Sanford kept saying, “Please

just let me go.” And the man replied, “I’m not going to do anything to you in front

of the cameras.”

4
Wyble began picking up her things to go inside and call the cops because the

situation seemed serious. But before Wyble could do so, the shooting started.

According to Wyble, the man shot Sanford, who tried to flee. He followed

her, continuing to shoot her as he went. Wyble said that the man shot Sanford

multiple times. In the end, he stood over Sanford, who lay prone, shooting her at

pointblank range.

Based on the description of the man that Wyble gave to investigators, they

showed her a photo array of six men. She identified Davis as the shooter, qualifying

her identification by indicating she was only 65 percent sure that it was him.

At trial, Wyble explained that she was only 65 percent certain when she

reviewed the array because Davis’s hair was longer in the photo than when she saw

him shoot Sanford. She believed that Davis had shorter hair or a shaved head when

he shot her.

Wyble also identified Davis as the shooter in open court. She said she was 100

percent sure that he was the shooter, even though he had braided hair at the time of

the trial.

There were surveillance cameras in the area of the complex where the

shooting occurred. As a result, the murder of Sanford was video-recorded.

The jury found Davis guilty as charged. The parties then tried punishment to

the bench, and the trial court assessed Davis’s punishment at life in prison.

5
DISCUSSION

I. The evidence is legally sufficient to prove that Davis is the person who
murdered Sanford.

Davis argues that the evidence is legally insufficient to prove beyond a

reasonable doubt that he is the person who murdered Sanford. We disagree.

A. Legal sufficiency

The test for legal sufficiency is whether a rational jury could find each

essential element of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt. Harrell v. State, 620

S.W.3d 910, 913 (Tex. Crim. App. 2021). In conducting a legal-sufficiency review

of the evidence, we consider all the admitted evidence, viewing it in the light most

favorable to the verdict. Id. at 913–14. This standard recognizes it is the jury’s role

to resolve conflicts in the testimony, weigh the evidence, and draw reasonable

inferences from basic facts to ultimate facts. Id. at 914. So, we must defer to the

jury’s evaluation of the credibility of the witnesses and the weight to be given to

various evidence. Martin v. State, 635 S.W.3d 672, 679 (Tex. Crim. App. 2021).

B. Analysis

In every prosecution, the State must prove that the accused is the one who

committed the crime charged. Phillips v. State, 534 S.W.3d 644, 651 (Tex. App.—

Houston [1st Dist.] 2017, no pet.); see also Jones v. State, 458 S.W.3d 625, 630

(Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2015, pet. ref’d) (saying so in murder prosecution).

6
Here, to begin, the jury could have reasonably credited Washington’s

testimony. From it, the jury could have found that shortly before Sanford was

murdered, she and Davis, who were in a dating relationship, became embroiled in

an argument about the possibility that Sanford might see another man. This evidence

placed Davis at the apartment complex where Sanford was murdered and in her

company near the time of the murder; it showed that he had both a motive and the

opportunity to murder her. See Nisbett v. State, 552 S.W.3d 244, 265 (Tex. Crim.

App. 2018) (motive and opportunity are not sufficient, standing alone, to prove who

killed the victim in a murder prosecution, but they are circumstances indicative of

guilt); see also Ingerson v. State, 559 S.W.3d 501, 510 (Tex. Crim. App. 2018)

(accused’s anger at woman in whom he was romantically interested showed motive

for her murder).

The defense put on a witness to dispute Washington’s version of events. This

witness, Laporchia Alexander, testified that Davis was known by the nickname

“Pokey” and that no one called him “King,” contrary to Washington’s testimony.

But this conflict in the evidence was for the jury to resolve, and the jury could have

reasonably believed Washington, who said she recognized Davis’s voice. See

Harrell, 620 S.W.3d at 914 (jury resolves evidentiary conflicts).

7
Moreover, two eyewitnesses, Umana and Wyble, also placed Davis at the

scene, quarreling with Sanford. Umana testified to seeing Davis with a handgun.

Wyble testified to seeing Davis shoot Sanford.

The defense pointed out weaknesses in Umana’s and Wyble’s identification

of Davis. The defense emphasized that Umana’s description of Davis’s hair as

braided conflicted with other evidence, including surveillance footage, that seemed

to show the perpetrator had short hair or a shaved head. The defense also pointed out

that Wyble initially had only been 65 percent sure that Davis was the man that she

saw shoot Sanford. But the jury heard both Umana and Wyble testify, and it was the

jury’s role to evaluate their credibility and decide what weight to give to their

identifications. See Martin, 635 S.W.3d at 679 (appellate court defers to the jury’s

credibility determinations and to the weight a jury assigns to various evidence).

Here, the jury could have reasonably credited the witnesses’ identifications of

Davis in spite of their shortcomings. For example, Umana was not the only one who

was apparently mistaken about the nature of the perpetrator’s hair. M. McElvany, a

crime scene investigator who viewed the surveillance footage afterward, testified

that he found it difficult to say what hairstyle the perpetrator wore, and it appeared

as though he had braided hair. In addition, Detective Wyatt testified that inconsistent

witness statements are not unusual in traumatic situations, like this one. On this

record, the jury could have reasonably found that Umana’s identification of Davis

8
was accurate in general, even if Umana was mistaken in some particular detail. See

Sharp v. State, 707 S.W.2d 611, 614 (Tex. Crim. App. 1986) (jury may accept or

reject witness’s testimony in whole or part); Jeansonne v. State, 624 S.W.3d 78, 92

(Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2021, no pet.) (citing Sharp for same proposition);

see also, e.g., Arrellano v. State, 555 S.W.3d 647, 651 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st

Dist.] 2018, pet. ref’d) (inconsistencies between accounts of eyewitnesses and

inconsistencies between their pretrial statements and their testimony did not render

evidence legally insufficient); Davis v. State, 177 S.W.3d 355, 358–59 (Tex. App.—

Houston [1st Dist.] 2005, no pet.) (eyewitness testimony was not legally insufficient

merely because it was ostensibly inconsistent with physical evidence).

Similarly, any uncertainty in Wyble’s pretrial identification, as compared to

her in-court identification of Davis as Sanford’s murderer, was for the jury to

resolve. See Martin, 635 S.W.3d at 679 (appellate court defers to jury’s credibility

assessments); Harrell, 620 S.W.3d at 914 (jury resolves evidentiary conflicts);

Sharp, 707 S.W.2d at 614 (jury was tasked with resolving inconsistencies in

eyewitness’s account, and even a total failure to identify the defendant on one

occasion would go only to the weight of the witness’s identification). In fact, if

credited by the jury, as it reasonably could have been here, Wyble’s testimony that

she saw Davis shoot Sanford is on its own legally sufficient to support the jury’s

finding of guilt. See Shah v. State, 414 S.W.3d 808, 812 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st

9
Dist.] 2013, pet. ref’d) (“It is well-established that the testimony of a sole witness to

an offense may constitute legally sufficient evidence to support a conviction.”).

We overrule Davis’s issue concerning the legal sufficiency of the evidence.

II. The trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying Davis’s motion to
suppress Umana’s out-of-court pretrial identification of him; the array
was not impermissibly suggestive.

Davis next argues that the trial court abused its discretion by denying his

motion to suppress Umana’s pretrial identification of him because the photo array

was impermissibly suggestive, thereby violating his right to due process. We

disagree that the array was impermissibly suggestive. The trial court did not err.

A. Impermissible suggestiveness

Complaints about the suggestiveness of a photo array are subject to a two-step

inquiry. The defendant must first show “by clear and convincing evidence that the

pretrial procedure was impermissibly suggestive.” Balderas v. State, 517 S.W.3d

756, 792 (Tex. Crim. App. 2016). If he does not do so, our inquiry ends, and his

complaint fails. See Ford v. State, 919 S.W.2d 107, 117 (Tex. Crim. App. 1996). If

the defendant shows the array was impermissibly suggestive, we proceed to the next

step and “assess[] the reliability of the identification under the totality of the

circumstances” to ascertain whether the procedure “gave rise to a very substantial

likelihood of irreparable misidentification.” Balderas, 517 S.W.3d at 792, 796.

10
A photo array may be impermissibly suggestive in the way in which it is

presented to the witness or due to the content of the array itself. Barley v. State, 906

S.W.2d 27, 33 (Tex. Crim. App. 1995). As to content, an array “may be

impermissibly suggestive if the suspect is the only individual in the array who

closely resembles the pre-procedure description.” Balderas, 517 S.W.3d at 794. But

the people in the array “need not be identical” to one another. Id.; see also Ragsdale

v. State, 713 S.W.3d 435, 458 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2025, no pet.)

(persons should be similar enough to reasonably test reliability of identification).

When a defendant argues the content of the array itself was impermissibly

suggestive on its face and his challenge does not turn on witness credibility, we

review the issue of suggestiveness de novo. Colgin v. State, 132 S.W.3d 526, 531–

32 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2004, pet. ref’d); see also Gamboa v. State, 296

S.W.3d 574, 581 (Tex. Crim. App. 2009) (reviewing de novo ruling on how

suggestiveness of photo array may have influenced in-court identification). But we

defer to the trial court’s determination of historical facts supported by the record

when its fact findings turn on the credibility and demeanor of the witnesses. Colgin,

132 S.W.3d at 531.

B. Analysis

The photo array is in the record. It features headshots (photographs from the

shoulders up) of six African-American men in two rows of three. The photos are of

11
the same size and shape. They were taken from approximately the same perspective

and are of the same general quality. The men in the array appear to be in the same

general age range. Each of the men has a braided hairstyle with the same color of

hair (black). The six men have similar complexions. To the extent their clothing is

visible, all are dressed in casual civilian clothes. The backgrounds of the photos are

plain. From the photos, it is not possible to discern the heights or weights of the men.

Davis is not the “only individual in the array who closely resembles the pre-

procedure description.” Balderas, 517 S.W.3d at 794. Davis does not stand out from

the others in a way that emphasizes his presence in the array or that tends to draw

the viewer’s eye to him in particular.

Our Court has held that photo arrays comparable to this one were not

impermissibly suggestive. See, e.g., Colgin, 132 S.W.3d at 532 (photos of six white

men dressed in civilian clothes with similar facial features and receding hairlines

were roughly similar; array was not impermissibly suggestive); Page v. State, 125

S.W.3d 640, 647 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2003, pet. ref’d) (array of six

African-American men dressed in civilian clothes with short black hair who

appeared to be of similar age was not an impermissibly suggestive despite slight

differences); Goldberg v. State, 95 S.W.3d 345, 356–57, 378 (Tex. App.—Houston

[1st Dist.] 2002, pet. ref’d) (array of six photos of equal quality, size, and shape,

taken from same general perspective, showing young white men with light blond to

12
dark brown hair, and in which appellant was not distinctive, was not impermissibly

suggestive).

At trial, Davis argued that the array at issue was impermissibly suggestive

because he is the only person in it wearing a red shirt. But he did not explain why

this makes the array suggestive. The color of the shirts worn by the six men varies.

Two wore a white shirt, one wore a blue shirt, one wore a black shirt, one wore a

dark-colored shirt that may have been black, and Davis wore a red shirt.

Under settled law, the fact that Davis was the lone person in the array who

wore a red shirt does not make the array impermissibly suggestive. See, e.g.,

Cienfuegos v. State, 113 S.W.3d 481, 492 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2003,

pet. ref’d) (rejecting claim that array was impermissibly suggestive because

appellant was only one wearing red shirt); see also In re M.I.S., 498 S.W.3d 123,

132 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2016, no pet.) (difference in shirt colors or

patterns did not make array impermissibly suggestive).

Notably, Umana testified that he could not recall what color shirt the armed

man who came into the apartment searching for Sanford was wearing at the time.

And Wyble, the other eyewitness, testified that the man who shot Sanford was

dressed in a white shirt. So Davis cannot even contend the red shirt was intended to

suggest or did suggest his identity by corresponding to the clothing he was said to

have worn when he allegedly committed the murder. Cf. Fisher v. State, 525 S.W.3d

13
759, 763 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2017, pet. ref’d) (rejecting claim that

array showing appellant in red-hooded sweatshirt was impermissibly suggestive

given that this matched the description of the perpetrator’s clothing provided by

witness).

Davis also argued at trial that the array was impermissibly suggestive because

he says that he is the only person in the array who does not have a beard. But on its

face, the array does not support his position:

14
To begin, shadows in the photos make it somewhat unclear how many do and

how many do not have beards. At least two men plainly have short beards. But the

extent to which the other men do is difficult to discern due to shadows. Before the

trial court denied Davis’s motion to suppress, Detective A. Vera, the homicide

investigator who prepared the array, testified about the uncertainty created by these

shadows. Later, during trial, Sergeant A. Hinojosa, who was a homicide investigator

at the time of the investigation and presented the array to Umana, testified similarly

regarding the shadows. On this record, the trial court could have reasonably rejected

Davis’s premise that he alone among the six men in the array was beardless.

Our Court and others have routinely held that variations in facial hair of the

sort that appear in this array do not make the array impermissibly suggestive. See,

e.g., Ragsdale, 713 S.W.3d at 458 (photo array was not impermissibly suggestive

when four of six African-American men in it had light facial hair); Escovedo v. State,

902 S.W.2d 109, 116–17 & n.4 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 1995, pet. ref’d)

(photo array of six Hispanic men with similar characteristics but variations in facial

hair—four had beards and mustaches and only one was similar to appellant’s—was

not impermissibly suggestive); see also Turner v. State, 600 S.W.2d 927, 932–33

(Tex. Crim. App. [Panel Op.] 1980) (rejecting argument that five-person line-up was

impermissibly suggestive because only appellant and two others had beards and

these two other men were unlike appellant in size or hair color); Wilson v. State, 15

15
S.W.3d 544, 552–53 (Tex. App.—Dallas 1999, pet. ref’d) (rejecting argument that

array was impermissibly suggestive when defendant argued (among other things)

that he was “the only person in the photographic spread without facial hair”; all of

the men in the array were African-American, bald, and appeared to be approximately

the same age); Mallard v. State, 661 S.W.2d 268, 276–77 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth

1983, no pet.) (line-up of five men was not impermissibly suggestive even though

defendant was “the only one with no obvious facial hair”; all five in line-up were

African-American men of the same general height and weight and they were all

dressed in substantially the same manner).1

1
On appeal, Davis primarily focuses on the second step of the inquiry—whether the
photo array gave rise to a very substantial likelihood of irreparable
misidentification. For example, he emphasizes that Umana’s pre-procedure
description of the suspect as having braided hair is inconsistent with the video
surveillance footage showing that the suspect had closely cropped hair instead.

But the second step of the inquiry is immaterial absent a showing of impermissible
suggestiveness. Ford, 919 S.W.2d at 117; see also Haq v. State, 445 S.W.3d 330,
337 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2013, pet. ref’d) (second step of inquiry
concerning reliability of identification “need only be considered once a
determination has been made that the relevant out-of-court identification procedure
was impermissibly suggestive”); Anderson v. State, 414 S.W.3d 251, 258–59 (Tex.
App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2013, pet. ref’d) (second step inquiring into reliability of
identification is not relevant to first step as to impermissible suggestiveness). And
whether Umana may have been mistaken in his belief about the length or style of
the suspect’s hair has no bearing on whether the array created based on that
description was impermissibly suggestive. See, e.g., Barley, 906 S.W.2d at 33
(inquiry as to whether content of array itself is impermissibly suggestive concerns
whether “suspect is the only individual closely resembling the pre-procedure
description” of the suspect).
16
In sum, while the six persons in the photo array are not identical, identicalness

is not required. Balderas, 517 S.W.3d at 794. The array features men who

correspond to a rough description of the suspect provided by Umana, and the array

was not impermissibly suggestive. See, e.g., Anderson v. State, 414 S.W.3d 251,

254, 258–59 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2013, pet. ref’d) (photo array of six

bald, tattooed white men of the same general age was not impermissibly misleading

even though only three, including appellant, had facial hair; the court rejected the

complaint that distinguishing characteristics of the other five made the array too

suggestive, explaining that “a photo array must contain individuals who fit a rough

description of the suspect” (citation modified)). And having held that the array was

not impermissibly suggestive, we conclude that Davis’s complaints about the array

fail. See Ragsdale, 713 S.W.3d at 458 (court of appeals did not need to address

second step as to whether photo array created substantial likelihood of

misidentification, given its holding that the array was not impermissibly suggestive).

We overrule Davis’s issue concerning the photo array.

III. The trial court did not violate the jury unanimity requirement by
instructing the jury on two alternate ways of committing murder under
sections 19.02(b)(1) and 19.02(b)(2).
A guilty verdict in a felony criminal prosecution must be unanimous. Ngo v.

State, 175 S.W.3d 738, 745 (Tex. Crim. App. 2005). Davis argues that the trial

court’s jury charge erroneously allowed the jury to find him guilty without unanimity

17
because the court disjunctively instructed the jury on two ways in which he may

have committed murder—by intentionally or knowingly causing Sanford’s death or

by intending to cause serious bodily injury and committing an act clearly dangerous

to human life that caused Sanford’s death—accompanied by a general verdict form

that did not require the jury to specify which of these two ways the jury found was

proven. See TEX. PENAL CODE § 19.02(b)(1), (2) (criminalizing both of these acts as

murder).

As Davis acknowledges, binding Texas precedent has already rejected this

argument. See Saenz v. State, 451 S.W.3d 388, 390 (Tex. Crim. App. 2014). As the

Court of Criminal Appeals has held, a trial court does not violate the unanimity

requirement by disjunctively instructing the jury on alternate ways of committing

the same crime. Id.

With respect to murder, the Court of Criminal Appeals has held that different

legal theories about the same victim’s death are alternate ways of committing the

same crime. Davis v. State, 313 S.W.3d 317, 342 (Tex. Crim. App. 2010). In other

words, intentionally or knowingly causing death and intending to cause serious

bodily injury and committing an act clearly dangerous to human life that causes

death are merely two ways of committing the same crime—murder. Thus, their

disjunctive submission in the charge does not violate the unanimity requirement.

18
Courts across Texas have repeatedly reached this conclusion. See, e.g., Yost

v. State, 222 S.W.3d 865, 877–78 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2007, pet. ref’d)

(unanimity requirement not violated by disjunctively instructing jury on murder

under sections 19.02(b)(1) and (b)(2) of the Texas Penal Code); see also Aguirre v.

State, 732 S.W.2d 320, 324–26 (Tex. Crim. App. 1982) (op. on reh’g) (no error in

disjunctively instructing jury on two alternate ways of committing murder:

intentionally or knowingly causing death and so-called felony murder, which are

now codified in sections 19.02(b)(1) and 19.02(b)(3) of the Texas Penal Code);

Braughton v. State, 522 S.W.3d 714, 727–28 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2017)

(citing Aguirre for proposition that sections 19.02(b)(1) and 19.02(b)(2) are alternate

ways of committing murder), aff’d, 569 S.W.3d 592 (Tex. Crim. App. 2018).

Our own Court has repeatedly held that the disjunctive submission of murder

under sections 19.02(b)(1) and 19.02(b)(2) accompanied by a general verdict form

does not violate the unanimity requirement. See, e.g., Harris v. State, No. 01-23-

00549-CR, 2025 WL 994036, at *6–8 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] Apr. 3, 2025,

pet. ref’d) (mem. op., not designated for publication); Lazarine v. State, No. 01-19-

00982-CR, 2021 WL 5702182, at *4–9 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] Dec. 2,

2021, pet. ref’d) (mem. op., not designated for publication); Pierre v. State, No. 01-

11-00681-CR, 2012 WL 6644780, at *1–2 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] Dec. 20,

2012, pet. struck) (mem. op., not designated for publication).

19
We overrule Davis’s issue concerning jury unanimity.

CONCLUSION

We affirm the trial court’s judgment.

Jennifer Caughey
Justice

Panel consists of Justices Guerra, Caughey, and Dokupil.

Publish. TEX. R. APP. P. 47.2(b).

20