Beverly Chancey v. Russell Chancey

Opinion issued December 9, 2025.

In The

Court of Appeals
For The

First District of Texas
————————————
NO. 01-24-00266-CV
———————————
BEVERLY CHANCEY, Appellant
V.
RUSSELL CHANCEY, Appellee

On Appeal from the 461st District Court
Brazoria County, Texas
Trial Court Case No. 115027-F

MEMORANDUM OPINION

This is an appeal from the trial court’s final decree of divorce entered on

January 25, 2024. In three issues, appellant Beverly Chancey argues that (1) an

adult child has no standing to intervene in her deceased father’s divorce after his

death, (2) the trial court abused its discretion by reinstating the divorce case after a
purported dismissal, and (3) an order wherein the parties and the trial court signed

an agreement as to the disposition of property was not a final judgment. Appellee

Amber Hamilton (decedent Russell Chancey’s daughter from a prior marriage)

argues that (1) she has standing and the right to intervene, (2) reinstatement was

not an abuse of discretion, and (3) the dismissal was granted in error. We reverse

the trial court’s January 25, 2024 judgment and render judgment consistent with

the trial court’s July 27, 2022 judgment.

Background

On October 21, 2021, Russell Chancey1 (Russell) petitioned for divorce

from appellant. On July 27, 2022, the Chanceys signed a rule 11 agreement2

agreeing to the disposition of property. The rule 11 agreement consisted of

handwritten entries on a printed form. The style of the case was handwritten at the

top of the form, along with “Final Or[d]ers/Decree.” There is a check-mark next to

a printed line that says, “RULE 11 AGREEMENT (with entry to follow).” At the

bottom of the first page, it says “‘Beverly F. Chapman’ – Name Change.” Next to

the pre-printed heading, “Property,” there is handwriting that says “See Exhibit

‘A.’” “Exhibit A” is an attached two-page table that purports to distribute the

1
Neither Russell Chancey nor his estate is a party to this appeal.
2
“Unless otherwise provided in these rules, no agreement between attorneys or
parties touching any suit pending will be enforced unless it be in writing, signed
and filed with the papers as part of the record, or unless it be made in open court
and entered of record.” TEX. R. CIV. P. 11.
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parties’ assets and liabilities. Under the “Property” heading, the document reads,

“Respondent to have exclusive use and possession of the following property during

the pendency of this suit – Real estate located at 2317 Parkview Drive, Pearland,

TX 77581 confirmed as separate property of wife.” Under “Debts,” the document

reads:

Petitioner to pay the following debts during the pendency of the suit –
to pay debts on property awarded to him and in his sole name.

Respondent to pay the following debts during the pendency of the suit
– to pay $20,000 to Petitioner secured by an interest bearing owelty
lien on property awarded to wife located at 2317 Parkview Drive. To
pay debts on property awarded to her and in her sole name, including
but not limited to vehicles awarded to her.

The document is signed by Russell, Russell’s attorney, appellant, appellant’s

attorney, and the trial court judge.

On December 9, 2022, counsel for Russell withdrew, alleging that “the

attorneys [were] unable to effectively communicate with [Russell] in a manner

consistent with good attorney-client relations.” On January 5, 2023, counsel for

appellant withdrew. The trial court did not enter a divorce decree before the

withdrawal of both parties’ counsel.

On October 5, 2023, Russell passed away. On November 22, 2023, through

new counsel, appellant filed a suggestion of death and a motion to dismiss for want

of prosecution. In the motion to dismiss, appellant claimed that “the parties

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reconciled” after the July 27, 2022 agreement and before Russell’s death. On

November 27, 2023, the trial court dismissed the case for want of prosecution.

On December 11, 2023, appellee filed an instrument entitled “Verified

Motion for New Trial or, Alternatively, Motion to Reinstate.” In her motion,

appellee argued that (1) the trial court committed error by granting the motion to

dismiss when a final judgment of divorce had already been pronounced, rendered,

and entered and (2) the trial court was required by rule 165(a)(3) of the Texas

Rules of Civil Procedure to reinstate the case because dismissal was not intentional

or the result of conscious indifference. In support of her motion, appellee attached

as exhibits the rule 11 agreement and docket sheet. The docket sheet contained an

entry for July 27, 2022, which read:

Set on the merits. Parties and Attys. C. Lay and D. Thornton
appeared. Record waived. Evidence presented. Divorce granted; No
child born or adopted of the marriage; Property per Rule 11
agreement; Name change granted Beverly F. Chapman. Pronounced
and rendered this date. EOJ August 25, 2022. PB

There was no written decree attached as an exhibit to appellee’s motion.

Appellant moved to strike appellee’s petition in intervention, arguing that

(1) appellee had no post-judgment right to intervene; (2) appellee had no standing

to intervene; and (3) the dismissal, not the oral pronouncement, was the final

judgment. Appellant also filed a response to appellee’s motion for new trial,

arguing that: (1) there was no good cause for a new trial, (2) the rule 11 agreement

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was not a final judgment, and (3) appellee’s cited authority was distinguishable

from the instant case because the cited case involved a proceeding that was

recorded by court reporter and the instant case was not.

On January 9, 2024, the trial court held a hearing on the motion to strike,

motion for new trial, and motion to reinstate. The trial court ultimately reinstated

the case. At the hearing, the trial court set the entry date of January 25, 2024.

On January 25, 2024, the trial court signed a divorce decree. Although the

document was titled “Agreed Final Decree of Divorce,” it was not signed by either

Russell or appellant.

On February 23, 2024, appellant filed a motion for new trial, arguing that

(1) reinstatement after dismissal for want of prosecution was not authorized as no

evidence was presented to show that the failure of the party or his attorney was not

intentional or the result of conscious indifference but was due to an accident or

mistake, or that the failure has been otherwise reasonably explained; (2) the

intervenor has no justiciable interest in the divorce; and (3) the rule 11 agreement

did not make the divorce final, as it lacked finality language disposing of all claims

and all parties.

The Divorce Became Final on July 27, 2022

Appellant argues that the divorce was not final when it was pronounced and

rendered from the bench. We disagree.

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A. Applicable Law

Reducing a decision to final judgment has three phases: (1) rendition,

(2) signing, and (3) entry. Baker v. Bizzle, 687 S.W.3d 285, 291 (Tex. 2024) (citing

Burrell v. Cornelius, 570 S.W.2d 382, 384 (Tex. 1978)). Rendition and signing are

judicial acts that can, but need not, occur at the same time. Id. at 291. A judgment’s

“rendition” is “the judicial act by which the court settles and declares the decision

of the law upon the matters at issue.” Id. at 292 (quoting Coleman v. Zapp, 151

S.W. 1040, 1041 (Tex. 1912)). Entry is a clerical act undertaken by the clerk of the

court. Id. at 291-92.

In Baker v. Bizzle, the Supreme Court of Texas recently reviewed the

requirements for a final judgment in a divorce proceeding. 687 S.W.3d at 288. A

husband and wife filed cross-petitions for divorce and tried the case to the bench.

Id. At the end of the trial, the trial court orally pronounced the parties’ divorce, but

did not include the grounds on which the divorce was granted or divide the marital

estate. Id. The trial court informed the parties that it would email them the

decision. Id. Two weeks later, the trial court emailed the parties its ruling as to the

grounds and disposition of property. Baker, 687 S.W.3d at 288-89. The trial court

did not copy the court clerk on the email or otherwise submit it to the clerk for

filing or entry into the record. Id. at 289. No written decree was submitted or

signed, and the trial court twice warned the parties that the case would be

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dismissed for want of prosecution if the decree was not submitted by a certain date.

Id. The wife passed away. Id. at 290. The trial court subsequently entered a

posthumous divorce decree. Id. The Supreme Court of Texas ultimately found that,

without public pronouncement, the trial court had not rendered judgment prior to

the wife’s passing and lacked jurisdiction to enter the posthumous decree. Id. at

294-95.

In Sargent v. Sargent, the Fort Worth Court of Appeals recently applied

Baker to uphold a judgment that was not a final decree of divorce. No. 02-24-

00470-CV, 2025 WL 2627033 at *8 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth Sept. 11, 2025, no

pet.). In Sargent, the parties reached an agreement during a bench trial on their

divorce petitions. Id. at *1. The agreement was read into the record and the parties

testified confirming the agreement. Id. The parties and their attorneys signed a

copy of the agreement that contained the provisions read into the record. Id. The

trial court signed the document, entitled “Judge’s Order,” and the clerk file-

stamped it and entered it into the record. Sargent, 2025 WL 2627033 at *1. Before

the trial court signed the final decree, the wife moved to revoke her consent to the

agreement and moved for a new trial. Id. The trial court denied the wife’s motion

and entered a decree in accordance with the parties’ earlier agreement. In its

conclusions of law, the trial court stated that, where the trial court had adopted the

parties’ agreement as an order of the court, “[t]he signing of a Decree [wa]s a

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ministerial act which does not affect the judgment entered by the [c]ourt.” Id. at *3.

The court of appeals agreed with the trial court, reasoning that the file-stamped

document entitled “Judge’s Order” evidenced a present intent by the trial court to

render judgment on the date the “Judge’s Order” was signed. Id. at *4.

B. Analysis

The instant case is somewhat distinguishable from Sargent, in that it lacks a

reporter’s record. However, here there are two documents in the clerk’s record that

reflect the trial court’s actions on July 27, 2022. According to the Judicial Docket

Sheet, the trial court granted the divorce and divided the parties’ property per their

written agreement. The trial court also granted appellant’s name change.

According to the docket sheet, the decision was “[p]ronounced and rendered this

date.” On the same day, the parties and the trial court signed the document entitled

both “Final OR[D]ERS/Decree” and “RULE 11 AGREEMENT (with entry to

follow)” and filed it with the court clerk. As in Sargent, the trial court entered its

judgment in this case when it rendered and signed this document. 2025 WL

2627033 at *4. Both the Judicial Docket Sheet and the fact that the document was

filed with the clerk as part of the public record indicate that, unlike the trial court in

Baker, the trial court intended to make its ruling public on July 27, 2022.

Appellant argues that the “Final OR[D]ERS/Decree” document is not final

because it leaves the disposition of certain items of property unresolved. Appellant

8
lists her own retirement account, credit cards, bank accounts, art, and mementos,

but there is no evidence of these assets in the record that would support this

argument. An appellant must present an appellate court with a sufficient record

demonstrating error requiring reversal. See, e.g., Tabe v. Tex. Inpatient

Consultants, LLP, No. 01-22-00294-CV, 2023 WL 3063403, at *5 (Tex. App.—

Houston [1st Dist.] Apr. 25, 2023, no pet.) (mem. op.); see also Nicholson v. Fifth

Third Bank, 226 S.W.3d 581, 583 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2007, no pet.)

(noting that party is required to request court reporter make record and holding

that, because appellant failed to request reporter’s record, court would assume

there was sufficient evidence to support trial court’s judgment). Typically, when

no reporter’s record is made and filed, the reviewing court must presume that the

missing evidence supports the trial court’s ruling. Bryant v. United Shortline Inc.

Assurance Servs., N.A., 972 S.W.2d 26, 31 (Tex. 1998); Opoku-Pong v.

Boahemaa, No. 14-19-00070-CV, 2020 WL 3240742, at *2 (Tex. App.—Houston

[14th Dist.] June 16, 2020, no pet.) (mem. op.).

Because the trial court rendered its disposition of property and divorce

decree in open court and in a document recorded in the clerk’s record, the parties’

divorce became final on July 27, 2022, and the July 27, 2022 document controls.

Baker, 687 S.W.3d at 291; Sargent, 2025 WL 2627033 at *4. Russell’s passing

divested the trial court of jurisdiction to enter the January 25, 2024 decree, and it is

9
therefore void. Baker, 687 S.W.3d at 295. For the same reasons, the orders

dismissing and reinstating the case were also void and without effect. Id.

Conclusion

Having determined the trial court entered its judgment when it signed the

July 27, 2022 order, we set aside the January 25, 2024 final decree of divorce.3

Amparo “Amy” Guerra
Justice

Panel consists of Justices Guerra, Caughey, and Dokupil.

3
Because this issue is dispositive of the appeal, we need not consider appellants’
remaining issues. See TEX. R. APP. P. 47.1 (providing that “court of appeals must
hand down a written opinion that is as brief as practicable but that addresses every
issue raised and necessary to final disposition of the appeal”).

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