Darrell Buchanan and Canon House Builders, LLC, Vigor Testosterone and Weight Loss, PLLC, John Leondike, Lala Rodriguez, Kassandra Canales v. Androderm X, LLC

Opinion issued November 25, 2025

In The
Court of Appeals
For The
First District of Texas
————————————
NO. 01-24-00762-CV
———————————
DARRELL BUCHANAN, CANON HOUSE BUILDERS, LLC, VIGOR
TESTOSTERONE AND WEIGHT LOSS, PLLC, JOHN LEONDIKE, LALA
RODRIGUEZ, KASSANDRA CANALES, Appellants
V.
ANDRODERM X, LLC, Appellee

On Appeal from the 405th District Court
Galveston County, Texas
Trial Court Case No. 23-CV-2203

MEMORANDUM OPINION

This interlocutory appeal arises from a suit brought by Androderm X, LLC,

seeking injunctive relief against (1) a business competitor, (2) the competitor’s

alleged principal, and (3) Androderm’s former employees who went to work for the

competitor. The six defendants sued by Androderm—(1) Darrell Buchanan,

(2) Canon House Builders, LLC, (3) Vigor Testosterone and Weight Loss, LLC,
(4) John Leondike, (5) Lala Rodriguez, and (6) Kassandra Canales—now appeal the

original temporary injunction order and the amended temporary injunction order

issued in Androderm’s favor. They also appeal the trial court’s oral denial of a

motion to dissolve a temporary restraining order and the temporary injunction. They

present three appellate issues.

We conclude that we cannot address the first two appellate issues challenging

the denial of the motion to dissolve and the temporary injunction order itself. We

lack jurisdiction to decide an appeal (1) from the denial of a motion to dissolve a

temporary restraining order and (2) from an oral denial of a motion to dissolve. Thus,

we dismiss the appeal from the denial of the motion to dissolve. We do not consider

the challenges to the temporary injunction order because they became moot when

the trial court issued the amended temporary injunction order. As to the amended

order, we dismiss the appeal in part, reverse in part and remand, and dissolve the

remainder of the order.

Background

In September 2022, Androderm and AndroGenX LLC signed an asset

purchase agreement whereby Androderm purchased AndroGenX’s “testosterone

replacement business.” Darrell Buchanan signed the agreement on behalf of

AndroGenX as its principal.

2
The asset purchase agreement contained a non-compete clause. The parties

agreed that Buchanan, for a period of two years, would not “become interested in . . .

a testosterone replacement business” within a 10-mile radius of the business

Androderm just purchased and would not solicit its current clients.

In November 2023, Androderm sued four defendants: (1) Vigor Testosterone

and Weight Loss, PLLC (Vigor); (2) John Leondike; (3) Lala Rodriguez; and

(4) Kassandra Canales, alleging violations of the Texas Uniform Trade Secrets Act,

civil conspiracy, and tortious interference. Androderm alleged that Leondike,

Rodriguez, and Canales were its former employees, who had acquired Androderm’s

“confidential information” through their employment. Androderm alleged that the

former employees went to work for Vigor, “a direct competitor,” where they

solicited Androderm’s clients and used Androderm’s “confidential information” to

promote Vigor’s new business. Androderm claimed this enabled Vigor “to quickly

attract and convert a substantial portion of [Androderm’s] customer base.”

Androderm sought damages and injunctive relief.

Nine months later, Androderm amended its petition to add two new

defendants: Buchanan and Canon House, a company it alleged “assumed the benefits

of the Asset Purchase Agreement.” Androderm asserted that Buchanan breached the

non-compete clause because he owned and managed Vigor. It also added an

application for (1) a temporary restraining order (TRO), (2) a temporary injunction,

3
and (3) a permanent injunction. Androderm claimed that injunctive relief should

include “equitable tolling” of the two-year period in the non-compete clause.

The amended petition was verified and supported with attached exhibits,

including the asset purchase agreement and text messages between Leondike and

Canales. The texts allegedly revealed Buchanan’s involvement with Vigor and the

former employees’ scheme to divert patients to Vigor.

The day after Androderm filed its amended petition, the trial court granted

Androderm’s request for a TRO. Its general effect was to prohibit Buchanan and the

other defendants from operating a competing testosterone clinic. The TRO ordered

expedited discovery and set the application for temporary injunction for a hearing

six days later.

The day before the temporary injunction hearing (TI hearing), Androderm

filed its second amended verified petition and application for temporary and

permanent injunctions. The asset purchase agreement and the text messages were

attached along with a tax form, identifying Buchanan as Vigor’s “director.”

None of the defendants appeared at the TI hearing. Buchanan and Canon

House were not yet served with the lawsuit or the TRO and had no notice of the

hearing. Androderm had emailed the TRO to Vigor, Leondike, and Canales’s

counsel, but he was seriously ill and did not attend the hearing.

4
During the TI hearing, the trial court judicially noticed, at Androderm’s

request, the exhibits attached to the second amended petition. To show a violation

of the non-compete clause, Androderm called a witness who testified that Vigor was

located only four miles from Androderm’s business.

The trial court signed an order granting Androderm’s application for

temporary injunction (TI Order). The order’s injunctive relief mirrored that of the

TRO. It also required the enjoined parties “to answer all expedited discovery

authorized by the [trial court’s] prior order”—presumably the TRO. The TI Order

did not set a trial date.

A few days later, Buchanan and Canon House appeared, answering the suit.

They also filed a motion to dissolve the TRO and the TI Order. They asked the trial

court to dissolve the TRO because it lacked an expiration date as required by Rule

of Civil Procedure 680. See TEX. R. CIV. P. 680. They asked the trial court to dissolve

the TI Order because Buchanan and Canon House had not received notice of the TI

hearing, which they asserted violated Rule of Civil Procedure 681 and their right to

due process. See TEX. R. CIV. P. 681.

Buchanan and Canon House also pointed out that Rule of Civil Procedure 683

required the order itself to specify the acts sought to be enjoined, without reference

to another document. See TEX. R. CIV. P. 683. They asserted that the TI Order

violated the rule because it referenced another document by mandating compliance

5
with a prior order’s discovery requirements. Later, they added an argument that the

TI Order also violated Rule 683 because it lacked a trial date. See id.

While the motion to dissolve was pending, Buchanan and Canon House

appealed the TI Order to this Court.

In the trial court, Androderm responded to the motion to dissolve and filed a

motion to enforce the TI Order. Androderm asked that its motion be set for hearing

at the same time as the motion to dissolve.

The trial court heard the motions together. Buchanan and Canon House

asserted that the TI Order’s failure to comply with Rules 681 and 683 and principles

of due process required its dissolution. They offered Buchanan’s declaration to

support the motion. He attested that neither he nor Canon House received notice of

the TI hearing and that neither were served with the lawsuit before the hearing.

Buchanan and Canon House argued that the application for temporary

injunction should be set for a new hearing so that both sides—not just Androderm—

could present evidence and cross-examine the other side’s witnesses. Buchanan and

Canon House also pointed out that their co-defendants did not appear at the TI

hearing and were not present at the current hearing because their counsel was

terminally ill. Buchanan and Canon House’s counsel informed the trial court that he

had filed a motion to substitute as counsel for the co-defendants.

6
Androderm acknowledged that the TI Order contained “some procedural

defects” and offered a proposed amended TI order to correct the defects.

Androderm argued against a new hearing on the TI application, asserting that

the motion-to-dissolve hearing provided Buchanan and Canon House with an

opportunity to present arguments and evidence opposing the application. Buchanan

and Canon House countered that the application was not set for hearing that day and

compared the hearing to a “trial by ambush.”

The trial court orally denied the motion to dissolve. The court stated that it

would “not void[] the prior [TI] order” but would amend it to correct the two

complained-of Rule 683 deficiencies.

Five days later, the trial court signed an amended temporary injunction order

(Amended TI Order). The Amended TI Order set a trial date and deleted the

reference to the trial court’s “prior order.” Otherwise, it was substantively the same

as the TI Order, containing essentially the same injunctive provisions and keeping

the same fact findings derived from the evidence admitted at the TI hearing.

All defendants—Buchanan, Canon House, Vigor, Leondike, Rodriguez, and

Canales (collectively, Appellants)—appealed the denial of the motion to dissolve

and the Amended TI Order.1

1
The notice of appeal for the TI Order and the later-filed notice of appeal for the
denial of the motion to dissolve and the Amended TI Order were both filed under
this appellate cause number.
7
Appellants raise three appellate issues. They challenge (1) the denial of the

motion to dissolve, (2) the TI Order, and (3) the Amended TI Order.

Denial of Motion to Dissolve

In their first issue, Appellants ask that we reverse the trial court’s denial of the

motion to dissolve and render judgment dissolving the TRO and the TI Order. We

begin by addressing whether we have jurisdiction to address the denial of the motion.

Section 51.014(a)(4) of the Civil Practice and Remedies Code permits an

appeal from an order granting a temporary injunction and from an order denying a

motion to dissolve a temporary injunction, but it does not permit an appeal from an

order denying a motion to dissolve a TRO. See TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE

§ 51.014(a)(4); Lindsey v. State, No. 01-20-00373-CV, 2021 WL 3868310, at *4

(Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] Aug. 31, 2021, no pet.) (mem. op.). Accordingly,

we lack jurisdiction to address Androderm’s challenge to the denial of the motion to

dissolve the TRO. See TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE § 51.014(a)(4); Lindsey, 2021

WL 3868310, at *4.

We also lack jurisdiction over the denial of the motion to dissolve generally

because the trial court orally denied the motion and did not sign a written order as

required to appeal an interlocutory order under section 51.014(a). See TEX. R. APP.

P. 26.1(b); Casillas v. M & S Concrete, No. 01-19-00145-CV, 2020 WL 2026367,

at *4–5. (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] Apr. 28, 2020, no pet.) (mem. op.). Thus,

8
we lack jurisdiction to review the denial of the motion to dissolve the TI Order as

well. See TEX. R. APP. P. 26.1(b); Casillas, 2020 WL 2026367, at *4–5. Accordingly,

because an interlocutory appeal is not authorized from the oral denial of a motion to

dissolve (or the denial of a motion to dissolve a TRO), we dismiss for lack of

jurisdiction the portion of the appeal challenging the denial of the motion to dissolve.

See Casillas, 2020 WL 2026367, at *5; see also Nagata v. MHWirth Inc., No. 01-

21-00492-CV, 2023 WL 2414880, at *3 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] Mar. 9,

2023, pet. denied) (mem. op.) (dismissing unauthorized portion of interlocutory

appeal).

TI Order

Appellant’s second issue also challenges the TI Order itself. When this appeal

was filed, we had jurisdiction to address the TI Order. See TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM.

CODE § 51.014(a)(4). But, while the appeal was pending, the trial court signed the

Amended TI Order, which was substantively the same as the TI Order except that it

corrected the procedural deficiencies complained of in the motion to dissolve. The

Amended TI Order did not indicate that the TI Order was still in effect, nor did it

indicate that it was a supplement to the original order. Instead, it was a standalone,

complete temporary injunction, covering the same subject matter as the original

order. As a result, the Amended TI Order superseded the TI Order, effectively

vacating and dissolving it. See Ahmed v. Shimi Ventures, L.P., 99 S.W.3d 682, 68–

9
89 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2003, no pet.) (holding that modified temporary

injunction, which did not expressly vacate previous temporary injunction,

“implicitly” superseded and vacated earlier injunction); see also Se. Tex. Veterinary

Clinics, PLLC v. Wilcox, No. 09-21-00083-CV, 2022 WL 3267918, at *5 (Tex.

App.—Beaumont Aug. 11, 2022, no pet.) (mem. op.) (explaining that order

modifying temporary injunction is equivalent to order dissolving temporary

injunction and granting new one).

The effective vacatur of the TI Order renders it no longer possible for this

Court to provide the relief that Appellants seek from that order. Thus, Appellants’

challenges in their second issue seeking reversal of the TI Order are moot, and we

cannot address them.2 See State ex rel. Best v. Harper, 562 S.W.3d 1, 6 (Tex. 2018)

(“Mootness occurs when events make it impossible for the court to grant the relief

requested or otherwise affect the parties’ rights or interests.” (citation modified));

Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n v. Jones, 1 S.W.3d 83, 86 (Tex. 1999) (“Appellate

courts are prohibited from deciding moot controversies.”).

As required by Rule of Appellate Procedure 27.3, we treat this appeal as from

the Amended TI Order. See TEX. R. APP. P. 27.3 (providing that, if trial court vacates

appealed order and replaces it with another appealable order, appellate court “must

2
We note that, even if we had a written order denying the motion to dissolve, the
effective vacatur of the TI Order would have rendered the appeal of the denial of
the motion to dissolve that order moot.
10
treat the appeal as from the subsequent order”); Hipps v. CBRE, Inc., No. 05-24-

00056-CV, 2024 WL 3823233, at *3 (Tex. App.—Dallas Aug. 15, 2024, no pet.)

(mem. op.) (treating appeal as from temporary injunction that replaced vacated

temporary injunction).

Amended TI Order

Appellants challenge the Amended TI Order in their third issue. We begin by

determining whether we have jurisdiction to review the merits of their arguments.

A. Mootness

The Amended TI Order contains five injunctive provisions. The second and

third injunctive provisions require that:

(2) Until January 31, 2025, Defendant Buchanan, and anyone
working in concert with same which includes all other
Defendants, is and are prohibited from directly or indirectly
soliciting, accepting, or seeking to obtain any business
competitive with that of [Androderm] from any customers that
they had contact with during their employment at the clinic
located at Androderm’s location;

(3) Until January 31, 2025, Defendants are prohibited from using or
divulging any confidential information they obtained from
Defendant.

“When a temporary injunction expires and thus no longer exists, an appeal

challenging the validity of the order becomes moot.” McGill Fin. Ltd. v. McGill, No.

01-24-00101-CV, 2025 WL 84144, at *1 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] Jan. 14,

2025, no pet.); see Jones, 1 S.W.3d at 86. Here, the second and third provisions

11
expired by their own terms on January 31, 2025. Thus, the controversy over the

validity of those provisions is moot, and we lack jurisdiction to review them. See

Jones, 1 S.W.3d at 86; Harper, 562 S.W.3d at 6; see also McGill Fin., 2025 WL

84144, at *2 (holding appeal of temporary injunction became moot when temporary

injunction expired by its own terms); Wimbrey v. Worldventures Mktg., LLC, No.

05-19-01520-CV, 2020 WL 7396007 at *4 (Tex. App.—Dallas Dec. 17, 2020, no

pet.) (mem. op.) (declining to address validity of first of three injunctive provisions

because dispute over first injunctive provision became moot with passage of time).

B. Compliance with Rule 683

“[A]ppellate courts do not have jurisdiction to address the merits of appeals

from void orders; rather, they have jurisdiction only to determine that the order or

judgment underlying the appeal is void and make appropriate orders based on that

determination.” Freedom Commc’ns, Inc. v. Coronado, 372 S.W.3d 621, 623 (Tex.

2012); see, e.g., Tatum v. Wells Fargo Home Mortg., Inc., No. 01-13-00855-CV,

2014 WL 7474074, at *12 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] Dec. 30, 2014, no pet.)

(mem. op.) (holding that, because temporary injunction order was void for non-

compliance with Rule 683, court lacked jurisdiction to reach merits-based arguments

challenging order).

The requirements of Rule of Civil Procedure 683 are mandatory and must be

strictly followed. InterFirst Bank San Felipe, N.A. v. Paz Constr. Co., 715 S.W.2d

12
640, 641 (Tex. 1986). A temporary injunction that does not strictly comply with the

mandates of Rule 683 is subject to being declared void and dissolved. Qwest

Commc’ns Corp. v. AT & T Corp., 24 S.W.3d 334, 337 (Tex. 2000). Appellate courts

“may sua sponte declare a temporary injunction order void if it does not comply with

Rule 683.” Clark v. Hastings Equity Partners, LLC, 651 S.W.3d 359, 370 n.8 (Tex.

App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2022, no pet.); accord Good Shepherd Hosp., Inc. v.

Select Specialty Hosp.–Longview, Inc., 563 S.W.3d 923, 928 (Tex. App.—

Texarkana 2018, no pet.); Greathouse Ins. Agency, Inc. v. Tropical Invs., Inc., 718

S.W.2d 821, 822 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 1986, no writ).3

In relevant part, Rule 683 requires:

Every order granting an injunction . . . shall set forth the reasons for its
issuance; shall be specific in terms; [and] shall describe in reasonable
detail and not by reference to the complaint or other document, the act
or acts sought to be restrained . . . .

TEX. R. CIV. P. 683.

“The purpose of [Rule 683] is to adequately inform the enjoined party of what

he is enjoined from doing and the reason why he is enjoined.” Wright v. Liming, No.

3
Other courts of appeals agree that an order can be declared void for non-compliance
with Rule 683 even though the issue was not raised on appeal. See, e.g., In re La
Joya Indep. Sch. Dist., No. 13-25-00388-CV, 2025 WL 2435928, at *3 (Tex.
App.—Corpus Christi–Edinburg Aug. 25, 2025, orig. proceeding) (mem. op.); In re
Brookshire, No. 12-23-00172-CV, 2023 WL 4681174, at *3 (Tex. App.—Tyler July
21, 2023, orig. proceeding) (mem. op.); City of Sherman v. Eiras, 157 S.W.3d 931,
931 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2005, no pet.); EOG Res., Inc. v. Gutierrez, 75 S.W.3d 50,
53 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2002, no pet.); Permian Chem. Co. v. State, 746
S.W.2d 873, 874 (Tex. App.—El Paso 1988, writ dism’d).
13
01-19-00060-CV, 2019 WL 3418516, at *4 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] July

30, 2019, no pet.) (mem. op.). The order itself should notify all enjoined parties

“unambiguously and with a reasonable degree of specificity, of the conduct to be

restrained.” In re Luther, 620 S.W.3d 715, 723 (Tex. 2021) (orig. proceeding).

“Restrained parties should be able to pick up a temporary injunction order, read it,

understand it, and not have to guess about what they are prohibited from doing upon

threat of contempt.” Clark, 651 S.W.3d at 372. To this end, “an injunction decree

must be as definite, clear and precise as possible and when practicable it should

inform the defendant of the acts he is restrained from doing, without calling on him

for inferences or conclusions about which persons might well differ and without

leaving anything for further hearing.” Lasser v. Amistco Separation Products, Inc.,

No. 01-13-00690-CV, 2014 WL 527539, at *5 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] Feb.

6, 2014, no pet.) (mem. op.) (citation modified); see Gilbreath v. Horan, 682 S.W.3d

454, 543 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2023, pet. denied).

Here, the remaining three injunctive provisions provide that:

(1) Due to persistent and continuous violations of the non-compete,
until the time of the Court’s trial Defendant Buchannan [sic] and
anyone working in concert with same which includes all other
Defendants is prohibited from owning, operating, or working in
concert with any other Defendant to own or operate a
testosterone clinic within 10 miles of [Androderm’s] clinic;

....

14
(4) The Defendants shall return any of [Androderm’s] confidential
information to [Androderm’s] attorney. . . [;]

(5) The Defendants shall not delete or destroy any data related to the
business of Defendant Vigor.

We examine these provisions to determine whether they comply with Rule

683’s requirements or whether they are void. See Qwest Commc’ns, 24 S.W.3d at

337; Clark, 651 S.W.3d at 370 n.8.

1. The Non-Compete Provision

The TI Order contains fact findings offering “the reasons for” the issuance of

the injunctive relief. See TEX. R. CIV. P. 683. The fact findings precede the injunctive

provisions in the order.

The findings identify Vigor, Leondike, Buchanan, and Canales collectively as

“the ‘Enjoined Defendants.’” The trial court described the “Enjoined Defendants’”

conduct necessitating the injunctive relief. The court made no findings mentioning

Rodriguez or Canon House and provided no reason for issuing injunctive relief

against them.

Nonetheless, in the first injunctive provision, the trial court ordered that

“Defendant Buchannan [sic] and anyone working in concert with same which

includes all other Defendants is prohibited from owning, operating, or working in

concert with any other Defendant to own or operate a testosterone clinic within 10

miles of [Androderm’s] clinic.” (Emphasis added.) Reading all parts of the order

15
together, an ambiguity arises regarding who, besides Buchanan, is subject to the

injunction. Are Rodriguez and Canon House subject to the first provision, even

though they are not mentioned in any fact finding or defined as “Enjoined

Defendants,” or were they intended to be excluded? The order’s context makes it

unclear.

The first provision’s language also presents an ambiguity regarding what

conduct of “all other Defendants” is enjoined. Are “all other Defendants” enjoined

from owning, operating, or working for a testosterone clinic only when they act in

concert with Buchanan? Or does the provision enjoin “all other Defendants” from

owning, operating, or working for a testosterone clinic even if they are not acting in

concert with Buchanan but are acting alone or in concert with the other defendants?

And, if so, do the other defendants include Rodriguez and Canon House? As written,

various interpretations are plausible.

In short, the ambiguities in the first provision make it unclear who, aside from

Buchanan, is prohibited from doing what with whom. “[A]ll other Defendants”

cannot “pick up [the Amended TI Order], read it, understand it, and not have to guess

about what they are prohibited from doing upon threat of contempt.” See Clark, 651

S.W.3d at 372. The first injunctive provision does not notify “all other Defendants”

“unambiguously and with a reasonable degree of specificity, of the conduct to be

restrained.” See Luther, 620 S.W.3d at 723. Instead, it requires “inferences or

16
conclusions about which persons might well differ.” See Lasser, 2014 WL 527539,

at *5.

For these reasons, we conclude that the first injunctive provision violates Rule

683’s specificity requirement as to all parties except for Buchanan. See TEX. R. CIV.

P. 683. Thus, it is void as to those parties. See Qwest, 24 S.W.3d at 337.

2. The Confidential-Information and Data-Retention Provisions

The fourth and fifth injunctive provisions require the enjoined parties to return

Androderm’s “confidential information” and “not to delete or destroy any data

related to the business of Defendant Vigor.” The Amended TI Order neither defines

nor indicates from its context the meaning of “confidential information” or “data”—

two inherently broad terms.

Rule 683 requires that an injunction be as “definite, clear and precise as

possible.” Gilbreath, 682 S.W.3d at 543. By failing to define what constitutes

Androderm’s “confidential information” or Vigor’s “data,” the fourth and fifth

provisions compel the enjoined parties to make “inferences or conclusions about

which persons might well differ” regarding what constitutes “confidential

information” and “data.” See Lasser, 2014 WL 527539, at *5; Ramirez v. Ignite

Holdings, Ltd., No. 05-12-01024-CV, 2013 WL 4568365, at *3–4 (Tex. App.—

Dallas Aug. 26, 2013, no pet.) (mem. op.).

17
We conclude that the provisions lack the clarity necessary to provide the

enjoined parties with adequate notice of what acts they are compelled to do or not

do and fail to meet Rule 683’s specificity requirement. See Lasser, 2014 WL 527539

at *5 (holding that injunctive provisions lacked required specificity because term

“confidential information” not defined); Ramirez, 2013 WL 4568365, at *5 (holding

that injunctive provision prohibiting destruction of materials relating in any way to

“the subject matter of this Order’” was not sufficiently specific). We hold that the

fourth and fifth injunctive provisions are void.4 See Qwest, 24 S.W.3d at 337; Lasser,

2014 WL 527539 at *5; Ramirez, 2013 WL 4568365, at *5.

C. Rule 681 and Buchanan’s Right to Due Process

Because the first injunctive provision is not void as to Buchanan, we address

Buchanan’s argument in issue three that the Amended TI Order should be reversed

because the trial court issued it in violation of Rule 681’s notice requirement and his

right to due process.5 Buchanan contends that the trial court erred by granting

4
Regarding the preservation of Vigor’s “data,” we note that “litigants owe a duty to
preserve evidence once they know or reasonably should know that a claim will be
filed and that the evidence in their possession or control is potentially relevant to
that claim.” Ramirez v. Ignite Holdings, Ltd., No. 05-12-01024-CV, 2013 WL
4568365, at *5 (Tex. App.—Dallas Aug. 26, 2013, no pet.) (mem. op.). Here, by the
time the trial court signed the Amended TI Order, the enjoined parties already owed
Androderm a legal not to destroy potentially relevant evidence. See id.
5
The other Appellants also attack the Amended TI Order on the basis that they did
not receive notice of the TI hearing. But, because we have determined that the
Amended TI Order is void as to them under Rule 683, we need not address those
arguments.
18
injunctive relief without providing him with an opportunity to present “rebuttal

evidence, cross-examine Androderm’s witnesses, and present arguments in

opposition to the [TI] application.” We agree.

Rule 681 provides that “[n]o temporary injunction shall be issued without

notice to the adverse party.” TEX. R. CIV. P. 681. “[A] lack of notice violates basic

principles of due process.” Highsmith v. Highsmith, 587 S.W.3d 771, 778 (Tex.

2019); see Peralta v. Heights Med. Ctr., Inc., 485 U.S. 80, 84 (1988) (“Failure to

give notice violates the most rudimentary demands of due process of law.”) (citation

modified)). “The underlying basis for enactment of [Rule] 681 was the recognition

of an individual’s fundamental right to due process of law.” Kramer Trading Corp.

of Tex. v. Lyons, 740 S.W.2d 522, 524 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 1987, no

writ) (citing TEX. CONST. art. 1, § 19). “Due process demands that a party be afforded

‘an opportunity to be heard at a meaningful time and in a meaningful manner.’”

Highsmith, 587 S.W.3d at 778 (quoting Univ. of Tex. Med. Sch. at Hous. v. Than,

901 S.W.2d 926, 930 (Tex. 1995)).

Rule 681’s notice requirement impliedly requires that an adverse party be

provided an opportunity to be heard before the temporary injunction issues. See

Great Lakes Eng’g, Inc. v. Andersen, 627 S.W.2d 436, 437 (Tex. App.—Houston

[1st Dist.] 1981, no writ); Oertel v. Gulf States Abrasive Mfg., Inc., 429 S.W.2d 623,

623 (Tex. Civ. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 1968, no writ). This means that an adverse

19
party must be given “an opportunity to present [his] defenses and . . . rest[] [his]

case” before a temporary injunction issues. Kramer Trading, 740 S.W.2d at 524; see

Oertel, 429 S.W.2d at 623 (“Notice implies an opportunity to be heard. Hearing

requires trial of an issue or issues of fact. Trial of an issue of fact necessitates

opportunity to present evidence and not by only one side to the controversy.”

(citation modified)).

Here, the record shows that only Androderm attended the hearing on the

application for temporary injunction. Buchanan had not yet been served with the

lawsuit and was not sent notice of the hearing.6

At the hearing, the trial court judicially noticed the exhibits attached to

Androderm’s live pleading. These included the asset purchase agreement, text

messages purportedly linking Buchanan to Vigor, and a tax form listing him as

Vigor’s director. To show that the non-compete clause was violated, Androderm’s

witness testified that Vigor was located less than 10 miles from Androderm. After

6
To the extent that Androderm argued at the TI hearing that Buchanan received
notice of the hearing because he was Vigor’s principal, we reject that argument.
Androderm asserted that Vigor had notice of the TI hearing because the TRO was
emailed to its attorney. However, Buchanan was not represented by Vigor’s
attorney. See Gerjets v. Davila, 116 S.W.3d 864, 869 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi–
Edinburg 2003, no pet.) (rejecting argument that corporation’s principal was given
notice of injunction hearing because corporation’s attorney received notice).
Nothing in the record otherwise shows that Buchanan received notice of the TI
hearing through Vigor.
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hearing the evidence, the trial court signed the TI Order, granting Androderm’s

application.

Buchanan moved to dissolve the TI Order, arguing that its issuance violated

Rule 681’s notice requirement and deprived him of due process because he did not

have an opportunity to be heard on the application. He asked the trial court to

dissolve the temporary injunction and to set a new hearing on the application to

provide him with an opportunity to present his defenses and offer argument about

the application’s “substantive deficiencies.” He attached his declaration attesting

that he was not notified of the TI hearing.

After hearing the motion to dissolve, the trial court signed the Amended TI

Order, which contains the same fact findings and orders the same injunctive relief

as the TI Order. Both orders indicate that the fact findings support the injunctive

relief. And both orders state that Androderm’s “verified evidence” supports those

findings. The record shows that Androderm offered “verified evidence” only at the

TI hearing—a hearing for which Buchanan was entitled to notice but received none.

Androderm suggests that the motion-to-dissolve hearing provided Buchanan

with an opportunity to cure whatever harm resulted from the lack of notice because

he could have presented his arguments and evidence opposing the application at that

hearing. Androderm intimates that, by failing to present his evidence opposing the

application at that hearing, he waived his lack-of-notice complaints. We disagree.

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“[T]he remedy for a denial of due process is due process.” Mosley v. Tex.

Health & Human Services Comm’n, 593 S.W.3d 250, 268 (Tex. 2019) (quoting

Than, 901 S.W.2d at 933). Because Buchanan had a right to be heard at the TI

hearing, the motion-to-dissolve hearing was not a cure for the notice violations. See

Highsmith, 587 S.W.3d at 778 (holding that appellant’s challenge to judgment’s

enforceability in post-judgment motions did not cure due-process violation because

appellant was “entitled to the opportunity to be heard at the initial hearing” for which

she received no notice); see also Armstrong v. Manzo, 380 U.S. 545, 550–52 (1965)

(rejecting argument that “whatever constitutional infirmity resulted from the failure

to give the petitioner notice had been cured by the hearing subsequently afforded to

him”).

Moreover, because the TI Order was still in effect when the motion-to-

dissolve hearing was held, Buchanan had no reason to anticipate a new evidentiary

hearing on Androderm’s TI application at that time. See IPSecure, Inc. v. Carrales,

No. 04-16-00005-CV, 2016 WL 3342108, at *2 (Tex. App.—San Antonio June 15,

2016, no pet.) (mem. op.) (explaining that “purpose of a motion to dissolve a

temporary injunction is not to give an unsuccessful party an opportunity to relitigate

the propriety of the original injunction order”). Androderm had moved to enforce

the TI Order, and that motion was set for hearing with the motion to dissolve. And,

even if Buchanan had offered evidence opposing the application, he still would have

22
been deprived of the opportunity to cross-examine Androderm’s witness and present

rebuttal evidence. See Elliott v. Lewis, 792 S.W.2d 853, 855 (Tex. App.—Dallas

1990, no writ) (holding that trial court abused its discretion “by refusing to allow

complete cross-examination of the [plaintiff’s] first and only witness and . . . by its

refusal to allow [defendant] to present any evidence in her defense” before issuing

temporary injunction).

We conclude that the issuance of the Amended TI Order against Buchanan

violated Rule 681’s notice requirements and his constitutional right to due process.

See TEX. R. CIV. P. 681; Highsmith, 587 S.W.3d at 778; Kramer Trading, 740

S.W.2d at 524; Oertel, 429 S.W.2d at 623. We hold that the trial court abused its

discretion in granting the temporary injunction against Buchanan.7 See State v. Cook

United, Inc., 469 S.W.2d 709, 712 (Tex. 1971) (modifying temporary injunction by

deleting parties not served with citation or notified of temporary injunction hearing);

PILF Invs., Inc. v. Arlitt, 940 S.W.2d 255, 260 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 1997, no

writ) (reversing portion of temporary injunction against four defendants not given

notice of temporary-injunction hearing); Kramer Trading, 740 S.W.2d at 524

(holding trial court abused its discretion by issuing temporary injunction before

7
Androderm argues that the trial court did not abuse its discretion by issuing the
Amended TI Order because a trial court is permitted to amend its orders to correct
procedurally deficiencies. They point out that the Amended TI Order corrected
procedural deficiencies. However, this argument fails to address Buchanan’s
argument that the lack of notice violated Rule 681 and his right to due process.
23
enjoined party presented its defense); see also Henry v. Cox, 520 S.W.3d 28, 33

(Tex. 2017) (“We review a trial court’s order granting a temporary injunction for

clear abuse of discretion.”).

Conclusion

We dismiss the appeal from the oral denial of the motion to dissolve. See

Casillas, 2020 WL 2026367, at *5 (dismissing interlocutory appeal for lack of

jurisdiction because trial court’s ruling was oral and not in signed order) We also

dismiss the appeal of the Amended TI Order in part as to the order’s second and third

injunctive provisions because those provisions have expired by their own terms,

rendering the challenges to their validity moot. See McGill, 2025 WL 84144, at *2

(dismissing appeal that became moot when temporary injunction expired). We

reverse the portion of the first injunctive provision enjoining Buchanan because it

was issued without notice to him and remand the matter for further proceedings. See

Great Lakes Eng’g, 627 S.W.2d at 437 (reversing temporary injunction and

remanding after holding temporary injunction’s issuance violated Rule 681’s notice

requirements). And we dissolve the remaining portions of the Amended TI Order,

including the first provision as to all parties except Buchanan. See Tannos Dev.

Group, LLC v. Galveston Cnty. Consol. Drainage Dist., No. 01-25-00020-CV, 2025

WL 1583583, at *5 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] June 5, 2025, no pet.) (mem.

24
op.) (dissolving temporary injunction after holding it failed to comply with Rule

683).

Clint Morgan
Justice

Panel consists of Chief Justice Adams and Justices Morgan and Dokupil.

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