In Re Paige Elaine Lauren and Raymond Henry Taylor v. the State of Texas

Opinion issued October 9, 2025

In The

Court of Appeals
For The

First District of Texas
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NO. 01-25-00742-CV
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IN RE PAIGE ELAINE LAUREN AND RAYMOND HENRY TAYLOR,
Relators

Original Proceeding on Petition for Writ of Mandamus

MEMORANDUM OPINION

Relators Paige Elaine Lauren and Raymond Henry Taylor seek mandamus

relief to vacate the trial court’s July 25, 2025 order granting a new trial and ask that

we reinstate the final judgment.1 The Court requested a response from real parties

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The underlying case is Paige Elaine Lauren and Raymond Henry Taylor v. DV
Communities LLC, Doorvest Inc., Kundra Sachin, Quyen Le, and Jackie “Jack”
Sheely, cause number 2022-71961, pending in the 80th District Court of Harris
County, Texas, the Honorable Sonya L. Aston presiding.
in interest DV Communities, LLC, Doorvest, Inc., Sachin Kundra, Quyen Le, and

Jackie “Jack” Sheely, who filed a response, asserting that the parties know the basis

for the new trial, but agree that the trial court’s order did not contain legally

appropriate and reasonably specific reasons for granting a new trial and ask that we

permit the trial court to issue a modified order. Relators also requested emergency

relief staying the new trial. We conditionally grant the petition.

The underlying case was a breach of contract action brought by relators. The

case was tried to a jury and the jury returned a verdict for the relators, awarding

damages in the amount of $2,344.67 and attorney’s fees of $93,545.10. The trial

court advised that it was going to visit with the jury for a few minutes in the jury

room and stated that they might be asked to give a written statement though there

was no obligation to do so. Nothing further appears in the transcript.

Relators state in their petition and Christopher A. Stevenson, attorney for real

parties in interest, stated in his affidavit attached to the motion for new trial, that

after the attorneys had been dismissed and left the courthouse on June 5, 2025, they

received a call from the bailiff instructing them to return to the courtroom. Once

there, the trial court advised attorneys for both parties that the trial court had

witnessed a juror, “who was a paralegal at a large, prestigious law firm,” tell other

jurors about the $1,000 per hour fee lawyers at her firm charged. This meeting

between the trial judge and the attorneys was not recorded.

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Stevenson stated in his affidavit that he moved for a mistrial, which the trial

court granted. Despite the apparent grant of a mistrial (no order appears in the

mandamus record), the trial court signed a final judgment on the verdict on June 17,

2025. On July 10, 2025, real party DV Communities, LLC filed a motion for new

trial, supported by Stevenson’s affidavit concerning the unrecorded June 5, 2025

trial court statements to both counsel. Stevenson also states that, because the only

source for the information about the juror’s comment was from the trial judge,

Stevenson thought it was inappropriate to seek an affidavit from the trial judge.

Stevenson added that he did not believe affidavits from any of the jurors was

necessary and he stated he was uncomfortable contacting jurors.

The motion for new trial was set for submission on July 28, 2025, but on July

25, 2025, the trial court signed an order stating:

After considering defendant, DV Communities, LLC’s motion for new
trial, the response, the pleadings and arguments of counsel, the Court
GRANTS the motion and orders a new trial.
On August 8, 2025, relators filed a motion for reconsideration, arguing that

no evidence was submitted in support of the real party’s motion, no hearing was

held, and no reasons were stated in the order. The trial court signed an order on

August 21, 2025, denying the motion for reconsideration.

Relators contend the trial court abused its discretion in granting new trial

without specifying any grounds or providing any explanation despite the lack of

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evidence of juror misconduct. Thus, relators essentially offer two reasons that the

order granting new trial was an abuse of discretion: (1) it failed to include specific

reasons and (2) it was not based on evidence of juror misconduct.

Mandamus relief is available “to correct a clear abuse of discretion or

violation of a duty imposed by law, when an adequate remedy by appeal does not

exist.” In re Columbia Med. Ctr. of Las Colinas, Subsidiary, L.P., 290 S.W.3d 204,

207 (Tex. 2009) (citations omitted). The requirement of an abuse of discretion is

established “where a trial court acts without reference to guiding rules or principles

or in an arbitrary or unreasonable manner.” In re Garza, 544 S.W.3d 836, 840 (Tex.

2018).

Concerning the adequacy of relators’ remedy by appeal, the Texas Supreme

Court has held that when a motion for new trial is timely filed and the motion is

granted during a trial court’s plenary power, the order granting new trial is not

reviewable on appeal. See Columbia Med. Ctr., 290 S.W.3d at 209. Here, the

motion for new trial was timely filed in that it was filed within 30 days of the date

the trial court signed the judgment. See TEX. R. CIV. P. 329b((a). When a timely

motion for new trial has been filed, the trial court’s plenary power extends until thirty

days after the motion is overruled, whether by written order or by operation of law,

whichever occurs first. See TEX. R. CIV. P. 329b(e). In this case, the order granting

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the motion was signed fifteen days after the motion for new trial was filed, and thus,

the order was signed during the trial court’s plenary power.

Because the motion for new trial was timely filed and the order granting that

motion was signed during the trial court’s plenary power, there is no review by

appeal of the order. See Columbia Med. Ctr., 290 S.W.3d at 209. Therefore, relators

have no adequate remedy by appeal. But to establish their right to mandamus relief,

relators must also show that the trial court abused its discretion by failing to specify

the grounds for granting a new trial.

Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 320 provides that a new trial may be granted

and the judgment may be set aside for “good cause, on motion or on the court’s own

motion on such terms as the court shall direct.” TEX. R. CIV. P. 320. The motion

must state the bases so that the trial court can understand the basis for the motion.

TEX. R. CIV. P. 321.

In the Columbia Medical Center case, the trial court had granted a new trial

“in the interests of justice and fairness.” 290 S.W.3d at 206. The Texas Supreme

Court stated that, although a trial court has broad discretion to grant a new trial, “that

discretion is not limitless.” Id. at 210. The Court observed that appellate courts are

required to explain by written opinions the analyses and conclusions concerning the

issues raised. See id. at 211. Although the Court recognized the differences between

appellate court review and trial court decisions, the Court discerned no “meaningful

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difference to the parties between an appellate court reversing a judgment based on a

jury verdict and a trial court setting the verdict aside or disregarding it” because the

end result is the same—the prevailing party loses its jury verdict or judgment. Id. at

211–12.

Noting that more than forty states and the District of Columbia require courts

under certain circumstances to specify reasons for setting aside a jury verdict, and

that Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 59(d) requires a trial court to specify reasons

for granting a new trial on its own motion, the Court determined that a trial judge

should not substitute his view for that of the jury without stating a valid basis for

doing so. Id. at 212. Therefore, the Court held that a trial court must specify the

reasons it refused to enter judgment on the jury verdict and ordered a new trial. See

id. at 215. “The reasons must be clearly identified and reasonably specific.” Id.

Broad statements that the new trial was granted “in the interest of justice” are not

sufficiently specific. See id.

Real parties agree with relators’ argument that the trial court’s order is legally

deficient, explain that they drafted the deficient order, and agree that the trial court

must specify reasons. Because the trial court in this case provided no reasons for

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granting the new trial, we conclude that the trial court abused its discretion.2 See id.

at 212, 215.

Because relators have established their right to mandamus relief, we

conditionally grant the petition for writ of mandamus and direct the trial court to

vacate the order of July 25, 2025 granting real party’s motion for new trial and enter

a new order specifying the reasons it ordered a new trial. We are confident the trial

court will comply and the Court will issue the writ only if it does not. Relators’

request for emergency relief is dismissed as moot.

PER CURIAM

Panel consists of Justices Guerra, Guiney, and Johnson.

2
Relators also argue that the trial court abused its discretion in granting a new trial
because there is no evidence of juror misconduct. We decline to address this issue
because the trial court’s order did not specify that it was based on juror misconduct.

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