RODRIGUEZ, ERIK v. the State of Texas

IN THE COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS
OF TEXAS

NO. PD-0377-24, 0378-24

THE STATE OF TEXAS

v.

ERIK RODRIGUEZ, Appellee

ON STATE’S PETITION FOR DISCRETIONARY REVIEW
FROM THE FOURTH COURT OF APPEALS
BEXAR COUNTY

SCHENCK, P.J., delivered the opinion of the Court in which
RICHARDSON, NEWELL, KEEL, and PARKER, JJ. joined. YEARY, J. filed a
concurring opinion. FINLEY, J. filed a concurring opinion. MCCLURE, J.
concurred. WALKER, J. dissented.

OPINION

We withdraw the original opinion delivered on May 14, 2025, and substitute

this corrected opinion.
RODRIGUEZ — 2

This case presents a Fourth Amendment question arising from the seizure of

Appellee’s cell phone. We are asked to determine if the court of appeals applied the

proper standard of review. We conclude it did not. We also conclude the plain view

doctrine validated the seizure of Appellee’s cell phone and pretermit consideration

of the remaining issues raised by the parties.

BACKGROUND

This case stems from a domestic violence incident involving Appellee’s

friend, Jeremiah Gonzalez and Gonzalez’s girlfriend. The girlfriend reported the

incident to the San Antonio Police Department (“SAPD”). At the time, Appellee

was employed as an officer with SAPD. Shortly thereafter, Gonzales confronted his

girlfriend about having made the report and assaulted her again. The girlfriend

contacted SAPD to report the assault and the apparent leak of her initial report.

After receiving this additional complaint, SAPD Detective Aisha Jackson

obtained a warrant for Gonzalez’s phone. A subsequent search of Gonzalez’s phone

revealed incriminating text messages between Gonzalez and a phone number listed

in SAPD personnel records as belonging to Appellee, as well as a $100 CashApp

payment from Gonzalez to that same number.

Detective Jackson then obtained, from a magistrate, a warrant to seize “[a]ny

type of cellular device or cellular communication device” of Appellee’s. The next

day, Detective Jackson went to Appellee’s normal place of work during his
RODRIGUEZ — 3

regularly-scheduled morning roll call and observed Appellee holding his cell phone.

At this point, she informed him of the warrant. During this same conversation, he

offered up the phone, and confirmed its number was the same number reflected in

the SAPD personnel records and the earlier search of Gonzalez’s phone.

Detective Jackson then invited Appellee for an interview at the downtown

police headquarters, and he did not object. Before the interview, she asked Appellee

for consent to search the phone. Appellee consented and signed a written form

confirming his consent. After the interview, Detective Jackson performed an initial

manual search of Appellee’s phone and found the incriminating correspondence and

payment related to the domestic violence investigation.

Following this basic search, Detective Jackson obtained a second warrant

specific to Appellee’s personal cell phone, this time from a district judge, apparently

in an effort to comply with Article 18.0215 of the Texas Code of Criminal Procedure,

and a crime analyst then searched the phone “without limitation.” Based on further

information the crime analyst’s search uncovered, Detective Jackson sought and

obtained six more warrants authorizing the search of Appellee’s home and personal

property, leading to the seizure of additional devices and accounts and ultimately

leading to Appellee’s indictments for possession of child pornography, misuse of

public information, and bribery.
RODRIGUEZ — 4

Appellee filed a motion to suppress his statements and all tangible evidence

seized, arguing that the original warrant was overbroad, thus everything flowing

from it was fruit of the poisonous tree. The State responded that all evidence was

legally obtained pursuant to the plain view doctrine, Appellee’s consent, or the

independent source doctrine.

The trial court held an evidentiary hearing and granted Appellee’s suppression

motion, rejecting the State’s contentions and concluding the first warrant lacked

probable cause despite Appellee’s phone number matching that reflected in the

SAPD personnel records. The trial court further held that the plain view doctrine

did not authorize Detective Jackson’s seizure of the cell phone. And, finally, the

trial court found Appellee’s consent to the original search failed to attenuate what

the trial court perceived as the taint of illegality of the original warrant. Likewise,

the trial court found the same failing with the second warrant and any evidence

obtained pursuant to it.

The State timely appealed. The Fourth Court of Appeals affirmed, deferring,

among other things, to the trial court’s conclusion that the plain view doctrine failed

to validate Detective Jackson’s original seizure of the cell phone. State v. Rodriguez,

No. 04-22-00727-CR, 2024 WL 1642931, at *6 (Tex. App.—San Antonio Apr. 17,

2024) (mem. op., not designated for publication). Justice Patricia Alvarez dissented

and would have reversed under the plain view doctrine. Id. at *6 (Alvarez, J.,
RODRIGUEZ — 5

dissenting) (citing LopezGamez v. State, 622 S.W.3d 445, 457 (Tex. App.—Fort

Worth 2020, pet. ref’d).

ANALYSIS

I. Standard of Review

We begin with the standard of review. The court of appeals applied an abuse

of discretion standard and upheld the trial court’s ruling, finding “on this record,

reasonable minds could disagree whether the incriminating nature of the phone in

[Appellee’s] hand was immediately apparent. Because the trial court’s ruling is not

outside the zone of reasonable disagreement, we must overrule the State’s

contentions to the contrary.” Id. at *4. This Court has previously held “although

great weight should be given to the inferences drawn by the trial judges and law

enforcement officers, determinations of reasonable suspicion and probable cause

should be reviewed de novo on appeal.” Guzman v. State, 955 S.W.2d 85, 87 (Tex.

Crim. App. 1997) (citing Ornelas v. United States, 517 U.S. 690, (1996)).

Application of the plain view doctrine is thus typically presented as a question of

law, and therefore reviewed de novo. Guzman, 955 S.W.2d at 88-89.

II. Detective Jackson’s Seizure was Authorized Under the Plain
View Doctrine
RODRIGUEZ — 6

Pretermitting any debate over the legality of the initial warrant, we believe

that Detective Jackson’s action in taking possession of the phone was authorized

pursuant to the plain view doctrine. As a result, neither Appellee’s subsequent

consent to Detective Jackson’s initial search nor the evidence obtained by the

subsequent warrant can be challenged as tainted by that seizure.

The plain view exception arises if three requirements are met. First, law

enforcement must be lawfully present where the object can be “plainly viewed.”

Horton v. California, 496 U.S. 128, 136 (1990). Second, the “incriminating

character” of the object in plain view must be “immediately apparent” to law

enforcement. Id. (quoting Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 466 (1971)

(plurality opinion)). Finally, law enforcement must have the right to access the

object, meaning that the intrusion into Appellee’s expectation of privacy “is justified

by a warrant or by an exception . . . or by an extraneous valid reason for the officer’s

presence.” Coolidge, 403 U.S. at 467.

Only the second prong is in dispute in this case. The second element of the

plain view doctrine requires a showing of probable cause, though actual knowledge

of incriminating evidence to be obtained is unnecessary. Joseph v. State, 807 S.W.2d

303, 308 (Tex. Crim. App. 1991). When Detective Jackson encountered Appellee

at his morning roll call, she knew that Gonzalez had communicated with Appellee

at a cell number reflected in SAPD personnel files, that Gonzalez’s girlfriend had
RODRIGUEZ — 7

been beat by him in retaliation for her reports of previous abuse to SAPD and could

see Appellee’s cell phone in his hand.

The plain view doctrine’s authorization of a warrantless seizure of evidence

serves as an important law enforcement tool to, among other things, permit

immediate seizure of evidence of probable criminality before any possible loss or

destruction. See Kentucky v. King, 563 U.S. 452, 472 (2011). Regardless of the

warrant or any debate over its legal sufficiency, Detective Jackson had “probable

cause to associate the property with evidence of criminal activity” by an SAPD

officer that may have been compromised or lost by any delay. Soldal v. Cook Cty.,

Ill., 506 U.S. 56, 69 (1992). She was also aware of apparent ongoing communication

between Appellee and Gonzalez, resulting in physical injury to Gonzalez’s

girlfriend.

The Fourth Amendment does not require a police officer to have certainty that

a suspect’s property is itself illicit or probative of a crime to take temporary custody

of it, but, rather, only probable cause to believe that the property is associated with

criminal activity. See Texas v. Brown, 460 U.S. 730, 741; Payton v. New York, 445

U.S. 573, 587 (1980); Colorado v. Bannister, 449 U.S. 1, 3–4 (1980).

Therefore, Detective Jackson did not need to be certain the phone in

Appellee’s hand that day was the exact cell phone associated with evidence of a
RODRIGUEZ — 8

crime; instead, she only needed probable cause to associate Appellee’s personal cell

phone with criminal activity.

To the extent the trial court found Detective Jackson’s asking Appellee if the

phone was his during their initial encounter as further investigation necessary to

establish probable cause for the seizure, it misapplied the plain view doctrine. The

question was immaterial to the existence of probable cause at that time. In viewing

the cell phone in Appellee’s hand, Detective Jackson was “merely looking at what

[was] already exposed to view, without disturbing it,” which is “not a search for

Fourth Amendment purposes.” Arizona v. Hicks, 480 U.S. 321, 328 (1987) (holding

that a pre-seizure search occurred where officers moved stereo equipment in order

to locate serial numbers to determine if equipment was stolen). It was reasonable

for Detective Jackson to believe the phone Appellee had in his hand at his place of

work was probably that same phone listed by Appellee in his personnel records and

linked to the communications uncovered in Gonzalez’s phone. Nothing more was

required.

CONCLUSION

Thus, we reverse the judgment of the court of appeals and remand the case to

that court for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

Delivered: July 30, 2025
RODRIGUEZ — 9

Do Not Publish