NIXON, BRIAN DALE v. the State of Texas

In the Court of Criminal
Appeals of Texas
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No. PD-0556-23
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BRIAN DALE NIXON,
Appellant
v.

THE STATE OF TEXAS

═══════════════════════════════════════
On State’s Petition for Discretionary Review
From the Fourth Court of Appeals
Medina County
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YEARY, J., delivered the opinion of the Court in which KELLER,
P.J., and HERVEY, RICHARDSON, KEEL, and SLAUGHTER, JJ., joined.
NEWELL and MCCLURE, JJ., concurred. WALKER, J., filed a dissenting
opinion.

In the early hours of January 21, 2016, Appellant shot and killed
NIXON – 2

Tylene Davis and Debra Echtle at Echtle’s residence in Medina County. 1
Appellant was later indicted for capital murder by a grand jury and was
put to trial in July of 2021. TEX. PENAL CODE § 19.03(a)(7)(A). Over his
objection, Appellant’s jury trial was held in an auxiliary courtroom
housed in the same building as the Medina County Jail and Sheriff’s
Department. The jury found Appellant guilty, and he was sentenced to
life imprisonment without parole. TEX. PENAL CODE § 12.31(a). 2
The court of appeals reversed Appellant’s conviction. It decided
that “the trial court setting in the jail courtroom created an unacceptable
risk that the presumption of innocence afforded to [Appellant] was
eroded.” Nixon v. State, 674 S.W.3d 384, 396 (Tex. App.—San Antonio
2023). The State then petitioned this Court to review the court of
appeals’ decision.
After considering the State’s petition, the Court granted review
to consider: (1) whether the location of the courtroom where Appellant’s
trial was held was inherently prejudicial to his presumption of
innocence; and, if so, (2) whether use of that courtroom was justified by
an essential state interest. 3 We conclude that the location of Appellant’s

1 At trial, Appellant did not contest that he killed Davis and Echtle but

argued instead that he acted in self-defense.

2 Section 12.31(a) of the Texas Penal Code provides in relevant part:

“An individual adjudged guilty of a capital felony in a case in which the state
does not seek the death penalty shall be punished by imprisonment in the
Texas Department of Criminal Justice for: . . . life without parole, if the
individual committed the offense when 18 years of age or older.” TEX. PENAL
CODE § 12.31(a)(2).

3 Specifically, the Court granted review of the following two grounds

from the State’s petition:
NIXON – 3

trial was not inherently prejudicial to his presumption of innocence
because the jurors need not have interpreted the setting of his trial as a
sign that Appellant was either culpable or dangerous. As a result, we
reverse the judgment of the court of appeals and remand the cause to
that court to consider Appellant’s remaining issues on appeal.
I. BACKGROUND
A. Appellant’s Motion
Prior to trial, Appellant filed a motion to conduct any individual
voir dire and the trial itself in the Medina County Courthouse. 4 In his
motion, Appellant argued that holding his trial in a courtroom attached

1. Is holding a jury trial in the county’s designated auxiliary courtroom
located in the same public building as the county jail and Sheriff’s
Department inherently prejudicial to the presumption of innocence?

and:

2. Was the use of the auxiliary courtroom justified when the trial judge’s
findings support the determination that he sought to: (1) prevent
exposing jurors to Appellant in shackles and jail attire, (2) alleviate
security concerns, and (3) provide adequate trial facilities?

Because we resolve this case on the State’s first ground for review, we need not
address the questions presented by its second ground for review.

4 Appellant’s motion stated:

Counsel for Mr. Nixon have learned that the individual voir dire
proceedings in this case may be conducted in the courtroom
attached to the Medina County Jail, rather than the Medina
County Courthouse Courtroom. If this is true, then conducting
any such proceedings, regardless of whether it is jury selection,
or actual trial on the merits presents a fundamental challenge
to the fairness of the jury selection and subsequent trial
proceedings by, at a minimum, undermining the presumption of
innocence[.]
NIXON – 4

to the county jail would necessarily “undermine[] the presumption of
innocence” analogous to forcing Appellant to appear before the jury in
shackles. To support that assertion, Appellant relied upon State v.
Jaime, 168 Wash. 857, 864, 233 P.3d 554, 557 (2010), in which the
Supreme Court for the State of Washington decided that “holding a trial
in a jailhouse courtroom is inherently prejudicial” because the “setting
is not in a courthouse” and “the setting that replaces the courthouse is .
. . decidedly not neutral, routine, or commonplace.”
At a later evidentiary hearing, Appellant also introduced a series
of photographs intended to prove that the auxiliary courtroom was
located inside a correctional facility. The photographs were admitted
into evidence without objection. They are attached as an appendix to the
court of appeals’ opinion, and they may be seen there. Nixon, 674 S.W.3d
at 400−07.
Appellant called as a witness an investigator with the regional
public defender’s office who took the photos. According to that witness,
the building where the auxiliary courtroom is housed is located on the
outskirts of the City of Hondo, approximately twelve blocks from the
Medina County Courthouse. The photos show that a sign posted above
the entrance to the building read “Medina County Jail[.]” After entering
the building through a glass door and passing through an outer vestibule
that provides access to restrooms and vending machines, visitors enter
a main lobby either through another glass door or a metal detector. The
main lobby includes: (1) a reception window for, and entrance to, the
Sheriff’s Department; (2) doors to two visitation rooms and a multi-
purpose room; (3) a jail information window; (4) a door stating
NIXON – 5

“Authorized Personnel Only[,]” which the witness identified as the
entrance to the jail; and (5) a pair of double doors leading into the
auxiliary courtroom where Appellant’s trial was held. A placard on the
entrance to the courtroom reads: “District Court in Session[.]” Along the
way, visitors encounter multiple signs advising that cell phones,
cameras, recording devices, food or drink, purses, packages, and openly
carried handguns are prohibited.
Appellant argued that this all proved that the auxiliary
courtroom was located “in a correctional facility” and “not a neutral
place to conduct business.” According to Appellant, “[i]t is a place where
people are incarcerated.” He also argued that the State failed to show a
“compelling need” to hold the trial in the auxiliary courtroom and that
“[c]onvenience is really why we are here.”
The State responded that the auxiliary courtroom was not located
in a building that was “wholly a correctional facility” but in a publicly
accessible building that also housed a correctional facility. In support of
its argument, the State called the Sheriff’s chief deputy, who testified
that the public regularly visits the building in which the auxiliary
courtroom is located. He also testified that the facility at times “host[s]
meetings [for] Crime Stoppers and other civic organizations.” And he
noted that other trials had been held in the auxiliary courtroom.
Second, the State argued that, if the trial were held in the Medina
County Courthouse, there would be “no good way to keep the jurors from
seeing the deputies walk [Appellant] in and out of the building with a
deputy at either side of him with shackles on his legs.” Addressing
similar security concerns, the sheriff’s deputy noted “[t]he lack of space”
NIXON – 6

and the difficulty of keeping the jury and Appellant separated in the
County Courthouse. He also noted that there was only one men’s
restroom on the courtroom level of that building.
At the conclusion of the hearing the judge denied Appellant’s
motion. He expressed essentially three reasons for denying the motion
and holding Appellant’s trial in the auxiliary courtroom: (1) security
issues; (2) the risk of commingling between the jurors and Appellant,
especially given the availability of only one men’s room on the courtroom
floor of the courthouse; and (3) the lack of technology in the courthouse. 5
B. Trial
Jury selection for Appellant’s trial began on July 6, 2021, at the
Medina County fairgrounds to accommodate a large jury panel under
COVID-19 restrictions. 6 According to the record, Appellant appeared at
voir dire in civilian clothes and without visible restraints. 7 At the

5 The trial court judge’s full remarks were:

I’m going to deny the motion to move [trial] from the courtroom
that you are currently sitting in, [defense counsel], along with
the defendant. You’ve made your record and frankly, we’ll let
somebody upstairs determine whether that’s correct or not[.]
[B]ut in addition to the security issues and [in] addition to
mingling with the jurors, the lack of bathroom facilities, [and] I
think we put on the record previously the lack of technology in
the old courthouse when we’ve had the initial argument on this.
So for all of those reasons I’m denying it.

6 The trial court judge noted on the record that “[w]e are selecting this

jury at the fairgrounds because of COVID issues and size issues of the
courtroom space available to us.”

7 When introducing the parties to the venire, the trial court judge
acknowledged Appellant’s presence by asking, “Mr. Nixon, could you please
stand for us, please?” and stating, “This is Brian Nixon.” Prior to trial, the
NIXON – 7

conclusion of voir dire, Appellant renewed his objection to being tried in
the county’s auxiliary courtroom. The trial court judge again denied
Appellant’s motion and granted him a running objection.
After swearing in the jury, the trial court judge noted that
proceedings would resume the next morning “in the regular courtroom.”
He added that others would “give[] . . . instructions about where to come,
but it[’]s 9:30 tomorrow.” The trial court judge did not otherwise
comment on the location of the trial, and any other instructions the
jurors might have been given about the courtroom’s location do not
appear in the record. Appellant’s trial commenced the following day in
the auxiliary courtroom. At the conclusion of a five-day trial, the jury
found Appellant guilty of capital murder.
C. Appeal
Appellant raised four issues on appeal. In his first three points of
error, Appellant argued that holding his trial “in the Medina County
Jail” violated: (1) his presumption of innocence; (2) his right to due
process under the Fourteenth Amendment; and (3) Section 24.012(e) of
the Texas Government Code. 8 In his fourth point of error Appellant also

judge had granted Appellant’s “Motion to Appear in Street Clothes at All
Pretrial and Trial Proceedings in Open Court.” The trial court judge had
likewise granted Appellant’s “Motion to Preclude Mr. Nixon from Being
Shackled in Public” and ordered that “The Medina County Sheriff shall ensure
that Mr. Nixon does not appear in shackles in open court hearings wherein the
public or media may attend. If restraints are ever deemed necessary by the
Court in any public hearing, such restraints shall be employed under clothing
in a fashion that is not visible.” Nothing in the record suggests that law
enforcement failed to comply with these orders at voir dire or throughout trial.

8 At the evidentiary hearing where the photographs of the building in

which the courtroom was located were introduced, Appellant argued, for the
first time, that holding Appellant’s trial in the auxiliary courtroom would
NIXON – 8

argued that African Americans were under-represented on the venire,
in denial of his Sixth Amendment right to have a fair cross-section of the
community on the jury panel.
The court of appeals resolved the case on Appellant’s first two
issues, deciding that: (1) “the trial court setting in the jail courtroom
created an unacceptable risk that the presumption of innocence afforded
to [Appellant] was eroded[;]” and (2) conducting the trial in that setting
was not justified by an essential state interest. Nixon, 674 S.W.3d at
396, 399. While the court of appeals first acknowledged that “a trial
setting in a building that houses a courtroom and a correctional facility”
will not always erode the presumption of innocence, it concluded that
“the various markings reminding the jury that the building at issue here
has a primary purpose as a jail created an unacceptable risk that the
jury would conclude, before hearing any evidence, that [Appellant] [was]
too dangerous to transport and must be isolated from society.” Id. at 396.
It further explained that the reasons the trial judge articulated—
security, the risk of commingling Appellant and the jury, and lack of
technology—failed to “support the furtherance of an essential state
interest [sufficient] to justify holding [Appellant’s] trial in the Medina
County Jail building.” Id. at 399. Accordingly, the court of appeals

violate Section 24.012(e) of the Texas Government Code. TEX.
GOV’T CODE § 24.012(e). According to that statutory provision, which Appellant
read into the record: “A district judge may hear a nonjury matter relating to a
civil or criminal case at a correctional facility in the county in which the case
is filed or prosecuted if a party to the case or the criminal defendant is confined
in the correctional facility.” Id. (emphasis added). Appellant argued that, by
negative implication, Section 24.012(e) prohibits a district judge from hearing
jury matters inside a correctional facility. The applicability of that provision is
not before us today.
NIXON – 9

reversed Appellant’s conviction and remanded the case for a new trial.
The State then petitioned this Court for discretionary review of the court
of appeals’ decision. We granted review.
II. APPLICABLE LAW
The Fourteenth Amendment provides, in relevant part, that “[n]o
State shall deprive . . . any person of life, liberty, or property, without
due process of law[.]” U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1. This Court has also
recognized that “[t]he right to due process of law includes within it the
right to a fair trial[.]” Marx v. State, 987 S.W.2d 577, 581 (Tex. Crim.
App. 1999). And the Supreme Court of the United States has said that
“[t]he presumption of innocence, although not articulated in the
Constitution, is a basic component of a fair trial under our system of
criminal justice.” Estelle v. Williams, 425 U.S. 501, 503 (1976).
To protect the presumption of innocence, the Supreme Court said,
“courts must be alert to factors that may undermine the fairness of the
fact-finding process” and “carefully guard against the dilution of the
principle that guilt is to be established by probative evidence and beyond
a reasonable doubt.” Id. Although trial judges have broad discretion over
courtroom practices, the Supreme Court declared that a practice that is
challenged as threatening to the “fairness of the fact-finding process”
must be subjected to “close judicial scrutiny.” Id. at 504. In applying this
scrutiny, the Supreme Court also explained, courts must “do the best
they can to evaluate the likely effects of a particular procedure, based
on reason, principle, and common human experience.” Id.
In Estelle v. Williams, for example, the Supreme Court decided
that compelling a defendant to appear before a jury in a jail uniform
NIXON – 10

violated the Fourteenth Amendment because “the constant reminder of
the accused’s condition implicit in such distinctive, identifiable attire
may affect a juror’s judgment.” Id. at 504–05. The Court acknowledged
that sometimes visible restraints may be necessary to “control a
contumacious defendant[,]” but it explained that “compelling an accused
to wear jail clothing furthers no essential state policy.” Id. 9 In the
Court’s view, the defendant’s clothing was likely to be “a continuing
influence throughout the trial[,]” and it posed an “unacceptable risk” of
“impermissible factors coming to play.” Id. at 505.
In contrast, ten years later, in Holbrook v. Flynn, 475 U.S. 560
(1986), the Supreme Court decided that the presence of four uniformed
state troopers seated directly behind a defendant in the first row of
spectators at his trial did not inherently prejudice his presumption of
innocence. Justice Thurgood Marshall, writing for the Court, noted that
“[t]he chief feature” distinguishing the presence of uniformed security
officers from other potentially troublesome courtroom practices was “the
wider range of inferences that a juror might reasonably draw from the
officers’ presence.” Id. at 569. The Court explained that, although jurors
might have interpreted the presence of the troopers as a sign of Flynn’s

9 See also Bell v. State, 415 S.W.3d 278, 281 (Tex. Crim. App. 2013)

(explaining that visible shackling of a defendant at trial is inherently
prejudicial to the presumption of innocence and is permissible only if justified
by “essential state interests such as physical security, escape prevention, or
courtroom decorum”) (quoting Deck v. Missouri, 544 U.S. 622, 628 (2005))
(internal quotation marks omitted); Randle v. State, 826 S.W.2d 943, 944–45
(Tex. Crim. App. 1992) (explaining that “[i]f a defendant timely objects to being
put to trial while dressed in prison clothes, he should not be compelled to stand
trial in that attire. Such compulsion would violate the defendant’s right to a
fair trial and his right to be presumed innocent”).
NIXON – 11

culpability or dangerousness, they “might just as easily [have] believe[d]
that the officers [were] there to guard against disruptions” from outside
the courtroom or “to ensure that tense courtroom exchanges d[id] not
erupt into violence.” Id.
In fact, the Supreme Court said in Flynn, “it is entirely possible
that jurors [did] not infer anything at all from the presence of the
guards.” Id. Accordingly, the Court concluded that the use of the four
troopers did not tend to brand that defendant in the jurors’ eyes “with
an unmistakable mark of guilt.” Id. at 571 (quoting Williams, 425 U.S.
at 518 (Brennan, J., dissenting)). 10 The Court also explained that, in
assessing a claim like the one presented there, courts should “look at the
scene presented to jurors and determine whether what they saw was so
inherently prejudicial as to pose an unacceptable threat to [the]
defendant’s right to a fair trial; if the challenged practice is not found [to
be] inherently prejudicial and if the defendant fails to show actual
prejudice, the inquiry is over.” Id. at 572.
Considering these cases later, in Marx v. State, this Court
similarly concluded that allowing a thirteen-year-old victim and a six-

10 See also Compton v. State, 666 S.W.3d 685, 726 (Tex. Crim. App. 2023)

(deciding that the presence of uniformed Texas Department of Criminal
Justice employees that “comprised up to one-fourth of the gallery” during the
punishment phase of Compton’s trial for capital murder did not inherently
prejudice his right to a fair trial); Sterling v. State, 830 S.W.2d 114, 118 (Tex.
Crim. App. 1992) (explaining that the presence of seven uniformed deputies in
the courtroom at a jury trial was not inherently prejudicial); Howard v. State,
941 S.W.2d 102, 118 (op. on orig. subm.) (Tex. Crim. App. 1996), overruled on
other grounds by Easley v. State, 424 S.W.3d 535, 538 n.23 (Tex. Crim. App.
2014) (“[T]his Court cannot hold that the mute and distant presence of twenty
peace officers—comprising roughly one-fifth of the spectator gallery—is
prejudicial, per se, without some other indication of prejudice.”).
NIXON – 12

year-old witness to testify via closed circuit television in the defendant’s
trial for aggravated sexual assault of a child was not inherently
prejudicial to the defendant’s presumption of innocence. 987 S.W.3d at
581–82. The Court observed that the trial court instructed the jury that
the procedure was “authorized by statute ‘in these types of cases.’” Id. at
581. But the Court also noted that, even without such an instruction,
the procedure was not inherently prejudicial because the jury could have
just as well inferred that the children in that case were generally afraid
of testifying “in the courtroom setting” as that they were “fearful of
testifying while looking at the defendant.” Id. (quoting W. LaFave & J.
Israel, Criminal Procedure § 24.3 at 1015 (2nd ed. 1992)) (internal
quotation marks omitted). The Court concluded that the practice did not
“tend[] to brand appellant with an unmistakable mark of guilt.” Id. at
582.
In light of the principles discussed in these cases, we conclude, as
did the court of appeals, that when a particular courtroom practice is
challenged as having the potential to erode a defendant’s presumption
of innocence, a court must first decide whether the practice is inherently
prejudicial to the defendant’s right to the presumption. Nixon, 674
S.W.3d at 390. Also, the court should conclude that the setting was
inherently prejudicial to the presumption of innocence only if, after
exercising “reason, principle, and common human experience[,]” 11 the
court determines that the challenged practice would necessarily be
interpreted by the jury as a sign that the defendant is particularly

11 Williams, 425 U.S. at 504.
NIXON – 13

culpable or dangerous. And if the court draws the conclusion that the
challenged practice is inherently prejudicial because it will necessarily
be interpreted by the jury as a signal that the defendant is culpable or
dangerous, the court should then go on to inquire whether the practice
was nevertheless justified by an “essential state interest.” Nixon, 674
S.W. 3d at 390; see also Bell, 415 S.W.3d at 281.
III. ANALYSIS
A. The Court of Appeals’ Conclusion
Before analyzing the first question—whether the practice
complained of was inherently prejudicial to the defendant’s presumption
of innocence—the court of appeals examined three cases from other
jurisdictions which, it said, had concluded that holding a trial in a
“Jailhouse Courtroom” is inherently prejudicial. See id. at 391−93
(examining Jaime, 168 Wash.2d at 864, 233 P.3d at 557; State v. Cavan,
337 Or. 433, 449, 98 P.3d 381, 389 (2004) (“[C]onducting defendant's
criminal jury trial in [the Snake River Correctional Institution] violated
defendant’s . . . guarantee to an impartial jury.”); and State v. Lane, 60
Ohio St.2d 112, 115, 397 N.E.2d 1338, 1340 (1979) (“By holding a trial
within a prison for an offense committed within that same institution,
the constitutional right to a fair trial is abridged in three ways: (1) The
presumption of innocence which must attach to the criminal defendant
is eroded; (2) there is a major interference with the jury's ability to
remain impartial; and (3) the right of the defendant to obtain witnesses
is chilled.”)). It then examined four cases from other jurisdictions which,
it said, had concluded that holding a trial in a “Jailhouse Courtroom”
was not inherently prejudicial. See id. at 393−95 (examining Harper v.
NIXON – 14

State, 887 So.2d 817, 826–27 (Miss. Ct. App. 2004) (“[T]he trial judge did
not abuse his discretion in ordering that the trials of these defendants
be moved from the courthouse to the Administrative Building at
Parchman.”); State v. Daniels, 40 P.3d 611, 620 (Utah 2002) (“[W]e
conclude that the practice challenged in this case was not inherently
prejudicial[.]”); California v. England, 83 Cal.App.4th 772, 781, 100
Cal.Rptr.2d 63, 69 (2000) (“There simply is no comparison to be made
between shackling a defendant and holding trial on prison grounds in
accordance with established standards.”); and Howard v. Virginia, 6 Va.
App. 132, 140, 367 S.E.2d 527, 532 (1988) (“[W]e conclude that the
location of Howard's trial did not impermissibly suggest that he was
guilty of the offense for which he was being tried or otherwise operate to
inherently prejudice him.”)). After examining the arguments made in
these cases from other jurisdictions—some approving of, and some
disapproving of—trials in what the court of appeals in this case called a
“Jailhouse Courtroom[,]” the court of appeals concluded that holding
Appellant’s trial in the courtroom at issue here was inherently
prejudicial to his presumption of innocence. But we do not agree.
B. The Building that Housed the Courtroom
There is no disagreement in this case that the government
building at issue here housed more than one government facility. One of
those facilities was a jail, another was the Sheriff’s Department, and a
third was the auxiliary courtroom. All of these distinct facilities were
located within the same building and under the same roof. And, as the
photographs present in the record and reproduced as an appendix to the
court of appeals’ opinion also indicate, the building that contained these
NIXON – 15

three distinct facilities was labeled on the outside with the words:
“Medina County Jail[.]”
The court of appeals observed that “the first thing” that jurors
would see as they approached the building where the trial was to take
place was the sign that said “Medina County Jail” over the entrance. Id.
at 395. It noted that there was no indication that the building was an
“annex building” which was used for purposes other than to house
inmates. Id. It expressed concern that the glass doors to the building
had signs posted stating that “cell phones, cameras, recording devices,
purses and packages” were banned. Id. And it concluded that, “under
the facts of this case, the various markings reminding the jury that the
building at issue here has a primary purpose as a jail created an
unacceptable risk that the jury would conclude, before hearing any
evidence, that [Appellant] [was] too dangerous to transport and must be
isolated from society.” Id. at 396. But we conclude, in contrast, that these
considerations would not have led the jury to necessarily conclude that
Applicant must be guilty or dangerous.
C. No Necessary Personal Implication of Guilt to Appellant
There is no doubt that a reasonably alert juror in this case would
have been aware of the proximity of the jail and the sheriff’s office to the
courtroom. And we do not discount the possibility that a juror may have
been initially confused upon arriving for trial at a building labeled
outside as “Medina County Jail[.]” Indeed it is possible that a juror
might have thought that the proximity of the auxiliary courtroom to the
jail could suggest that Appellant was either culpable or dangerous.
But jurors need not have necessarily drawn that inference.
NIXON – 16

Indeed, we are persuaded that average jurors may have more likely
understood that the government and the courts use whatever facilities
they have available to get their work done, and that the facility where a
trial is held ordinarily does not reflect inherently on the guilt or
dangerousness of an accused. 12 In this case, we are convinced that jurors
would likely have concluded that, while the courtroom was located in a
building labeled on the outside with the name “Medina County Jail[,]”
the courtroom itself was a separate government facility distinct from the
jail.
In addition, jurors would not have been likely to understand the
location of the courtroom to necessarily reflect on Appellant’s guilt or
dangerousness. Neither the sign on the outside of the building, nor even
the courtroom’s proximity to the jail and the sheriff’s office inside, had
any inherent tendency to brand Appellant himself as unmistakably
guilty. The challenged practice here—conducting Appellant’s trial in the
auxiliary courtroom, which happened to have been housed under the
same roof as the jail and the sheriff’s office in Medina County—did not
necessarily brand Appellant personally with an unmistakable mark of
guilt. See, e.g., Jaime, 168 Wash.2d at 873, 233 P.3d at 562 (Fairhurst,
J., dissenting) (“A courtroom is a location, not an accoutrement. Because
a courtroom does not serve as an identifier, it does not possess the
inherently prejudicial power of a shackle or prison uniform.”).
Jurors would also have observed Appellant in civilian clothes and
without visible restraints throughout his trial—which, if anything,

12 Indeed, in this very case, the voir dire of the jury was conducted at

the Medina County fairground because of Covid-19 concerns.
NIXON – 17

would have suggested to them that Appellant was not an inmate. 13 If
jurors had seen Appellant in jail clothing or visible shackles, that might
have been an indelible reminder of a defendant’s confinement. But
Appellant’s appearance in civilian clothing would have been likely to
dispel any initial confusion jurors might have had because of the location
of the courtroom.
This distinction is well illustrated by a simple comparison of
Williams and Flynn. In Williams, the Supreme Court focused on the
inherent prejudice of compelling a defendant to appear before the jury
in a jail uniform and explained that such clothing would constitute a
“constant reminder of the accused’s condition implicit in such
distinctive, identifiable attire[.]” 425 U.S. at 504–05. But in Flynn, the
presence of additional uniformed guards, even seated directly behind
the defendant, did not brand the defendant in the eyes of the court with
an unmistakable mark of guilt. 475 U.S. at 571; accord Marx, 987
S.W.2d at 581–82. Whatever the jurors may have thought about the
location of the courtroom in this case, Appellant points to nothing that
would have necessarily tied Appellant personally to that location, any
more than the judge, the attorneys, and the jurors themselves were tied
to it.
D. The Courtroom was Distinguishable from
the Jail and the Sheriff’s Office
The court of appeals also seems not to have recognized the natural

The record reflects that Appellant was identified in court by his
13

civilian clothing throughout his trial. For example, on the first day of the
State’s presentation of the evidence, a witness identified Appellant as wearing
a green jacket and cream-colored shirt.
NIXON – 18

distinction between the larger building complex, which also housed a jail
and the sheriff’s department, and the courtroom itself. See Nixon, 674
S.W.3d at 387 (describing the courtroom at issue in this case as “the jail
courtroom”). In failing to recognize the distinction, it concluded that
“[t]he jailhouse venue vitiates the ‘aura of neutrality and judicial
impartiality [that] contributes to and fosters the public’s belief in . .
impartiality in judicial proceedings.’” Id. at 396 (quoting Cavan, 337 Or.
at 448, 98 P.3d at 389). But contrary to the court of appeals’ conclusion,
and even though it was housed inside the same building where the jail
and the sheriff’s department were located, the courtroom itself appears
to have been a separate facility.
The courtroom does not appear to be within, or even necessarily
a part of, the portion of the building dedicated to housing inmates. Nor
does the courtroom seem to be indistinguishably connected to the county
sheriff’s office. And once the jurors were inside the courtroom, they
would have encountered the same judge and attorneys they saw at the
fairgrounds, where the voir dire proceedings had been conducted.
Although the courtroom is housed in a building with a potentially
misleading label on the outside, once the jurors were inside the building,
the courtroom would appear to them to be separate and distinct from
both the jail and the sheriff’s office.
Moreover, no photos of the inside of the courtroom are included in
the record. And we can find nothing to suggest that the courtroom itself
appeared to be anything other than an ordinary courtroom, once inside.
Were there something about the inside of the courtroom that would have
tied Appellant personally to the jail facility or to the sheriff’s
NIXON – 19

department, it would have behooved Appellant to make the record
reflect as much for purposes of appellate review. But we have seen
nothing like that in this case.
E. Other Factors Did Not Suggest Appellant’s Guilt
The court of appeals also expressed concern about the signs on
the glass doors that jurors would encounter upon entering the building
and before reaching the courtroom, as well as about the presence of a
machine in the building lobby—the purpose of which seems to have been
to “deposit money into an inmate’s account” and which was “wrapped in
a large image containing handcuffs.” See id. at 395 (“[J]urors . . . are
immediately confronted with glass doors with posted signs stating cell
phones, cameras, recording devices, purses, and packages are banned.”);
id. at 396 (“[U]nder the facts of this case, the various markings
reminding the jury that the building at issue here has a primary purpose
as a jail created an unacceptable risk that the jury would conclude,
before hearing any evidence, that [Appellant] is too dangerous to
transport and must be isolated from society.”). In our view, however, the
presence of the various signs—indicating prohibitions on (1) possession
of certain items that might present a security risk, (2) cell phones, (3)
recording devices, and (4) other items such as purses and packages—has
become so ubiquitous on government buildings with a justice system
purpose that those measures would have been taken for granted by
ordinary jurors. They would not have had any necessary tendency to
suggest to the jury the guilt of Appellant. Similarly, the presence of the
device designed to facilitate deposits into inmate accounts would not
have necessarily been associated with the courtroom or with Appellant,
any more than would the presence of the sign outside the building that
NIXON – 20

said “Medina County Jail[.]”
As the Supreme Court observed in Flynn with respect to the
presence of additional guards seated behind a defendant: “Our society
has become inured to the presence of armed guards in most public
places; they are doubtless taken for granted so long as their numbers or
weaponry do not suggest particular official concern or alarm.” 475 U.S.
at 569. The security measures described in this case are no more, and
perhaps even less, onerous than those required to enter many
courthouses in this state, or even to attend oral arguments at this Court.
Nothing about those measures seems to have necessarily cast an aura
of guilt onto Appellant.
F. No “Continuing Influence” or “Unacceptable Risk” of
Influence by “Impermissible Factors”
We also do not think that the labeling on the building in this case,
or the proximity of the courtroom to the area in which inmates were
housed, was likely to be a “continuing influence” throughout Appellant’s
trial. Williams, 435 U.S. at 505. In Williams, the Supreme Court noted
that the prejudice inherent in compelling a defendant to appear in jail
attire before a jury was a “continuing influence throughout the trial” and
that the attire was “not unlike placing a jury in the custody of deputy
sheriffs who were also witnesses for the prosecution[.]” Id. (citing Turner
v. Louisiana, 397 U.S. 466, 473 (1965)). According to the Supreme Court,
the jail clothing presented an “unacceptable risk . . . of impermissible
factors coming into play.” Id. But here, Appellant was dressed in civilian
clothing, and we have seen nothing that would have otherwise indelibly
suggested some other connection between Appellant and either the
nearby jail facilities or the sheriff’s department.
NIXON – 21

The courtroom utilized here also did not suggest the kind of
“unacceptable risk” of influencing the jury with “impermissible factors”
that the Supreme Court was concerned about in Turner v. Louisiana. In
Turner, jurors were placed under the charge of, and were “continuously
in the company of[,]” two deputy sheriffs who were also key witnesses
for the prosecution in the defendant’s trial. Id. at 469. The Court
explained there that it would be “blinking reality not to recognize the
extreme prejudice inherent” in those circumstances since “the
relationship was one which could not but foster the jurors’ confidence in
those who were their official guardians during the entire period of trial.”
Id. at 473–74.
The record in this case suggests nothing like the continuing
nature of the prejudice present in either Williams or Turner. In
Williams, the defendant appeared before the jury in jail attire
throughout the trial. Similarly, in Turner, the familiarity between the
jurors and the bailiffs/prosecution-witnesses increased the longer the
trial went on. But any confusion or distraction caused by the location of
Appellant’s trial likely decreased as the auxiliary courtroom became
more of a familiar space to which the jurors, the judge, the attorneys,
and Appellant (dressed in civilian clothing and without visible
restraints), returned daily.
G. A Wide Range of Inferences Unrelated
to Guilt or Dangerousness Were Available
The Supreme Court’s determination in Flynn—that the presence
of four uniformed troopers behind the defendant was not inherently
prejudicial to the presumption of his innocence—rested on the “wider
range of inferences” jurors might reasonably have drawn from the
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troopers’ presence. 475 U.S. at 569. Those possible inferences included
that: (1) “the officers [were] there to guard against disruptions
emanating from outside the courtroom”; (2) their presence was “to
ensure that tense courtroom exchanges [did] not erupt into violence”; (3)
that they were simply “elements of an impressive drama”; or even, the
Court concluded, (4) the “jurors [may] not [have] infer[red] any[thing] at
all from the presence of the guards.” Id. An equally wide range of
inferences was open to the jurors in this case as well.
For instance, a juror in this case might reasonably have believed
that holding Appellant’s trial in a courtroom located in the same
building as the county jail and sheriff’s office: (1) was necessary to
ensure courtroom security in a high-profile capital murder trial; (2) that
it was a result of COVID-19 pandemic restrictions; (3) that it was the
only courtroom space available, given that the trial judge was a visiting
judge from out of town; 14 (4) that it was simply preferable to hold trial
in a more modern courtroom for the sake of the available technology it
provided or consistent climate-control in the summer months; or, finally
(5) a juror may have inferred nothing at all from the location of the
courtroom.
Holding Appellant’s trial in the auxiliary courtroom was not
inherently prejudicial to his presumption of innocence. Id.; Marx, 987
S.W.2d at 581. A challenged procedure is inherently prejudicial to the
presumption of innocence only if jurors must necessarily interpret it as

14 According to the record, at the outset of jury selection the trial court

judge introduced himself to the venire panel by saying, “[M]y name is Sid
Harle. I’m a visiting judge from San Antonio.”
NIXON – 23

a sign that a defendant is particularly dangerous or culpable. Flynn, 475
U.S. at 569; accord Marx, 987 S.W.2d at 581. If jurors can reasonably
draw a wider range of inferences, not reflecting at all on danger or
culpability, then no unacceptable risk of impermissible factors comes
into play. See Flynn, 475 U.S. at 572 (noting that the reviewing court’s
role is not to determine whether alternative procedures were possible
but to “look at the scene presented to the jurors and determine whether
what they saw was so inherently prejudicial as to pose an unacceptable
threat to defendant’s right to a fair trial”); accord Howard v. State, 941
S.W.2d 102, 117 (op. on orig. subm.) (Tex. Crim. App. 1996), overruled
on other grounds by Easley v. State, 424 S.W.3d 535, 538 n.23 (Tex.
Crim. App. 2014); see also Daniels, 40 P.3d at 619–20 (holding that
conducting a jury trial for the murder of a fellow inmate in a courtroom
inside the prison where Daniels was incarcerated was not inherently
prejudicial under Flynn’s wider-range-of-inferences test).
H. We Decline to Follow State v. Jaime
Appellant relies heavily on the decision of the Washington State
Supreme Court in State v. Jaime, contending that it was “both analogous
[to this case] and persuasive.” But for many of the reasons we have
already articulated, we decline to follow that decision. In that case, the
defendant’s jury trial had been held “in a courtroom located in the
county jail[,]” which Jaime challenged as inherently prejudicial. 168
Wash.2d at 859, 233 P.3d at 555. In analyzing the question presented
there, the court noted that “[w]hen a courtroom arrangement is
challenged as inherently prejudicial, the question to be answered is
whether an unacceptable risk is presented of impermissible factors
NIXON – 24

coming into play.” Id., 168 Wash.2d at 862, 233 P.3d at 556 (quoting In
re Pers. Restraint of Woods, 154 Wash.2d 400, 417, 114 P.3d 607 (2005))
(internal quotations omitted). It then stated that “[a] courtroom practice
might present an unacceptable risk of impermissible factors coming into
play because of ‘the wider range of inferences that a juror might
reasonably draw’ from the practice.” Id. (quoting Flynn, 475 U.S. at 569)
(emphasis added).
But Jaime turns the Flynn analysis on its head. Indeed, one of
the dissenting justices in Jaime observed that, “[w]hile the majority uses
[Flynn] to support its contention, a closer analysis of the case compels
the opposite conclusion.” Id., 168 Wash.2d at 873, 233 P.3d at 562–63
(Fairhurst, J., dissenting). The entire purpose of considering whether
there is a wider range of inferences that a juror might reasonably draw
from a practice is to determine if it “need not be interpreted as a sign
that [a defendant] is particularly dangerous or culpable”—because if it
need not, then the practice cannot be inherently prejudicial. Flynn, 475
U.S. at 569.
In Flynn, the Supreme Court explained that “‘reason, principle,
and common human experience,’ Williams, [425 U.S. at 504], counsel
against a presumption that any use of identifiable security guards in the
courtroom is inherently prejudicial.” 475 U.S. at 569. It observed that,
“[i]n view of the variety of ways in which such guards can be deployed,
we believe that a case-by-case approach is more appropriate.” Id. And it
concluded that, “[e]ven had the jurors [in that case] been aware that the
deployment of troopers was not common practice in Rhode Island, we
cannot believe that the use of the four troopers tended to brand
NIXON – 25

respondent in their eyes ‘with an unmistakable mark of guilt.’” Id. at
571. We believe the same conclusion is appropriate here.
IV. CONCLUSION
We conclude that holding Appellant’s trial in the auxiliary
courtroom located in the same building as the Medina County Jail and
Sheriff’s Department was not inherently prejudicial to Appellant’s
presumption of his innocence. We, therefore, reverse the judgment of the
court of appeals and remand the cause to that court to consider
Appellant’s remaining points of error on appeal.

DELIVERED: November 20, 2024
PUBLISH