In the Interest of C.S. Jr. and Z.S., Children

Supreme Court of Texas
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No. 25-0008
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In the Interest of C.S. Jr. and Z.S., Children

═══════════════════════════════════════
On Petition for Review from the
Court of Appeals for the Eleventh District of Texas
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JUSTICE LEHRMANN, joined by Justice Bland and Justice Huddle,
and joined by Justice Busby as to Part II, dissenting.

Section 263.401 of the Family Code sets a one-year jurisdictional
deadline to commence a trial on the merits in a suit to terminate
parental rights. That deadline serves the laudable goal of bringing these
heartbreaking cases to a swift conclusion. But the initial dismissal date
is not absolute; the statute recognizes that extraordinary circumstances
may warrant a limited extension of that date, and the statute
accordingly authorizes trial courts to retain their jurisdiction by
granting such an extension before the initial deadline has passed. The
trial court in this case did just that: it granted an extension of the initial
dismissal date before the date passed, and it did so on the record.
The Court concludes that the trial court indicated merely an
intent to grant an extension in the future even though the court
simultaneously set the case for trial on a date that fell after the initial
deadline would elapse. The Court also holds that the trial court—an
associate judge—could not orally grant the extension without a court
reporter present. In doing so, the Court dismisses as irrelevant the fact
that the Family Code expressly authorizes associate judges, who often
bear the brunt of a shortage of court reporters, to preserve the record by
other means. I cannot agree with either conclusion and must
respectfully express my dissent.

I. Background

Because the Court concludes that the trial court lost jurisdiction
before trial, it does not discuss the facts that led to the children’s
removal and the trial court’s termination of Mother’s parental rights. I
begin with that discussion.
In February 2023, Mother engaged in conduct in the presence of
her two children that led to her being charged with aggravated assault
with a deadly weapon. Mother and the children, then two and four years
old, accompanied Mother’s boyfriend, D’Martja Wellons, to pick up
Wellons’s child from his ex-girlfriend. Mother “storm[ed]” the
ex-girlfriend, and they started physically fighting. Mother then
retrieved a gun from Wellons’s car, pointed it at his ex-girlfriend, and
threatened to shoot her.
This incident prompted an investigation by the Department of
Family and Protective Services. A Department caseworker visited
Mother’s home twice and detected a strong odor of marijuana on both
visits. Mother initially denied using the drug, but she then admitted to
use “in the prior months,” most recently in December 2022. After a
court-ordered services hearing on February 28, 2023, Mother was
ordered to complete a drug test. Mother’s urine test was negative, but

2
her and Wellons’s hair-follicle tests were positive for marijuana, and
both children tested positive for marijuana in trace amounts. Mother
downplayed the children’s test results, saying they were “basically
negative.”
In light of the assault in the children’s presence and the positive
drug tests, the Department requested, and the trial court ordered,
removal of the children from Mother’s home and appointment of the
Department as their temporary managing conservator. This occurred
on March 6, 2023, and the Department placed the children with their
paternal grandmother. A few weeks later, the trial court signed a
scheduling order setting the case for a pretrial hearing on January 26,
2024, and for trial on February 12, 2024. In bold, capitalized font, the
order noted a dismissal date of March 11, 2024. See TEX. FAM. CODE
§ 263.401(a) (providing for termination of the court’s jurisdiction over
and automatic dismissal of a suit by the Department requesting
termination of parental rights or managing conservatorship “on the first
Monday after the first anniversary of the date the court rendered a
temporary order appointing the department as temporary managing
conservator,” barring commencement of trial on the merits or an
extension under Subsection (b) or (b-1)). The order also noted that “[a]ll
hearings will be heard by the Associate Judge, except for Jury Trials.”
See id. § 201.005(a) (authorizing a judge, with some exceptions, to “refer
to an associate judge any aspect of” certain suits over which the referring
court has jurisdiction, including parental termination suits). The
associate judge presided over the entirety of the case, including the final
bench trial.

3
At the January 26 pretrial hearing, the parties agreed to an
extension of the trial setting. The record reflects several reasons for the
agreed extension, including to give Mother more time to complete
services and additional drug tests and to accommodate Mother’s
counsel’s vacation plans that conflicted with the trial setting. The trial
court reset the pretrial hearing for February 23, 2024. It also reset the
trial for March 4, a week before the March 11 dismissal date.
Due to a shortage of available court reporters, 1 the February 23
pretrial hearing was electronically recorded and later transcribed.
Mother’s counsel had undergone a dental procedure that morning and
did not attend the hearing. At the trial court’s request, the
Department’s counsel called Mother’s counsel to determine how much
time she estimated needing for trial. Based on that call and the
Department’s own estimate, the trial court concluded half a day was
necessary. The trial court stated that, based on the court’s caseload, “I
don’t have anywhere to put a half day that works with everyone’s
schedules” before the March 11 dismissal date. As such, the trial court
stated, “I think I have to grant an extension and we can pick a date -- we
can go ahead and pick a half day during trial week in April.” The trial
court asked the Department’s counsel to communicate with Mother’s
counsel regarding her availability the week of April 8. Based on that
discussion, the trial court set the case for trial on April 12 and stated
that the Department’s counsel “is going to get me that extension order
before March 11th.”

1 The trial judge would later explain that she had a court reporter only

one week out of every month.

4
The trial court’s and court coordinator’s handwritten notes from
the pretrial hearing reflect the extension and the new trial date, but the
extension was not noted on the docket sheet. As of the March 11
dismissal date, the Department had not submitted a written extension
order to the trial court, and the court had not signed one.
On April 4, a week before trial, Mother filed a motion to dismiss,
arguing that with no written order or docket entry extending the
dismissal date, the trial court lost jurisdiction over the case on
March 11. At the hearing on that motion, the trial court discussed the
difficulty of finding court reporters in rural West Texas and the
accompanying “struggle that this Court has with setting things in order
to comply with dismissal deadlines.”
The trial court denied Mother’s motion to dismiss and signed a
written order retaining the suit on the court’s docket. The order stated
that the court had granted a “263.401(b) extension” on February 23,
included the extraordinary-circumstances and best-interest findings,
and noted a new dismissal date of September 7, 2024. See id.
§ 263.401(b) (stating that if the court makes those findings, it may retain
the suit on its docket for up to an additional 180 days after the initial
dismissal date).
At the conclusion of the ensuing trial, 2 the trial court found by
clear and convincing evidence that termination of Mother’s parental

2 In addition to evidence of the altercation between Mother and
Wellons’s ex-girlfriend and the evidence of Mother’s and the children’s initial
positive drug tests, the Department presented evidence at trial regarding
Mother’s conduct after the children’s removal. That evidence included several

5
rights was in the children’s best interest and that Mother had engaged
in conduct satisfying several statutory termination grounds, including
knowingly placing or allowing the children to remain in endangering
conditions and engaging in conduct that endangered the children. See
id. § 161.001(b)(1)(D)–(E), (2). 3 Accordingly, the trial court signed a
final order terminating Mother’s parental rights to the children. The
court of appeals affirmed. 717 S.W.3d 1 (Tex. App.—Eastland 2024).

II. Jurisdiction

To encourage prompt resolution of suits in which the Department
seeks termination of the parent–child relationship or to be named
managing conservator of the child, the Family Code provides for
termination of the court’s jurisdiction over, and automatic dismissal of,
such suits unless the trial court has commenced the trial or granted an
extension within one year after the court appoints the Department as

positive drug tests for marijuana—though the levels trended downward
leading up to trial—and one positive test for cocaine. In addition, Mother
continued to associate with Wellons, who also tested positive for cocaine and
marijuana during the pendency of the proceedings and who was limited to
supervised visitation with his own child. And Mother lied to the Department
about her relationship with Wellons. On the other hand, Mother maintained
suitable housing and employment, maintained contact with the Department,
attended all her supervised visits with the children, completed a
substance-abuse assessment and counseling, attended a family violence
prevention course, and was involved in no further violent incidents. Several
witnesses testified the children wanted to return to Mother, although they
were also happy and doing well with their grandmother.
3 The trial court also found that the evidence warranted termination

under former Subsection (b)(1)(O), which involved a parent’s failure to comply
with a court-ordered service plan following removal of a child for abuse or
neglect.

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the child’s temporary managing conservator. TEX. FAM. CODE § 263.401;
In re G.X.H., 627 S.W.3d 288, 292 (Tex. 2021). Section 263.401 states in
relevant part:
(a) Unless the court has commenced the trial on the merits
or granted an extension under Subsection (b) or (b-1),
on the first Monday after the first anniversary of the
date the court rendered a temporary order appointing
the department as temporary managing conservator,
the court’s jurisdiction over the suit affecting the
parent–child relationship filed by the department that
requests termination of the parent–child relationship or
requests that the department be named conservator of
the child is terminated and the suit is automatically
dismissed without a court order. . . .
(b) Unless the court has commenced the trial on the merits,
the court may not retain the suit on the court’s docket
after the time described by Subsection (a) unless the
court finds that extraordinary circumstances
necessitate the child remaining in the temporary
managing conservatorship of the department and that
continuing the appointment of the department as
temporary managing conservator is in the best interest
of the child. If the court makes those findings, the court
may retain the suit on the court’s docket for a period not
to exceed 180 days after the time described by
Subsection (a). If the court retains the suit on the
court’s docket, the court shall render an order in which
the court:
(1) schedules the new date on which the suit will be
automatically dismissed if the trial on the merits
has not commenced, which date must be not later
than the 180th day after the time described by
Subsection (a);
(2) makes further temporary orders for the safety
and welfare of the child as necessary to avoid
further delay in resolving the suit; and

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(3) sets the trial on the merits on a date not later
than the date specified under Subdivision (1).
TEX. FAM. CODE § 263.401(a)–(b).
Beginning with Subsection (a), the trial court here “rendered a
temporary order appointing the department as temporary managing
conservator” on March 6, 2023, meaning that the court’s jurisdiction
over the case terminated on March 11, 2024, unless the court either
“commenced the trial on the merits or granted an extension under
Subsection (b)” by that date. Id. § 263.401(a). As for Subsection (b)’s
extension requirements, we have broken them down as follows:
The first sentence . . . provides a prerequisite for granting
an extension of the dismissal date: the trial court must find
(1) extraordinary circumstances necessitate the children
remaining in the Department’s temporary managing
conservatorship, and (2) continuing the appointment of the
Department as temporary managing conservator is in the
children’s best interest. [The] second sentence limits the
length of the extension to 180 days. And the third sentence
directs the trial court that has granted an extension to
render an order that does three things: schedules the new
dismissal date, makes further temporary orders as
necessary for the children’s safety and welfare, and sets the
trial date.
G.X.H., 627 S.W.3d at 297.
Importantly, we have held that Section 263.401’s only
jurisdictional requirement is that the trial court grant an extension of
the initial automatic dismissal date before it passes. In re J.S., 670
S.W.3d 591, 603–04 (Tex. 2023); G.X.H., 627 S.W.3d at 301 (“[W]hile a
trial court’s failure to timely extend the automatic dismissal date before
that date passes . . . is jurisdictional, claimed defects relating to the
other requirements of 263.401(b) are not.”). Thus, the requisite

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extraordinary-circumstances and best-interest findings, as well as the
order described in Subsection (b)’s third sentence, are mandatory but
not jurisdictional. J.S., 670 S.W.3d at 604; G.X.H., 627 S.W.3d at
300–01.
We have also held that the statute does not require a formal
written order to grant an extension. In G.X.H., we held that even a
pre-dismissal-date docket-sheet entry reflecting the extension is
sufficient to satisfy Section 263.401’s jurisdictional component. 627
S.W.3d at 301. In doing so, we discussed the Family Code’s definition of
the term “render” and explained that “the pronouncement [of the court’s
ruling] may be made orally in the presence of a court reporter or in
writing, ‘including on the court’s docket sheet or by a separate written
instrument.’” Id. at 298 (quoting TEX. FAM. CODE § 101.026). We further
emphasized that while trial courts should make the
extraordinary-circumstances and best-interest findings “in a written
order as a matter of course, . . . the failure to do so is not error, provided
the findings are made orally on the record or in some other writing.” Id.
at 299.
Here, the trial court complied with Section 263.401’s only
jurisdictional requirement—it granted an extension before March 11,
2024. As discussed, at the February 23 pretrial hearing, the trial court
struggled to find a setting that would accommodate the parties’ need for
a half-day trial. As the court would later explain, this was due in part
to a shortage of court reporters in certain areas of the State:
It’s not clear if you just read this record that I do not have
a Court Reporter that is employed as my Official Court
Reporter, which is part of the reason that we have a trial

9
week. Because I have a Court Reporter who will come one
week out of the month and so we set our trials during that
week. The County and the State of Texas do not provide
me with a salaried Court Reporter. And we live in rural
West Texas. It is difficult to find Court Reporters. . . .
So, that is part of the struggle that this Court has
with setting things in order to comply with dismissal
deadlines.
Given the scheduling difficulties, the trial court stated that “I
think I have to grant an extension and we can pick a date -- we can go
ahead and pick a half day during trial week in April.” The court later
confirmed, “[L]et’s go set Smith, 11002 [i.e., this case], the week of
April 8th, and I am grant -- I am going to have to grant an extension.”
After additional discussion regarding the exact date, the court
concluded, “How about Friday, April the 12th, at 9:00? We are going to
put Smith, 11002.” The trial court then instructed the Department’s
counsel to “get me that extension order before March 11th.” 4 The trial
court’s notes from the hearing reflect the extension and the new trial
date.
Despite this exchange, the Court concludes that the trial court did
not actually grant an extension on February 23; it only intended to do
so sometime in the future but before March 11. I cannot agree. First,
as the Court recognizes, Section 263.401 does not require that the
extension be granted in writing. See ante at 10; see also G.X.H., 627

4The Court emphasizes the instances of “inaudible or unintelligible
statements” and other omissions in the transcript of the hearing. Ante at 3.
However, the portions of the transcript at issue here—specifically, the
discussion about extending the dismissal date and setting the case for
trial—are perfectly clear.

10
S.W.3d at 299 (holding that the failure to make the findings underlying
an extension order in writing is not error).
Second, in my view, the trial court made it clear at the pretrial
hearing that the court was granting an extension. In a vacuum, perhaps
the phrase “I am going to have to grant” merely indicates an intent to
grant in the future. But in context, it does not. See Sargent v. Sargent,
No. 02-24-00470-CV, 2025 WL 2627033, at *3–4 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth
Sep. 11, 2025, no pet.) (“[A] trial court’s use of the words ‘will approve’
and ‘will sign’ indicate an intent to render judgment in the future. . . .
Here, however, the word ‘will’ did not stand alone, as additional evidence
supported the fact that the trial court intended to render judgment [at
that time].”). Specifically, the court also explained that it did not have
availability for a trial before the dismissal date, stated “let’s go set” the
case for trial the week of April 8, and then confirmed April 12 as the new
trial date after the Department’s counsel spoke with Mother’s counsel
(twice) about her availability. It would make no sense for the trial court
to set the case for trial on April 12 before granting an extension.
The Court views as “[c]rucial[]” the trial court’s indication at the
hearing that it would be issuing a subsequent written order. Ante at 4.
But that is perfectly consistent with an intent to comply with the
statute’s additional, nonjurisdictional requirements like making express
extraordinary-circumstances and best-interest findings, which the court
had not yet done. See J.S., 670 S.W.3d at 601–03 (holding that the
statutory findings must be made expressly but compliance with that
requirement is not jurisdictional). And in the trial court, Mother did not
make the “intention” argument that the Court finds so persuasive.

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Mother contended in her motion to dismiss that the extension order was
a nullity because no court reporter was present and the court failed to
make the requisite findings. 5 Even in this Court, Mother argues that
the February 23 “order” retaining the suit on the trial court’s docket was
“defective,” not that no such order was issued. In holding otherwise, the
Court ignores the obvious: the trial court’s act of resetting the case for
trial on April 12 demonstrated the court’s present intent to grant the
extension. Otherwise, what was the point? A reset to a specific date
would serve no purpose had the court not yet extended the dismissal
date.
Like the trial court and the court of appeals, I view the transcript
of the February 23 hearing as reflecting an oral order granting an
extension of the dismissal date and setting a new trial date. Further,
the court granted the extension on the record, before the March 11
dismissal date, which in my view was sufficient to allow the trial court
to retain jurisdiction over the case.
Typically, of course, the record of a hearing is preserved by the
trial court’s official court reporter. 6 TEX. GOV’T CODE § 52.042(a). “On

5 Mother argued in the court of appeals, and continues to argue in this

Court, that the trial court lacked the present intent to grant the extension at
the February 23 hearing. In the trial court, however, Mother stated that “on
February 23, 2024, the Court made an oral pronouncement, or rendering,
granting the extension pursuant to 401(b)” and argued that the
pronouncement was insufficient given the absence of a docket entry or court
reporter.
6 As a general matter, “[e]ach judge of a court of record shall appoint an

official court reporter.” TEX. GOV’T CODE § 52.041(a). However, courts of
record in counties with populations of less than 125,000 may share an official
court reporter. Id. § 52.041(b)–(c).

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request,” the reporter “attend[s] all sessions of the court,” “take[s] full
shorthand notes of oral testimony offered before the court,” “preserve[s]
the notes for future reference for three years,” and “furnish[es] a
transcript of the reported evidence or other proceedings” in accordance
with the governing statute. Id. § 52.046(a).
However, that is not necessarily the case for associate judges.
Under the Family Code, a court reporter “may be provided during a
hearing held by an associate judge,” but a reporter is only “required to
be provided when the associate judge presides over a jury trial or a
contested final termination hearing.” TEX. FAM. CODE § 201.009(a)
(emphasis added). With those two exceptions, “in the absence of a court
reporter or on agreement of the parties, the record may be preserved by
any means approved by an associate judge.” Id. § 201.009(c). 7 That
authorization—to preserve the record by another approved
means—makes sense given that associate judges are not always
guaranteed a court reporter and, as was the case here, often struggle to
ensure that one is present even on those occasions when they are
required. The fact that court reporters are not in sufficient supply
should not affect our courts’ ability to preserve records of proceedings
held before associate judges, who are necessary to the efficient
administration of an overburdened justice system. The adage “justice
delayed is justice denied” is particularly apt in child protection cases,
making the use of alternative means of record preservation even more
important.

7 Similar provisions govern associate judges appointed by district and

statutory county courts in civil cases more generally. See id. § 54A.110.

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Here, as discussed, the presiding associate judge was provided a
court reporter during trial weeks but otherwise preserved the record by
electronic recordings due to the scarcity of court reporters in the area.
The Family Code authorized the associate judge to do so. Id.; see also
id. § 101.0255 (defining “record” as “information that is: (1) inscribed on
a tangible medium or stored in an electronic or other medium; and
(2) retrievable in a perceivable form”). Consistent with that permissible
practice, the February 23 hearing was preserved by an electronic
recording, which a court reporter later transcribed. We know from that
transcription, just as we would know from a transcription prepared by
a court reporter who attended the hearing, that the trial court granted
an extension.
I recognize, as the Court did in G.X.H., see 627 S.W.3d at 298, that
the Family Code defines the term “render” as “the pronouncement by a
judge of the court’s ruling on a matter,” which “may be made orally in
the presence of the court reporter or in writing, including on the court’s
docket sheet or by a separate written instrument,” TEX. FAM. CODE
§ 101.026. Mother therefore argues, and the Court concludes, that
although the February 23 hearing was electronically recorded, the trial
court could not orally “render” an extension order unless a court reporter
was present. Ante at 7–9. But G.X.H., which involved a docket-sheet
entry, simply did not address the issue here: whether a trial court may
orally grant an extension without a court reporter present but in a
manner authorized by other provisions of the Family Code. In G.X.H.,
we utilized Section 101.026’s definition of “render” to support our
conclusion that while the extraordinary-circumstances and best-interest

14
findings mandated by Section 263.401(b) should be made “in a written
order as a matter of course, . . . the failure to do so is not error, provided
the findings are made orally on the record or in some other writing.” 627
S.W.3d at 299. That same reasoning applies here. A trial court should
grant an extension “in a written order as a matter of course,” but “the
failure to do so is not error, provided the [extension is granted] orally on
the record or in some other writing.” Id.
In sum, the associate judge in this case granted an extension on
the record, in a manner authorized by the Family Code, before the
March 11, 2024 dismissal date passed. That is what Section 263.401
requires for the trial court to retain jurisdiction. The Court erroneously
requires more.

III. Additional Issues

Mother raises two additional issues that the Court does not reach
given its conclusion that the trial court lost jurisdiction. I would reach
those issues and affirm the court of appeals’ judgment.
First, Mother asserts that the trial court erred by failing to make
the extraordinary-circumstances and best-interest findings when it
extended the dismissal date. As discussed, one of Section 263.401’s
nonjurisdictional requirements is that the trial court, to retain the suit
on its docket beyond the initial dismissal date, must “find[] that
extraordinary circumstances necessitate the child remaining in the
temporary managing conservatorship of the department and that
continuing the appointment of the department as temporary managing
conservator is in the best interest of the child.” TEX. FAM. CODE
§ 263.401(b). Mother is correct that the trial court erred by failing to

15
make these findings when it extended the dismissal date, but the court
cured that error when it subsequently issued the written order in which
the court, among other things, expressly made the requisite findings.
Second, Mother challenges the sufficiency of the evidence to
support the trial court’s termination judgment. As explained, that
judgment is premised on the court’s finding by clear and convincing
evidence that Mother endangered the children and that termination is
in their best interest. In this Court, Mother does not challenge the
sufficiency of the evidence to support the trial court’s endangerment
findings. She does, however, assert that legally insufficient evidence
supports the best-interest finding.
In the context of a clear-and-convincing burden of proof, the
evidence is legally sufficient to support a finding if “a reasonable trier of
fact could have formed a firm belief or conviction that its finding was
true.” In re J.W., 645 S.W.3d 726, 741 (Tex. 2022) (quoting In re J.F.C.,
96 S.W.3d 256, 266 (Tex. 2002)). Given the evidence described above,
and for the reasons explained in detail by the court of appeals, 717
S.W.3d at 25–27, I would hold that a reasonable factfinder could have
formed a firm belief or conviction that termination was in the children’s
best interests.

IV. Conclusion

The Court erroneously holds that the trial court never even
purported to grant an extension before the initial dismissal date passed.
To justify that conclusion, the Court ignores the obvious—that the trial
court’s contemporaneous act of resetting the trial to a date that fell after
the initial deadline demonstrated a present intent to grant the

16
extension. Further, the Court ignores the Family Code’s efforts to
ensure associate judges have the means to preserve the record in the
absence of an available court reporter, treating an on-the-record ruling
as though it does not exist. I respectfully dissent.

Debra H. Lehrmann
Justice

OPINION FILED: June 5, 2026

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Supreme Court of Texas
══════════
No. 25-0008
══════════

In the Interest of C.S. Jr. and Z.S., Children

═══════════════════════════════════════
On Petition for Review from the
Court of Appeals for the Eleventh District of Texas
═══════════════════════════════════════

Argued October 9, 2025

JUSTICE YOUNG delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Chief
Justice Blacklock, Justice Devine, Justice Sullivan, and Justice Hawkins
joined.

JUSTICE LEHRMANN filed a dissenting opinion, in which Justice
Bland and Justice Huddle joined, and in which Justice Busby joined as
to Part II.

Subject-matter jurisdiction is a lawyerly term for the judicial power
to decide a case. A party that brings a lawsuit to a court is invoking the
court’s jurisdiction. Every lawsuit’s antecedent premise is that the court
in which it is filed has the power to resolve the suit’s underlying dispute.
Jurisdiction is the power to do so. Seeking relief from a court without
jurisdiction is as pointless as demanding a ride in a car without gas or
electricity.
A court’s first duty, therefore, is to ensure that its jurisdiction exists.
If not, the court’s only authority is to acknowledge the lack of jurisdiction
and remove the case from its docket without addressing the merits. Courts
always have jurisdiction to determine their own jurisdiction, and on
appeal, superior courts always have jurisdiction to assess the jurisdiction
of the lower courts. We conclude that neither the trial court nor the court
of appeals had jurisdiction to reach the merits in this case, and we therefore
vacate their judgments.
Underlying this appeal is one of the many cases in which the
government invokes judicial power to terminate a parent–child
relationship—here, to terminate the parental rights of Mother, the
petitioner in this Court, to her two children. Prompt resolution of
parental-termination proceedings is so imperative a principle that our
legislature has taken the extraordinary step of divesting trial courts of
jurisdiction over cases that do not proceed to trial within a year. See In
re G.X.H., 627 S.W.3d 288, 292 (Tex. 2021). Strong cases, weak cases, easy
cases, hard cases—every case is subject to this jurisdictional mandate.
Further underscoring the legislature’s seriousness of purpose, the statute
does not direct courts to dismiss cases but makes dismissal automatic,
without any judicial action at all:
Unless the court has commenced the trial on the merits or
granted an extension under Subsection (b) or (b-1), on the
first Monday after the first anniversary of the date the
court rendered a temporary order appointing the department
as temporary managing conservator, the court’s jurisdiction
over the suit affecting the parent-child relationship filed by
the department that requests termination of the parent-child
relationship or requests that the department be named
conservator of the child is terminated and the suit is
automatically dismissed without a court order. Not later
than the 60th day before the day the suit is automatically
dismissed, the court shall notify all parties to the suit of the

2
automatic dismissal date.
Tex. Fam. Code § 263.401(a) (emphasis added).
The statute authorizes this automatic dismissal to be delayed in
exceptional circumstances, but only if the trial court properly grants a
limited extension before the one-year deadline. Id. To grant the extension,
the trial court must also comply with several requirements enumerated in
§ 263.401(b) that we have described as mandatory but not jurisdictional.
See In re J.S., 670 S.W.3d 591, 602 (Tex. 2023). Perhaps we have gone too
far in that characterization; for purposes of today’s case, we assume that
we were correct.
In cases like this one, where it is undisputed that trial did not begin
before the one-year deadline, the determinant of subject-matter jurisdiction
is the § 263.401(a) extension order itself. The trial court correctly identified
March 11, 2024, as the automatic-dismissal date. If the court did not
properly grant an extension before then, it would automatically lose
jurisdiction.
That threshold jurisdictional issue turns on what happened—or
more precisely, what did not happen—at the February 23 pretrial hearing.
That inquiry is harder to undertake than one might expect because the
transcript is riddled with omissions. No court reporter was present, so the
hearing was recorded and later partially transcribed. The result is a
transcript that reflects multiple instances of inaudible or unintelligible
statements, an unidentified speaker, and recording failure. The
transcriptionist unlucky enough to draw this assignment memorialized
these deficiencies with notations like “Unidentified Speaker”;
“Unintelligible”; “Sotto voce discussion, unintelligible”; and “Audio cut out.”

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As best as we can tell, here is what occurred. Mother’s counsel,
Danna Wolfe, did not appear in court due to a medical issue. So at the trial
court’s request, the lawyer representing the Department of Family and
Protective Services stepped out of the room to call Wolfe, then reported back
on how long Wolfe thought she would need for trial. At that point, the
parties determined that the presentation of evidence would take half a day.
The court correctly recognized March 11 as the fast-approaching
statutory automatic-dismissal date. Based on the volume of cases on the
court’s docket, however, the judge stated: “I don’t have anywhere to put a
half day that works with everyone’s schedules before March the 11th, so I
think I have to grant an extension and we can pick a date . . . during trial
week in April.” The court then asked the department’s counsel to “step out
in the hall again” to contact Wolfe and seek her availability that week.
Then came the key events. First, the judge said: “I am grant—I am
going to have to grant an extension.” (Emphasis added.) Based on the
off-the-record calls, the judge announced that Wolfe was available “any day
except Monday” during the week of April 8. The judge then indicated that
she was “going to put” the trial on April 12. Crucially, and highlighting
her awareness that an extension had not yet been granted, she directed
counsel for the department to “get me that extension order before March
11th.” (Emphasis added.)
The department did not submit the requested extension order. Nor
did the court take any other step to grant an extension before March 11,
such as making a simple docket entry to indicate that an extension had
been granted.
So after March 11 passed, Mother moved to dismiss the case for lack

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of jurisdiction. This motion was entirely proper and could have been raised
by any party, all of whom “remain duty-bound for as long as they invoke or
submit to a court’s authority to confirm the presence of jurisdiction and to
raise jurisdictional defects.” Rattray v. City of Brownsville, 662 S.W.3d
860, 867 (Tex. 2023). In light of the statute’s jurisdictional command, a
case that proceeds beyond the automatic-dismissal date should prompt the
court and all parties to carefully ensure that the court’s jurisdiction
remains secure.
At the hearing in response to Mother’s motion to dismiss, Wolfe
indicated that, due to the medical procedure that had caused her court
absence in February, she had been “under the influence of quite a few
medications” when the department asked about her availability for an
April trial and she “was not made aware” that an extension was under
consideration at the pretrial hearing. The attorney ad litem, who had
attended the pretrial hearing, could not recall an extension having been
granted. The court asked what would happen to the children upon
dismissal, and the attorney ad litem expected that “they would just go back
with mom.” She was comfortable with that outcome because Mother had
made “major strides since the beginning of the case,” the concerns she had
at the case’s inception “ha[d] been alleviated,” and the “kids desperately
miss[ed] their mom and want[ed] to go home” (a fact she mentioned twice).
The court then entered its private notes from the pretrial hearing
into the public record and issued an order purporting to retain the suit on
its docket. Following the eventual trial, the court terminated Mother’s
parental rights. The court of appeals affirmed. 717 S.W.3d 1, 27 (Tex.
App.—Eastland 2024). We granted Mother’s petition for review.

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We hold that the trial court lost jurisdiction on March 11. The record
leaves no doubt that, to its credit, the court understood that an extension
must come before March 11. Directing the government to supply a proposed
order before then was not a whimsical request, a mere housekeeping task,
or a formality of judicial administration. March 11 was the day the court
would lose jurisdiction—its power over the case—unless it invoked
§ 263.401(a)’s narrow exception to automatic dismissal before that date.
Equally clear is the trial court’s understanding that it had not yet
granted an extension. “I am grant—I am going to have to grant an
extension” reflects the point perfectly: the court was not at that point
purporting to actually grant the extension. The judge’s initial “I am grant,”
followed by the corrective “I am going to have to grant,” emphasizes that
the granting was still in the future and that the requested order was
essential to that step.
Indeed, getting the order from the government before March 11 was
vital precisely because signing that order was how the trial court would
grant the extension. Our dissenting colleagues depict that never-fulfilled
request as needless, treating a plan to grant an extension as equivalent to
actually granting it. The two are not the same. One who firmly plans to
get to the airport in time for a flight will not be treated as having arrived
at the destination on time if he inadvertently ends up missing the flight.
A step necessary to preserve jurisdiction must be undertaken, not merely
expected.
The court may have thought an extension was warranted and may
have fully expected to grant it. But it never did, which is the only thing
that matters under the statute. Why the extension was not granted, or

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whose fault that was (if anyone’s), is immaterial. Assigning fault is neither
relevant nor helpful. Lawyers and judges, like everyone else, make
mistakes. All involved in this case were busy and doing their best. Our
system could not function without men and women who dedicate
themselves to these sad cases—on the bench, on both sides of the bar,
and as agents of the government seeking to protect children. The available
resources are too few, the cases are too many, the legal process is too
intricate, and the stories are too heart-wrenching. We cast no aspersion on
anyone in the proceedings below. Fortunately, in this very case (and others
like it), if Mother is indeed unfit, the State retains an arsenal of heavy
weapons capable not only of protecting the children but even of instituting
new termination proceedings if necessary.
But none of that is relevant to jurisdiction. Since March 11, 2024,
the only lawful option for any court has been to recognize that the case was
dismissed on that date. The trial court thus erred by proceeding to trial.
The court of appeals erred by adjudicating the merits on appeal. This
Court’s authority is likewise limited to acknowledging the case’s dismissal
by operation of law and therefore vacating the judgments below.
Even if we could overlook this jurisdictional problem, however, a
second defect would still require dismissal: no extension was granted in
writing or orally in the presence of a court reporter before the statutory
automatic-dismissal date. Our dissenting colleagues must defend the
purported extension on this ground, too. For the avoidance of doubt in the
lower courts, we again reject their conclusion.
The key point, as this Court has already explained, is that a valid
extension can be granted only by rendering an order that complies with the

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Family Code’s specific definition of “render.” In G.X.H., we considered
whether a trial court’s docket entry made before the automatic-dismissal
date—simply indicating “extension granted”—was sufficient to “avoid
automatic dismissal and retain jurisdiction over the case” even though
docket-sheet entries generally are “insufficient to constitute a decree of the
court.” 627 S.W.3d at 297 (quotation marks omitted). The department
urged us to look to Family Code § 101.026 to determine whether the trial
court had validly granted an extension order and therefore satisfied
§ 263.401(a). Section 101.026 states that “render” means “the
pronouncement by a judge of the court’s ruling on a matter” and dictates
that a court’s pronouncement must “be made orally in the presence of the
court reporter or in writing, including on the court’s docket sheet or by
a separate written instrument.” Tex. Fam. Code § 101.026.
We agreed with the department. Section 263.401(a) refers to
“grant[ing] an extension,” which constitutes an unusually serious and
important ruling—the only one (according to our precedents) that
determines subject-matter jurisdiction. The definition of “render” in
§ 101.026 sets forth the means by which trial courts must pronounce
such rulings. The department thus correctly invoked § 101.026.
In turn, because § 101.026 expressly authorizes a court to
“pronounce or render an order on its docket sheet,” we held that “the only
reasonable interpretation” of the docket entry was that the court “granted
both a continuance of the trial date and an extension of the automatic
dismissal date under section 263.401(b).” G.X.H., 627 S.W.3d at 298. Only
because § 101.026 authorizes rendition by docket entry was the extension
valid in that case, as flimsy as the docket entry was (and bereft, too, of the

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mandatory findings upon which an extension depends). We did not
question that “rendition” was required. Given how strict the automatic-
dismissal date is, and how important an extension is—the coach turns into
a pumpkin at the stroke of midnight without one—the least that we could
read the statute to demand is rendition.
We were correct in G.X.H. that § 101.026 informs what it means to
grant an extension under § 263.401(a). Rendition is how a “grant” is
conveyed—it is the “judicial act by which the court settles and declares
the decision of the law.” Baker v. Bizzle, 687 S.W.3d 285, 292 (Tex. 2024)
(quoting Coleman v. Zapp, 151 S.W. 1040, 1041 (Tex. 1912)).
Subsection (b) requires a court to “render an order” making specific
findings, and subsection (a) requires the court to “grant[] an extension.”
Section 101.026 recognizes the uncontroversial principle that granting
an extension in a parental-termination case is to take the solemn step
of pronouncing a legal ruling extending jurisdiction pursuant to highly
limited statutory authority—i.e., it is to render a decision that carries
the force of law, thus triggering § 101.026, which requires that the
“pronouncement . . . be made orally in the presence of the court reporter
or in writing” in this context. Tex. Fam. Code § 101.026.
This statutory obligation is no huge burden, in truth. According to
G.X.H., a two-word public docket entry could do the trick if done before
dismissal. For subject-matter jurisdiction involving some of the most
serious civil cases known to our law, see D.V. v. Tex. Dep’t of Fam. &
Protective Servs., 722 S.W.3d 854, 858 (Tex. 2025), it is not too much to ask
for at least a simple docket entry to prevent automatic dismissal. To her
credit, the trial judge wanted to do more than this absolute minimum. She

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intended to have a proper written order—presumably one that would have
explained itself rather than rely on this Court’s forgiving approach to the
omission of the mandatory but non-jurisdictional findings. Doing so would
not have been hard. The department could have provided a simple order;
failing that, the trial court could have just written one itself. Failing even
that, it at least could have added a docket entry before March 11.
It is true that § 101.026 currently authorizes rendition either by
written order or given orally before a court reporter. Our dissenting
colleagues, having stolen one base (asserting that mere intention to grant
an extension is the same as actually granting one), seek to steal yet another
by arguing that oral extensions without court reporters are no different from
those announced with a court reporter. They invoke Family Code § 201.009
for this startling disregard of § 101.026’s unambiguous command. But
§ 201.009 simply allows family-court judges to record their proceedings if
a court reporter is not available. It says nothing about the specific
requirements for rendition. A judge may simultaneously record proceedings
without a court reporter (as § 201.009 allows) and “render” an order in
writing (as § 101.026 commands). There is no conflict in the statutes. We
hold that courts authorized to preserve proceedings without a court reporter
under § 201.009 are still subject to § 101.026, which means that they should
take the simple and easy step of rendering with a written order.
Even when there is a court reporter, however, a court is well advised
to render an extension order (and indeed any order) in writing rather than
orally. This is what the trial court here had planned to do. An extension
order must be “reasonably calculated to make the decision accessible to the
general public.” Baker, 687 S.W.3d at 293. The specific jurisdictional

10
statute at issue is one that is poorly served by proceeding only orally.
Section 263.401(a) is unusual in mandating automatic dismissal—that is,
by operation of law rather than upon a court’s order. An extension order
that is publicly available on the docket before that date is the only certain
and instant way of eliminating any doubt about whether the court has
granted an extension and thus prevented automatic dismissal.
So even if a court can render some orders orally when a court reporter
is present, that does not mean that it should do so, especially in this context.
Texas courts now may enter orders electronically, making them instantly
available to everyone; oral orders taken down by a court reporter become
available only once the record is produced. The legislature may well find
it worthwhile to consider whether anything other than written orders should
constitute rendition in light of that salutary development. For a statute
like § 263.401(a), instantly available written orders are especially important
to achieving the legislature’s purpose and avoiding later conflict about
jurisdiction.
Even if under current statutes and rules we may tolerate an oral
extension that is transcribed and eventually produced by a court reporter,
oral orders recorded without a court reporter—such as the hearing in this
case with the many technical problems we have described—are altogether
off-limits for rendition. Judges may currently have the authority to orally
render an extension before a court reporter, but we expect that they will
instead choose the more prudent course of issuing a written order for
matters as serious as extending the automatic-dismissal date of a
parental-termination case.

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* * *
The trial judge rightly focused on getting the extension done before
March 11 and doing so by a written order. Yet March 11 came and went
with no extension order. The court therefore lost jurisdiction by operation
of law. It should not have proceeded to trial, and the court of appeals erred
by reviewing the merits on appeal. No court—not this Court, not the lower
courts—has or had jurisdiction to proceed to the merits, much less to
render a judgment. The judgments below are accordingly vacated, and the
case is dismissed for lack of jurisdiction.

Evan A. Young
Justice

OPINION DELIVERED: June 5, 2026

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