In Re State of Texas

Supreme Court of Texas
══════════
No. 25-0674
══════════

In re Greg Abbott,
Relator

~ consolidated with ~

══════════
No. 25-0687
══════════

In re State of Texas,
Relator

═══════════════════════════════════════
On Petitions for Writ of Quo Warranto
═══════════════════════════════════════

CHIEF JUSTICE BLACKLOCK delivered the opinion of the Court.

JUSTICE SULLIVAN filed a concurring opinion.

Justice Hawkins did not participate in the decision.

It should always be remembered that the separation of the
great powers of government into different and distinctive
departments, each independent in its own sphere and
protected by constitutional limitations that neither can
transcend but which all must respect, is the distinctive
feature of our system . . . . The preservation of these
powers in their full integrity and independence is a matter
of common concern, for upon the freedom of their exercise
depend alike public repose and private security, and
neither will long endure if their abridgment be permitted
or encouraged. While the courts will not and should not
hesitate to discharge their responsible functions in all
cases that fall within the judicial authority, to them
peculiarly is committed the duty of emphasizing the
obligation that rests upon each department of the
government to observe its rightful limits, and for this
reason it is the more incumbent upon them not to exceed
their own.
City of Dallas v. Dall. Consol. Elec. St. Ry., 148 S.W. 292, 294 (Tex.
1912).
For a brief time in the summer of 2025, the Texas House of
Representatives lacked the two-thirds quorum required to do business.
See TEX. CONST. art. III, § 10. Several dozen House members left the
state, on August 3, for the express purpose of preventing the House from
functioning. They voluntarily returned two weeks later, and a quorum
was achieved on August 18. The redistricting legislation precipitating
this “quorum break” passed the House shortly afterward. The Governor
signed it into law on August 29. Congressional elections under the new
district lines are well underway.
Days after the absent House members left the state, the Governor
and the Attorney General each petitioned this Court for writs of quo
warranto removing from office certain of the absent members. The
petitions contend that by purposefully fleeing the state to prevent the
House from doing business, the absent members abandoned or forfeited
their offices. The accused members respond, among other arguments,
that “quorum-breaking” is a legitimate legislative tactic, not an
abandonment or forfeiture of office. Although the legislative stalemate
giving rise to the dispute was long ago resolved, the petitioners continue

2
to urge that removal from office is the necessary consequence of the
absent members’ actions. The respondents continue to advance a
variety of responses, both jurisdictional and substantive.
The potential constitutional magnitude of this litigation is
self-evident. Executive officers ask judicial officers to remove legislative
officers from their seats. At stake are fundamental questions about the
allocation of power between and within the branches of Texas
government, all three of which are commanded by our Constitution not
to “exercise any power properly attached to either of the others, except
in the instances . . . expressly permitted [by the Constitution].” Id.
art. II, § 1. Faced with any such question, our first instinct should be to
consult the Texas Constitution, which is by no means silent on the topic:
Two-thirds of each House shall constitute a quorum to do
business, but a smaller number may adjourn from day to
day, and compel the attendance of absent members, in such
manner and under such penalties as each House may
provide.
Id. art. III, § 10.
With these words, the nineteenth-century framers of the Texas
Constitution anticipated the situation in which our state found itself in
2025. They understood that in a legislature with a two-thirds quorum
rule, the power “to compel the attendance of absent members” can be the
difference between a functioning government and debilitating gridlock.
Id. They entrusted the power to compel legislative attendance not to the
judicial branch but to the present members of each House, to be wielded
“in such manner and under such penalties as each House may provide.”
Id. In a similar vein, the framers empowered not the Supreme Court
but “[e]ach House . . . with the consent of two-thirds [to] expel a

3
member.” Id. art. III, § 11. They also made “[e]ach House . . . the judge
of the qualifications . . . of its own members.” Id. art. III, § 8.
During the two weeks in which a quorum was lacking in August
of 2025, the present members of the House wielded their constitutional
power to compel attendance in several ways, including by withholding
financial resources from absent members. The modest measures
employed barely scratched the surface of the House’s broad coercive
authority to compel attendance “in such manner and under such
penalties as each House may provide.” Id. art. III, § 10. They
nonetheless proved effective. Other actors in the political process,
including the Governor—whose constitutional interest in legislative
affairs is naturally heightened when he has called the legislature into
special session—also sought by various means to pressure the absent
members to return. In the end, a quorum was restored in two weeks’
time, without judicial intervention, by the interplay of political and
practical forces.
“Courts have uniformly recognized that it is not their role to
resolve disputes between the other two branches that those branches
can resolve for themselves.” In re Turner, 627 S.W.3d 654, 660 (Tex.
2021) (collecting cases). The courts’ institutional “reluctance . . . to
involve themselves in contests of factional political power,” a reluctance
we reiterate and reinforce today, is a check on the judicial power “of
ancient standing,” not an optional preference we are at liberty to
discard. Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 288 n.21 (1962) (Frankfurter, J.,
dissenting) (citing The Duke of York’s Claim to the Crown (1460), 5
Rotuli Parl. 375, reprinted in EUGENE WAMBAUGH, A SELECTION OF

4
CASES ON CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1 (1915)). Nevertheless, once again “we
are asked to settle a dispute between coequal branches of our
Government, each of which has resources available to protect and assert
its interests.” Turner, 627 S.W.3d at 661 (quoting Goldwater v. Carter,
444 U.S. 996, 1004 (1979) (Rehnquist, J., concurring)). And once again,
as has so often been the case in our state’s history, the robust political
dynamics envisioned by our Constitution proved well suited to resolve a
contentious political matter on their own, without interference from the
courts.
Whatever wrong may have been committed by the absent House
members, the Texas Constitution’s internal political remedies, none of
which involve the judicial branch, were sufficient to the task of restoring
the House’s ability to do business. Should those remedies unexpectedly
prove inadequate in a future case, we might have occasion to consider
whether any judicial remedy could ever be available in circumstances
such as these. We resolve neither that question nor any other today.
The House’s temporary inability to function having been speedily
resolved by the political mechanisms envisioned by our Constitution, we
decline to exercise discretionary jurisdiction over the petitions for writ
of quo warranto, which are denied.

James D. Blacklock
Chief Justice

OPINION DELIVERED: May 15, 2026

5

Supreme Court of Texas
══════════
No. 25-0674
══════════

In re Greg Abbott,
Relator

~ consolidated with ~

══════════
No. 25-0687
══════════

In re State of Texas,
Relator

═══════════════════════════════════════
On Petitions for Writ of Quo Warranto
═══════════════════════════════════════

JUSTICE SULLIVAN, concurring in the denials of the petitions.

Last summer, the Texas Legislature was crippled when members
of the House of Representatives fled the State to deprive their chamber
of a quorum. They returned to Austin two weeks later, before we could
wield our “original jurisdiction . . . to issue writs of quo warranto.” Tex.
Const. art. V, § 3(a); see also Tex. Gov’t Code § 22.002(a). Today the
Court declines to oust the quorum-breakers from office with this
discretionary power.
I concur because this constitutional crisis passed too quickly for
us to engage in factfinding that might’ve justified quo warranto relief.
But we should be prepared to perform this grave task if legislators
refuse to do their jobs again in the future. To that end, I offer these
preliminary thoughts on how such quo warranto proceedings might go.

I
The writ of quo warranto dates back to at least the thirteenth
century. See Paxton v. Annunciation House, Inc., 719 S.W.3d 555, 566
(Tex. 2025) (citing 1 W.S. Holdsworth, A History of English Law 87–88
(3d ed. 1922)). The writ allowed the king to demand that a person show
by what authority (in Latin, “quo warranto”) he supported his claim to
an office or franchise. James L. High, A Treatise on Extraordinary Legal
Remedies, Embracing Mandamus, Quo Warranto, and Prohibition 544
(3d ed. 1896). If the respondent couldn’t produce a charter proving that
he rightfully held the office, he was removed. Id. at 545; 1 Holdsworth,
supra, at 88. The writ was returnable to the justices in eyre, 1 and as a
result the ancient writ of quo warranto fell into disuse after that system
of itinerant judging was abolished. See Baker, supra, at 156.

1 To spread royal justice, kings had a practice of sending justices to

travel throughout England. This took several forms, but by 1176, these
itinerant justices were organized into circuits. The justices were first known
as justiciae errantes (wandering justices) but later came to be known as
justiciarii in itinere (justices in eyre). “Eyre” is a French word that means
judicial circuit, but it came to represent the institution itself. At one point, this
system “was the most visible form of royal justice,” with large groups of people
attending the judicial visits “either to account for themselves or to seek justice.”
See John Baker, An Introduction to English Legal History 19 (5th ed. 2019).

2
The ancient writ was supplanted by a “less cumbrous procedure,”
namely, “an information laid in the King’s Bench by the attorney
general.” Id. This “information in the nature of a quo warranto” started
out as a criminal proceeding. High, supra, at 555. “Despite its criminal-
law roots, however, the information in the nature of quo warranto
developed into a purely civil proceeding and remains exclusively civil
today.” Annunciation House, 719 S.W.3d at 567 (internal quotation
marks omitted). The main difference between the new information and
the ancient writ was that litigants could file directly with the King’s
Bench instead of having to wait for the justices in eyre to come to town.
Id. 2 The information was so much more convenient that references to
“a writ of quo warranto” came to refer to a proceeding by information
and not to the ancient writ. High, supra, at 555.
The ancient writ of quo warranto was a “high prerogative writ,”
which meant only the king could use it. Id. at 544. The same was true
of the information in the nature of quo warranto until 1710, when the
Statute of Anne “authorized the filing of the information, by leave of
court, upon the relation of any person desirous of prosecuting the same,
for usurping or intruding into any municipal office or franchise in the
kingdom.” Id. at 554.

2 Justices in eyre, to whom the ancient writ was returnable, were largely

phased out by the 1330s. Baker, supra, at 23. King Henry VIII temporarily
brought them back for the sole purpose of issuing writs of quo warranto. Id. at
156. But from that time until the information was abolished in 1938, the only
writs of quo warranto issued in England were obtained by filing an information
instead of by the ancient writ. England’s last significant use of quo warranto
occurred when Charles II sought to revoke the City of London’s charter. Id.
That case was prosecuted by an information, not the ancient writ. R. v. City of
London (1682–83) 8 State Tr. 1039.

3
Quo warranto first came to Texas as part of the English common
law adopted by the Congress of the Republic in 1840. Act of Jan. 20,
1840, 4th Cong., R.S., § 1, 1840 Repub. Tex. Laws 3, 4, reprinted in 2
H.P.N. Gammel, The Laws of Texas 1822–1897, at 177–78 (1898). And
it was constitutionalized in 1891, when the People ratified an
amendment authorizing the Legislature to grant this Court original
jurisdiction over such proceedings. S.J.R. 16, 22d Leg., R.S. (Austin,
Gammel Book Co. 1891); see Tex. Const. art. V, § 3(a) (“The Legislature
may confer original jurisdiction on the Supreme Court to issue writs of
quo warranto and mandamus in such cases as may be specified, except
as against the Governor of the State.”). The Legislature did so in 1892.
Act approved Apr. 13, 1892, 22d Leg., 1st C.S., ch. 14, § 1, 1892 Tex.
Gen. Laws 19, 21, reprinted in 10 H.P.N. Gammel, The Laws of Texas
1822–1897, at 385 (Austin, Gammel Book Co. 1898). The relevant
statute now provides that “[t]he supreme court or a justice of the
supreme court may issue . . . all writs of quo warranto . . . agreeable to
the principles of law regulating those writs, against . . . any officer of
state government except the governor, the court of criminal appeals, or
a judge of the court of criminal appeals.” Tex. Gov’t Code § 22.002(a).
A different statute, originally passed in 1879 and modified only
in form since then, allows the Attorney General, a county attorney, or a
district attorney to bring quo warranto actions in a district court. Tex.
Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code §§ 66.001–.003; see also Act approved July 9,
1879, 16th Leg., 1st C.S., ch. 48, 1879 Tex. Gen. Laws 43, 43–44,
reprinted in 9 H.P.N. Gammel, The Laws of Texas 1822–1897, at 75–76
(Austin, Gammel Book Co. 1898). Almost all of this Court’s quo

4
warranto cases began in a district court. Indeed, we’ve been asked just
three times to exercise our original jurisdiction to issue a writ of quo
warranto. We granted relief in none of them.
First came State ex rel. McCall v. Manry, a dispute between two
candidates who both claimed the same office of district judge. 16 S.W.2d
809, 810 (Tex. [Comm’n Op.] 1929). Manry was elected to a four-year
term but, before he could complete it, the Legislature reorganized the
trial-court system and required that judges currently serving run again
if they wanted to keep their seats. Id. He ran against McCall and lost.
Id. Manry sued McCall in district court, which granted a temporary
injunction prohibiting McCall from assuming the office. Id. at 811.
Before the case went to trial, McCall invoked our original jurisdiction,
filing an information in the nature of quo warranto that we accepted and
referred to the Commission of Appeals for resolution. Id. at 811–12.
McCall argued that the district court didn’t have the power to decide
election disputes via an injunction and urged us to resolve the dispute
through our original jurisdiction to issue writs of quo warranto instead.
Id. The Commission held that district courts could decide such cases
through an injunction and that this Court had discretion to “decline to
take further jurisdiction” of the case. Id. at 813–14. We adopted the
Commission of Appeals’ opinion and dismissed the case to let the parties
pursue their remedies in the district court. Id. at 814.
Next was State ex rel. Todd v. Martineau. The law at the time
allowed practicing attorneys to elect a “special judge” if the regular judge
was temporarily absent, but not if he’d vacated his office. State ex rel.
Todd v. Martineau, 171 S.W.2d 856, 857 (Tex. 1943). Judge Wood left

5
the State when he was commissioned as an officer in the U.S. Naval
Reserve, and Martineau was elected special judge. Id. The district
attorney filed an original quo warranto action arguing that Martineau
had been illegally elected because Wood vacated his seat upon becoming
an officer in the Naval Reserve. Id. In a somewhat cryptic opinion, we
observed that the Legislature had also enabled county and district
attorneys to file quo warranto actions in the district court, and then we
concluded without much explanation that “a district attorney has no
lawful authority to file a quo warranto petition in the Supreme Court.”
Id. We set aside our order permitting the relator to file an information
in the nature of quo warranto. Id.
After we issued our opinion, the Attorney General moved to
reinstate the case, apparently signaling that if his absence from the
litigation was the reason why we refused to adjudicate the dispute, it
needn’t be. State ex rel. Todd v. Martineau, 173 S.W.2d 460, 460 (Tex.
1943). We overruled the Attorney General’s motion, noting that special
judges were only elected for eight-week terms and that it would be
impossible for the case to be presented to us and decided in that short
timeframe. Id. We reiterated that the action could be filed in district
court but declined to decide whether that avenue was exclusive. Id.
Lastly there was State ex rel. Angelini v. Hardberger. There,
Justice Hardberger announced in June 1996 that he intended to resign
from the Fourth Court of Appeals effective January 1, 1997. 932 S.W.2d
489, 490 (Tex. 1996). A statute arguably made the resignation effective
no later than eight days after the resignation letter was received, despite
the announced intention to resign later. Id. at 491. Believing the office

6
to be vacant as a matter of law, the Governor appointed Karen Angelini
to take Justice Hardberger’s place on June 28, 1996. Id. at 490. Justice
Hardberger refused to vacate his office until the date he’d specified. Id.
The State filed an information in the nature of quo warranto seeking to
have the office declared vacant. Id.
Our opinion began by characterizing our holdings in Martineau
and Manry as ordinarily requiring “parties seeking quo warranto to first
pursue their claim in district court” rather than invoking our original
jurisdiction. Id. But we “exercise[d] our discretion to decide this matter
without first requiring presentation to the district court” for three
reasons: (1) time was of the essence; (2) if Justice Hardberger had
vacated the office, his further actions would be invalid; and (3) there
were no disputed issues of fact. Id. at 490–91. So we permitted the State
to file the information, but “den[ied] the writ of quo warranto” because
we interpreted the statute as not creating a vacancy until Justice
Hardberger wanted one. Id. at 490–91, 495.
Although Manry, Martineau, and Hardberger leave many
questions unanswered, they establish an important point: Our
Constitution and laws have imported from England the information in
the nature of quo warranto, not the ancient writ. I reviewed all three
case files in the state archives and verified that each was litigated by
way of an information in the nature of quo warranto. That’s hardly
surprising, given that the ancient writ hasn’t been used in England since
the sixteenth century. See Annunciation House, 719 S.W.3d at 566–67;
High, supra, at 550–57.

7
When our Legislature first enacted a statute referring to
“proceedings by quo warranto” in the district courts, moreover, the text
expressly stated that those proceedings would take the form of an
“information in the nature of a quo warranto.” Act approved July 9,
1879, 16th Leg., 1st C.S., ch. 48, §§ 1, 3, 1879 Tex. Gen. Laws 43, 43,
reprinted in 9 H.P.N. Gammel, The Laws of Texas 1822–1897, at 75, 75
(Austin, Gammel Book Co. 1898). That 1879 statute established “the
necessity of proceeding by information in the nature of a quo warranto”
and “expressly re-enacted in many of its essential features” England’s
eighteenth-century Statute of Anne. Brennan v. City of Weatherford, 53
Tex. 330, 336 (1880). It’s safe to “presume that the Legislature acted
with knowledge of th[is] background law and with reference to it,” City
of Round Rock v. Rodriguez, 399 S.W.3d 130, 137 (Tex. 2013), when it
proposed the circa-1891 constitutional amendment concerning this
Court’s “original jurisdiction . . . to issue writs of quo warranto,” Tex.
Const. art. V, § 3(a).

II
To exercise our original jurisdiction over an information in the
nature of quo warranto, as the Governor and the Attorney General have
requested here, this Court would have to resolve disputed issues of fact.
Such a quo warranto proceeding would have us “correct the . . . non-user
. . . of a public office,” Brennan, 53 Tex. at 336–37, by removing quorum-
breakers from the House due to abandonment, see Honey v. Graham, 39
Tex. 1, 15–16 (1873). As the Attorney General himself opined during
the last quorum break, “[w]hether a specific legislator abandoned his or
her office such that a vacancy occurred will be a fact question for a

8
court.” Tex. Att’y Gen. Op. KP-0382, 2021 WL 3849510, at *2 (2021)
(citing Steingruber v. City of San Antonio, 220 S.W. 77, 78 (Tex. Comm’n
App. 1920, judgm’t adopted)).
This Court, like our federal counterpart, is “structured to perform
as an appellate tribunal[ and is] ill-equipped for the task of factfinding.”
Ohio v. Wyandotte Chems. Corp., 401 U.S. 493, 498 (1971). And last
summer’s two-week quorum break hardly gave us enough time to
complete this unfamiliar task. Now that the storm has passed, I’d be
hard-pressed to argue that this nine-member tribunal should try its
hand as a finder of fact. Cf. Hardberger, 932 S.W.2d at 490 (describing
the absence of “disputed issues of fact” as a “compelling reason[ ] to
exercise our discretion to decide” a quo warranto matter within our
original jurisdiction). That said, I hope our Court will stand ready to
put in that work the next time there’s a quorum break and an ensuing
information in the nature of quo warranto.
An appellate court that’s been vested with original jurisdiction
must have some way of trying the case before it. See, e.g., Texas v. New
Mexico, 602 U.S. 943, 975 (2024) (Gorsuch, J., dissenting) (“The
Constitution vests this Court with original jurisdiction . . . , an awkward
arrangement where we sit, in effect, as a trial court, a court of first (and
last) review.” (cleaned up)); Original Jurisdiction, Garner’s Dictionary
of Legal Usage (3d ed. 2011) (“[J]urisdiction to take cognizance of a case
at the outset, to try it, and to decide the issues . . . usually contrasted
with appellate jurisdiction . . . .” (emphasis omitted)). Recognizing as
much, other high courts have come up with a variety of strategies for
resolving factual disputes.

9
For example, early in its history, the U.S. Supreme Court
“impanelled juries as a matter of course at the beginning of every Term,”
though it appears to have used those juries on just three occasions.
Lochlan F. Shelfer, Note, Special Juries in the Supreme Court, 123 Yale
L.J. 208, 210 (2013) (citing Georgia v. Brailsford, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 1
(1794)); cf. William Francis Bailey, 2 A Treatise on the Law of Habeas
Corpus and Special Remedies 1277 (1913) (“At common law quite
generally, issues of fact arising in quo warranto proceedings were triable
by jury whether commenced in the supreme court under its jurisdiction
or in a subordinate court.”). Nowadays, it simply “appoints a special
master to take evidence and prepare findings of fact.” William Baude et
al., Hart and Wechsler’s The Federal Courts and The Federal System 350
(8th ed. 2025). Meanwhile, when the Wyoming Supreme Court is
exercising original jurisdiction, it can direct a district judge to hold
hearings and make findings of fact. Wyo. R. App. P. 20.
We could use any of the aforementioned strategies, or come up
with a new one, to resolve factual disputes that arise during the exercise
of our “original jurisdiction . . . to issue writs of quo warranto.” Tex.
Const. art. V, § 3(a). It’s up to us, because “[t]he Supreme Court shall
also have power, upon affidavit or otherwise as by the court may be
determined, to ascertain such matters of fact as may be necessary to the
proper exercise of its jurisdiction.” Id. art. V, § 3(b) (emphasis added). 3

3 Our all-too-convenient refrain about how we can’t resolve “doubtful

question[s] of fact” has arisen in the mandamus context, not the quo warranto
context. Love v. Wilcox, 28 S.W.2d 515, 519 (Tex. 1930) (quoting Teat v.
McGaughey, 22 S.W. 302, 303 (Tex. 1893)).

10
It’s been argued that the quorum-breakers would have a right to
a jury trial in any quo warranto proceedings before this Court. That
right, if it exists, must be found in our Bill of Rights’ decree that “[t]he
right of trial by jury shall remain inviolate.” Tex. Const. art. I, § 15. 4
We’ve long understood this provision to guarantee a jury if one would’ve
been granted in 1876. See Barshop v. Medina Cnty. Underground Water
Conservation Dist., 925 S.W.2d 618, 636 (Tex. 1996); State v. Credit
Bureau of Laredo, Inc., 530 S.W.2d 288, 291 (Tex. 1975); White v. White,
196 S.W. 508, 512 (Tex. 1917); Cockrill v. Cox, 65 Tex. 669, 674 (1886);
see also Davis v. Davis, 34 Tex. 15, 24 (1870) (construing the predecessor
to Tex. Const. art. I, § 15).
The question, then, is whether a jury trial would’ve been granted
upon request in quo warranto proceedings in 1876. My research has
yielded no solid evidence either way. The election dispute in Davis v.
State ex rel. Wren was tried without a jury, but it’s not clear whether
either party asked for one in the district court. 12 S.W. 957, 957 (Tex.
1889). My initial survey of our remaining quo warranto opinions yields
no better answers.
If the issue had been settled in other States around the time our
Constitution was adopted, that would suggest an answer. But it wasn’t.
Although every state constitution at the time provided for a jury-trial
right, States in the late nineteenth century were split as to whether this
right extended to proceedings on an information in the nature of quo

4 Our Constitution contains two civil jury-trial rights: one in Article I

and the other in Article V. See Tex. Const. art. I, § 15; id. art. V, § 10. But the
latter provision applies only to trials “in the district courts.” Id. art. V, § 10
(emphasis added).

11
warranto. Compare Buckman v. State ex rel. Spencer, 15 So. 697, 699–
701 (Fla. 1894) (yes); People v. Havird, 25 P. 294, 295 (Idaho 1889) (yes),
aff’d on other grounds sub nom. Gorman v. Havird, 141 U.S. 206 (1891);
People v. Albany & S.R. Co., 57 N.Y. 161, 174 (1874) (yes), with State ex
rel. Norton v. Lupton, 64 Mo. 415, 417 (1877) (no); State v. Johnson, 26
Ark. 281, 292–93 (1870) (no); see also State v. Allen, 5 Kan. 213, 222–23
(1869) (maybe so, and ordering a jury trial just in case). Absent further
scholarship, it seems that we can’t point to a settled practice that our
Bill of Rights would have rendered “inviolate.” Tex. Const. art. I, § 15.

III
Perhaps the most vexing question posed here is this: Who can
seek quo warranto relief? One of the quorum-breakers argues that only
the Attorney General, or district and county attorneys, may litigate on
the State’s behalf—not the Governor.
This position is undermined by the history outlined above. To
review, the ancient writ of quo warranto was a prerogative writ that
belonged only to the king. High, supra, at 544. At first, the information
in the nature of quo warranto likewise could only be instituted by the
king, acting through his attorney general. Baker, supra, at 156. But
that changed with the Statute of Anne, under which anyone could seek
leave to file an information. High, supra, at 554. And we’ve held that
statutory references to a writ of quo warranto incorporate the essential
features of the Statute of Anne. See Brennan, 53 Tex. at 336. Like the
Statute of Anne, our first statute enabled the Attorney General “either
of his own accord or at the instance of any individual relator” to request
“leave to file an information in the nature of a quo warranto.” Act

12
approved July 9, 1879, 16th Leg., 1st C.S., ch. 48, § 1, 1879 Tex. Gen.
Laws 43, 43, reprinted in 9 H.P.N. Gammel, The Laws of Texas 1822–
1897, at 75, 75 (Austin, Gammel Book Co. 1898). So perhaps anyone
could file an information, not just one of the People’s representatives.
On the other hand, in that same case, we said that quo warranto
proceedings could not be brought by private individuals, at least when
it came to proceedings questioning the validity of a corporate charter.
Brennan, 53 Tex. at 336; see also Wright v. Allen, 2 Tex. 158, 159 (1847)
(reaching the same conclusion about a quo warranto election dispute).
Owing to the dearth of Texas cases, it’d be tempting to look to
other States to get a sense of how the late-nineteenth-century American
legal community would’ve understood a constitutional reference to “quo
warranto.” But States at that time were all over the place. Some held
that private parties must have a particularized interest in the
proceedings, such as a claimed right to occupy the office. See Marian v.
Beard, 242 N.W. 880, 881 (Mich. 1932); Meehan v. Bachelder, 59 A. 620,
621 (N.H. 1904); State ex rel. Antrim v. Reardon, 68 N.E. 169, 170 (Ind.
1903); Miller v. Town of Palermo, 12 Kan. 14, 17 (1873). In
Pennsylvania, it was held that not even a rival claimant to an office
could institute quo warranto proceedings; only the Attorney General
could. See Commonwealth v. Cluley, 56 Pa. 270, 275 (1867). In at least
some places where quo warranto proceedings had to be instituted in the
name of the State, private relators could litigate them if the attorney
general refused to. See Buckman, 15 So. at 697.
In contrast, other States held that ordinary citizens could
institute quo warranto proceedings, often on the theory that every

13
citizen has an interest in ensuring that those who claim authority to
govern them actually have that authority. See In re Sherwood, 22 Haw.
385, 388 (1914); State v. Barker, 89 N.W. 204, 205 (Iowa 1902); State ex
rel. Nelson v. Mott, 86 N.W. 569, 570 (Wis. 1901); State v. Martin, 46
Conn. 479, 482 (1878); People ex rel. Hargrove v. Hilliard, 72 N.C. 169,
170 (1875); Mitchell v. Tolan, 33 N.J.L. 195, 199 (1868). One state court
even reasoned that ordinary citizens have a greater interest in
instituting quo warranto proceedings than do competing office
claimants. See Churchill v. Walker, 68 Ga. 681, 685 (1882) (citing
Hardin v. Colquitt, 63 Ga. 588, 592 (1879)); see also id. at 684 (“[O]ffices
are created by law for the benefit and convenience of the citizens, and if
any usurper should assume their duties, can redress be had only
through a contestant claimant? We think not.”). 5
Confusion on this issue seems to have been so rampant that one
state court adopted both perspectives at various points in time.
Compare Voisin v. Leche, 23 La. Ann. 25, 26 (1871), with State ex rel.
Saunders v. Kohnke, 33 So. 793, 797 (La. 1903). And even in those
States permitting ordinary citizens to institute quo warranto
proceedings, the lack of a particularized interest was sometimes a
reason for the court to exercise its discretion to withhold leave to file the
information. Robibero v. Hillery, 58 A.2d 596, 597 (N.J. 1948); State v.

5 It appears this is still the law in Georgia.See Georgiacarry.org, Inc.
v. Allen, 791 S.E.2d 800, 802 (Ga. 2016) (“If the relator happens to be the
defeated candidate, his right to file the information is in his capacity as an
interested citizen, and not in his capacity of a defeated candidate.” (quoting
Hathcock v. McGouirk, 119 Ga. 973, 978 (1904))).

14
Nohle, 112 N.W. 141, 142 (N.D. 1907) (“[W]e will not assume [original
quo warranto] jurisdiction . . . at the relation of private parties, except
in cases which present some special reason or some special or peculiar
emergency . . . .” (quoting State v. Elliott, 44 P. 248, 251 (Utah 1896))).
As discussed above, there is reason to believe that the ratifiers of
our Constitution would’ve understood it to allow any private party to
institute quo warranto proceedings in the State’s name. The Statute of
Anne allowed this, and our Court has treated statutory references from
this time as modeled after that English enactment. See Brennan, 53
Tex. at 336. If that’s true, it’s quite plausible that the Constitution’s use
of “quo warranto” refers to the common-law information as modified by
the Statute of Anne.
Admittedly, though, that view could be in tension with other legal
principles. Giving a cause of action to some random member of the
public who lacks a personal stake in the matter may be incompatible
with the doctrine of constitutional standing. In re B.I.V., 923 S.W.2d
573, 574 (Tex. 1996) (per curiam) (“To establish standing, a person must
show a personal stake in the controversy.”). And there may be
separation-of-powers concerns with the Legislature authorizing private
citizens to sue on the State’s behalf, a power the Constitution gives to
the Attorney General and to county attorneys and district attorneys. See
Tex. Const. art. IV, § 22; id. art. V, § 21; cf. In re Novartis Pharm. Corp.,
722 S.W.3d 720, 721–22 (Tex. 2025) (statement of Young & Sullivan, JJ.)
(raising these constitutional concerns with qui tam laws).
In short, this is a thorny issue that the parties to this litigation
only began to untangle. If someone other than the Attorney General

15
comes to this Court seeking to invoke our original quo warranto
jurisdiction, he’d do well to establish some special interest in the
outcome. The Governor’s quo warranto petition is an exemplar in this
regard: Given his “unique constitutional status” as “the superior
executive official” in Texas, the Governor “is not just first among equals.”
Paxton v. Am. Oversight, 716 S.W.3d 535, 549 (Tex. 2025). And it was
he alone who controlled the call for the special sessions of the 89th
Legislature that were hijacked by last summer’s quorum-breakers. See
Tex. Const. art. III, § 5; id. art. IV, § 40.

IV
When it comes to breaking quorum, maybe there won’t even be a
next time. After all, the People of Texas have made it perfectly clear
that “[t]he Legislature shall meet every two years at such time as may
be provided by law and at other times when convened by the Governor.”
Tex. Const. art. III, § 5(a) (emphasis added). “[W]hen the Constitution
provides and commands that a thing shall be done, the matter must be
done as directed, and neither the Legislature, Executive, nor the courts
have the authority to set aside the mandates.” Ferguson v. Wilcox, 28
S.W.2d 526, 533 (Tex. 1930) (emphasis added).
I won’t be holding my breath, though, given the recent pattern of
legislative walkouts here in the Lone Star State. It happened in 2003.
See Brooks Landgraf, Comment, The Golden Rule of Texas, 9 Scholar
427, 432–38 (2007) (recounting 2003 quorum break in which members
of the Texas House and Senate fled to Oklahoma and New Mexico to
prevent passage of a congressional-redistricting bill). It happened again
in 2021. See In re Abbott, 628 S.W.3d 288, 290 (Tex. 2021) (“Plaintiffs

16
. . . are members of the Texas House of Representatives who denied the
House a quorum by fleeing the state on July 12, 2021. They broke
quorum to prevent the legislature, in special session, from enacting
voting legislation they oppose.”). And then it happened again in 2025.
See LULAC v. Abbott, 809 F. Supp. 3d 502, 620 (W.D. Tex. 2025) (Smith,
J., dissenting) (“[Members of the Texas House] broke quorum and
delayed passage of the 2025 map for weeks. . . . [They] should not get
the benefit of the delay that they caused by breaking quorum.”).
Were it to happen yet again, I believe the next set of quorum-
breakers had better be ready to pay us a visit. Our original jurisdiction
to issue writs of quo warranto will empower us to inquire whether
they’ve abandoned their legislative offices and, if we so find, to throw
them out. Cf. State ex rel. Jones v. Lockhart, 265 P.2d 447, 454 (Ariz.
1953) (“It is the judgment of the court that the defendant is guilty of
usurping or intruding into the State Senate, . . . and he is therefore
ordered ousted and excluded from said legislative body.”).

James P. Sullivan
Justice

OPINION FILED: May 15, 2026

17