Shamrock Enterprises, LLC D/B/A Frsteam gulfcoast/la v. Top Notch Movers, LLC

Supreme Court of Texas
══════════
No. 24-0581
══════════

Shamrock Enterprises, LLC d/b/a FRSTeam Gulfcoast/LA,
Petitioner,

v.

Top Notch Movers, LLC,
Respondent

═══════════════════════════════════════
On Petition for Review from the
Court of Appeals for the Thirteenth District of Texas
═══════════════════════════════════════

Argued October 8, 2025

JUSTICE DEVINE delivered the opinion of the Court.

CHIEF JUSTICE BLACKLOCK filed a concurring opinion, in which
Justice Lehrmann, Justice Busby, Justice Young, and Justice Sullivan
joined.

This restricted appeal challenges a no-answer default judgment
based on defective service of process. The plaintiff sought substituted
service under a statute requiring process to be forwarded to the
defendant’s “most recent address . . . on file with the secretary of state.” 1

1 TEX. BUS. ORGS. CODE §§ 5.251, .253.
Assuming the defendant was amenable to service under that statute,
which is disputed, the record does not reflect that process was forwarded
to the statutorily required address. Because the lower courts erred in
presuming it was, we reverse the court of appeals’ judgment, vacate the
default judgment, and remand to the trial court.
In the aftermath of Hurricane Laura, Top Notch Movers, a
Texas-based LLC, provided moving services in Alabama and Louisiana
to Alabama-based Shamrock Enterprises, LLC d/b/a FRSTeam
Gulfcoast/LA. By letter addressed to Shamrock at a location in
Summerdale, Alabama, Top Notch demanded payment of more than
$170,000 for unpaid invoices. 2 Weeks later, Top Notch sued Shamrock
in Texas for nonpayment of services but provided a different address for
service of process. The original petition identified Shamrock’s “principal
office” as a location in Foley, Alabama, and alleged that Shamrock was
amenable to substituted service on the Secretary of State under
section 5.251(1)(A) of the Texas Business Organizations Code.
As Top Notch requested, the district clerk issued citation on
Shamrock via the Secretary of State at the Foley, Alabama address. The
Secretary’s Whitney certificate, 3 which Top Notch filed with the trial
court, states that copies of the citation and original petition were

2 The demand letter was also mailed to two ostensibly related entities

at addresses in Dallas, Texas, and Kenning, Louisiana, but neither entity was
named a party in the proceedings below.
3 See Whitney v. L&L Realty Corp., 500 S.W.2d 94, 95 (Tex. 1973)
(holding that a trial court lacks jurisdiction to issue a default judgment based
on substituted service on the Secretary of State unless the Secretary has
certified that a copy of the citation was forwarded to the defendant); see also
U.S. Bank Nat’l Ass’n v. Moss, 644 S.W.3d 130, 132 n.2 (Tex. 2022) (explaining
the origin of Whitney certificates).

2
forwarded to Shamrock at the Foley, Alabama address but the mailing
was returned with the notation “Return to Sender, Vacant, Unable to
Forward.”
When Shamrock failed to appear, Top Notch promptly filed a
motion for default judgment, certifying the Foley, Alabama location as
Shamrock’s “last known mailing address.” 4 The trial court granted the
motion and rendered a default judgment awarding Top Notch actual
damages, attorney’s fees, and costs. The district clerk subsequently
mailed the judgment to Shamrock at the Foley, Alabama address, but it
too was returned as undeliverable.
Several months later, Shamrock filed a restricted appeal seeking
to vacate the default judgment based on improper service of process.
The court of appeals affirmed, holding that (1) Shamrock was amenable
to substituted service under section 5.251(1)(A) of the Business
Organizations Code and (2) the Whitney certificate was irrebuttable
proof that Shamrock was properly served. 5
A restricted appeal permits a direct attack on a default judgment
when the deadline for filing an ordinary appeal has passed. 6 After
satisfying jurisdictional requirements not at issue here, a restricted
appeal may be sustained on the merits only if error is apparent on the

4 See TEX. R. CIV. P. 239a. The rule now requires a party seeking a
default judgment to additionally certify the defaulting party’s last known email
address, but that rule change was not effective when Top Notch filed its motion
for default judgment. See id. (amended Sept. 8, 2023).
5 711 S.W.3d 699, 700, 702-04 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi–Edinburg

2024).
6 See TEX. R. APP. P. 30.

3
face of the record. 7 When proper service is challenged in this procedural
posture, it must be proved, not presumed. 8 If the record does not
affirmatively demonstrate proper service, a no-answer default judgment
cannot stand. 9
As to that, Shamrock contends the record establishes that (1) it
was not amenable to substituted service under section 5.251(1)(A)
because it was not “transacting business in this state”; (2) even if it was,
Top Notch failed to strictly comply with that statute’s service
requirements; (3) due process requires reversal of a no-notice default
judgment when a Whitney certificate shows the Secretary’s attempted
forwarding was unsuccessful; and (4) a no-notice default judgment must
be reversed when the record does not demonstrate the nonresident had
minimum contacts with Texas. Because Shamrock is correct on the
second issue, we do not reach the others.
“To transact business in this state,” a foreign entity must register
with the Secretary of State, maintain that registration “while
transacting business in this state,” and designate a registered agent and

7 See TEX. R. APP. P. 26.1(c) (time limit for filing a restricted appeal in

a civil case), 30 (establishing requisites for a restricted appeal); Alexander v.
Lynda’s Boutique, 134 S.W.3d 845, 848 (Tex. 2004) (listing the four
requirements for a restricted appeal); see also Ex parte E.H., 602 S.W.3d 486,
497 (Tex. 2020) (explaining that all restricted-appeal elements are
jurisdictional except error on the face of the record).
8Spanton v. Bellah, 612 S.W.3d 314, 316 (Tex. 2020); McKanna v.
Edgar, 388 S.W.2d 927, 928 (Tex. 1965).
9 Hubicki v. Festina, 226 S.W.3d 405, 408 (Tex. 2007); Primate Constr.,

Inc. v. Silver, 884 S.W.2d 151, 153 (Tex. 1994).

4
office for service of process. 10 If the foreign entity fails to meet these
requirements, section 5.251(1)(A) makes the Secretary of State the
entity’s agent for service of process. Such service is effectuated by
delivering duplicate copies of the process and any required forwarding
fees to the Secretary, 11 who must then send one copy to the named entity
“addressed to the most recent address of the entity on file with the
secretary of state.” 12
Top Notch’s original petition alleged that Shamrock was
“required to register with the Secretary of State but has not appointed
or maintained a registered agent for service of process in Texas.”
Shamrock concedes it neither registered nor maintained a registered
agent in Texas but disputes that it was required to do so. As Shamrock
notes, the registration requirement applies when an entity “transact[s]
business in this state,” 13 but “transacting business in interstate

10 TEX. BUS. ORGS. CODE §§ 9.001 (identifying the foreign entities
required to register to “transact business in this state” and “while transacting
business in this state”), .004(b)(9) (registration must include the name and
address of the initial registered office and agent for service of process); see id.
§§ 1.002(28)-(29) (defining “foreign entity” as one whose formation and internal
affairs are governed by another jurisdiction’s laws and a “foreign filing entity”
as one who “registers or is required to register as a foreign entity under
Chapter 9”), 5.201(a), (b) (requiring a foreign filing entity “to designate and
continually maintain in this state” a registered agent and registered office for
service of process).
11 Id. § 5.252(a)(1), (a)(2)(B).

12 Id. § 5.253(a), (b)(1).

13 Id. § 9.001(a).

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commerce” “do[es] not constitute transaction of business in this state.” 14
Because the invoices Top Notch attached to its trial-court filings reflect
a business transaction between a Texas resident and an Alabama
resident for services to be performed in Louisiana and Alabama,
Shamrock contends the record demonstrates that it was engaged in
interstate commerce and, therefore, not transacting business in Texas,
not required to register, and not amenable to substituted service under
section 5.251(1)(A). Without resolving the parties’ dispute about those
matters, we can assume, without deciding, that Shamrock was subject
to service of process under section 5.251(1)(A) because error requiring
reversal is readily apparent in a different regard.
“[F]or a default judgment to survive a restricted appeal, the face
of the record must reflect that service was forwarded to the address
required by statute.” 15 For substituted service to count under
section 5.251(1)(A), the Secretary must have forwarded the process to
the address the statute designates: the “most recent address of the
entity on file with the secretary of state.” 16 Top Notch’s trial-court
filings alleged that the Foley, Alabama address was Shamrock’s
“principal office” and “last known mailing address,” but nowhere does

14 Id. § 9.251(9) (emphasis added) (listing activities excluded from the

meaning of “transaction of business in this state” “for purposes of this chapter,”
including “transacting business in interstate commerce”).
15 Wachovia Bank of Del., N.A. v. Gilliam, 215 S.W.3d 848, 850 (Tex.

2007).
16 TEX. BUS. ORGS. CODE § 5.253(b)(1); see Whitney, 500 S.W.2d at 94

(identifying two major requirements to support a default judgment based on
substituted service: (1) amenability to process under the statute and (2) proof
in the record that the defendant was, in fact, “served in the manner required
by statute”).

6
the record reflect, by allegation or otherwise, that the Foley, Alabama
address was Shamrock’s “most recent address . . . on file with the
secretary of state.” We cannot simply presume that the address Top
Notch provided is the one the statute requires. To the contrary, “the
face of the record must show that the forwarding address is the one
required by statute.” 17
The court of appeals held that the Secretary of State’s “Whitney
certificate conclusively established that [Shamrock] was properly served
with process,” 18 but this was error. Because we presume nothing, the
Secretary of State’s certification establishes only the facts stated
therein. 19 In this case, the Secretary’s certificate documented that
process was forwarded to Shamrock at the Foley, Alabama address, but
it did not identify that address as Shamrock’s address on file, let alone
its most recent one. Our opinion in Wachovia Bank of Delaware, N.A. v.
Gilliam forecloses reliance on the Secretary’s Whitney certificate to
presume that substituted service complied with the statutory
requirements when it does not so state. 20
Like this case, Wachovia Bank involved a restricted appeal
challenging a default judgment based on noncompliance with statutes

17 Wachovia Bank, 215 S.W.3d at 850.

18 711 S.W.3d at 703.

19 TEX. BUS. ORGS. CODE § 4.005 (“A court . . . shall accept a certificate

issued . . . by the secretary of state . . . that is certified by the secretary of state
as prima facie evidence of the facts stated in the certificate[.]” (emphasis
added)).
20 215 S.W.3d at 850-51.

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authorizing substituted service on the Secretary of State. 21 The statutes
at issue there required process to be forwarded to the foreign
corporation’s “principal office,” and we vacated the judgment because
the petition, citation, return, and Whitney certificate listed an address
without alleging it was the defendant’s home office, principal office, or
anything else for that matter. 22 And because “nothing in the record
show[ed] that the Secretary of State forwarded process to [the
defendant’s] home office or principal office as required by the statutes
on which the plaintiffs rel[ied], error [was] apparent on the face of the
record.” 23
The same infirmity is present here. While the petition, citation,
return, and Whitney certificate state that process was forwarded to an
address alleged to be Shamrock’s “principal office” and “last known
mailing address,” those are not the addresses the Business
Organizations Code designates for forwarding process to the defendant.
Various Texas statutes authorize substituted service on a government
official who must then forward service to the defendant at an address
designated by the authorizing statute, 24 but the requirement of strict

21 Id. at 848.

22 Id. at 850-51.

23 Id. at 851.

24 See, e.g., TEX. BUS. & COM. CODE § 302.108(b)(2) (requiring mailing

to “the seller’s principal business location at the last address on file with the
secretary of state”); TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE §§ 17.045, .091 (requiring
the Secretary to forward process to a nonresident’s “home or home office”); id.
§ 17.063 (requiring mailing by a “properly addressed letter”); TEX. OCC. CODE
§§ 1803.155 (requiring forwarding to “the address of the nonresident, as shown
on the nonresident’s registration statement”), 2051.402 (specifying service by

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compliance does not allow mixing and matching among those statutes. 25
Different substituted-service statutes provide different service paths.
The path Top Notch chose required forwarding to the most recent
address on file with the Secretary of State, and if there was no such
address because Shamrock never registered, Top Notch might have
made a case for substituted service under a different statute authorizing
forwarding to a different address or by a different method. 26 But having
hitched its wagon to section 5.251(1)(A), the default judgment can
survive only if the record demonstrates strict compliance with that
statute. The Whitney certificate is not proof that it does, let alone
conclusive proof.
As Wachovia Bank explains, a Whitney certificate conclusively
“establishes that process was served and forwarded to the address
provided,” but “we cannot presume” that “the forwarding address is the

delivery to the individual or mailing to the individual’s “place of residence” or
“principal place of business”).
25 Cf. McKanna, 388 S.W.2d at 929 (“[I]t is imperative and essential that

the record affirmatively show a strict compliance with the provided mode of
service.”).
26 See TEX. BUS. ORGS. CODE § 5.256 (“This chapter does not preclude

other means of service of process, notice, or demand on a domestic or foreign
entity as provided by other law.”). For example, the Texas long-arm statute
authorizes substituted service on the Secretary of State for a nonresident who
“has not designated or maintained a resident agent for service” but either (1) is
required by statute to do so or (2) “engages in business in this state”; however,
unlike section 5.253 of the Business Organizations Code, the long-arm statute
requires the Secretary to forward process to the nonresident’s “home or home
office.” TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE §§ 17.044–.045. In this case, Top Notch
did not seek and expressly does not rely on substituted service under the
long-arm statute to support the default judgment.

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one required by statute.” 27 In other words, absent fraud or mistake, the
Whitney certificate is irrebuttable proof that service was forwarded as
addressed, but it does not conclusively establish that “the forwarding
address was correct.” 28 As to that matter, the face of the record must
show compliance with the statute. 29 “When a default judgment is
challenged by restricted appeal, there are no presumptions in favor of
valid service,” 30 so unless the Whitney certificate “certifies that the
forwarding address is the one required by statute, we cannot presume”
that it is. 31
Despite the clarity with which Wachovia Bank elucidates the
distinction between what a government official’s certificate does and
does not establish, intermediate appellate courts, including the court of
appeals here, have overlooked this controlling authority. Before
Wachovia Bank, we had issued opinions describing a Whitney certificate
as conclusive proof that the Secretary of State “received service of
process” and “forwarded the service as required by statute.” 32 But as
Wachovia Bank explained and clarified, 33 in the context of those cases,
those statements did not pertain to a dispute about whether service was

27 215 S.W.3d at 850.

28 Id.

29 Id.

30 Id. at 848.

31 Id. at 850.

See Campus Invs., Inc. v. Cullever, 144 S.W.3d 464, 465-66 (Tex.
32

2004); Capitol Brick, Inc. v. Fleming Mfg. Co., 722 S.W.2d 399, 401 (Tex. 1986).
33 215 S.W.3d at 850 (addressing a misunderstanding about the scope

of the statement in Capitol Brick that was quoted in Cullever).

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forwarded to the address designated by the statute. It is this nuance
that some courts have missed in overstating the effect of a Whitney
certificate. Those decisions implying or affording more evidentiary
weight to a Whitney certificate than Wachovia Bank allows are
disapproved. 34
In Texas, “no-answer default judgments are disfavored” and
cannot be sustained absent meticulous adherence to service
requirements. 35 Such judgments are “tolerable” when “the absent party
could have appeared but chose not to do so,” 36 but “[i]f the defendant did
not appear because he or she never received the suit papers,” 37 then the
“failure to affirmatively show strict compliance . . . renders the
attempted service of process invalid and of no effect.” 38 Such is the case

34 See, e.g., Balkan Express, LLC v. Hollins, No. 01-22-00911-CV, 2023

WL 8720912, at *2 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] Dec. 19, 2023, no pet.)
(mem. op.); Dansk Express, LLC v. IPFS Corp., No. 01-22-00621-CV, 2023 WL
4937497, at *6 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] Aug. 3, 2023, no pet.) (mem.
op.); Acadian Props. Austin, LLC v. KJMonte Invs., LLC, 650 S.W.3d 98, 112
(Tex. App.—El Paso 2021, no pet.); MG Int’l Menswear, Inc. v. Robert Graham
Designs LLC, No. 05-18-00517-CV, 2019 WL 642724, at *3 (Tex. App.—Dallas
Feb. 15, 2019, no pet.) (mem. op.); El Paisano Nw. Hwy., Inc. v. Arzate,
No. 05-12-01457-CV, 2014 WL 147701, at *2-4 (Tex. App.—Dallas Apr. 14,
2014, no pet.) (mem. op.); BLS Dev., LLC v. Lopez, 359 S.W.3d 824, 828 (Tex.
App.—Eastland 2012, no pet.).
35 Spanton, 612 S.W.3d at 316 (“We have long held that a no-answer

default judgment cannot stand when the defendant ‘was not served in strict
compliance with applicable requirements.’” (quoting Wilson v. Dunn, 800
S.W.2d 833, 836 (Tex. 1990))); Hubicki, 226 S.W.3d at 408 (“[W]e rigidly enforce
rules governing service when a default judgment is rendered[.]”).
36 In re Lakeside Resort JV, LLC, 689 S.W.3d 916, 920-21 (Tex. 2024).

37 Sutherland v. Spencer, 376 S.W.3d 752, 755 (Tex. 2012).

38 Uvalde Country Club v. Martin Linen Supply Co., 690 S.W.2d 884,

885 (Tex. 1985).

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here. Nothing in the record, including the Whitney certificate, alleges or
identifies the Foley, Alabama address as Shamrock’s “most recent
address . . . on file with the secretary of state” as required for valid
substituted service under section 5.251(1)(A).
Having held that the record does not demonstrate strict
compliance with the Texas Business Organizations Code’s
substituted-service requirements, 39 we reverse the court of appeals’
judgment, vacate the trial court’s default judgment, and remand to the
trial court for further proceedings.

John P. Devine
Justice

OPINION DELIVERED: January 16, 2026

39 Primate Constr., 884 S.W.2d at 153 (the person requesting service

bears the burden of ensuring “service is properly reflected in the record”).

12

Supreme Court of Texas
══════════
No. 24-0581
══════════

Shamrock Enterprises, LLC d/b/a FRSTeam Gulfcoast/LA,
Petitioner,

v.

Top Notch Movers, LLC,
Respondent

═══════════════════════════════════════
On Petition for Review from the
Court of Appeals for the Thirteenth District of Texas
═══════════════════════════════════════

CHIEF JUSTICE BLACKLOCK, joined by Justice Lehrmann, Justice
Busby, Justice Young, and Justice Sullivan, concurring.

I agree with the Court that this record does not show strict
compliance with the applicable service statute and that default
judgment was therefore improper. I write separately because even if the
statute had been followed, our Constitutions would still require more.
The law’s deep skepticism of default judgments is no mere rule of
procedure. It is a “principle of natural justice which requires a person
to have notice of a suit before he can be conclusively bound by its result.”
Lafayette Ins. v. French, 59 U.S. (18 How.) 404, 406 (1856). Indeed, “[i]t
is a dictate of natural justice, as well as a general principle of law, that
every person to be directly affected in his interest or rights by the
judgment of a court of record is entitled to be named or described in the
suit, to have notice of it, and an opportunity of being heard in defense of
his rights.” Summerlin v. Reeves, 29 Tex. 85, 88 (1867).
To “bind a defendant personally by a judgment, when he was
never personally summoned, nor had notice of the proceedings,” is
“contrary to the first principles of justice.” Harris v. Hardeman, 55 U.S.
(14 How.) 334, 340 (1853) (quoting Borden v. Fitch, 15 Johns. 121,
133–34 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1818)). If judgment is thus rendered “without any
public notice of the proceedings, so that the parties in interest have no
opportunity of appearing and making a defence, the sentence is not so
much a judicial sentence as an arbitrary sovereign edict.” Windsor v.
McVeigh, 93 U.S. 274, 280 (1876) (quoting Bradstreet v. Neptune Ins.,
3 F. Cas. 1184, 1187 (C.C.D. Mass. 1839) (No. 1,793)).
For this reason, under both the United States and Texas
Constitutions, a “fundamental requirement of due process in any
proceeding which is to be accorded finality is notice reasonably
calculated, under all the circumstances, to apprise interested parties of
the pendency of the action and afford them an opportunity to present
their objections.” Mullane v. Cent. Hanover Bank & Tr., 339 U.S. 306,
314 (1950). In other words, “when notice is a person’s due, process which
is a mere gesture is not due process.” Id. at 315. Rather, the “means
employed must be such as one desirous of actually informing the
absentee might reasonably adopt to accomplish it.” Id. Attempts to put
the other party on notice of a lawsuit must therefore reflect the efforts
of someone who “wanted to do it, not merely had to do it.” Tex. State

2
Univ. v. Tanner, 689 S.W.3d 292, 299 (Tex. 2024); see also In re E.R., 385
S.W.3d 552, 565 (Tex. 2012) (holding that efforts to give notice “must
include inquiries that someone who really wants to find the defendant
would make”).
***
In December 2021, before filing suit, Top Notch sent a demand
letter to “Shamrock Enterprises Inc. dba FRSTeam Of Gulfcoast/LA” at
an address in Summerdale, Alabama. It appears that when Top Notch
wanted to avoid litigation and simply get paid, it used the Summerdale
address. Two months later, when Top Notch sued Shamrock, it alleged
a different address in Foley, Alabama. Top Notch also attached invoices
reflecting its transactions with Shamrock. Those invoices listed an
address in Kenner, Louisiana—where most deliveries occurred—as well
as a phone number and e-mail.
Because Shamrock, an Alabama company, had no registered
agent in Texas, Top Notch requested substituted service through the
Secretary of State at the Foley address it provided. The Secretary of
State received the citation on February 22, 2022, forwarded it by
certified mail to the Foley address on February 28, and later issued a
certificate stating that the mailing was returned “[b]earing the notation
Return to Sender, Vacant, Unable to Forward.” This certificate was filed
in the trial court on April 19, 2022.
Despite the evidence that its lone attempt at service had failed,
the record shows no further effort by Top Notch to notify Shamrock
before seeking a default judgment on May 2. The record does not reflect
that Top Notch sent any further communication to the Summerdale

3
address used in its demand letter or to the address in Louisiana listed
on its invoices. The record also does not show that Top Notch tried the
phone number on those invoices or used the listed e-mail address in an
attempt to either provide notice or figure out where Shamrock could be
served or notified. In sum, nothing in this record indicates that Top
Notch acted like someone who “wanted” to give Shamrock notice of this
lawsuit, Tanner, 689 S.W.3d at 299, or was “desirous of actually
informing” Shamrock that its rights were at stake, Mullane, 339 U.S. at
315.
As the United States Supreme Court explained in Jones v.
Flowers, “a person who actually desired to inform” another party of an
action would not simply “do nothing when a certified letter . . . is
returned unclaimed.” 547 U.S. 220, 229 (2006). This holding was not
novel. Indeed, “most” circuit courts and state supreme courts had held
that when mailed notice is returned undelivered, due process requires
additional reasonable steps. Id. at 227–28 (collecting cases); see also
Plemons v. Gale, 396 F.3d 569, 575 (4th Cir. 2005) (“Most courts have
reached precisely this conclusion. In case after case they have held that
the reasonable diligence standard requires a party charged with notice
to follow up when a mailing has been returned as unclaimed or
undeliverable.” (footnote omitted)). Texas courts have reached similar
conclusions in cases involving notice letters returned unclaimed. See,
e.g., Barnes v. Frost Nat’l Bank, 840 S.W.2d 747, 750 (Tex. App.—San
Antonio 1992, no writ) (“An unclaimed letter from the Secretary of
State’s office can hardly further the aim and objective of the long-arm
statute, which is to provide reasonable notice of the suit and an

4
opportunity to be heard.”); Orgoo, Inc. v. Rackspace US, Inc., 341 S.W.3d
34, 42 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2011, no pet.).
Jones rejected the idea that a party charged with achieving notice
is absolved of responsibility for the failure of notice simply because the
other party bears some responsibility himself. The Court noted that,
even if Jones had a statutory duty to keep his address current and bore
some responsibility for the missed notices, a “party’s ability to take steps
to safeguard its own interests” does not relieve the party charged with
notice “of its constitutional obligation.” 547 U.S. at 232 (citation
modified). In identifying what “additional reasonable steps” might look
like, id. at 225, the Court stressed that due process demands neither
exhaustive searches nor heroic measures. It pointed to simple, low-
burden options—resending by regular mail, posting notice on the door,
or addressing the mail to “occupant”—all easy steps that “one desirous
of actually informing” the owner might reasonably try. Id. at 235–36.
Another simple option, surely one that a plaintiff desirous of achieving
actual notice of a lawsuit would try, is to deliver the suit to alternate
addresses for the defendant that are known to the plaintiff.
The record contains no indication that Top Notch made any such
effort despite having multiple alternative addresses for Shamrock in its
own files, as well as phone numbers and e-mail addresses. Top Notch
knew that its sole attempt at service had failed because the certified
mailing to the Foley address came back “Return to Sender, Vacant,
Unable to Forward.” Yet despite having several different alternative
ways to reach Shamrock, Top Notch took no further action. Even if that

5
is what the service statute at issue might seem to permit in some cases,1
that is not what our Constitutions permit.
***
As a matter of both basic fairness and basic constitutional law,
any court asked to render a default judgment should require the plaintiff
to explain the steps it took to actually notify the defendant after learning
that its initial efforts failed. Irrespective of any statutes or procedural
rules about service of process, a party who can take further reasonable,
low-cost steps to provide actual notice of a lawsuit but does not do so
should never be permitted to obtain a default judgment in a Texas court.
That principle is already implicit in this Court’s precedents. We should
make it explicit in a future case. Because reaching the constitutional
question was unnecessary in this case, I join the Court’s opinion and
judgment.

1 Interpreting an earlier version of the service provision at issue here,

the First Court of Appeals remarked that “[t]he consequence of the appellee’s
actions is that a party to a lawsuit has the complete and absolute right to
ignore information it has concerning the proper address of the office of the
registered agent and then deny that party its day in court by obtaining a
no-notice default judgment.” Harold-Elliott Co. v. K.P./Miller Realty Growth
Fund I, 853 S.W.2d 752, 755 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 1993, no writ).
Even so, the court reluctantly “agree[d] that the appellee complied with the
literal interpretation of the statute.” Id. The Fourteenth Court reached a
similar conclusion under the current statute: “[A] diligent party may rely on
the registered address a corporation has placed on file with the Secretary of
State, even when the party knows that the address is no longer correct.”
Autodynamics Inc. v. Vervoort, No. 14-10-00021-CV, 2011 WL 1260077, at *6
(Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] Apr. 5, 2011, no pet.). It appears, however,
that neither court was urged to consider whether our Constitutions might
compel a different reading of the statute or a different result despite the
statute.

6
James D. Blacklock
Chief Justice

OPINION FILED: January 16, 2025

7