Red Bluff, LLC v. Nicole Tarpley

Supreme Court of Texas
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No. 24-0005
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Red Bluff, LLC,
Petitioner,

v.

Nicole Tarpley,
Respondent

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On Petition for Review from the
Court of Appeals for the Fourteenth District of Texas
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PER CURIAM

Generally, a party must file any post-judgment motions within
thirty days after the trial court signs the judgment. TEX. R. CIV.
P. 329b(a). But the trial court may extend that deadline up to ninety
days if a party establishes that, within twenty days after the judgment
was signed, the party neither (1) received notice of the judgment as the
rules require nor (2) acquired “actual knowledge” of the judgment. Id.
R. 306a(4). If a party makes that showing, the thirty-day period does
not begin to run until the date the party either received the required
notice or acquired actual knowledge of the judgment, whichever is
earlier. Id.
Until April 25, 2022, the procedural rules required a trial court
clerk to “immediately give notice to the parties or their attorneys of
record by first-class mail advising that the judgment or order was
signed.” Id. R. 306a(3) (Vernon 1941, amended 2022) (emphasis
added). 1 In this case, the clerk sent notice of the judgment to the parties
on February 8, 2022, four days after the trial court signed it on
February 4. But the clerk sent the notice to defendant Red Bluff’s lead
counsel by email rather than by first-class mail. Red Bluff’s counsel
asserts that he did not see, open, or read the email until after he learned
about the judgment on March 14 (thirty-eight days after it was signed),
when plaintiff Nicole Tarpley’s attorney sent him an email demanding
payment. 2 Red Bluff’s counsel immediately filed a notice of appeal that
day, along with a sworn motion under Rule 306a to reset the
post-judgment-motion deadline to run from March 14. On April 13, he
filed a motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict and a motion
for new trial.

1 The Court has amended Rule 306a twice since the clerk sent notice of

the judgment in this case. As amended, the rule now requires the court clerk
to “immediately send the judgment or order to the parties as provided in
Rule 21(f)(10),” which requires that notice be given through the state’s
electronic-filing system unless the judgment is sealed or otherwise restricted
or the party is not represented by counsel. TEX. R. CIV P. 306a(3); see id.
R. 21(f)(10). The parties agree that the amended rule does not apply in this
case.
2 Nicole Tarpley sued Red Bluff—her employer and a nonsubscriber to

the workers’ compensation program—for injuries she sustained while working
as a certified nursing assistant at Red Bluff’s rehabilitation facility. Based on
a jury verdict in her favor, the trial court’s judgment awarded her $7.1 million
on claims for negligence and premises liability.

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The trial court denied the Rule 306a motion, finding that Red
Bluff’s counsel acquired “actual knowledge” of the judgment when the
clerk sent notice by email on February 8. The court of appeals agreed
and affirmed. 679 S.W.3d 211, 216 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.]
2023). 3 Based on that finding, the court held that Red Bluff was not
entitled to a deadline extension and the trial court lacked plenary
jurisdiction over Red Bluff’s post-judgment motions. Id.
We disagree. Because the court clerk did not send notice of the
judgment “by first-class mail,” Red Bluff satisfied Rule 306a(4)’s first
prong by demonstrating it did not receive notice of the judgment as the
then-applicable version of Rule 306a(3) required. The question, then, is
whether Red Bluff also satisfied Rule 306a(4)’s second prong by
demonstrating it did not acquire “actual knowledge” of the judgment
when it received the email. We conclude Red Bluff satisfied that second
prong.
Like the court of appeals here, other courts have held that a party
acquires “actual knowledge” of a judgment when it receives notice of the
judgment by email from the court clerk, even if the party never saw or
read the email. See Rendon v. Swanson, No. 11-19-00260-CV, 2021 WL
3672622, at *4 (Tex. App.—Eastland Aug. 19, 2021, no pet.) (“[W]e hold
that sufficient evidence existed to support the trial court’s finding that
Rendon’s counsel acquired actual knowledge of the trial court’s
dismissal order.”); see also Park v. Aboudail, No. 02-20-00260-CV,

3The court first held that Red Bluff properly invoked its appellate
jurisdiction by filing the notice of appeal within Rule 26.3’s fifteen-day grace
period. See TEX. R. APP. P. 26.3. The parties do not dispute this holding.

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2021 WL 1421442, at *6 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth Apr. 15, 2021, no pet.)
(concluding the plaintiff “failed to negate that he timely received, yet
failed to read, notice of the judgment by email”). These holdings
misconstrue the rule. Notice and “actual knowledge” are alternative
sufficient conditions. See TEX. R. CIV. P. 306a(4) (“[A]ll the periods
mentioned . . . shall begin on the date that such party or his attorney
received [the required] notice or acquired actual knowledge. . . .”
(emphasis added)); see also Park, 2021 WL 1421442, at *6 (determining
the plaintiff failed to establish the date when he “first either received
notice of the judgment or acquired actual knowledge of its signing”
(emphases added)). If the court clerk fails to deliver notice of the
judgment as required, “actual knowledge” will independently suffice to
defeat a deadline extension.
Because the rules do not define “actual knowledge,” we give the
phrase its plain and ordinary meaning. See EBS Sols., Inc. v. Hegar,
601 S.W.3d 744, 758 (Tex. 2020). Under that meaning, “to have ‘actual
knowledge’ of a piece of information, one must in fact be aware of it.”
Intel Corp. Inv. Pol’y Comm. v. Sulyma, 589 U.S. 178, 184 (2020)
(emphasis added). “Dictionaries are hardly necessary to confirm the
point, but they do.” Id. Actual “knowledge” means actual “awareness of
a fact or condition.” BRYAN A. GARNER, Garner’s Dictionary of Legal
Usage 512 (3d ed. 2011) (contrasting “knowledge” with “notice”).
Actual knowledge must be “distinguished from constructive
knowledge,” which is “[k]nowledge that one using reasonable care or
diligence should have, and therefore [is attributable] to a given person.”

4
Knowledge, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (12th ed. 2024). 4 To acquire actual
knowledge of information, a person must in fact become subjectively
aware of the information. See United States ex rel. Schutte v. SuperValu
Inc., 598 U.S. 739, 751 (2023) (“[T]he term ‘actual knowledge’ refers to
whether a person is ‘aware of’ information.”). That the information was
available to the person does not establish his actual knowledge, even if
he reasonably should have become aware of it. If a person “is not aware
of a fact, he does not have ‘actual knowledge’ of that fact however close
at hand the fact might be.” Sulyma, 589 U.S. at 186.
Red Bluff’s lead counsel does not dispute that he received the
email providing notice of the judgment on February 8, but he avers that
he did not see or read that email until March 14. Perhaps he should
have. Perhaps he had constructive knowledge of the judgment. But
Rule 306a(4) requires actual knowledge, not constructive knowledge.
See LDF Constr., Inc. v. Tex. Friends of Chabad Lubavitch, Inc., 459
S.W.3d 720, 725 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2015, no pet.) (“The
rules do not . . . provide that the timetable commences on the date the
party should have acquired actual knowledge.”). The fact that Red
Bluff’s counsel admits that he received the email on February 8 “is no
doubt relevant in judging whether he gained knowledge of that

4 See City of Corsicana v. Stewart, 249 S.W.3d 412, 414-15 (Tex. 2008)

(noting that actual knowledge of a premises defect “requires knowledge that
the dangerous condition existed at the time of the accident, as opposed to
constructive knowledge”); State v. Tennison, 509 S.W.2d 560, 562 (Tex. 1974)
(“Actual knowledge rather than constructive knowledge of the dangerous
condition is required.”).

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information,” but the rule prevents the deadline extension only if he “in
fact [became] aware of that information.” Sulyma, 589 U.S. at 186-87.
Red Bluff’s lead counsel provided sworn proof that he did not in
fact see the clerk’s email or otherwise become aware of the judgment
until March 14, and Tarpley provided no evidence to contradict that fact.
Because Red Bluff also established that the clerk did not give notice of
the judgment by first-class mail, Red Bluff was entitled to a deadline
extension and thus timely filed its post-judgment motions. See TEX. R.
CIV. P. 306a(5). Without hearing oral argument, see TEX. R. APP. P. 59.1,
we grant the petition for review, reverse the court of appeals’ judgment,
and remand the cause to the trial court for it to consider Red Bluff’s
post-judgment motions.

OPINION DELIVERED: May 9, 2025

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