Nejla Kassandra Keyfli Lane v. Commission for Lawyer Discipline

Supreme Court of Texas
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No. 23-0956
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Nejla Kassandra Keyfli Lane,
Appellant,

v.

Commission for Lawyer Discipline,
Appellee

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On Appeal from the Board of Disciplinary Appeals
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JUSTICE BUSBY, dissenting.

Petitioner Nejla Lane, a licensed Texas attorney, sent emails in
2017 to a federal judge in Illinois that: called the judge’s rulings
“outrageous” and “fraudulent,” said the judge “ha[d] done [her] wrong”
and was “in this to delay and deny justice for [her] client,” exclaimed
“[h]ow dare you do that to me?!”, and threatened “[w]hat goes around
comes around.” The federal Northern District of Illinois and the
Supreme Court of Illinois suspended Lane from their bars in January
2018 and January 2023 respectively, concluding that her conduct was
intended to disrupt a tribunal and prejudicial to the administration of
justice in violation of their disciplinary rules.
Lane reported her federal suspension and underlying emails to
the Chief Disciplinary Counsel of respondent Texas Commission for
Lawyer Discipline (CLD) in July 2020. She also reported her Illinois
suspension in February 2023. The following month, the Chief
Disciplinary Counsel sought to impose on Lane a reciprocal suspension
from the State Bar of Texas. We are asked to decide whether this action
was timely.
When an attorney licensed in Texas commits professional
misconduct in another jurisdiction, our Disciplinary Rules of
Professional Conduct (Disciplinary Rules) and Rules of Disciplinary
Procedure (Procedural Rules) provide two pathways for discipline
relevant here. First, if the CLD receives notice of conduct in another
jurisdiction that constitutes professional misconduct under our
Disciplinary Rules, the Chief Disciplinary Counsel handles the
allegation as a “Grievance” using the multi-step process for ordinary
discipline cases in Part II of the Procedural Rules. See TEX.
DISCIPLINARY RULES PROF’L CONDUCT R. 8.05(a); TEX. RULES
DISCIPLINARY P. R. 1.06(R), 1.06(CC)(1), 2.10, 2.11(A), 2.12 et seq.
Second, if the CLD receives notice of professional misconduct under our
rules that occurs in another state and results in discipline in that state,
the Chief Disciplinary Counsel files the discipline order and a petition
for reciprocal discipline with a different tribunal using the abbreviated
process outlined in Part IX of the Procedural Rules. See TEX. RULES
DISCIPLINARY P. R. 1.06(CC)(2), 9.01-9.04.
The CLD disciplined Lane using the second pathway. The
question before us is whether doing so violated the following rule, which

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is entitled “Limitations”: “No attorney may be disciplined for
Professional Misconduct that occurred more than four years before the
date on which a Grievance alleging the Professional Misconduct is
received by the Chief Disciplinary Counsel.” Id. R. 17.06(A).
I would hold that even if this limitations rule applies here and
was not waived, as the Court concludes, Lane’s reciprocal discipline
complied with the rule. The predicate “Professional Misconduct”
relevant under the second pathway was not complete and therefore did
not occur until the Supreme Court of Illinois imposed discipline, which
happened only one month before the Chief Disciplinary Counsel received
the discipline order. But even if Lane had been disciplined under the
first pathway, the result would be the same: the emails that the Court
identifies as “Professional Misconduct” were sent in 2017 and the Chief
Disciplinary Counsel received information about them from Lane fewer
than four years later (July 2020), which constituted a “Grievance” under
the Court’s own reasoning. Because the Court reaches a different
conclusion by mixing up the two pathways, and its reasoning leads to
the absurd result that reciprocal discipline was barred by limitations
before the Chief Disciplinary Counsel could ever have sought it, I
respectfully dissent.
* * *
A defendant seeking judgment in its favor based on a limitations
defense must “prove (1) when the cause of action accrued, and (2) [when]
the plaintiff brought its suit,” which must be not “later than the
applicable number of years thereafter.” Draughon v. Johnson, 631
S.W.3d 81, 89 (Tex. 2021). Here, Procedural Rule 17.06(A) defines the

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two measuring points as (1) when the “Professional Misconduct . . .
occurred” and (2) when “a Grievance alleging [that misconduct] is
received by the Chief Disciplinary Counsel,” 1 which must be not later
than “four years” thereafter. The Procedural Rules provide definitions
of both “Professional Misconduct” and “Grievance” that help identify
each of these points with precision.
At the relevant time, Procedural Rule 1.06(CC) provided that
“‘Professional Misconduct’ includes,” as pertinent here: (1) “Acts or
omissions by an attorney . . . that violate one or more of the [Disciplinary
Rules]”; and (2) “[a]ttorney conduct that occurs in another state . . . and
results in the disciplining of an attorney in that other jurisdiction, if the
conduct is Professional Misconduct under the [Disciplinary Rules].” 2
Because Disciplinary Rule 8.05(a) provides that a Texas lawyer “also
may be disciplined in this state for conduct occurring in another
jurisdiction . . . if it is professional misconduct under Rule 8.04,”
violating acts under the first prong of the “Professional Misconduct”
definition can include acts in another jurisdiction, which are handled
under Part II of the Procedural Rules. See, e.g., TEX. RULES

1 In describing the CLD’s argument, the Court seems to suggest that

the second measuring point is when “discipline [is] imposed.” Ante at 15. That
suggestion is contrary to the plain text of Procedural Rule 17.06(A).
Elsewhere, however, the Court acknowledges that it is when a Grievance is
“received.” Ante at 20.
2 TEX. RULES DISCIPLINARY P. R. 1.06(CC) (emphasis added). As the
Court notes, this definition was amended in 2021 to include discipline imposed
by a federal court or agency. Ante at 18 n.7; Sup. Ct. of Tex., Final Approval
and Adoption of Amendments to the Texas Disciplinary Rules of Professional
Conduct and the Texas Rules of Disciplinary Procedure, Misc. Docket
No. 21-0961 (May 25, 2021).

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DISCIPLINARY P. R. 2.11(a)-(b) (prescribing venue when “the acts or
omissions complained of occurred wholly outside the State of Texas”).
Violating acts under the second prong of the definition must also
“result[] in . . . disciplin[e] . . . in that other jurisdiction,” id.
R. 1.06(CC)(2), and those acts are handled under Part IX of the
Procedural Rules. See, e.g., id. R. 9.01 (providing procedures for
reciprocal discipline when “an attorney licensed to practice law in Texas
has been disciplined in another jurisdiction”).
The Procedural Rules define “Grievance” as “a written statement,
from whatever source, apparently intended to allege Professional
Misconduct by a lawyer . . . received by the Office of Chief Disciplinary
Counsel.” Id. R. 1.06(R). 3 Thus, a “Grievance” must appear to allege
the relevant type of “Professional Misconduct” for which discipline is
being sought.
Here, the relevant type of “Professional Misconduct” for which the
Chief Disciplinary Counsel sought to reciprocally discipline Lane falls
under the second prong: “Attorney conduct that occurs in another
state . . . and results in the disciplining of an attorney in that other
jurisdiction, if the conduct is Professional Misconduct under the
[Disciplinary Rules].” Id. R. 1.06(CC)(2) (emphasis added). Because the
parts of this definition are joined by the conjunctive “and,” the
“Professional Misconduct . . . occurred” for limitations purposes when
Lane both sent the emails that allegedly violated our Disciplinary Rules

3 “Grievance” is a term used extensively in Part II but not at all in

Part IX. Nonetheless, I assume for purposes of argument that the concept has
relevance under Part IX as well. Cf. ante at 16-17.

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and those emails resulted in her discipline in Illinois. See ANTONIN
SCALIA & BRYAN A. GARNER, READING LAW: THE INTERPRETATION OF
LEGAL TEXTS 116 (2012) (explaining that “and” combines items so that
all items listed are required). Thus, the first relevant point for
Procedural Rule 17.06(A)’s limitations calculation is January 2023,
when the Supreme Court of Illinois disciplined Lane. The second point
is the “Grievance,” which the Court holds was Lane’s February 2023
report of her Illinois discipline. See ante at 16. Because these points are
separated by fewer than four years, Rule 17.06(A) does not bar Lane’s
reciprocal discipline.
The Court attempts to avoid this plain-text conclusion by
dismissing as “strained” the parts of the second prong of the
“Professional Misconduct” definition that are relevant to the reciprocal
discipline pathway in Part IX. Ante at 18. In particular, the Court
disregards when the resulting discipline occurred, concluding that the
only material fact for limitations purposes is “when the misconduct
occurred.” Id. at 19. In other words, the Court treats the second prong
as if it reads no differently than the first prong of the “Professional
Misconduct” definition, which focuses on the “[a]cts or omissions by an
attorney . . . that violate” the Disciplinary Rules. TEX. RULES
DISCIPLINARY P. R. 1.06(CC)(1). As explained above, the first prong
already makes actionable any acts or omissions in another state that
violate those rules. Thus, the Court’s reading renders the second prong
a nullity.
That cannot be correct; we must give effect to the different
wording of these alternative definitions. And if the Court were correct

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in disregarding the Illinois discipline, this disciplinary proceeding
should have been brought using the full procedural safeguards offered
by Part II of the Procedural Rules, which it was not. But even indulging
the Court’s framing that the relevant date of the Professional
Misconduct is simply when the violation occurs, as if this were not really
a reciprocal discipline case after all, Lane’s discipline is not barred by
limitations.
According to the Court, Lane’s “Professional Misconduct . . .
occurred” under Procedural Rule 17.06(A) when she sent the emails to
the judge in 2017. Ante at 20. As discussed, the other relevant date for
limitations purposes is specified later in the same sentence of the rule:
when “a Grievance alleging the Professional Misconduct”—the very
same Professional Misconduct that the rule just said occurred—“is
received by the Chief Disciplinary Counsel.” TEX. RULES DISCIPLINARY
P. R. 17.06(A) (emphasis added). Applying the Court’s own
understanding of what constitutes a “Grievance,” the Chief Disciplinary
Counsel received allegations of Lane’s misconduct from Lane herself in
2020. On July 29, 2020, Lane submitted an electronic contact form to
the Chief Disciplinary Counsel disclosing her 2017 emails to the federal
judge, the federal discipline, and the ongoing Illinois misconduct
investigation. Because this was Lane’s first submission that—in the
Court’s words—“plainly include[s] and incorporate[s] the allegations of
Lane’s misconduct,” it “falls within the scope of Rule 1.06(R)’s definition
of a Grievance.” Ante at 16. Under this approach, too, the Professional
Misconduct occurred fewer than four years before a Grievance alleging

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that misconduct was received, so Procedural Rule 17.06(A) does not bar
Lane’s discipline.
The Court attempts to avoid this conclusion as well, but its
reasoning is internally inconsistent. It observes that the “Professional
Misconduct referred to in Rule 17.06(A)” was Lane’s “sending three
discrete emails” to the judge in 2017. Ante at 20. But it holds that the
“Grievance alleging the Professional Misconduct was received” 4 when
the Chief Disciplinary Counsel “received the Illinois Supreme Court’s
judgment of suspension in 2023,” id., despite its earlier statement that
“Rule 17.06(A)’s focus . . . is on when the misconduct occurred,” not upon
the “resulting discipline.” Id. at 19. In other words, the Court treats the
“Professional Misconduct” as sending the emails for purposes of
determining the occurrence date but as imposing the discipline for
purposes of determining the grievance date.
This analysis improperly gives two different meanings to the term
“Professional Misconduct” in the very same sentence of Procedural
Rule 17.06(A). And it mixes up the separate procedural pathways for
discipline based on out-of-state Professional Misconduct, using the
misconduct at issue in Part II cases—the act or omission violating the
Disciplinary Rules—to determine the occurrence date but the
misconduct at issue in Part IX cases—the violating conduct and the
resulting discipline—to determine the grievance date.
The Court attempts to wave this contradiction away by
introducing the concept of an “operative” grievance on which the Chief

4 TEX. RULES DISCIPLINARY P. R. 17.06(A).

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Disciplinary Counsel takes action. Id. at 20-21. But Procedural Rule
17.06 contains no such concept. Instead, Parts II and IX identify the
applicable grievance and when the Chief Disciplinary Counsel must act.
For ordinary grievances, the Chief Disciplinary Counsel has thirty days
after receipt to classify them and (generally) sixty days to investigate
those classified as complaints. See TEX. RULES DISCIPLINARY P. R. 2.10,
2.12(A)(1). For reciprocal discipline under Part IX, the Chief
Disciplinary Counsel must act “diligently” “[u]pon receipt of information
that a [Texas-licensed] attorney . . . has been disciplined in another
jurisdiction” to obtain a certified copy of the disciplinary order and file
her petition. Id. R. 9.01. Here, she did so within one month of receiving
information about Lane’s Illinois suspension. Thus, the Court is simply
wrong to suggest that its counter-textual reading of Procedural
Rules 1.06(CC) and 17.06 is required to prevent the Chief Disciplinary
Counsel from sitting on a grievance for decades. The Court’s response
also pretends that the Chief Disciplinary Counsel received the very
same grievance in 2023 that she did in 2020, but that too is incorrect.
Her petition under Part IX makes clear that just as Procedural Rule 9.01
required, she took diligent action after receiving notice of the Illinois
judgment—the first information she received that provided a basis for
reciprocal discipline. 5
Finally, the Court’s holding today leads to an absurd result: that
Procedural Rule 17.06(A) bars the Chief Disciplinary Counsel from

5 As previously discussed, our Procedural Rules did not provide for
reciprocal discipline based on federal-court disciplinary orders at the time
Lane was suspended by the federal court. Ante at 18 n.7; see also supra note 2.

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performing her duty to pursue reciprocal discipline under Part IX before
she could ever have done so. Procedural Rule 9.01 provides that “[u]pon
receipt of information indicating that an attorney licensed to practice
law in Texas has been disciplined in another jurisdiction . . . the Chief
Disciplinary Counsel shall” obtain a copy of the order or judgment of
discipline and file it with a petition requesting reciprocal discipline in
Texas. Id. (emphasis added). Obviously, the Chief Disciplinary Counsel
cannot carry out this duty before an order or judgment of discipline
exists. But here, the Court holds that even though the Chief
Disciplinary Counsel received the Illinois judgment of suspension within
a month of its issuance and filed it promptly, she was too late because
the misconduct—which alone cannot provide a basis for reciprocal
discipline under Part IX—“occurred more than four years before.” Ante
at 20.
This result is fundamentally at odds with the nature of a statute
of limitations. Texas courts, like other American courts, recognize a
“strong background presumption” that “a cause of action does not
become complete and present for limitations purposes until the plaintiff
can file suit and obtain relief.” Corner Post, Inc. v. Bd. of Governors of
Fed. Rsrv. Sys., 603 U.S. 799, 811 (2024) (internal quotation marks
omitted); see, e.g., Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Rincones, 520 S.W.3d 572, 593
(Tex. 2017); Provident Life & Accident Ins. Co. v. Knott, 128 S.W.3d 211,
221 (Tex. 2013). Although this “standard rule can be displaced such that
the limitations period begins to run before a plaintiff can file a suit,
[courts] will not infer such an odd result in the absence of any such
indication in the text of the limitations period.” Corner Post, 603 U.S.

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at 811 (internal quotation marks omitted). There is no such language
in Procedural Rule 17.06(A). Yet the Court transforms this rule entitled
“Limitations” into a rule of repose, 6 imposing an absolute time limit on
bringing a claim even before a cause of action accrues despite the lack of
any textual support for that result.
I recognize, of course, that there is a fundamental policy question
underlying today’s decision. If the Chief Disciplinary Counsel receives
an allegation that a Texas lawyer has committed out-of-state
misconduct that violates our Disciplinary Rules, must she pursue that
misconduct under Part II of the Procedural Rules? Or may she, in the
interest of comity and conservation of scarce resources, await the results
of ongoing disciplinary proceedings in the state where the professional
misconduct occurred and then, if that state imposes discipline, ask a
Texas tribunal to order reciprocal discipline under the abbreviated
procedure in Part IX? I can see good arguments on both sides, and I
favor amending our Procedural Rules to expressly resolve the question.
But nothing currently in the text of our Procedural Rules suggests
that the limitations period of Procedural Rule 17.06(A) can force the
Chief Disciplinary Counsel to pursue the Part II pathway and forfeit the
Part IX pathway if disciplinary proceedings in the other state take too
long. Today’s opinion essentially amends our rules to impose that result
without notice to the parties or the public, contrary to this Court’s
long-held view that “we do not revise our rules by opinion.” State Dep’t

6 See Holubec v. Brandenberger, 111 S.W.3d 32, 37 (Tex. 2003); Trinity

River Auth. v. URS Consultants, Inc., 889 S.W.2d 259, 263 (Tex. 1994)
(“Statutes of repose differ from traditional limitations, of course, in that they
potentially cut off a right of action before it accrues.”).

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of Highways & Pub. Transp. v. Payne, 838 S.W.2d 235, 241 (Tex. 1992). 7
Indeed, we may not do so because rule amendments require notice, an
opportunity to comment, and—as to rules of disciplinary conduct and
procedure—approval by members of the state bar in a referendum. See
TEX. GOV’T CODE §§ 81.0876(a), 81.0878. None of those steps have been
taken here.
At the very least, when we change the rules after the game has
been played, we should give the parties an opportunity to play again
under the new rules—for example, by using the Part II pathway to
resolve this grievance. See, e.g., Carowest Land, Ltd. v. City of New
Braunfels, 615 S.W.3d 156, 158-59 (Tex. 2020) (collecting cases).
Because the Court does not, I respectfully dissent.

J. Brett Busby
Justice

OPINION FILED: June 6, 2025

7 See also Alvarado v. Farah Mfg. Co., 830 S.W.2d 911, 915 (Tex. 1992)

(“[W]e are not free to disregard [the rule’s] plain language. Nor should we
revise the rule by opinion. The Legislature has provided that notice be given
before rules amendments become effective. TEX. GOV’T CODE § 22.004. In
addition, this Court has structured the rules-revision process to encourage
advice and comment from the bench and bar, and from the public generally. . . .
While those processes are at work, we adhere to the language of the rule and
our consistent precedent.”).

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