Fiberwave v. AT&T Enterprises, 2026 Tex. Bus 2. (1st Div.) (mem. op.)

2026 Tex. Bus. 2
The Business Court of Texas,
First Division
FIBERWAVE, INC., f/k/a
SPEARHEAD CONSULTING, INC.,
Plaintiff,
v.
AT&T ENTERPRISES, LLC, f/k/a
AT&T CORP.,
Defendant/Counter-Plaintiff,
v.
FIBERWAVE, INC., f/k/a
SPEARHEAD CONSULTING, INC.,
SPEARHEAD NETWORKS TECH,
INC., FAISAL CHAUDHRY, and
CHRIS PERCY,
Counter-Defendants.
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Cause No. 25-BC01A-0013
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Memorandum Opinion and Order Granting Defendant’s Motion for
Summary Judgment on Plaintiff’s Defamation Claim
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¶1 	Before 	the 	Court 	is 	Defendant 	AT&T 	Enterprises, 	LLC’s
Traditional and No-Evidence Motion for Summary Judgment on Plaintiff’s
Defamation Claim and attendant briefing. Defendant chiefly argues that
Plaintiff has proffered no evidence of a false, defamatory statement or that

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AT&T knew or should have known of its falsity. See AT&T’s Motion at p. 1.
Concluding that the summary judgment record reflects no evidence of either
element, the Court GRANTS Defendant’s motion.
I. 	Applicable Legal Standard
¶2 	After adequate time for discovery, a party may move for summary
judgment on an opposing party’s claims on no-evidence grounds. Tex. R. Civ.
P. 166a(i); KCM Fin. LLC v. Bradshaw, 457 S.W.3d 70, 79 (Tex. 2015). Such
a motion “puts the burden on the nonmovant ‘to present evidence raising an
issue of material fact as to the elements specified in the motion.’” State v.
Three Thousand, Seven Hundred Seventy-Four Dollars and Twenty-Eight Cents
U.S. Currency ($3,774.28), 713 S.W.3d 381, 387 (Tex. 2025) (quoting Mack
Trucks, Inc. v. Tamez, 206 S.W.3d 572, 582 (Tex. 2006)).
¶3 	A trial court will grant a no-evidence motion if “there is a
complete absence of evidence of a vital fact,” or when “the evidence offered
to prove a vital fact is no more than a mere scintilla.” Merrell Dow Pharms.,
Inc. v. Havner, 953 S.W.2d 706, 711 (Tex. 1997). “Less than a scintilla of
evidence exists when the evidence is ‘so weak as to do no more than create a
mere surmise or suspicion’ of a fact.” King Ranch, Inc. v. Chapman, 118

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S.W.3d 742, 751 (Tex. 2003) (quoting Kindred v. Con/Chem, Inc., 650
S.W.2d 61, 63 (Tex. 1983)).
II. 	Summary of AT&T’s Motion
¶4 	By its suit, Fiberwave alleges that the following statement—
communicated via email by AT&T to its “solution providers” on April 3,
2024—constituted textual defamation by implication:1
Acting with integrity and doing the right thing are part of our
culture. These values underpin how we operate and upholding
them can require making difficult business decisions. We want to
let you know that we have decided to end our business relationship
with one of our Alliance Channel partners, specifically Spearhead
Consulting, 	also 	known 	as 	FiberWave 	and 	related 	entities
(collectively, “Spearhead”).
Fiberwave’s Response Ex. 1-A at p. 2. Fiberwave claims that this statement
“cunningly 	implied 	that 	Fiberwave’s 	business 	was 	not 	conducted 	with
integrity or with doing the right thing in mind, and AT&T was thus forced to
terminate its business with Fiberwave.” Fiberwave’s Response at ¶ 10.
¶5 	AT&T primarily moves for judgment on Fiberwave’s defamation
claim on no-evidence grounds. To prevail on a cause of action for defamation,
1 Fiberwave alleges that AT&T reiterated its defamatory statement in a second email on
April 18, 2025. The second email is subject to an agreed protective order. The allegedly-
defamatory content in the two emails is substantially the same, making the application of
the law the same for both communications.

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a plaintiff must prove “(1) the publication of a false statement of fact to a third
party, (2) that was defamatory concerning the plaintiff, (3) with the requisite
degree of fault, and (4) damages, in some cases.” In re Lipsky, 460 S.W.3d
579, 593 (Tex. 2015). AT&T’s motion challenges Fiberwave’s claim on the
second and third elements.2 See AT&T’s Motion at p. 1.
III. 	Analysis
A. 	A False and Defamatory Statement
¶6 	AT&T 	contends 	Fiberwave 	has 	“no 	evidence 	that 	AT&T
published a false and defamatory statement.” AT&T’s Motion at p. 3. The
Court agrees. The statements by AT&T about which Fiberwave complains are
not 	objectively 	verifiable 	and 	therefore, 	as 	a 	matter 	of 	law, 	are 	not
defamatory. 3 Further, Fiberwave proffered no evidence of this element,
2 AT&T’s motion first sought traditional summary judgment by challenging Fiberwave’s
standing and lastly argued that Fiberwave had no evidence of damages. See AT&T’s Motion
at p. 1. AT&T subsequently abandoned its first argument, leaving only the no-evidence
motion before the Court. See AT&T’s Reply at p. 2, n. 1. And as acknowledged by AT&T in
its Reply, the Court need not reach the issue of damages. See id.
3 Fiberwave argues that AT&T failed to raise “the objectively verifiable fact ground in [its]
motion.” But a movant for no-evidence summary judgment need only identify the
challenged elements to provide adequate notice to the non-movant. See State, 713 S.W.3d
at 388. Whether a statement is objectively verifiable goes directly to the element of the
existence of a false and defamatory statement, which AT&T’s motion expressly challenged.
See Dallas Morning News, Inc. v. Tatum, 554 S.W.3d 614, 638 (Tex. 2018) (noting that
“statements that are not verifiable as false are not defamatory” (internal quotation
omitted)). Thus, the issue was sufficiently raised by AT&T’s motion.

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offering 	only 	a 	conclusory 	declaration 	expressing 	opposing 	opinions.
Accordingly, judgment for AT&T on this issue is warranted.
¶7 	To be defamatory, a statement must be verifiable as false. Dallas
Morning News, Inc. v. Tatum, 554 S.W.3d 614, 638 (Tex. 2018); see Lilith
Fund for Reprod. Equity v. Dickson, 662 S.W.3d 355, 363 (Tex. 2023)
(distinguishing between defamatory statement and opinion). A court assaying
the verifiability of a challenged statement will take into consideration the type
of writing in which the statement was made and pay particular attention to the
context in which the statement was made. See Dallas Morning News, 554
S.W.3d at 639. This is so because “even when a statement is verifiable as false,
it does not give rise to liability if the ‘entire context in which it was made’
discloses that it is merely an opinion masquerading as fact.” Id. (quoting
Bentley v. Bunton, 94 S.W.3d 561, 581 (Tex. 2002)). Whether an allegedly
defamatory statement is “a verifiable falsity is a question of law.” Lilith Fund,
662 S.W.3d at 363.
¶8 	AT&T 	argues 	that 	under 	existing 	precedent 	the 	challenged
statements 	are 	not 	defamatory 	because 	they 	involve 	an 	opinion—an
“individual judgment that rests solely in the eye of the beholder.” AT&T
Reply at p. 3 (quoting Avila v. Larrea, 394 S.W.3d 646, 659 (Tex. App.—

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Dallas 2012, pet. denied)). AT&T points the Court to numerous cases in which
courts held that sentiments akin to those allegedly implied by AT&T’s emails
were not actionable defamation. See id. at pp. 3-4 (citing, among others,
Paulsen v. Yarrell, 537 S.W.3d 224, 237 (Tex. App.—Houston 2017, pet.
denied) (“grave breach of legal ethics”); Neurodiagnostic Consultants, LLC v.
Villalobos, No. 03-18-00743-CV, 2019 WL 4892220, at *4 (Tex. App.—
Austin Oct. 4, 2019) (mem. op.) (“dirty”), McConnell v. Coventry Health Care
Nat’l Network, No. 05-13-01365-CV, 2015 WL 4572431, at *10 (Tex. App.—
Dallas July 30, 2015, pet. denied) (mem. op.) (“unprofessional”); Ruder v.
Jordan, No. 05-14-01265-CV, 2015 WL 4397636, at *5 (Tex. App.—Dallas
July 20, 2015, no pet.) (mem. op.) (“incompetent” or “mentally unstable”);
Teel v. Deloitte & Touche LLP, No. 3:15-CV-2593-G, 2015 WL 9478187, at *7
(N.D. Tex. Dec. 29, 2015) (mem. op.) (“untrustworthy, sloven, lazy and
unproductive,” “unreliable”)).
¶9 	For its part, Fiberwave relies on Cullum v. White, 399 S.W.3d 173
(Tex. App.—San Antonio 2011, pet. denied), for the proposition that honesty,

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integrity, and ethics are objectively verifiable.4 But in Cullum, the defendant
did not 	just 	impugn plaintiffs’ honesty, integrity, or ethics. Rather, in
conjunction with such aspersions, the defendant published “facts” in support
thereof capable of verification, including going so far as to accuse plaintiffs of
“illegal activity.” 	See id. 	at 183. Defendant’s communications charged
plaintiffs with specific actions including “shooting and killing a Mexican
transient on the Ranch,” “us[ing] a four wheeler to chase the animals around
the Ranch,” “ignoring illegal activity,” and the like as factual predicates for
broader comments on plaintiffs’ business operations. Id. at 182-83. The court
did not indicate whether general denunciations of plaintiffs’ ethics would still
be actionable in the absence of their accompanying factual contexts. See
generally id. And the instant case does not compare.
¶10 	AT&T’s allegedly-defamatory statements—even assuming they
imply, as Fiberwave contends, that Fiberwave lacks honesty and integrity and
4 Fiberwave also cites Shipp v. Malouf, 439 S.W.3d 432 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2014, pet.
denied), for the proposition that “questioning the solvency or honesty of a merchant in
business is actionable [defamation] per se.” Id. at 440. But Shipp involved a false public
statement that a dentist had declared bankruptcy and whether that constituted defamation
per se. See id. at 441. The case did not involve statements about (dis)honesty, nor did the
court delve into what constitutes objective verifiability. See generally id. Moreover, the
same court, the following year, held that a defendant’s comment calling plaintiff
“unprofessional” was “merely opinion and not an objectively verifiable fact.” McConnell,
2015 WL 4572431, at *10. Thus, Shipp is not persuasive.

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does not do the right thing—communicated no allegations of any verifiable act
or omission by Fiberwave. The significance of this is best illustrated by
Fiberwave’s sole evidence of the falsity of AT&T’s statements: a declaration
from Fiberwave’s CEO, Chris Percy, asserting—equally generally—that
“Fiberwave operated, and continues to operate, its business with honesty and
integrity” and that “Fiberwave also emphasized, and continues to emphasize,
doing the right thing as part of its culture and business.” Fiberwave’s
Response Ex. 1 at ¶ 8; Fiberwave’s Response at ¶ 43. What is missing is a yard
stick (i.e., verifiable facts) by which any reasonable fact-finder could measure
the veracity of the conclusory statements.
¶11 	The absence of verifiable facts in Percy’s declaration renders it of
no evidentiary value. See, e.g., In re Lipsky, 460 S.W.3d at 592-93 (stating
that 	“[b]are, baseless opinions do 	not 	create 	fact 	questions” 	and 	that
“[o]pinions must be based on demonstrable facts and a reasoned basis”).
“[A]n affidavit that is nothing more than a sworn repetition of allegations in
the pleadings has no probative force, as the statements are no more than
conclusions or a mere surmise or suspicion.” Brookshire Katy Drainage Dist.
v. Lily Gardens, LLC, 333 S.W.3d 301, 308 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.]
2010, pet. denied). Percy's declaration simply re-states, in the negative,

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AT&T’s implied message—according to Fiberwave, broad generalizations
assailing its integrity. Thus, it amounts to no evidence of a false or defamatory
statement.
¶12 	In sum, the Court is persuaded by AT&T’s argument that the
implications of AT&T’s emails—assuming they are what Fiberwave alleges—
reflect only non-verifiable opinions, or beliefs that lie “in the eye of the
beholder.” Palestine Herald-Press Co. v. Zimmer, 257 S.W.3d 504, 511 (Tex.
App.—Tyler 2008, pet. denied); see also Schauer v. Mem’l Care Sys., 856
S.W.2d 437, 446 	(Tex. App.—Houston [1st 	Dist.] 	1993, no 	pet.) (“A
statement may be false, abusive, unpleasant, and objectionable to the plaintiff
without being defamatory.”). Honesty, integrity, and doing the right thing are
similar concepts to those found to be “somewhat indefinite and ambiguous”
and susceptible to variance “from person to person.” See Palestine Herald-
Press, 257 S.W.3d at 511-12. But even if they could be proven objectively,
Percy’s 	declaration 	attempting 	to 	refute 	AT&T’s 	statements 	is 	wholly
conclusory and amounts to no evidence. For these reasons, the Court GRANTS
summary judgment in favor of AT&T on Fiberwave’s defamation claim.

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B. 	Negligence
¶13 	AT&T’s motion also challenged Fiberwave’s ability to prove the
requisite degree of fault, here: negligence. See In re Lipsky, 460 S.W.3d at 593.
“[T]he defendant is negligent if it knew or should have known a defamatory
statement was false.” D Mag. Partners, L.P. v. Rosenthal, 529 S.W.3d 429,
440 (Tex. 2017) (internal quotation omitted).
¶14 	In its Reply, AT&T correctly notes that “Fiberwave’s response is
devoid of any evidence (or even argument) that AT&T knew or should have
known that the challenged statement was false and defamatory.” AT&T’s
Reply at p. 5. At the December 17 hearing, Fiberwave orally referenced
evidence outside the summary judgment record attempting to establish that
AT&T knew Fiberwave was, in a sense, not unethical or criminal—which is
distinguishable from proof of honesty or integrity (that is, differentiating the
absence of bad acts from the existence of good or noble ones). But the Court
only considers evidence expressly referenced in the response to the motion.
See 	Lance 	v. 	Robinson, 	543 	S.W.3d 	723, 	732 	(Tex. 	2018) 	(approving
consideration of evidence not attached to summary-judgment motion only
when “expressly ‘referenced and specified’” in motion); De La Garza v. Bank

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of N.Y. Mellon, No. 02-17-00427-CV, 2018 WL 5725250, at *3 (Tex. App.—
Fort Worth Nov. 1, 2018, no pet.) (mem. op.).
¶15 	While summary judgment in favor of AT&T is already supported
by the Court’s determination that the alleged statements are not objectively
verifiable and that Fiberwave failed to adduce any evidence of a false and
defamatory statement by AT&T, this second basis further supports the
granting of AT&T’s motion. Accordingly, on the additional grounds that
Fiberwave offered no evidence of the requisite degree of fault, the Court
GRANTS summary judgment in favor of AT&T on Fiberwave’s defamation
claim.
IV. 	Order
¶16 	IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that Defendant AT&T Enterprises,
LLC’s 	Traditional 	and 	No-Evidence 	Motion 	for 	Summary 	Judgment 	on
Plaintiff’s Defamation Claim is GRANTED.
_______________________
ANDREA K. BOURESSA
Judge of the Texas Business Court,
First Division
SIGNED ON: January 8, 2026.