RDSTR IP 2 AB v. Alexander M Casarez and Andrew P Casarez

This Opinion is Not a
Precedent of the TTAB
Mailed: September 25, 2026
UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
_____
Trademark Trial and Appeal Board
_____
RDSTR IP 2 AB
v.
Alexander M. Casarez and Andrew P. Casarez
_____
Opposition No. 91294305
_____
Edward J. Sackman, of Hinckley, Allen & Snyder, LLP, for RDSTR IP 2 AB.1
Rexford Brabson and Jorge M. Franco of T-Rex Law, P.C.,
for Alexander M. Casarez and Andrew P. Casarez.
_____
Before English, Stanley and Bradley,
Administrative Trademark Judges.
Opinion by Bradley, Administrative Trademark Judge:
Alexander M. Casarez and Andrew P. Casarez (collectively “Applicant”) seek to
register the standard-character mark DOPEBOYZ on the Principal Register for “hats;
shoes; bottoms as clothing; hoodies; tops as clothing,” in International Class 25.2
1 The change of correspondence for Opposer, filed July 14, 2026, is noted, and the Board’s
records have been updated accordingly.
2 Application Serial No. 90802243, filed June 29, 2021 under Section 1(b) of the Trademark
Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1051(b), based on an alleged intent to use the mark in commerce. There is a
discrepancy in the application between the identified applicants and entity type. Each
Applicant is identified as an individual, but the legal entity type is identified as a “limited

Opposition No. 91294305
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RDSTR IP 2 AB (“Opposer”) opposes registration of Applicant’s mark on the
ground of likelihood of confusion under Section 2(d) of the Trademark Act, 15 U.S.C.
§ 1052(d).3 In its Notice of Opposition, Opposer alleges ownership of the following six
registrations and four pending applications on the Principal Register for various
“DOPE” marks:4
Mark Reg. No./
Ser. No.
Goods/Services
DOPE
(standard characters)
Reg. No. 4918788 Cl. 25: Athletic apparel, namely, pants;
Boxer shorts; Crew neck sweaters; Gym
suits; Jogging suits; Socks; Sweaters; Swim
trunks; Swim wear for gentlemen; V-neck
sweaters; Women’s clothing, namely,
shirts, skirts
DOPE
(standard characters)
Reg. No. 4403067 Cl. 25: Hats
DOPE
(standard characters)
Reg. No. 4547955 Cl. 25: Coats for men and women;
Headwear; Jackets; Shirts; Shorts; Wind
resistant jackets
DOPEST
(standard characters)
Reg. No. 4595333 Cl. 25: Hats; Jackets; Pants; Shirts; Shoes;
Shorts; Sweaters
DOPE
(standard characters)
Reg. No. 5622868 Cl. 25: Shirts for infants, babies, toddlers
and children; Infant and toddler one piece
clothing
liability company” in California. This discrepancy is not germane to the disposition of
Opposer’s claim. However, given the dismissal of the opposition as discussed herein,
Applicant should correct this discrepancy by submitting a Post-Approval/Publication/Post-
Notice of Allowance Amendment form using the trademark electronic filing system. See
TRADEMARK MANUAL OF EXAMINING PROCEDURE § 505.01 (May 2026).
3 1 TTABVUE.
Citations in this opinion to the briefs and other materials in the case docket refer to
TTABVUE, the Board’s online docketing system. The number preceding TTABVUE
corresponds to the docket entry number, and any numbers following TTABVUE refer to the
page(s) of the docket entry where the cited materials appear.
4 Id. at 9-20, 26-80.

Opposition No. 91294305
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Mark Reg. No./
Ser. No.
Goods/Services
Reg. No. 6822934 Cl. 25: Clothing for skiing and hiking,
namely, ski jackets and ski pants, water
resistant and waterproof jackets and pants;
clothing for snowboarding, namely,
snowboarding jackets and snowboarding
pants, water resistant and waterproof
jackets and pants; tops being clothing;
undershirts; sports jerseys; pants; jackets
being clothing; outer clothing, namely,
jackets, coats, tops as clothing; shorts;
swim shorts; swim wear; long johns; sweat-
absorbent underwear; underwear; socks;
stockings; stockings for skiing; footwear;
shoes; snowboard shoes; scooter shoes;
headwear; caps being headwear; caps with
visors; sports headwear, namely, beanies,
hats and caps other than helmets;
headbands; neckerchiefs; neck tube
scarves; balaclavas; ski balaclavas; gloves;
ski gloves; fingerless gloves; garters; belts
being clothing
This registration also covers various goods
in Classes 9, 18, and 28.
DOPE SNOW
(standard characters
with “Snow”
disclaimed)
Ser. No. 90333369 Cl. 25: Clothing, namely, tops, bottoms,
headwear and footwear; Sportswear
clothing, namely, tops, bottoms, headwear
and footwear; Clothing for skiing, namely,
ski jackets and ski pants; Clothing for
snowboarding, namely, snowboard jackets
and snowboard pants; Tops as clothing;
Undershirts; Sports jerseys; Pants;
Jackets; Outerwear, namely, thermal pants
and jackets, shell jackets and pants, and
water resistant and waterproof jackets and
pants; Shorts; Swim shorts; Swim wear;
Long Johns; Sweat-absorbent underwear;
Underwear; Socks; Stockings; Stockings for
skiing; Footwear; Shoes; Snowboard shoes;
Scooter shoes; Caps being headwear; Caps
with visors; Headgear, namely, sports
headgear other than helmets; Headbands

Opposition No. 91294305
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Mark Reg. No./
Ser. No.
Goods/Services
as clothing; Neckerchiefs; Neck tube
scarves; Balaclavas; Ski balaclavas; Gloves;
Ski gloves; Fingerless gloves; Garters; Belts
being clothing
This application also covers various goods
and services in Classes 9, 28, and 35.
Ser. No. 90333365 Cl. 25: Ski and Snowboard outwear,
namely thermal pants and jackets, shell
jackets and pants, and water resistant and
waterproof jackets and pants; Ski and
Snowboard clothing, namely, tops and
bottoms; Ski and snowboard apparel,
namely, headwear, footwear, neck tube
scarves, balaclavas and gloves; Ski and
Snowboard apparel, namely, underwear,
thermal underwear and sweat-absorbent
underwear
This application also covers various goods
and services in Classes 9, 28, and 35.
DOPE
(standard characters)
Ser. No. 90333343 Cl. 25: Ski and Snowboard outwear,
namely thermal pants and jackets, shell
jackets and pants, and water resistant and
waterproof jackets and pants; Ski and
Snowboard clothing, namely, tops and
bottoms; Ski and snowboard apparel,
namely, headwear, footwear, neck tube
scarves, balaclavas and gloves; Ski and
Snowboard apparel, namely, underwear,
thermal underwear and sweat-absorbent
underwear
This application also covers various goods
and services in Classes 9, 28, and 35.
DOPEST
(standard characters)
Ser. No. 97524456 Cl. 25: Clothing and apparel, namely, tops,
bottoms, headwear, footwear and
outerwear, namely, ski and snowboard
outwear, namely, gloves, thermal pants
and jackets, shell jackets and pants, water-
resistant and waterproof jackets and pants

Opposition No. 91294305
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Opposer also alleges prior use of these marks.5
Applicant denied the salient allegations of Opposer’s Notice of Opposition in its
Answer.6
Only Opposer filed a brief.7 Applicant did not file a brief, take testimony, or
introduce any other evidence during its testimony period, but it is not required to do
so. See Yazhong Investing Ltd. v. Multi-Media Tech. Ventures, Ltd., No. 92056548,
2018 TTAB LEXIS 168, at *12 n.13 (TTAB 2018) (“Because Respondent, as defendant
herein, is under no obligation to submit evidence or a brief, we do not construe
Respondent’s failure to do so as a concession of the case.”); see also Trademark Rule
2.128(a)(1), 37 C.F.R. § 2.128(a)(1).
We dismiss the Opposition for the reasons explained below.
5 1 TTABVUE 20 ¶ 3.
6 4 TTABVUE. Applicant asserted two affirmative defenses (id. at 3-22), but as noted below
did not file a brief or otherwise pursue these defenses at trial, and thus they are deemed
impliedly waived or forfeited. See In re Google Techs. Holdings, LLC, 980 F.3d 858, 862-63
(Fed. Cir. 2020); Peterson v. Awshucks SC, LLC, No. 92066957, 2020 TTAB LEXIS 520, at *2
n.3 (TTAB 2020) (affirmative defenses waived where “[r]espondent did not present any
evidence or argument with respect to these asserted defenses at trial”).
7 16 TTABVUE. Opposer’s brief identifies Opposer as “Ridestore Holding AB” (id. at 9), and
is also signed on behalf of “Ridestore Holding AB” (id. at 37), but the opposer of record in this
proceeding is “RDSTR IP 2 AB.” Every submission filed in an opposition “must be signed by
the party filing it, or by the party’s attorney or other authorized representative.” 37 C.F.R.
§ 2.119(e). An “electronic signature entered on the Board’s electronic filing forms is sufficient
as the required signature for the entire submission, including in the absence of a signature
on any attachment to the filing form.” TRADEMARK TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD MANUAL OF
PROCEDURE (TBMP) § 106.02 (2026) (and cases cited therein). Here, given that the ESTTA
filing coversheet correctly identifies Opposer RDSTR IP 2 AB and bears the electronic
signature of Opposer’s counsel of record (id. at 1), as well as the fact that all of the trial
evidence of record was filed by RDSTR IP 2 AB (see 13-14 TTABVUE), we accept and consider
Opposer’s trial brief despite the misidentification.

Opposition No. 91294305
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I. Trial Record
The record consists of the pleadings,8 and, by operation of Trademark Rule
2.122(b), the file of Applicant’s involved application.
Opposer also submitted the following evidence during its trial period:
1. Testimony Declaration of Elin Glommen, Chief Operating Officer of
Opposer (“Glommen Declaration”), with Exhibits A-K (13 TTABVUE);9 and
2. Opposer’s Notice of Reliance on screenshots of various internet materials
from Instagram and Yelp (14 TTABVUE).
Applicant did not file any evidence.
II. Whether Has Opposer Proven Ownership and Current Active
Status of the Pleaded Registrations and Applications
A. Registration Certificates and Trademark Status & Document
Retrieval (“TSDR”) Print-outs
In its brief, Opposer states “the registrations of the Ridestore Marks that form the
bases [sic] of the Opposition are part of the record of this proceeding without any
action by . . . Ridestore” (citing Trademark Rules 2.122(b)(1), (d)(1), 37 C.F.R.
§ 2.122(d)(1), (b)(1)).10 This is incorrect. “[T]he file of an opposer’s pleaded registration
is not automatically part of the opposition record, but must be made of record.” In re
Sela Prods., LLC, No. 77629624, 2013 TTAB LEXIS 175, at *6-7 (TTAB 2013); see
8 As discussed below, there is an exception regarding certain exhibits attached to pleadings.
The TSDR print-outs for the pleaded applications attached to the Notice of Opposition do not
meet this exception so we have given these exhibits no consideration. Trademark Rule
2.122(c).
9 Although the document is titled “affidavit” we refer to it as a declaration because it does not
contain a sworn oath or notarization. See DowntownDC Bus. Improvement Dist. v. Clarke,
No. 91275100, 2024 TTAB LEXIS 412, at *7 n.11 (TTAB 2024) (“The testimony affidavit
(notarized) is a sworn statement, while the declaration permits a comparable alternative
unsworn statement under penalty of perjury.”).
10 16 TTABVUE 9.

Opposition No. 91294305
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also 37 C.F.R. § 2.122(b)(1) (providing only that, “[t]he file of . . . each registration
against which a petition or counterclaim for cancellation is filed forms part of the
record of the proceeding without any action by the parties.”). Opposer’s registrations
are not the subject of any counterclaim or petition to cancel in this proceeding.
Trademark Rule 2.122(d)(1) explains the manner in which a pleaded registration
may be made of record stating that “[a] registration of the opposer . . . pleaded in an
opposition . . . will be received in evidence and made part of the record” where the
notice of opposition includes:
• a copy of the registration prepared and issued by the Office showing both
the current status of and current title (i.e., owner) to the
registration; or
• a current print-out or copy of information from the U.S. Patent and
Trademark Office’s (“USPTO”) TSDR electronic database showing the
current status of and title (i.e., owner) to the registration.
37 C.F.R. § 2.122(d)(1). See also TBMP § 704.03(b)(1)(A). Trademark Rule 2.122(d)(2)
also allows an opposer to file one of the above identified options either “by appropriate
identification and introduction during the taking of testimony” (e.g., through a
witness declaration or affidavit), or “by filing a notice of reliance” with the referenced
copies.
Opposer failed to follow any of the above procedures to make the pleaded
registrations of record in this proceeding. First, Opposer attached plain copies of the
registration certificates for the six pleaded registrations to its Notice of Opposition
and the Glommen Declaration, which is not sufficient to make the registrations of
record because the plain copies do not reflect current status or current ownership of

Opposition No. 91294305
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the registrations.11 See Sterling Jewelers Inc. v. Romance & Co., No. 91207312, 2014
TTAB LEXIS 103, at *7 (TTAB 2014) (“The Board has routinely held that the
submission of a photocopy of a . . . registration, by itself, is insufficient for purposes
of establishing a party’s current ownership, or the current status, of the registration,
and therefore does not suffice to make the registration of record.”). The plain copies
are also not competent evidence because they did not “issue[] ‘substantially’ or
‘reasonably’ contemporaneous with the filing of the notice of opposition.” Shenzhen
IVPS Tech. Co. v. Fancy Pants Prods., LLC, No. 91263919, 2022 TTAB LEXIS 383,
at *15 (TTAB 2022) (accepting plain copy of registration issued a month and a half
before the filing of the opposition). Here, the issue dates for the registrations range
from 2013 to 2022, which is well before the October 2, 2024 filing of Opposer’s Notice
of Opposition.12 See United Global Media Group, Inc. v. Tseng, No. 91200786, 2014
TTAB LEXIS 348, at *13 (TTAB 2014) (to be “substantially contemporaneous with
the filing of the notice of opposition” the issue date for the registration must be “very
near the date the opposition was filed”; accepting copy of registration issued
11 1 TTABVUE 27, 32, 37, 43, 49, 61; 13 TTABVUE 22, 27, 32, 38, 49. For Reg. No. 6822934,
the Glommen Declaration only contains an outdated TSDR print-out showing it as a pending
application (Serial No. 79300325). See 13 TTABVUE 83-86.
12 See 1 TTABVUE 27 (Reg. No. 4918788 issued March 15, 2016), 32 (Reg. No. 4403067 issued
September 17, 2013), 37 (Reg. No. 4547955 issued June 10, 2014), 43 (Reg. No. 4595333
issued September 2, 2014), 49 (Reg. No. 5622868 issued December 4, 2018), 61 (Reg. No.
6822934 issued on August 23, 2022); see also id. at 1 (showing a “[f]iling date” of October 2,
2024 for the Notice of Opposition).

Opposition No. 91294305
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approximately four months before opposition filed). Moreover, the plain copies do not
identify Opposer RDSTR IP 2 AB as the current owner of the registrations.13
Second, the TSDR print-outs submitted with the Notice of Opposition and
Glommen Declaration are not “current” as required by Trademark Rule 2.122(d)(1).
To be a “current” print-out or copy “the rule contemplates submission of a copy from
the Office’s electronic database records to be reasonably or substantially
contemporaneous with the initiation of the proceeding, upon the filing of . . . the
notice of opposition.” Shenzhen IVPS, 2022 TTAB LEXIS 383, at *11-12. Here, the
TSDR print-outs for the pleaded registrations attached to the Notice of Opposition
and Glommen Declaration bear a date of September 30, 2021,14 March 22, 2022,15 or
September 9, 2022.16 These dates are two to three years prior to the October 2, 2024
filing of Opposer’s Notice of Opposition, and are not reasonably or substantially
contemporaneous. Additionally, like the plain copies of the registration certificates,
the TSDR print-outs do not identify Opposer RDSTR IP 2 AB as the current owner of
the registrations, but instead list “Ridestore Holding AB” under the “Current
Owner(s) Information”.17
13 Rather, the registrations list Third Estate, LLC (1 TTABVUE 27, 32, 37, 43), Epod America,
LLC (id. at 49), or Ridestore Holding AB (id. at 61) as the registrants.
14 Id. at 28, 33, 38, 44, 50; 13 TTABVUE 23, 28, 33, 39, 50.
15 13 TTABVUE 83. This print-out is so outdated that it shows as a pending application,
rather than a registration. See 1 TTABVUE 61.
16 1 TTABVUE 63.
17 Id. at 29, 34, 39, 45, 50-51, 64; 13 TTABVUE 24, 29, 34, 40, 50-51, 84.

Opposition No. 91294305
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Opposer similarly failed to follow the required rules and procedures to make its
four pleaded applications of record. See TBMP § 704.03(b)(2) (citing 37 C.F.R.
§ 2.122(e)). The TSDR print-outs for the pleaded applications attached to the Notice
of Opposition are not evidence in this proceeding because a plaintiff’s applications
cannot be made of record at the pleading stage. See 37 C.F.R. § 2.122(c) (exhibits to
pleadings are not evidence on behalf of the submitting party “[e]xcept as provided in
paragraph (d)(1) of this section”); 37 C.F.R. § 2.122(d)(1) (providing that only “[a]
registration of the opposer . . . will be received in evidence and made part of the
record if the opposition . . . is accompanied” by a current status and title copy of the
registration or a current print-out from the USPTO’s electronic database records)
(emphasis added). There are two ways to make pleaded applications of record:
In order for Opposer’s pleaded pending application to be
received in evidence and made part of the record, Opposer
had to file a copy of its pleaded pending application
showing the current status and title under its notice of
reliance during its assigned testimony period.
Alternatively, Opposer could have introduced into evidence
witness testimony, in deposition or declaration form,
regarding its pending application and the status thereof.
WeaponX Performance Prods. v. Weapon X Motorsports, Inc., No. 91221553, 2018
TTAB LEXIS 72, at *18 (TTAB 2018) (citation omitted).
Opposer did not attempt to make any pleaded applications of record with its notice
of reliance.18 Accordingly, we consider whether Opposer properly introduced any of
the pleaded applications through the Glommen Declaration.
18 See generally, 14 TTABVUE.

Opposition No. 91294305
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The Glommen Declaration attaches TSDR print-outs for three of the four pleaded
applications.19 However, the print-outs are dated March 22, 2022, over two years
before the institution of this proceeding.20 As such, the print-outs do not show current
status of the pleaded applications and are insufficient to make them of record.
Additionally, the print-outs do not identify Opposer RDSTR IP 2 AB as the current
owner of the pleaded applications, and instead list “Ridestore Holding AB” under
“Current Owner(s) Information”.21
B. Opposer’s Testimony and Applicant’s Answer
We also consider Ms. Glommen’s testimony and Applicant’s answer to determine
if they provide any proof regarding Opposer’s alleged ownership of and the status of
the pleaded registrations and applications.
“[G]enerally, to be credible, testimony cannot be characterized by inconsistencies,
contradictions and uncertainties.” Vans, Inc. v. Branded, LLC, No. 92066859, 2022
TTAB LEXIS 294, at *69 (TTAB 2022) (finding testimony unpersuasive where it was
“both vague on critical points and riddled with inconsistencies”). Ms. Glommen
clearly identifies Opposer as “RDSTR IP 2 AB” and defines and refers to Opposer as
“Ridestore” in her declaration.22 She begins her testimony by stating:
I submit this declaration to provide relevant information
regarding Ridestore’s use of its various “DOPE”
trademarks (the “Ridestore Marks” or “DOPE”) in United
19 13 TTABVUE 74-83.
20 Id. at 74, 77, 80.
21 Id. at 75, 78, 81.
22 Id. at 2 ¶ 1.

Opposition No. 91294305
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States commerce, including Ridestore’s use of DOPE. The
Ridestore Marks, attached hereto as Exhibit A, form the
basis of this Opposition.23
Yet Exhibit A only contains a copy of the ESTTA filing coversheet for the Notice of
Opposition which lists the pleaded registrations and applications, but does not make
the listed registrations or applications of record, as discussed above.24 See Melwani v.
Allegiance Corp., No. 91190682, 2010 TTAB LEXIS 443, at *8-9 (TTAB 2010) (“The
fact that completion of the ESTTA filing form results in the creation of electronic
records in the Board’s TTABVUE system, and that such records contain links to
information on a pleaded registration, is for administrative ease and it is insufficient
to make the pleaded registrations of record.”).
Further on in her declaration, Ms. Glommen does explicitly testify that “Ridestore
owns numerous applications and registrations for the trademarks ‘DOPE’ and the
term ‘DOPE’ combined with other terms and/or designs.”25 However, Ms. Glommen
then testifies that “[t]rue and correct copies of the Certificates of Registration and the
information available on the Trademark Status and Document Retrieval database,
which show the statuses and titles of the Ridestore Marks, are attached hereto
as Exhibit B.”26 And as discussed above the registration certificates and TSDR print-
outs attached as Exhibit B to Ms. Glommen’s Declaration do not show Opposer
RDSTR IP 2 AB as the owner, but instead the registration certificates show Third
23 13 TTABVUE 2 ¶ 1.
24 See id. at 13-20.
25 Id. at 3 ¶ 6.
26 Id. (emphasis added).

Opposition No. 91294305
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Estate LLC or Epod America, LLC as the registrants,27 and the TSDR print-outs show
Ridestore Holding AB as the “current owner”.28 Ms. Glommen does not provide any
testimony regarding any relationship between Opposer RDSTR IP 2 AB and any of
these other entities, and, in fact, does not reference them at all in her declaration.
Given that the only explicit statement regarding ownership is directly contradicted
by the TSDR print-outs and registration certificates which Ms. Glommen testifies
contain the “statuses and titles”, and the remaining testimony is indefinite, we find
that the testimony of Ms. Glommen – Opposer’s only witness – does not establish
Opposer’s ownership of the pleaded registrations or applications. See Fuji Med.
Instruments Mfg. Co. v. Am. Crocodile Int’l Grp., Inc., No. 92062760, 2021 TTAB
LEXIS 270, at *35, 38 (TTAB 2021) (evasive testimony regarding ownership of the
respondent entitled to little weight where witness “alternately implied that his wife
owned [r]espondent, they shared it 50/50 because they were married, and, finally, he
simply wasn’t very sure who owned [r]espondent”); CDS, Inc. v. I.C.E.D. Mgmt., No.
94001250, 2006 TTAB LEXIS 243, at *29 (TTAB 2006) (indefinite testimony “simply
does not carry the conviction of accuracy and applicability”).
Applicant’s answer does not contain any admissions regarding Opposer’s
ownership of the pleaded registrations or applications. Specifically, Applicant stated
that it was “without sufficient knowledge or information to form a belief as to the
allegations of paragraph 2” regarding Opposer’s ownership of “applications and
27 13 TTABVUE 22, 27, 32, 38, 49.
28 Id. at 24, 29, 34, 40, 50-51, 75, 78, 81, 84.

Opposition No. 91294305
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registrations for the trademarks DOPE and the term DOPE combined with other
terms and/or designs,” and therefore Applicant denied the same.29 Fed. R. Civ. P.
8(b)(5) (response in an answer that the defendant lacks knowledge or information
sufficient to form a belief about the truth of an allegation “has the effect of a denial”);
see also Shenzhen IVPS, 2022 TTAB LEXIS 383, at *16 (“There are . . . no admissions
in the answer to establish current status and current title of these pleaded
registrations.”).
In sum, Opposer has not proved by a preponderance of the evidence that it owns
any of the six pleaded registrations or four pleaded applications. Accordingly, we do
not consider Opposer’s pleaded registrations or applications, and determine whether
Opposer has proven any common law rights in the pleaded marks sufficient to
establish entitlement and priority.
III. Entitlement to a Statutory Cause of Action
Entitlement to a statutory cause of action is an element of the plaintiff’s case in
every inter partes proceeding. See Corcamore, LLC v. SFM, LLC, 978 F.3d 1298,
1304-05 (Fed. Cir. 2020); Australian Therapeutic Supplies Pty. Ltd. v. Naked TM,
LLC, 965 F.3d 1370, 1373-74 (Fed. Cir. 2020) (citing Lexmark Int’l, Inc. v. Static
Control Components, Inc., 572 U.S. 118, 128 (2014)). Opposer, as the plaintiff in the
action, must establish its entitlement to a statutory cause of action by demonstrating
(i) an interest falling within the zone of interests protected by the statute, and (ii) a
29 4 TTABVUE 2 ¶ 2; 1 TTABVUE 9 ¶ 2.

Opposition No. 91294305
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reasonable belief in damage proximately caused by the registration of the mark.
Corcamore, 978 F.3d at 1305-06.
As discussed above, Opposer has not established ownership of any of the pleaded
registrations or applications, and therefore cannot rely on them to establish
entitlement. However, “[e]ntitlement to a cause of action under [§ 1063] is not
contingent on whether [an opposer] has proprietary rights in its own mark.”
Australian Therapeutic, 965 F.3d at 1374 (“[c]ontracting away one’s rights to use a
trademark does not preclude a petitioner from challenging a mark before the Board”).
Opposer correctly asserts in its brief that it may show entitlement where “two
marks are the same or similar to one another and are used on the same or similar
goods, creating competition between the opposer and applicant and therefore a direct
commercial interest for the opposer.”30 As discussed above, Ms. Glommen’s testimony
regarding Opposer’s ownership of the pleaded registrations and applications was
contradicted by the registration certificates and TSDR print-outs attached as Exhibit
B to her declaration. But we do not find anything in the record that contradicts Ms.
Glommen’s testimony that Opposer uses a DOPE mark in connection with apparel,31
30 16 TTABVUE 16.
31 See 13 TTABVUE 4, 8 at ¶ 25 (“Ridestore has sold apparel bearing the Ridestore Marks
(“DOPE Apparel”) in the United States since at least 2020.”); ¶ 10 (“Today, DOPE Apparel is
sold by Ridestore to consumers throughout the United States and around the world.”); ¶ 9
(“Ridestore has expanded the range of products it sells bearing the Ridestore Marks,
including beanies, balaclavas, necktubes, goggles, and tshirts.”); ¶ 7 (“Today, Ridestore
creates all types of DOPE outerwear as well as complementary products such as sweaters,
leggings, tights, and eyewear.”). In her declaration, Ms. Glommen defined “Ridestore” to
mean “Opposer/Petitioner RDSTR IP 2 AB” and “Ridestore Marks” and “DOPE” to mean
“Ridestore’s use of its various ‘DOPE’ trademarks.” Id. at 2 ¶ 1.

Opposition No. 91294305
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and her declaration also attaches corroborating documentary evidence from
Opposer’s website showing a sampling of products offered for sale bearing the pleaded
marks.32 See Syngenta Crop Prot., Inc. v. Bio-Chek, LLC, No. 91175091, 2009 TTAB
LEXIS 70, at *15-16 (TTAB 2009) (Even where “opposer failed to properly introduce
the pleaded registration” witness testimony that opposer uses its mark was
“sufficient to support opposer’s allegations of a reasonable belief that it would be
damaged by registration of applicant’s mark.”). See also Australian Therapeutic, 965
F.3d at 1375 (an opposer may “demonstrate a real interest and reasonable belief of
damage by producing and selling merchandise bearing the registered mark”). Ms.
Glommen also testified that during 2024 and 2025, Opposer “has sold over 300,000
DOPE Apparel items in the U.S.” representing sales of “over $50,000,000 in DOPE
Apparel in the United States.”33 She further testified that Opposer “also uses DOPE
on social media to advertise DOPE Apparel, including profiles on Instagram, TikTok,
and Facebook.”34 See Australian Therapeutic, 965 F.3d at 1376 (“advertising and
sales in the United States also demonstrate a real interest and reasonable belief of
damage”).
Given that “[p]roof of [entitlement] in a Board opposition is a low threshold,
intended only to ensure that the plaintiff has a real interest in the matter, and is not
32 13 TTABVUE 87-95 (containing screenshots from www.dopesnow.com). Ms. Glommen
testifies that this Exhibit C contains “true and correct samples of apparel currently sold in
the U.S. that bears the Ridestore Marks.” Id. at 4 ¶ 9; see also id. at 5-6 ¶ 15 (“Ridestore also
advertises DOPE Apparel through its website at https://www.dopesnow.com/”).
33 Id. at 8 ¶¶ 26-27.
34 Id. at 6 ¶ 18.

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a mere intermeddler,” we find this testimony and documentary evidence is sufficient
to establish Opposer’s entitlement to a statutory cause of action. Syngenta Crop Prot.,
2009 TTAB LEXIS 70, at *16 n.8. See also Australian Therapeutic, 965 F.3d at 1376
(“The real interest requirement is meant to prevent litigation where there is no real
controversy between the parties, where a plaintiff, petitioner or opposer, is no more
than an inter-meddler.”) (citation and quotation omitted).
IV. Priority
Section 2(d) of the Trademark Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1052(d), permits opposition to
registration of an applied-for mark based on likelihood of confusion with “a mark
registered in the Patent and Trademark Office, or a mark or trade name previously
used in the United States . . . and not abandoned.” Accordingly, we first consider
whether Opposer has established “priority, which is a necessary element of any claim
under Trademark Act § 2(d).” Syngenta Crop Prot., 2009 TTAB LEXIS 70, at *18.
As discussed above, Opposer has not proven ownership of the pleaded
registrations or applications or whether they are currently active. Therefore, Opposer
may not rely on them to establish priority. Opposer, however, may maintain a Section
2(d) claim if it demonstrates prior common law rights in the pleaded marks.35 See
SawStop, LLC v. Felder KG, No. 91255905, 2025 TTAB LEXIS 351, at *11 (TTAB
2025) (to prevail on its Section 2(d) claim, “[o]pposer must establish prior proprietary
35 We find the allegation in the Notice of Opposition that “Opposer’s earliest dates of first use
of Opposer’s Trademarks preceded the earliest priority date Applicants can claim” is
sufficient to plead likelihood of confusion based on Opposer’s common law use. See 1
TTABVUE 20 ¶ 3.

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rights (i.e., priority) in the pleaded common-law mark”). To establish such prior
common law rights, Opposer “must prove by a preponderance of the evidence that
[the] marks are distinctive, inherently or otherwise, and that [it] acquired rights in
the marks prior to any date on which Applicant can rely.” Major League Baseball
Players Ass’n v. Chisena, No. 91240180, 2023 TTAB LEXIS 117, at *24 (TTAB 2023),
aff’d, No. 2023-2073 (Fed. Cir. Jan. 8, 2026); see also Moreno v. Pro Boxing Supplies,
Inc., No. 91214580, 2017 TTAB LEXIS 299, at *18, 26 (TTAB 2017) (“licensee and
user of the marks” has entitlement to oppose, but “licensee, cannot rely on [its]
licensor’s use to prove priority” and instead must prove priority based on its own use).
Applicant “may rely without further proof upon the [June 29, 2021] filing date of
its application as a ‘constructive use’ date for purposes of priority.” Id., at *19.
Applicant has not provided any evidence of any earlier use, and accordingly we find
that Applicant’s priority date is June 29, 2021.
We evaluate Opposer’s evidence to determine if Opposer has established use
before June 29, 2021 of any of its alleged trademarks DOPE, DOPEST, DOPE SNOW,
DOPE (stylized), or DOPE & Design. In considering the testimony and evidence of
priority, we “look at the evidence as a whole, as if each piece of evidence were part of
a puzzle which, when fitted together, establishes prior use.” W. Fla. Seafood, Inc. v.
Jet Rests., Inc., 31 F.3d 1122, 1125-26 (Fed. Cir. 1994).
A. Opposer’s Alleged Common Law Marks are Distinctive
We first find that Opposer’s alleged common law marks DOPE, DOPEST, DOPE
SNOW, DOPE (stylized), and DOPE & Design are “distinctive as a whole since there

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is an absence of evidence or argument showing otherwise.” DowntownDC, 2024 TTAB
LEXIS 412, at *38.
B. Analysis of Opposer’s Evidence of Common Law Use
“[I]t is well settled that the oral testimony even of a single witness may be
adequate to establish priority, but only if it is sufficiently probative.” Kemi Organics,
LLC v. Gupta, No. 92065613, 2018 TTAB LEXIS 149, at *23-24 (TTAB 2018) (citation
omitted). Additionally, “[s]uch testimony ‘should not be characterized by
contradictions, inconsistencies, and indefiniteness but should carry with it conviction
of its accuracy and applicability.’” Exec. Coach Builders, Inc. v. SPV Coach Co., No.
91212312, 2017 TTAB LEXIS 201, at *36 (TTAB 2017) quoting B.R. Baker Co. v.
Lebow Bros., 150 F.2d 580, 583 (CCPA 1945).
Opposer’s only evidence of record regarding its use of the alleged common law
marks DOPE, DOPEST, DOPE SNOW, DOPE (stylized), and DOPE & Design is Ms.
Glommen’s testimony and the associated exhibits. Ms. Glommen testified that
“Ridestore began selling products bearing the Ridestore Marks in the United States
substantially earlier than June 29, 2021”36 and that “Ridestore has sold apparel
bearing the Ridestore Marks (‘DOPE Apparel’) in the United States since at least
2020.”37 We find both broad statements insufficient to establish Opposer’s priority
because they do not identify which of Opposer’s alleged common law marks were in
36 13 TTABVUE 4 ¶ 8. Ms. Glommen defined “Ridestore” to mean “Opposer/Petitioner RDSTR
IP 2 AB”. Id. at 2 ¶ 1. “Ridestore Marks” is defined as “Ridestore’s . . . various ‘DOPE’
trademarks” which is also vague and overbroad. Id.
37 Id. at 8 ¶ 25.

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use or identify on which goods beyond “apparel” generally.38 Ms. Glommen’s
testimony does not reference any exhibits in connection with either statement, and
none of the exhibits attached to her declaration show use in connection with apparel
prior to Applicant’s June 29, 2021 priority date.39 See Shenzhen IVPS, 2022 TTAB
LEXIS 383, at *27 (“Broad general statements by a witness that lack sufficient detail
are usually not adequate [to establish prior use], especially in the absence of
corroborating documentary evidence.”).
Similarly, Ms. Glommen testified that “[s]ince 2020” Ridestore used “at least one
of the Ridestore Marks in U.S. commerce in connection with clothing, such as jackets,
pants, sweaters, gloves, and leggings.”40 This testimony lacks specificity as to which
of Opposer’s pleaded marks is encompassed by the reference to “at least one of the
Ridestore Marks.” The phrase “such as” also creates ambiguity as to which specific
goods may have been used with which mark. And the following statement in her
testimony that “[m]ore recently, Ridestore has expanded the range of products it sells
38 As the Board has explained, there is no per se rule that all items of apparel are related,
and accordingly, Opposer needs to provide evidence of use of specific items of apparel or
clothing to establish its priority. See In re Embiid, No. 88202890, 2021 TTAB LEXIS 168, at
*34-35 (TTAB 2021) (rejecting any per se rule regarding apparel and holding that “[w]e must
examine the record in this case to determine whether the particular clothing items at issue
are related”); H.D. Lee Co. v. Maidenform, Inc., No. 91168309, 2008 TTAB LEXIS 21, at *22
(TTAB 2008) (“there can be no rule that certain goods (e.g., all clothing products) are per se
related, such that there must be a likelihood of confusion from the use of similar marks in
relation thereto”).
39 Ms. Glommen’s testimony regarding sales also does not reference any particular mark or
goods, is limited to 2024 and 2025, and is not supported by any documentary evidence. See
13 TTABVUE 8 ¶¶ 26-27.
40 Id. at 4 ¶ 9.

Opposition No. 91294305
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bearing the Ridestore Marks”41 is indefinite as to any date or time frame. Exhibit C,
which is referenced with this testimony, contains screenshots dated April 10, 2023,
almost two years after Applicant’s June 29, 2021 priority date.42 See Vans, 2022 TTAB
LEXIS 294, at *69-70 (witness testimony regarding a party’s use that was “vague on
critical points” was unpersuasive). None of the other exhibits or testimony of record
provides sufficient context or meaning to Ms. Glommen’s ambiguous reference to
“more recently.”
Ms. Glommen also testified that, “Ridestore engages in extensive promotional
activities for the sale of apparel that bears the Ridestore Marks (‘DOPE Apparel’).
Since 2020, Ridestore has invested in the American market through advertisements
on Google, Facebook, Instagram, TikTok, and other online platforms.”43 While the
2020 date is before Applicant’s priority date, the testimony is vague and indefinite as
to which of Opposer’s various alleged marks and what specific articles of apparel were
used in the advertisements. In connection with this testimony, Ms. Glommen
references Exhibits D1 and D2 which she describes as “advertisements Ridestore has
published on the aforementioned platforms over the last three years.”44 However, we
do not find these exhibits probative because none of the screenshots contain a URL,
41 13 TTABVUE 4 ¶ 9.
42 Id. at 87-95.
43 Id. at 5 ¶ 13.
44 Id.

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and very few contain a date.45 Of the pages that do contain dates, those dates are
either partial containing only a month and day (e.g., September 9),46 or dates that fall
several years after Applicant’s priority date (e.g., January 1, 2024-February 21, 2024
and November 22, 2024-December 22, 2024).47 Moreover, Ms. Glommen’s testimony
that the advertisements are from “the last three years” establishes at most a date of
October 29, 202248 which is more than a year after Applicant’s June 29, 2021 priority
date.49
The remaining documentary evidence attached to Ms. Glommen’s declaration is
dated after Applicant’s June 29, 2021 priority date including:
• Print-outs of the homepage of Opposer’s purported website “as of
September 29, 2025”;50
• Print-outs of “the DOPE TikTok, Facebook, and Instagram pages as of
September 29, 2025”;51 and
45 13 TTABVUE 96-250. Exhibit G (id. at 261-266), identified as “examples of the types of
promotional content” posted by “social media influencers” engaged by Ridestore (id. at 7 ¶ 20)
similarly is missing URLs. The screenshots only contain partial dates or a date in 2024, and
thus do not establish Opposer’s priority.
46 Id. at 234; see also id. at 240-243.
47 Id. at 244-250.
48 Ms. Glommen’s declaration is dated October 29, 2025. Id. at 11.
49 Ms. Glommen also provides testimony regarding Ridestore’s growing Instagram audience
in 2020 and 2021, and the number of users that “engaged with Ridestore’s Instagram posts
on its DOPE account” (id. at 6-7 ¶ 19) but does not connect this testimony to any content on
these platforms, or more specifically to the use of any particular mark or goods or the
availability of any such goods in commerce that Congress may regulate.
50 Id. at 5-6 ¶ 15, and 251-256 (Exhibit E).
51 Id. at 6 ¶ 18, and 257-260 (Exhibit F). Ms. Glommen also submitted a sampling of inquiries
customers submitted via Ridestore’s website or social media which bear dates from 2019 (id.
at 334-339), but as she testified this was “before [DOPE Apparel] was available in the United
States” and were unsuccessful “attempt[s] to purchase DOPE Apparel” which is confirmed

Opposition No. 91294305
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• Print-outs of “unsolicited media coverage” from “[o]ver the years” bearing
access dates of May 9 and 10, 2023.52
C. Finding as to Priority
Considering the record as a whole, we find that Opposer has failed to establish,
by a preponderance of the evidence, its use of any of the alleged marks DOPE,
DOPEST, DOPE SNOW, DOPE (stylized), or DOPE & Design for any specific clothing
items prior to Applicant’s June 29, 2021 constructive first use date. When we consider
all the evidence, the pieces of the puzzle simply do not fit to establish Opposer’s prior
common law use of any of the pleaded marks in connection with any specific apparel
goods. See Shenzhen IVPS, 2022 TTAB LEXIS 383, at *50 (“[o]pposer’s witness
testimony is too vague and nonspecific to associate use of any of the SMOK or SMOK-
formative marks identified by [o]pposer’s witness with any particular goods or
services”).
V. Conclusion
Given that Opposer has failed to establish priority, Opposer’s claim under Section
2(d) must fail because priority is a necessary element. Accordingly, “[w]e need not
by the messages stating the website was not available in the U.S. and products did not ship
to the U.S. See id. at 7-8 ¶ 23.
52 13 TTABVUE 7 ¶ 21, and 267-333 (Exhibit H). While the bylines of the articles in the print-
outs contain earlier dates, such dates are hearsay, and Ms. Glommen’s testimony of coverage
from “[o]ver the years” is insufficient to establish use before Applicant’s constructive use date.
See Hangzhou Mengku Tech. Co. v. Shanghai Zhenglang Tech. Co., No. 91272143, 2024 TTAB
LEXIS 575, at *7 (TTAB 2024) (“Internet materials accompanied by the requisite URL and
date are admissible, but standing alone without accompanying testimony, they constitute
hearsay, and we consider such materials only for what they show on their face, not the truth
of their contents.”).

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reach the issue of likelihood of confusion because without proof of its priority, Opposer
cannot prevail.” Exec. Coach Builders, 2017 TTAB LEXIS 201, at *88-89.
Decision: The opposition is dismissed.