Charlie Blue Therapy, LLC

THIS OPINION IS NOT A
PRECEDENT OF THE TTAB
Mailed: September 24, 2026
UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
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Trademark Trial and Appeal Board
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In re Charlie Blue Therapy, LLC
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Serial No. 99180551
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Darin Deaver of Plunk Smith, PLLC, for Charlie Blue Therapy, LLC.
Gilbert Swift, Trademark Examining Attorney, Law Office 109,
Michael Kazazian, Managing Attorney.
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Before Lykos, Lebow and Elgin,
Administrative Trademark Judges.
Opinion by Lebow, Administrative Trademark Judge:
Applicant, Charlie Blue Therapy, LLC, seeks to register:
CHARLIE BLUE
in standard characters on the Principal Register for “Mental health therapy services;
Clinical mental health counseling services; Counseling in the field of mental health
and wellness; Psychological counseling services in the field of sports” in International
Class 44.1
1 Application Serial No. 99180551 (“the Application”) was filed on May 12, 2025, under
Section 1(a) of the Trademark Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1051(a), alleging November 30, 2023 as the

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The Trademark Examining Attorney has refused registration under Section 2(d)
of the Trademark Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1052(d), on the ground that Applicant’s mark, as
used in connection with the identified services, so resembles the following three
registered marks, all owned by the same entity (hereafter, “Registrant”), as to be
likely to cause confusion, to cause mistake, or to deceive:
CHARLIE (in standard characters) for, among other services, “Mental
health services; Providing mental health and wellness information;
Psychotherapy; Psychiatric services; Outpatient and inpatient care
services in the fields of mental health, psychology, psychiatry, addiction
treatment, and social work; Telemedicine services in the fields of mental
health, psychology, psychiatry, addiction treatment, and social work; …
Cognitive therapy services; Cognitive-behavioral therapy (CBT);
Dialectical behavior therapy (DBT); … Managed mental health care and
treatment services” in International Class 44;2
CHARLIE HEALTH (in standard characters, HEALTH disclaimed) for
“Healthcare provider services, namely, behavioral health services for
adolescents” in International Class 44;3 and
CHARLIE HEALTH (in standard characters, HEALTH disclaimed) for
online non-downloadable software for connecting patients with mental-
health providers, providing telehealth services, and coordinating care in
the fields of mental health, psychology, psychiatry, addiction, and social
work, in International Class 42.4
When the refusal was made final, Applicant appealed. The appeal is briefed. For
the reasons discussed below, we affirm the refusal to register.
date of first use anywhere and in commerce. The application includes a statement that the
name shown in the mark does not identify a particular living individual.
2 Registration No. 7254442 (“the ’442 Registration”), issued December 26, 2023 .
3 Registration No. 6247401 (“the ’401 Registration”), issued January 12, 2021.
4 Registration No. 7546077 (“the ’077 Registration”), issued October 22, 2024.
Citations to the prosecution file refer to the USPTO’s Trademark Status & Document System
Retrieval (“TSDR”) system and identify the documents by title, date, and page in the
downloadable .pdf version. Citations to the briefs refer to TTABVUE.

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I. Likelihood of Confusion
“The Trademark Act prohibits registration of a mark that ‘so resembles a
registered mark as to be likely, when used on or in connection with the goods [or
services] … of the applicant, to cause confusion, mistake, or to deceive.’ 15 U.S.C.
§ 1052(d) (also called Section 2(d)).” In re Charger Ventures LLC, 64 F.4th 1375, 1379
(Fed. Cir. 2023). “To determine whether a likelihood of confusion exists under section
2(d), the Board considers the so-called DuPont factors in its analysis. In re E. I. Du
Pont de Nemours & Co., 476 F.2d 1357, 1361 (CCPA 1973) (reciting thirteen factors
to be considered, referred to as ‘DuPont factors’).” Id.
We consider each DuPont factor for which there is evidence and argument, In re
Guild Mortg. Co., 912 F.3d 1376, 1379 (Fed. Cir. 2019), but “we focus our analysis on
those factors we find to be relevant.” ProMark Brands, Inc. v. GFA Brands, Inc., No.
91194974, 2015 TTAB LEXIS 67, at *26-27. “The weight given to each factor depends
on the circumstances of each case.” Charger Ventures, 64 F.4th at 1381.
“In any likelihood of confusion analysis, two key considerations are the
similarities between the marks and the similarities between the services.” Monster
Energy Co. v. Lo, No. 91225050, 2023 TTAB LEXIS 14, at *18 (citing Federated Foods,
Inc. v. Fort Howard Paper Co., 544 F.2d 1098, 1103 (CCPA 1976) (“The fundamental
inquiry mandated by § 2(d) goes to the cumulative effect of differences in the essential
characteristics of the goods [and services] and differences in the marks.”)).
A. Focus on the ’442 Registration
We focus our likelihood of confusion analysis on the standard-character mark
CHARLIE in the ’442 Registration (hereafter, “the Registration”), because we find it

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closest in appearance, sound, connotation and commercial impression to Applicant’s
mark, and because it identifies Class 44 services that encompass Applicant’s services.
If we find a likelihood of confusion with respect to this mark, we need not find it with
respect to the CHARLIE HEALTH Marks in the ’401 and ’077 Registrations.
Conversely, if we do not find a likelihood of confusion with respect to this mark, we
would not find it with respect to those marks. See In re Max Cap. Grp. Ltd., No.
77186166, 2010 TTAB LEXIS 1, at *4-5.5
B. Similarity of the Services and Channels of Trade
The second DuPont factor concerns the “similarity or dissimilarity and nature of
the goods or services as described in an application or registration,” and the third
DuPont factor concerns the “similarity or dissimilarity of established, likely-to-
continue trade channels.” DuPont, 476 F.2d at 1361; Stone Lion Cap. Partners, LP v.
Lion Cap. LLP, 746 F.3d 1317, 1321 (Fed. Cir. 2014).6
Likelihood of confusion is determined based on the services as identified in the
application and registration, not on extrinsic evidence of actual use. In re Detroit
Athletic Co., 903 F.3d 1297, 1307 (Fed. Cir. 2018). The services “need not be identical
or even competitive to find a likelihood of confusion.” Coach Servs., Inc. v. Triumph
Learning LLC, 668 F.3d 1356, 1369 (Fed. Cir. 2012). “They need only be related in
5 Applicant notes that the final Office action expressly made the refusal final with respect to
the ’442 Registration and treats the refusal as final as to all three cited registrations because
the Examining Attorney continued to compare all three marks. 4 TTABVUE 3 (Applicant’s
Brief). The Examining Attorney’s brief addresses all three. 6 TTABVUE. Our focus on the
closest mark resolves the appeal as to the refusal.
6 We discuss classes of customers under the fourth DuPont factor, infra.

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some manner and/or if the circumstances surrounding their marketing are such that
they could give rise to the mistaken belief that [they] emanate from the same source.”
Id. (internal quotation omitted). It is sufficient for a finding of likelihood of confusion
if relatedness is established for any item encompassed by the identification in a
particular class. Tuxedo Monopoly, Inc. v. Gen. Mills Fun Grp., Inc., 648 F.2d 1335,
1336 (CCPA 1981).
Applicant’s services are “Mental health therapy services; Clinical mental health
counseling services; Counseling in the field of mental health and wellness;
Psychological counseling services in the field of sports.” The Registration identifies,
among other things, “Mental health services,” “Psychotherapy,” “Cognitive therapy
services,” “Cognitive-behavioral therapy (CBT),” and “Managed mental health care
and treatment services.”
Applicant’s “mental health therapy services” and “clinical mental health
counseling services” are encompassed by Registrant’s broadly-worded “mental health
services.” Because the identifications contain no restrictions as to channels of trade,
the legally identical services are presumed to travel in the same channels of trade. In
re Viterra Inc., 671 F.3d 1358, 1362 (Fed. Cir. 2012); Detroit Athletic, 903 F.3d at
1306. The Examining Attorney also made of record website evidence from third-party
mental-health providers (including BetterHelp, Thriveworks, Ellie Mental Health,
Lotus Wellness, and Old Town Psychology) showing therapy, counseling, and related
mental-health services offered together through the same online and clinical

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channels.7
The second and third DuPont factors weigh strongly in favor of finding a likelihood
of confusion.
C. Similarity of the Marks
Under the first DuPont factor, we consider the similarity or dissimilarity of the
marks in their entireties as to appearance, sound, connotation and commercial
impression. DuPont, 476 F.2d at 1361. “Similarity in any one of these elements may
be sufficient to find the marks confusingly similar.” In re Inn at St. John’s, LLC, No.
87075988, 2018 TTAB LEXIS 170, at *13, aff’d, 777 F. App’x 516 (Fed. Cir. 2019).
The proper test is not a side-by-side comparison, but “whether the marks are
sufficiently similar in terms of their commercial impression such that persons who
encounter the marks would be likely to assume a connection between the parties.”
Coach Servs., 668 F.3d at 1368. We consider the marks as a whole, while recognizing
that more or less weight may be given to a particular feature provided the ultimate
conclusion rests on the marks in their entireties. In re Nat’l Data Corp., 753 F.2d
1056, 1058 (Fed. Cir. 1985).
Applicant’s mark is CHARLIE BLUE. The cited mark is CHARLIE. Both are in
standard characters. CHARLIE is a commonly recognized given name. It is the
entirety of the cited mark and the first component of Applicant’s mark. Although
BLUE can denote a color or a mood in isolation, when it follows the given name
7 See September 26, 2025 Office Action, at TSDR 8-32.

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CHARLIE, consumers are more likely to perceive BLUE as a surname, and CHARLIE
BLUE as a whole as the full name of a person.
Applicant’s mark thus incorporates the cited mark in its entirety and adds matter
that will likely be taken as a surname. “The incorporation of an entire mark within
another has often been found to increase the similarity between the compared marks
where … the dominant portion of the marks is the same.” Charger Ventures, 64 F.4th
at 1381-82 (SPARK LIVING and SPARK). Consumers familiar with CHARLIE for
mental health services who later encounter CHARLIE BLUE for the same services
are likely to regard the latter as a more complete identification of the same source—
the given name plus a surname—rather than as an unrelated mark.
Applicant argues that the Examining Attorney applied the wrong standard by
calling the marks “related,” and that CHARLIE BLUE must be treated as a “unitary”
term given equal weight to both terms.8 Applicant further argues that BLUE creates
a distinct commercial impression because it may denote melancholy or the color blue
(trust, calm, loyalty), so that CHARLIE BLUE as a whole differs from CHARLIE.9
Applicant relies on In re Hearst Corp., 982 F.2d 493 (Fed. Cir. 1992) (VARGA GIRL
versus VARGAS), and on cases in which addition of matter was found sufficient to
distinguish marks that shared a common term.
We compare the marks in their entireties. Giving more weight to CHARLIE
because it is the shared given name, and because the addition of a surname does not
8 4 TTABVUE 4-6 (Applicant’s Brief).
9 Id. at 6.

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uniquely identify a different source, is not improper dissection. Nat’l Data, 753 F.2d
at 1058-59. Contrary to its contention,10 Applicant has not shown that CHARLIE
BLUE is a coined unitary expression with a meaning independent of its parts of the
kind found in Hearst, where GIRL was held to contribute significantly to the
commercial impression of VARGA GIRL. A given name followed by a surname is an
ordinary personal-name structure. That some consumers might also read BLUE as a
color or a mood does not change the likely commercial impression of CHARLIE BLUE
as a full personal name build on the cited given name CHARLIE.
Additionally, the cited mark is in standard characters and may be displayed in
any font, size, or color, including in a manner that emphasizes CHARLIE and
subordinates or omits stylization of any added wording an applicant might use.
Trademark Rule 2.52(a), 37 C.F.R. § 2.52(a); Viterra, 671 F.3d at 1364-65.
Applicant’s cited decisions finding no confusion despite a shared term are
distinguishable on their facts. Those cases involved different goods or services,
additional distinctive matter, or commercial impressions not present here. Prior
decisions on different records do not dictate the result in this case. See In re Nett
Designs, Inc., 236 F.3d 1339, 1342 (Fed. Cir. 2001).
Where the services are legally identical in part, a lesser degree of similarity
between the marks is necessary to support a finding of likely confusion. Cai v.
Diamond Hong, Inc., 901 F.3d 1367, 1373 (Fed. Cir. 2018).
The first DuPont factor weighs in favor of a likelihood of confusion.
10 Id. at 5-6.

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D. Conditions of Sale and Classes of Customers
The fourth DuPont factor considers the “conditions under which and buyers to
whom sales are made, i.e., ‘impulse’ vs. careful, sophisticated purchasing.” DuPont,
476 F.2d at 1361.
Applicant argues that purchasers of mental-health services proceed only after
intake, consultation, and careful consideration; that impulse purchase of healthcare
is virtually nonexistent; and that Carefirst of Md., Inc. v. FirstHealth of the Carolinas
Inc., 2005 TTAB LEXIS 600, at *38 (TTAB 2005), recognizes that even ordinary
consumers exercise care in healthcare decisions.11 Applicant contends this factor
weighs heavily against confusion.12
Even assuming that some purchasers of mental-health services exercise elevated
care, “the fact that purchasers are sophisticated or knowledgeable in a particular field
does not necessarily mean that they are sophisticated or knowledgeable in the field
of trademarks or immune from source confusion.” Stone Lion, 746 F.3d at 1325. We
must consider the least sophisticated potential purchaser. Id. The identifications are
not limited to specialized institutional buyers or to high-cost, insurance-driven
transactions of the kind emphasized in Carefirst. They include unrestricted “mental
health therapy services” and “counseling in the field of mental health and wellness,”
which on their face may be offered to ordinary consumers through the same online
platforms reflected in the record.
11 4 TTABVUE 7-8 (Applicant’s Brief).
12 Id. at 8.

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We find the fourth factor neutral.
E. Conclusion
The first, second, and third DuPont factors weigh in favor of a likelihood of
confusion. Applicant’s CHARLIE BLUE mark incorporates the cited CHARLIE mark
in its entirety and adds BLUE, which does not create a distinct source-identifying
commercial impression sufficient to avoid confusion for legally identical mental
health services offered in overlapping channels. The fourth factor does not change the
result.
Decision: The refusal to register under Section 2(d) is affirmed.