DTF Printer USA, LLC v. Karatas Yunus

Bukrinsky Mailed: September 16, 2026
Opposition No. 91298315
DTF Printer USA, LLC
v.
Karatas Yunus
Before Allard, Casagrande, and Brock,
Administrative Trademark Judges.
By the Board:
This proceeding comes before the Board on Opposer’s motion, filed March 18,
2026, for summary judgment on its pleaded claim of likelihood of confusion. The
motion is fully briefed.
I. Background
Applicant applied to register Application Serial No. 986706291 for the mark
(“RUSTIC UNITED Design Mark”) for the following goods:
“Inks for colouring textiles; Inks for printing; Inks for use in silk screen
printing; Printing inks, coatings, pigments and dispersions for use in the
graphic arts industry; UV inks; Inks for use in UV printing; Metallic inks;
Printers’ ink; Printing ink; Printing inks,” in International Class 2,
1 Filed July 28, 2024 on an intent to use basis pursuant to Trademark Act Section 1(b), 15
U.S.C. § 1051(b). Per the application, “[t]he mark consists of stylized writing of ‘RUSTIC
UNITED’ wording next to a printer image.” Color is not claimed as a feature of the mark.
UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
Trademark Trial and Appeal Board
P.O. Box 1451
Alexandria, VA 22313-1451
General Contact Number: 571-272-8500
THIS ORDER IS NOT A
PRECEDENT OF THE
TTAB

Opposition No. 91298315
2
“Printing machines for commercial or industrial use; Printing machines for
textiles; UV printing machines for commercial or industrial use; Machines,
namely, heat transfer presses; Machines, namely, sublimation heat transfer
presses,” in International Class 7, and
“3D decals for use on any surface; Corrugated paper panels laminated with
bleached white paper primarily for application of printed media for further use
in signage applications; Drawing ink; Duplicating ink; Educational kits sold as
a unit in the field of printing consisting primarily of printed educational books
and also including DVDs and t-shirts; Giclee prints; Graphic art prints;
Graphic fine art prints; Heat transfer paper; Ink stamps; Iron-on transfers of
paper; Plastic sheets for writing, printing, and marking; Polyester film for use
as a paper substitute for dry toner xerographic imaging, namely, laser
printing, color copier printing, dry toner printing, screen printing, and offset
printing; Print substrate, namely, transparent, opaque and translucent films
for use with ink jet printers; Print substrate, namely, transparent, opaque, and
translucent films for use with ink jet copiers and laser printers; Printed
knitting patterns; Stamp inks; Stamp pad inks; Stamping inks; UV DTF
decals; UV DTF stickers; UV DTF transfers; Dye-sublimation print paper;
Industrial coated thermal paper for UV inkjet printing; Industrial uncoated
thermal paper for UV inkjet printing; Paper substrates onto which digital
images are printed; Print substrates in the nature of films for transferring dye
sublimation inks to three-dimensional objects; UV direct-to-film (DTF) decals;
UV direct-to-film (DTF) stickers; UV direct-to-film (DTF) transfers,” in
International Class 16.
Opposer filed a notice of opposition alleging likelihood of confusion with its
identical mark, previously used for the same and similar goods. 1 TTABVUE.
Opposer also pleaded ownership of Application Serial No. 990528702 for the same
mark for the same and similar goods in International Classes 2, 7, and 16. Id. at 7-8.
Applicant filed an answer admitting some allegations of the notice of opposition
and denying others; and it asserted four paragraphs of “affirmative defenses.” 6
TTABVUE.
2 Filed February 24, 2025 pursuant to Trademark Act Section 1(a), 15 U.S.C. § 1051(a).
Opposer alleged use and use in commerce at least as early as April 13, 2022 for goods in Class
2; September 30, 2022 for goods in Class 7; and June 29, 2022 for goods in Class 16.

Opposition No. 91298315
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II. Preliminary Matter
As a preliminary matter, Opposer states it did not consent to Applicant’s January
5, 2026 request for an extension of time to serve its Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(a)(1) initial
disclosures, which Applicant filed with an allegation of Opposer’s consent; and that
Applicant’s initial disclosures were untimely served, thus implicating sanctions
under Fed. R. Civ. P. 37(c), which would include precluding Applicant from offering
any evidence in its defense. 17 TTABVUE 5-6. In response, Applicant’s counsel
submits communications with Opposer’s counsel of record at that time, documenting
counsel’s consent to the extension. 19 TTABVUE 8-10.
Applicant has submitted evidence that Opposer consented to the extension.
Moreover, Opposer never filed a response objecting to Applicant’s requested
extension. Finally, the Board issued its order granting the extension on January 28,
2026, and Opposer did not request reconsideration of that order within the time
allowed. See Trademark Rule 2.127(b). Accordingly, Opposer’s argument that
Applicant’s initial disclosures are untimely is not well-taken, and sanctions are not
warranted.
III. Legal Standard
Summary judgment is an appropriate method of disposing of cases in which there
is no genuine dispute with respect to any material fact, thus allowing the case to be
resolved as a matter of law. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). A party moving for summary
judgment has the burden of demonstrating the absence of any genuine dispute as to
a material fact, and that it is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. See Celotex

Opposition No. 91298315
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Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986); Sweats Fashions, Inc. v. Pannill Knitting
Co. Inc., 833 F.2d 1560, 1562 (Fed. Cir. 1987). A factual dispute is genuine if, on the
evidence of record, a reasonable fact finder could resolve the matter in favor of the
non-moving party. See Opryland USA Inc. v. Great Am. Music Show Inc., 970 F.2d
847, 850 (Fed. Cir. 1992); Olde Tyme Foods, Inc. v. Roundy’s, Inc., 961 F.2d 200, 202
(Fed. Cir. 1992).
The evidence of record must be viewed in the light most favorable to the
non-moving party, and all justifiable inferences must be drawn from the undisputed
facts in favor of the non-moving party. See Lloyd’s Food Prods. Inc. v. Eli’s Inc., 987
F.2d 766, 767 (Fed. Cir. 1993); Opryland USA, 970 F.2d at 850. We ascertain only
whether any material fact is genuinely disputed. We may not resolve any disputed
material facts and thereby decide the merits of the proceeding. See Lloyd’s Food
Prods., 987 F.2d at 767; Olde Tyme Foods, 961 F.2d at 202; Meyers v. Brooks Shoe
Inc., 912 F.2d 1459, 1461 (Fed. Cir. 1990).
IV. Analysis
A. Entitlement to a Statutory Cause of Action
To prevail on summary judgment, Opposer must first establish that there is no
genuine dispute of material fact that it is entitled to a statutory cause of action. See
Australian Therapeutic Supplies Pty. Ltd. v. Naked TM, LLC, 965 F.3d 1370, 1377
(Fed. Cir. 2020) (citing Lexmark Int’l, Inc. v. Static Control Components, Inc., 572
U.S. 118, 128 (2014)).

Opposition No. 91298315
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Opposer has submitted a declaration from its co-owner, Huseyin Gencer, stating
that Opposer has used its pleaded mark, which is identical to Applicant’s involved
mark, in connection with printing machines and related goods. 17 TTABVUE 11; id.
at 27-32 (photographs of Opposer’s goods bearing its mark). On this record, we find
no genuine dispute of material fact that Opposer is entitled to a statutory cause of
action. See Corcamore, LLC v. SFM, LLC, 978 F.3d 1298, 1306-07 (Fed. Cir. 2020);
Lipton Indus. v. Ralston Purina Co., 670 F.2d 1024, 1029 (Fed. Cir. 1982) (entitlement
to a statutory cause of action shown by evidence of the plaintiff’s “real commercial
interest in its own marks, and a reasonable basis for its belief that it would be
damaged.”).
B. Likelihood of Confusion
For Opposer to prevail on its likelihood of confusion claim, it must demonstrate
that there is no genuine dispute of material fact that it owns common law rights in a
distinctive mark that was “previously used in the United States,” and that
contemporaneous use of the parties’ respective marks in connection with their
respective goods would be likely to cause confusion or mistake or to deceive consumers
regarding the source of thegoods. See 15 U.S.C. § 1052(d); Giersch v. Scripps Networks
Inc., No. 92045576, 2009 TTAB LEXIS 72, at *9 (TTAB 2009); Hornblower & Weeks,
Inc. v. Hornblower & Weeks, Inc., No. 91110043, 2001 TTAB LEXIS 562, at *7 (TTAB
2001). Whether there is a likelihood of confusion between two marks presents an
issue of law based on underlying facts, namely, findings under the factors set forth in
In re E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 476 F.2d 1357, 1361 (CCPA 1973) (“DuPont”).

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Opposer has submitted the Declaration of Huseyin Gencer stating that Opposer
has used the RUSTIC UNITED Design Mark “since at least 2022.” 17 TTABVUE 11.
Attached to Mr. Gencer’s declaration are invoices for, inter alia, printer ink, transfer
powder, and film, dating to June 2022, that Mr. Gencer states were sold under the
RUSTIC UNITED Design Mark,3 as well as photographs of printing machines and
boxes of film bearing the mark. Id. at 13-32.
In response, Applicant concedes that Opposer commenced using the RUSTIC
UNITED Design Mark in 2022. 19 TTABVUE 5, 13 (Declaration of Yunus Karatas).
Applicant states that he was a part owner of Opposer at that time, and designed the
mark. Id. at 6, 13. Applicant does not dispute Opposer’s priority of use, but claims to
own the mark in certain states where Opposer allegedly did not sell its products
before July 29, 2024 (the date Applicant filed his application). Id. at 13-14.
On this record, we find no genuine dispute of material fact that Opposer
commenced using the RUSTIC UNITED Design Mark in connection with, inter alia,
printing machines, ink for printers, and film and transfer powder for printers in 2022,
which is before Applicant filed his intent-to-use application on July 29, 2024.
Accordingly, there is no genuine dispute of material fact that Opposer has priority in
the mark for these goods.
3 The mark is not legible on Opposer’s invoices. See 17 TTABVUE 13-25. It is the filing party’s
responsibility to ensure that all attachments are legible. See TBMP § 110.03(b) and cases
cited therein. Nonetheless, Mr. Gencer’s declaration and the photographs of goods bearing
the RUSTIC UNITED Design Mark corroborate the invoices. Moreover, Applicant does not
dispute Mr. Gencer’s assertion that these invoices represent sales of goods bearing the mark.
Applicant does dispute whether Opposer commenced use in April or June 2022, see 19
TTABVUE 5, 6, but that disputed fact is not material.

Opposition No. 91298315
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Applicant’s assertion that it owns common law rights in the RUSTIC UNITED
Design Mark in certain geographic areas where Opposer had not sold its goods at the
time Applicant filed his intent-to-use application – and accordingly may be entitled
to a geographically restricted registration – cannot be determined in the context of
this opposition proceeding. “The only mechanism for determining whether imposition
of geographic restrictions might be sufficient to eliminate the likelihood of confusion
is the concurrent use proceeding.” Tamarkin Co. v. Seaway Food Town, Inc., No.
91087637, 1995 TTAB LEXIS 18, at *16 n.9 (TTAB 1995); see also Holmes Oil Co. v.
Myers Cruizers of Mena, Inc., No. 94002400, 2011 TTAB LEXIS 379, at *2-4 (TTAB
2011) (“In a concurrent use proceeding, the Board determines whether one or more
applicants are entitled to a registration, generally with a geographic restriction, and
whether the involved parties, which can be applicants, registrants or mere users of
marks, can coexist without a likelihood of confusion among consumers.”). We note
furthermore that Applicant has not sought a geographically restricted registration.4
Having found no genuine dispute as to Opposer’s priority, we next turn to
likelihood of confusion. In determining whether Opposer has demonstrated the
absence of a genuine dispute of material fact that there is a likelihood of confusion
between the parties’ marks, we have considered each DuPont factor that is relevant
and for which there is evidence or argument of record. See M2 Software, Inc. v. M2
Commc’ns, Inc., 450 F.3d 1378, 1384 (Fed. Cir. 2006); ProMark Brands Inc. v. GFA
4 In addition, a concurrent use application “must assert use in commerce.” 37 C.F.R. § 2.42.
Applicant’s application is based on intent to use.

Opposition No. 91298315
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Brands, Inc., No. 91194974, 2015 TTAB LEXIS 67, at *26-27 (TTAB 2015). We treat
as neutral any DuPont factors for which there is no record evidence or argument.
Neither party addresses the elements of likelihood of confusion. Nonetheless, we
find no genuine dispute on this record—which, crucially, includes the pleadings—that
the parties’ marks are identical. Further, Applicant has admitted that “Applicant’s
goods are the same as or are related to all or part of Opposer’s goods[.]” 1 TTABVUE
7, ¶ 15; 6 TTABVUE 4, ¶ 15. There are also no restrictions in Applicant’s application
as to its channels of trade, thus triggering the presumption that Applicant’s goods
“will move in all channels of trade normal for such goods and be purchased by all
potential customers, including Opposer’s trade channels and Opposer’s customers
and potential customers.” Bell’s Brewery, Inc. v. Innovation Brewing, No. 91215896,
2017 TTAB LEXIS 452, at *12 (TTAB 2017). There is no evidence or argument as to
any other factors.
On this record, we find no genuine dispute of material fact that the parties’
contemporaneous use of the RUSTIC UNITED Design Mark for their respective goods
would be likely to cause confusion or mistake, or to deceive. See UVeritech, Inc. v.
Amax Lighting, Inc., No. 92057088, 2015 TTAB LEXIS 242, at *6-7 and n.7 (TTAB
2015) (“[W]hen the parties are claiming rights in the same mark for the same goods,
likelihood of confusion is inevitable.”). Opposer is entitled to judgment as a matter of
law.
In view thereof, Opposer’s motion for summary judgment is granted. Judgment
is entered against Applicant and in favor of Opposer on Opposer’s claim of likelihood

Opposition No. 91298315
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of confusion under Section 2(d) of the Trademark Act. The opposition is sustained,
and registration of application Serial No. 98670629 is hereby denied.