Green Leaf Consulting Group, Inc.

This Opinion is Not a
Precedent of the TTAB
Mailed: July 21, 2026
UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
_____
Trademark Trial and Appeal Board
_____
In re Green Leaf Consulting Group, Inc.
_____
Serial No. 98620760
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Kevin Grierson of CM LAW LLP,
for Green Leaf Consulting Group, Inc.
Jaime Batt, Trademark Examining Attorney, Law Office 125,
Robin Mittler, Managing Attorney.
_____
Before Pologeorgis, Casagrande, and Stanley,
Administrative Trademark Judges.
Opinion by Stanley, Administrative Trademark Judge:
Green Leaf Consulting Group, Inc. (“Applicant”) seeks registration on the
Principal Register of the standard-character mark GREENVIEW for “Software as a
service (SAAS) services featuring software for deploying and reviewing reports,
dashboards and analytics in a customizable interface that can be white labeled for
external use,” in International Class 42.1
1 Application Serial No. 98620760 was filed on June 26, 2024 under Section 1(b) of the
Trademark Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1051(b), based on Applicant’s allegation of a bona fide intention
to use the mark in commerce.

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The Trademark Examining Attorney refused registration under Section 2(d) of the
Trademark Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1052(d), on the ground that Applicant’s mark, when used
in connection with the identified services, so resembles the registered composite mark
(the “Cited Mark”), for the services listed below, that it is likely
to cause confusion, to cause mistake, or to deceive:
Business consultation services, professional business
consulting, Business advisory services, consultancy and
information; Statistical analysis and reporting services for
business purposes; Business consulting service that
provides transformational strategies to hospitality and
tourism organizations wishing to move towards
sustainability and socially responsible business practices,
in International Class 35.2
When the refusal was made final, Applicant appealed. The case is now briefed.3
We affirm the refusal to register Applicant’s mark.
2 Registration No. 4509504 issued on the Principal Register on April 8, 2014 and has been
renewed. The registration includes the following description: “The mark consists of the word
‘GREENVIEW’ with the ‘GREEN’ portion of the mark appearing in dark green and the
‘VIEW’ portion of the mark appearing in light green. Directly above the word ‘GREENVIEW’
are four leaves appearing in forest green.” The colors dark green, light green and forest green
are claimed as a feature of the mark. The cited registration is owned by Greenview LLC
(“Registrant”).
3 Applicant’s brief is at 4 TTABVUE. The Examining Attorney’s brief is at 6 TTABVUE.
Applicant’s reply brief is at 9 TTABVUE. Applicant’s initial reply brief (7 TTABVUE)
exceeded the page limit, and pursuant to the Board’s April 7, 2026 order giving Applicant
time to file a substitute reply brief (8 TTABVUE), Applicant filed a substitute reply brief that
same day (9 TTABVUE).
Citations to the appeal record are to TTABVUE, the Board’s online docketing system.
Citations to the prosecution file are to the USPTO’s TRADEMARK STATUS & DOCUMENT
RETRIEVAL (“TSDR”) system in .pdf format.

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I. Likelihood of Confusion
Section 2(d) of the Trademark Act prohibits registration of a mark that so
resembles a registered mark as to be likely, when used on or in connection with the
goods or services of the applicant, to cause confusion, mistake, or deception. 15 U.S.C.
§ 1052(d); see also In re Charger Ventures LLC, 64 F.4th 1375, 1379 (Fed. Cir. 2023).
Our determination under Section 2(d) is based on an analysis of all of the probative
evidence of record bearing on a likelihood of confusion. In re E. I. DuPont de Nemours
& Co., 476 F.2d 1357, 1361 (CCPA 1973) (“DuPont”); see also In re Majestic Distilling
Co., 315 F.3d 1311, 1315 (Fed. Cir. 2003). When analyzing the likelihood of confusion
factors, the overriding concerns are not only to prevent buyer confusion as to the
source of the goods and services, but also to protect registrants from adverse
commercial impact due to use of a similar mark by a newcomer. See In re Shell Oil
Co., 992 F.2d 1204, 1207-08 (Fed. Cir. 1993).
In any likelihood of confusion analysis, different DuPont factors may play a
dominant role, and some factors may not be relevant. Naterra Int’l, Inc. v. Bensalem,
92 F.4th 1113, 1116 (Fed. Cir. 2024) (citing Tiger Lily Ventures Ltd. v. Barclays Cap.
Inc., 35 F.4th 1352, 1362 (Fed. Cir. 2022)). Varying weight may be assigned to each
factor depending on the evidence presented, and “any one of the factors may control
a particular case.” Id.; see also Charger Ventures, 64 F.4th at 1381. Although we
consider each DuPont factor for which there is evidence and argument, In re Guild
Mortg. Co., 912 F.3d 1376, 1379 (Fed. Cir. 2019), two key considerations are the
similarities between the marks and the similarities between the services. In re

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i.am.symbolic, llc, 866 F.3d 1315, 1322 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (quoting Herbko Int’l, Inc. v.
Kappa Books, Inc., 308 F.3d 1156, 1164-65 (Fed. Cir. 2002)). These factors, and
others, are discussed below.
A. The Marks
The first DuPont factor requires us to compare the marks in their entireties as to
appearance, sound, connotation, and commercial impression. Palm Bay Imps. Inc. v.
Veuve Clicquot Ponsardin Maison Fondee En 1772, 396 F.3d 1369, 1371 (Fed. Cir.
2005); see also Stone Lion Cap. Partners, L.P. v. Lion Cap. LLP, 746 F.3d 1317, 1319
(Fed. Cir. 2014). “Similarity in any one of these elements may be sufficient to find the
marks confusingly similar.” In re Inn at St. John’s, LLC, No. 87075988, 2018 WL
2734893, at *5 (TTAB 2018) (quoting In re Davia, No. 85497617, 2014 WL 2531200,
at *2 (TTAB 2014)), aff’d mem., 777 F. App’x 516 (Fed. Cir. 2019); accord Krim-Ko
Corp. v. Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 390 F.2d 728, 732 (CCPA 1968) (“It is sufficient if the
similarity in either form, spelling or sound alone is likely to cause confusion.”)
(citation omitted).
“Similarity is not a binary factor but is a matter of degree.” In re St. Helena Hosp.,
774 F.3d 747, 752 (Fed. Cir. 2014) (quoting In re Coors Brewing Co., 343 F.3d 1340,
1344 (Fed. Cir. 2003)). The proper test “is not a side-by-side comparison of the marks,
but instead whether the marks are sufficiently similar in terms of their commercial
impression such that persons who encounter the marks would be likely to assume a
connection between the parties.” Cai v. Diamond Hong, Inc., 901 F.3d 1367, 1373
(Fed. Cir. 2018) (quoting Coach Servs. v. Triumph Learning LLC, 668 F.3d 1356, 1368

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(Fed. Cir. 2012)) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). “The focus is on the
recollection of the average purchaser, who normally retains a general rather than a
specific impression of trademarks.” In re St. Julian Wine Co., No. 87834973, 2020 WL
2788005, at *6 (TTAB 2020).
We must base our comparison on the marks in their entireties, not on a dissection
of their individual components. In re Nat’l Data Corp., 753 F.2d 1056, 1058 (Fed. Cir.
1985). “No element of a mark is ignored simply because it is less dominant, or would
not have trademark significance if used alone.” In re Electrolyte Labs. Inc., 929 F.2d
645, 647 (Fed. Cir. 1990) (citing Spice Islands, Inc. v. Frank Tea & Spice Co., 505 F.2d
1293 (CCPA 1974)). Nonetheless, “in articulating reasons for reaching a conclusion
on the issue of confusion, there is nothing improper in stating that, for rational
reasons, more or less weight has been given to a particular feature of a mark, provided
the ultimate conclusion rests on consideration of the marks in their entireties.” In re
Detroit Athletic Co., 903 F.3d 1297, 1305 (Fed. Cir. 2018) (quoting Nat’l Data, 753
F.2d at 1058).
With these principles in mind, we compare Applicant’s standard-character mark
GREENVIEW with the cited composite mark .
In sound and appearance, the marks are virtually identical. The sole literal
element of the Cited Mark – GREENVIEW − is identical to the entirety of Applicant’s
mark. The stylized color treatment and four-leaf design in the Cited Mark do not
diminish the dominance of the shared word GREENVIEW. When evaluating a

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composite mark consisting of words and a design, the word portion is normally
accorded greater weight because it is likely to make a greater impression upon
purchasers, be remembered by them, and be used by them to request the services. In
re Viterra Inc., 671 F.3d 1358, 1362 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (citing CBS Inc. v. Morrow, 708
F.2d 1579, 1581-82 (Fed. Cir. 1983)); see also In re Appetito Provisions Co., No.
423405, 1987 WL 124293, at *1 (TTAB 1987) (“if one of the marks comprises both a
word and a design, then the word is normally accorded greater weight because it
would be used by purchasers to request the goods or services”).
Moreover, because Applicant is seeking to register its mark in standard
characters, it is not limited to any particular lettering style, color, or font − and could
therefore be displayed in a manner identical or substantially similar to the stylized
GREENVIEW in the Cited Mark, further heightening the similarity between the
marks. Viterra, 671 F.3d at 1363; Citigroup Inc. v. Cap. City Bank Grp. Inc., 637 F.3d
1344, 1353 (Fed. Cir. 2011).
As to connotation and commercial impression, nothing in the record suggests −
nor does Applicant argue − that the term GREENVIEW conveys a different meaning
or creates a different commercial impression when used in connection with
Applicant’s services than when used in connection with the services identified in the
cited registration. In re Embiid, No. 88202890, 2021 WL 2285576, at *9 (TTAB 2021)
(“[T]here is no evidence here, or other reason to find, that the mark TRUST THE
PROCESS has one meaning when used with shoes, and a second and different

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meaning when used with shirts and sweatshirts, based on the nature of the respective
goods.”).
In sum, the marks share an identical dominant word element − the term
GREENVIEW − and differ only in the Cited Mark’s addition of non-dominant design
and stylization elements. Where, as here, the sole literal elements of the marks are
identical, the first DuPont factor weighs heavily in favor of a likelihood of confusion.
B. The Services
We next consider the relatedness of the parties’ services, assessed based on the
identifications in the application and cited registration. See Detroit Athletic, 903 F.3d
at 1307 (“The relevant inquiry in an ex parte proceeding focuses on the goods and
services described in the application and registration, and not on real-world
conditions.”) (emphasis in italics in original); Stone Lion Cap. Partners, 746 F.3d at
1323; Hewlett-Packard Co. v. Packard Press Inc., 281 F.3d 1261, 1267 (Fed. Cir. 2002).
“‘[I]t is not necessary that the products [or services] be similar or even competitive
to support a finding of likelihood of confusion.’” Coach Servs., 668 F.3d at 1369
(quoting 7-Eleven, Inc. v. Wechsler, No. 91117739, 2007 WL 1431084, at *6 (TTAB
2007)). Nor is the question whether the services themselves will be confused with
each other; rather, it is whether consumers would be confused as to their source. See
Recot, Inc. v. Becton, 214 F.3d 1322, 1329 (Fed. Cir. 2000). It is sufficient that the
services “are related in some manner and/or if the circumstances surrounding their
marketing are such that they could give rise to the mistaken belief that [the services]
emanate from the same source.” Coach Servs., 668 F.3d at 1369.

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Evidence of relatedness may include news articles and/or evidence from online
databases showing that the relevant services are used together or used by the same
purchasers; advertisements showing that the relevant services are advertised
together or sold by the same manufacturer or dealer; and/or copies of prior use-based
registrations of the same mark for both an applicant’s services (or similar services)
and the services listed in the cited registration (or similar services). See, e.g., In re
Country Oven, Inc., No. 87354443, 2019 WL 6170483, at *2 (TTAB 2019); Davia, 2014
WL 2531200, at *6-8 (finding pepper sauce and agave related where evidence showed
both were used for the same purpose in the same recipes and thus consumers were
likely to purchase the products at the same time and in the same stores).
As noted above, Applicant’s services are identified as:
Software as a service (SAAS) services featuring software
for deploying and reviewing reports, dashboards and
analytics in a customizable interface that can be white
labeled for external use.
And the cited registration identifies:
Business consultation services, professional business
consulting, Business advisory services, consultancy and
information; Statistical analysis and reporting services for
business purposes; Business consulting service that
provides transformational strategies to hospitality and
tourism organizations wishing to move towards
sustainability and socially responsible business practices.
We find the services related for the following reasons.
1. The Services Are Intrinsically Related
The Federal Circuit has recognized that goods or services sometimes are
intrinsically related. See, e.g., Tiger Lily Ventures, 35 F.4th at 1363 n.3; Majestic

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Distilling, 315 F.3d at 1315; Shell Oil, 992 F.2d at 1207. Here, the respective services
share an intrinsic functional relationship.
Applicant’s identification covers the provision of a hosted software platform that
enables users to deploy and review reports, dashboards, and analytics. The cited
registration covers, among other things, “[s]tatistical analysis and reporting services
for business purposes” − i.e., the performance of statistical analysis and reporting as
a professional consulting deliverable. Both address the same core business function:
analyzing data and generating reports. They differ principally in the mode of delivery
− software platform versus professional service − rather than in the underlying need
they serve.
Where a technology service automates or facilitates the same function that a
professional service performs, the two may be found intrinsically related. Here, a
consumer seeking “statistical analysis and reporting services for business purposes”
and a consumer seeking a SaaS platform for “deploying and reviewing reports,
dashboards and analytics” are both seeking solutions to the same problem:
generating actionable analytical insights from business data. See Recot, 214 F.3d at
1329 (“[E]ven if the goods in question are different from, and thus not related to, one
another in kind, the same goods can be related in the mind of the consuming public
as to the origin of the goods. It is this sense of relatedness that matters in the
likelihood of confusion analysis.”). Critically, neither identification limits the context
in which these services are offered − the cited registration does not restrict its
“statistical analysis and reporting services” to any particular mode of delivery, and

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Applicant’s identification does not restrict its SaaS to users who would never also
seek consulting assistance with the same underlying business function.
We recognize that not every software product that digitizes a function previously
performed by a professional service will be found related to that professional service
for purposes of Section 2(d). The degree of overlap in the core function, the
marketplace context, and the expectations of the relevant consumers all bear on this
determination. Here, the overlap is substantial and specific: both identifications
expressly reference the generation of reports and analytics for business purposes, and
the marketplace evidence discussed below confirms that consumers encounter both
types of offerings from a single source. See Kellogg Co. v. General Mills, Inc., No.
91125884, 2007 WL 499921, at *5 (TTAB 2007) (acknowledging that in some cases
“the identifications of goods alone [may] reveal sufficient facts about the respective
goods from which a conclusion, not based on mere conjecture, as to the relationship
between the goods may be made”).
2. The Internet Evidence Confirms Relatedness
Beyond the intrinsic relationship, the Examining Attorney’s Internet evidence
confirms that the same entity commonly provides both business consulting services
of the type identified in the cited registration and SaaS analytics platforms of the
type identified in Applicant’s application.
Applicant’s own website. Applicant’s website is particularly probative. The
record shows that Applicant − Green Leaf Consulting Group − offers both “Technical
strategy and consultation” (encompassing consulting services of the type identified in
the cited registration) and “GreenView” (a SaaS analytics platform matching the

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services identified in the application) under the same house mark, GREEN LEAF
CONSULTING GROUP.4 Applicant thus provides both types of services under a
single mark − precisely the same-source relationship at issue here. See Hewlett-
Packard, 281 F.3d at 1267 (finding the Board erred in concluding that there was
insufficient evidence of relatedness, because “[w]hile additional evidence, such
as whether a single company sells the goods and services of both parties, if
presented, is relevant to a relatedness analysis, [the Board] did not consider the
important evidence already before it, namely the ITU application and [opposer's]
registrations.”) (emphasis added); Octocom Sys. Inc. v. Houston Computer Servs. Inc.,
918 F.2d 937, 941 (Fed. Cir. 1990) (finding a relationship between the applicant’s
“modems” and the opposer’s “computer programs,” finding that the relationship
between the goods “is shown,” in part, “by [applicant’s] original application, which
indicates [applicant] itself used the mark OCTOCOM for both modems and
computer programs”) (emphasis added); cf. Nike, Inc. v. WNBA Enters, LLC, No.
91160755, 2007 WL 763166, at *7 (TTAB 2007) (finding persuasive the fact that
applicant itself offered or intended to offer both types of products under its mark).
The fact that Applicant separately brands the platform as “GREENVIEW” does
not negate the concurrent use of the GREEN LEAF CONSULTING GROUP mark in
connection with both types of services. See Textron Inc. v. Cardinal Eng’g Corp., 1969
WL 8396, at *4 (TTAB 1969) (“[I]t is a common practice for manufacturers to apply
both a house mark and a product mark to their various items of merchandise”). We
4 January 16, 2025 Non-Final Office Action, TSDR at 32-37.

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recognize that Applicant’s creation of a separate brand – GREENVIEW − for its SaaS
platform might be viewed as evidence that Applicant itself recognizes the need to
distinguish its consulting services from its SaaS offering. But this fact actually
reinforces the likelihood of confusion rather than negating it.
Applicant’s business model demonstrates precisely the scenario Section 2(d) is
designed to address: a consulting firm launching a SaaS product under a new mark
that consumers may then associate with the consulting firm’s source. The registrant
here − also a consulting firm using the mark GREENVIEW − would be harmed if
consumers encountering Applicant’s GREENVIEW SaaS assume it originates from
or is affiliated with Registrant’s GREENVIEW consulting services. As such,
Applicant’s website is probative in the same way that any third-party website would
be: it demonstrates that, in the actual marketplace, the same entity offers both
consulting and SaaS analytics services, and therefore consumers may expect a similar
relationship when they encounter the same mark on both types of services offered by
different entities. See Hewlett-Packard, 281 F.3d at 1267.
Third-party websites. The Examining Attorney also submitted website
evidence from four third-party entities − Epicor, IBM, Oracle, and SAP − each of
which offers both business consulting services of type identified in the cited
registration and SaaS or cloud-based analytics under the same house mark.5
• Epicor offers “Epicor Consulting” (e.g., business consulting workshops
for ERP implementation, risk management, and change acceleration)
and “Epicor Data Analytics” (a cloud-based analytics platform for
5 May 12, 2025 Final Office Action, TSDR at 7-41, 56-67.

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creating “reports, dashboards, and graphs in minutes”) under the
EPICOR mark.6
• IBM offers “IBM Consulting” (e.g., strategy consulting, cloud consulting,
and finance consulting) and cloud-based data and analytics services
(including “IBM Watson Studio”) under the IBM mark.7
• Oracle offers “Oracle Consulting” (e.g., ERP consulting, HCM
consulting, and customer experience consulting) and “Oracle Analytics”
(a cloud-based analytics platform with dashboards and reporting) under
the ORACLE mark.8
• SAP offers “SAP Advisory Services” (e.g., business transformation
consulting, organizational change management, and value design
services) and “SAP Business Data Cloud” (a cloud-based data and
analytics platform with dashboards and reporting) under the SAP
mark.9
Applicant argues that these examples are unpersuasive because each entity uses
distinct product-level sub-brands for its SaaS offerings (e.g., “Epicor Data Analytics,”
“Oracle Analytics Cloud,” “SAP Business Data Cloud”), and that this branding
pattern demonstrates a marketplace norm in which consumers expect SaaS platforms
to carry separate brand identities from consulting services − even when offered by
the same company.10 Applicant contends this norm undermines any inference that
consumers encountering GREENVIEW for SaaS would assume a connection to
GREENVIEW for consulting.11
6 May 12, 2025 Final Office Action, TSDR at 7-21.
7 Id. at 22-31.
8 Id. at 32-41.
9 Id. at 56-67.
10 Applicant’s Br., 4 TTABVUE 4; Applicant’s Reply Brief, 9 TTABVUE 3-4.
11 Applicant’s Br., 4 TTABVUE 4; Applicant’s Reply Brief, 9 TTABVUE 3-4.

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We are not persuaded that this negates the Examining Attorney’s showing. First,
it is well established that a product or service may bear multiple marks
simultaneously. Textron, 1969 WL 8396, at *4; see also In re Maugus Mfg., Inc., No.
88389863, 2021 WL 5206090, at *3 (TTAB 2021) (“A product ‘can bear more than one
mark without diminishing the identifying feature of each.’”) (citation omitted);
Weatherford/Lamb, Inc. v. C&J Energy Servs., Inc., No. 92050101, 2010 WL 4502073,
at *7 (TTAB 2010) (“It is well settled that a party may use more than one mark to
identify a product or service and thus may choose to use its housemark in conjunction
with other marks.”). The use of a product-level sub-brand does not negate the
concurrent use of the house mark in connection with the same service. Each of these
entities prominently uses its house mark − Epicor, IBM, Oracle, SAP − in connection
with both its consulting services and its analytics platform on the same website,
reinforcing the single-source impression. The sub-brand identifies the specific
product within the company’s portfolio; the house mark identifies the source. Both
function as marks used in connection with the service.
Second, and more fundamentally, the branding pattern Applicant identifies −
house mark plus product sub-brand − is precisely the pattern that creates the source-
confusion risk at issue here. If consumers are accustomed to encountering a
company’s house mark on both consulting and SaaS (with the SaaS bearing an
additional product-level mark), then a consumer encountering the standalone mark
GREENVIEW on SaaS analytics would have reason to believe it is the house mark of
a consulting firm that has launched a SaaS platform − exactly the confusion Section

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2(d) is designed to prevent. The fact that the hypothetical full branding might be
“GREENVIEW ANALYTICS” rather than just “GREENVIEW” does not eliminate the
likelihood that consumers would associate the GREENVIEW mark with the
consulting source. See Weatherford/Lamb, 2010 WL 4502073, at *7 (“While the
housemark WEATHERFORD or generic wording appears frequently with petitioner's
mark FRACSURE, this does not detract from the source-identifying nature of the
mark.”).
Third, the question is not whether consumers expect every SaaS platform to be
branded identically to its parent’s consulting services, but whether consumers
encountering the same mark on both types of services would be likely to assume a
connection. The evidence shows they would, because the marketplace demonstrates
that consulting entities do offer SaaS analytics under marks that include the same
source-identifying word (the house mark). When that source-identifying word is all
the consumer encounters − as here − the confusion risk is heightened, not diminished.
Applicant further argues that IBM, Oracle, and SAP are large, well-known
technology conglomerates whose house-mark usage across broad product lines has
diminished probative force in establishing relatedness for non-famous marks.12 We
acknowledge that IBM, Oracle, and SAP are large companies whose marks span a
broad range of products and services, and we are mindful that evidence of famous-
mark usage may overstate consumer expectations for less well-known marks. See In
re Donnay Int’l, S.A., No. 74160268, 1994 WL 515456, at *1 n.3 (TTAB 1994)
12 Applicant’s Brief, 4 TTABVUE 7-8.

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(acknowledging that registrations for house marks are not particularly persuasive to
show relatedness because house marks can be used to identify a broad range of
products). However, we do not find this concern dispositive here for three reasons.
First, the Federal Circuit has not recognized a categorical rule excluding
marketplace evidence simply because the third parties are large or well-known. The
relevant question is whether the evidence shows that the same source commonly
provides both types of services − and it does.
Second, the evidence is not limited to multinational conglomerates. Epicor has not
been shown to be a large company or a household name. Its concurrent offering of
“Epicor Consulting” and “Epicor Data Analytics” under the same mark demonstrates
that the consulting-plus-SaaS-analytics pattern is not unique to mega-conglomerates
whose brands span hundreds of product or service categories. See Detroit Athletic,
903 F.3d at 1306 (evidence that third parties use the same mark for involved goods
and services “suggests that consumers are accustomed to seeing a single mark
associated with a source that sells both”); In re Davey Prods. Pty Ltd., No. 77029776,
2009 WL 2420527, at *5 (TTAB 2009) (third-party website evidence shows that the
applicant’s and registrant’s products “can be manufactured and sold by a single
source”).
Third, and most significantly, Applicant itself − a company not shown to be famous
or multinational − offers both consulting and SaaS analytics in connection with the
mark GREEN LEAF CONSULTING GROUP. If the pattern existed only among IBM,
Oracle, and SAP, Applicant’s argument about diminished probative force would carry

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greater weight. But the fact that Applicant’s own business model replicates the same
pattern substantially undermines the contention that only famous companies operate
this way. Applicant’s own commercial behavior is the strongest evidence that the
consulting-plus-SaaS-analytics model is not limited to conglomerates with famous
house marks.
3. Applicant’s Third-Party Registration Evidence Does Not
Rebut the Showing of Relatedness
Applicant attempts to counter the Examining Attorney’s evidence by submitting
eighteen pairs of use-based, Principal Register registrations owned by different
entities for identical or substantially similar marks, where one entity’s registration
covers software and the other’s covers business consulting.13 Applicant argues that
these paired registrations demonstrate the Office’s repeated recognition that
business consulting services on the one hand and software or SaaS on the other are
not related for likelihood of confusion purposes.14 See, e.g., In re G.B.I. Tile & Stone,
Inc., No. 77369073, 2009 WL 3491050 at *5 (TTAB 2009) (“[T]hird-party registrations
can be used by examining attorneys to suggest that the goods are related because the
same party has registered a common mark for the goods at issue in a likelihood of
confusion case. Similarly, applicants may submit sets of third-party registrations to
suggest the opposite, i.e., that the Office has registered the same mark to different
parties for the goods at issue.”); see also In re Thor Tech, Inc., No. 85667188, 2015 WL
496133, at *4 (TTAB 2015) (considering similar argument).
13 Ex. A to April 16, 2025 Response to Office Action, TSDR at 20-120.
14 Applicant’s Br., 4 TTABVUE 10-19.

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Applicant’s paired-registration evidence is entitled to limited weight for several
reasons.
First, three of the registrations in Applicant’s pairs have been cancelled for failure
to file a declaration of use under Section 8 of the Trademark Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1058:
Registration Nos. 4691082 (BRIGHTSPOT), 5657410 (MINDSIGHT), and 5783150
(SUPERMASSIVE).15 A cancelled registration is evidence only that the registration
once issued; it is not evidence of present rights or actual use. In re Seminole Tribe of
Fla., No. 87890892, 2023 WL 3751113, at *3 n.15 (TTAB 2023); see also In re Kysela
Pere et Fils Ltd., No. 77686637, 2011 WL 1399224, at *2 (TTAB 2011) (“‘dead’ or
cancelled registrations have no probative value at all”). The three pairs containing
these cancelled registrations are therefore not probative.
Second, unlike the Examining Attorney’s website evidence − which shows actual
marketplace use of the same mark in connection with both types of services −
Applicant’s registration evidence tells us nothing about whether the listed marks are
currently in use, whether the public is familiar with them, or whether consumers
have formed any expectations based on their coexistence. In re Midwest Gaming &
Entm’t LLC, No. 85111552, 2013 WL 1442237, at *5 n.5 (TTAB 2013) (citing In re
Mighty Leaf Tea, 601 F.3d 1342, 1346 (Fed. Cir. 2010)); see also Palm Bay Imps., 396
15 The Board’s general practice is not to take judicial notice of USPTO records regarding
registrations, see In re Weiss, No. 88621608, 2024 WL 3617597, at *1 (TTAB 2024), but an
exception exists for changes in the status or title of a registration that has properly been
made of record. Cf. Harry Winston Inc. v. Bruce Winston Gem Corp., No. 91153947, 2014 WL
3686875, at *4 n. 19 (TTAB 2014) (taking judicial notice of status of pleaded registration
made of record). We take judicial notice that Registrations No. 4691082, 5657410, and
5783150 were each cancelled for failure to file a declaration of continuing use of the mark.

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F.3d at 1374 (quoting Han Beauty, Inc. v. Alberto-Culver Co., 236 F.3d 1333, 1338
(Fed. Cir. 2001)) (“[W]here the ‘record includes no evidence about the extent of [third-
party] uses … [t]he probative value of this evidence is thus minimal.’”).
Third, the paired registrations are presented without context. We do not know
whether the paired registrants entered into coexistence agreements, whether their
marks actually coexisted in the marketplace without confusion, or whether they
operate in a crowded field that has conditioned consumers to distinguish among
similar marks. See In re Thomas, No. 78334625, 2006 WL 1258862, at *8 (TTAB 2006)
(coexistence on the register does not prove coexistence in the marketplace without
confusion). Without such context, the registrations are of limited probative value.
Fourth, Applicant’s paired registrations almost certainly present an incomplete
picture of USPTO practice. There is no comparative evidence of how many
applications covering the relevant services were refused registration based on similar
marks. See In re Ala. Tourism Dep’t, No. 87599292, 2020 WL 2301221, at *13 (TTAB
2020) (“Applicant’s evidentiary submission almost certainly presents an incomplete
picture of USPTO practice, as it omits marks in applications that were refused
registration under § 2(b) in a manner likely to be highly consistent with the action in
this case.”). Moreover, the fact that these types of services may sometimes emanate
from different sources does not negate the affirmative evidence that they may also
emanate from a common source. Made in Nature, LLC v. Pharmavite LLC, No.
91223352, 2022 WL 2188890, at *25 (TTAB 2022) (“For Applicant’s and Registrant’s

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identified goods to be related, it is not necessary that they always emanate from the
same source under the same mark.”).
Fifth, prior decisions of other examining attorneys carry little evidentiary weight
and are not binding on the Board. Midwest Gaming & Entm’t, 2013 WL 1442237, at
*2 n.3 (citing In re Nett Designs, Inc., 236 F.3d 1339, 1342 (Fed. Cir. 2001)). Each case
is decided on its own merits. The fact that some marks may have been registered to
different parties for arguably similar services does not compel registration here −
particularly where the services are intrinsically related and the Examining Attorney
has produced affirmative marketplace evidence supporting that relationship. See In
re Toshiba Med. Sys. Corp., No. 79046106, 2009 WL 1896059, at *6 (TTAB 2009) (“the
third party registrations relied on by applicant cannot justify the registration of
another confusingly similar mark”) (citations omitted).
We recognize that paired third-party registrations have sometimes contributed to
a successful rebuttal of an examining attorney’s relatedness showing. In Thor Tech,
for example, the Board reversed a Section 2(d) refusal based in part on approximately
50 pairs of registrations for similar marks owned by different entities for automobiles
versus recreational vehicles. Thor Tech, 2015 WL 496133, at *3-4. But that record is
materially distinguishable: the examining attorney there relied on only two third-
party registrations, the goods were expensive (respectively ranging between about
$8,000-23,000 and $17,000-40,000), and the record did not establish overlapping
trade channels. Id. at *2, *5.

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Here, by contrast, the Examining Attorney has produced five instances of actual
marketplace use (including Applicant’s own use) showing the same entity offering
both types of services under the same mark, the services are intrinsically related,
and, as discussed further below, the trade channels overlap. The circumstances of
Thor Tech are not present here.
In sum, Applicant’s paired registrations carry diminished probative value due to
the cancelled registrations, the absence of evidence of actual use, the unknown
marketplace conditions, and the possible existence of coexistence agreements. Even
at face value, they do not overcome the Examining Attorney’s affirmative showing −
consisting of Applicant’s own website and four third-party websites − that the
marketplace treats business consulting services of the type identified in the cited
registration and SaaS analytics platforms of the type identified in Applicant’s
application as commonly emanating from a single source under a single mark.
We do not dismiss Applicant’s paired registrations entirely, and we credit them to
the extent they demonstrate that coexistence between software and consulting marks
is possible and has occurred. But the question before us is not whether coexistence is
possible − it is whether confusion is likely on this record. The paired registrations
demonstrate that the USPTO has sometimes permitted coexistence, but they do not
establish that confusion never occurs or that the services are categorically unrelated.
The Examining Attorney’s affirmative marketplace evidence, particularly Applicant’s
own website, demonstrates that these services do in fact emanate from the same

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source in the actual marketplace − a showing that paired registrations, without more,
cannot overcome.
4. Summary as to Relatedness
Based on the foregoing, we find that the services identified in Applicant’s
application and the cited registration are related for purposes of the likelihood of
confusion analysis. The services share an intrinsic functional connection − both
address the core business need of data analysis and reporting, differing principally in
the mode of delivery. The Examining Attorney’s website evidence, including notably
Applicant’s own website, confirms that consumers encounter both types of services
from a single source in the marketplace. Applicant’s third-party registration evidence
does not overcome this showing for the reasons discussed above.
We acknowledge this is a closer case than one involving identical services or an
overwhelming volume of marketplace evidence. But where, as here, the marks are
virtually identical, “the degree of similarity between the goods and services that is
required to support a finding of likelihood of confusion declines.” Country Oven, 2019
WL 6170483, at *2 (citing In re i.am.symbolic, llc, No. 85044494, 2015 WL 6746543,
at *6 (TTAB 2015), aff’d, 866 F.3d 1315 (Fed. Cir. 2017)); see also Shell Oil, 992 F.2d
at 1207; DeVivo v. Ortiz, Opp. No. 91242863, 2020 WL 1227592, at *13 (TTAB 2020)
(“because the marks are identical, the degree of similarity between the goods or
services required for confusion to be likely declines”). The intrinsic relationship
between the services, confirmed by actual marketplace evidence of single-source
offerings, satisfies that threshold. The second DuPont factor weighs in favor of a
likelihood of confusion.

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C. The Trade Channels, Classes of Consumers, and Purchasing
Conditions
We next consider the third DuPont factor, “[t]he similarity or dissimilarity of
established, likely-to-continue trade channels,” and the fourth DuPont factor, “[t]he
conditions under which and buyers to whom sales are made, i.e., ‘impulse’ vs. careful,
sophisticated purchasing.” DuPont, 476 F.2d at 1361. As with the comparison of the
services, we base our comparison of the trade channels and customers on what is set
forth in the involved application and cited registration. See, e.g., i.am.symbolic, 866
F.3d at 1325. When, as in this case, the application’s and cited registration’s
identifications of services do not contain any restrictions as to trade channels or
classes of purchasers, we presume that both parties’ services move through all normal
and usual channels of trade and are available to all normal potential purchasers for
such services. See In re FCA US LLC, No. 85650654, 2018 WL 1756431, at *9 (TTAB
2018), aff’d mem., 778 F. App’x 962 (Fed. Cir. 2019).
The record affirmatively demonstrates that the trade channels overlap. The same
website evidence discussed under the second DuPont factor shows that Epicor, IBM,
Oracle, SAP, and Applicant itself market both consulting services and SaaS analytics
platforms on the same websites, accessible to the same consumers through the same
site navigation. See Charger Ventures, 64 F.4th at 1382 (third-party website evidence
showed that services and channels of trade were similar); Davey Prods. Pty, 2009 WL
2420527, at *6 (website evidence of third parties offering goods of both applicant and
registrant showed same or overlapping channels of trade and purchasers). The trade

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channels are not merely theoretically overlapping based on the breadth of the
identifications; they overlap in the actual marketplace.
Applicant argues that trade channels differ because SaaS procurement involves
“technology procurement processes, technical evaluation, integration assessments,
and IT-driven purchasing decisions” distinct from the channels for retaining
consulting services.16 We are not persuaded, for two reasons.
First, neither identification limits the services to any particular trade channel.
Applicant’s identification does not restrict its SaaS to enterprise-grade platforms sold
exclusively through formal IT procurement processes; the identification is broad
enough to encompass SaaS platforms marketed through general business channels,
websites, and digital marketplaces. Similarly, the cited registration does not limit
consulting services to engagements retained through any particular procurement
methodology. Because neither identification contains trade-channel restrictions, we
must presume that both parties’ services move through all normal and usual channels
of trade. See In re FCA US LLC, 2018 WL 1756431, at *9.
Second, the record evidence affirmatively contradicts Applicant’s premise.
Applicant’s own website markets both types of services through the same digital
channel to the same audience − business professionals visiting greenleafgrp.com
encounter both consulting offerings and the GREENVIEW SaaS platform through
the same site navigation, the same “Solutions” page, and directed at the same class
of purchasers. Similarly, Epicor, IBM, Oracle, and SAP each market both consulting
16 Applicant’s Reply Brief, 9 TTABVUE 6.

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and analytics platforms through their respective websites to overlapping audiences
of business decision-makers.
We acknowledge that, in practice, some purchasers of enterprise SaaS may follow
more rigorous procurement processes than some purchasers of consulting services (or
vice versa). But this observation relates to the degree of care exercised by purchasers
− addressed next under the fourth DuPont factor − rather than the channels of trade
through which the services are marketed. The services travel through overlapping
channels even if some purchasers exercise more care than others when making
purchasing decisions within those channels.
Because the record establishes that business consulting services of the type
identified in the cited registration and SaaS analytics platforms of the type identified
in Applicant’s application are offered through overlapping trade channels, the third
DuPont factor weighs in favor of finding a likelihood of confusion.
Having established that the trade channels overlap, we turn to the related
question of whether the classes of consumers also overlap − and, if so, the degree of
care those consumers exercise when purchasing the services. The relevant services
are directed to business professionals and organizations seeking analytical tools and
advisory services to support data-driven decision-making. Because the identifications
contain no limitations as to industry, business size, or type of purchaser, we presume
the classes of consumers are the same − namely, business professionals and
organizations seeking data analytics, reporting, and advisory solutions. See Stone
Lion Cap. Partners, 746 F.3d at 1323. An overlap in the classes of consumers,

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however, does not resolve the fourth DuPont factor. We must also consider the
conditions under which purchases are made − specifically, whether they are impulse
purchases or the product of careful deliberation. DuPont, 476 F.2d at 1361.
A heightened degree of care in making a purchasing decision may tend to
minimize likelihood of confusion. See, e.g., In re N.A.D., Inc., 754 F.2d 996, 999-1000
(Fed. Cir. 1985) (because only sophisticated purchasers exercising great care would
purchase the relevant goods, there would be no likelihood of confusion merely because
of the similarity between the marks NARCO and NARKOMED). Conversely, impulse
purchases of inexpensive goods or services may tend to have the opposite effect. Palm
Bay Imps., 396 F.3d at 1376. However, “that the relevant class of buyers may exercise
care does not necessarily impose on that class the responsibility of distinguishing
between similar trademarks for similar [services].” In re Rsch. & Trading Corp., 793
F.2d 1276, 1279 (Fed. Cir. 1986).
Applicant contends this factor favors it because the services are “specialized, high
consideration B2B offerings purchased by sophisticated enterprise purchasers
exercising a heightened degree of care.”17 However, Applicant submitted no evidence
regarding the degree of consumer care exercised in purchasing either its services or
those identified in the cited registration. Attorney argument alone “is no substitute
for evidence.” Cai, 901 F.3d at 1371 (quoting Enzo Biochem, Inc. v. Gen-Probe Inc.,
424 F.3d 1276, 1284 (Fed. Cir. 2005)).
17 Applicant’s Br., 4 TTABVUE 19.

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Furthermore, because neither identification restricts the services by price,
industry, or level of consumer sophistication, we must consider the full range of
potential purchasers and base our analysis on “the least sophisticated potential
purchasers.” Stone Lion Cap. Partners, 746 F.3d at 1325; FCA US LLC, 2018 WL
1756431, at *10. Nevertheless, we may take into account the inherent nature of the
identified services in evaluating purchasing conditions. See In re Info. Builders Inc.,
No. 87862101, 2020 WL 2094122, at *6 (TTAB 2020) (“some degree of purchasing care
may be exercised” in view of the inherent nature of the involved computer software
goods and computer system services). Here, even the least sophisticated purchaser of
SaaS analytics services or business consulting would likely exercise at least some
degree of care beyond a casual impulse purchase. These are not inexpensive consumer
goods purchased off a shelf; by their nature, they involve a threshold level of
evaluation.
At the same time, we cannot credit Applicant’s characterization that all
purchasers are sophisticated enterprise buyers exercising the heightened care
present in cases like N.A.D. The cited registration broadly covers “Business
consultation services, professional business consulting, [and] Business advisory
services” without restriction as to scale or formality. Such services may be retained
by purchasers ranging from large enterprises with formal procurement processes to
small businesses or sole proprietors seeking modest advisory assistance with
relatively little deliberation. The breadth of this identification does not permit us to

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conclude that purchasers uniformly exercise the elevated level of care Applicant
asserts.
Because both parties’ services inherently involve at least some deliberation − and
because there is no evidence that either party’s services are the type of inexpensive,
impulse purchases that heighten the risk of confusion − the fourth DuPont factor
slightly weighs against finding a likelihood of confusion.18
II. Conclusion
The final step in analyzing likelihood of confusion is to weigh the DuPont factors
for which there is evidence and argument, “explain the results of that weighing,” and
address “the weight [we] assigned to the relevant factors.” Charger Ventures, 64 F.4th
at 1384. “No mechanical rule determines likelihood of confusion, and each case
requires weighing of the facts and circumstances of the particular mark.” Mighty Leaf
18 The Examining Attorney argues that because Applicant’s identification states the interface
“can be white labeled for external use,” the identification also encompasses software that is
not white-labeled and is instead sold directly to end users. Examining Attorney’s Br., 6
TTABVUE 9-10. Applicant counters this argument by asserting that it was raised for the
first time on appeal and is, in any event, unpersuasive. Applicant’s Reply Br., 9 TTABVUE
5-6.
We need not determine whether this argument was waived because it does not materially
affect our analysis. Whether the platform is white labeled for external use or deployed
directly by the purchasing entity, the service remains the same: a hosted SaaS analytics
platform accessed through a customizable interface. The “can be white labeled” language
describes a capability of the platform − not a distinct service category. We do not rely on the
“can be white labeled” language to expand the universe of trade channels or purchasers
beyond what the remainder of the identification already encompasses. That said, to the
extent the identification’s breadth is relevant to our analysis, we note that because the
identification does not require white labeling, it encompasses deployments in which the
GREENVIEW mark is visible to end users of the platform. In such deployments, the
GREENVIEW mark would be encountered by business professionals seeking analytics
solutions − the same class of professionals who might also seek business consulting services.
This supports our finding that the trade channels and classes of consumers overlap.

Serial No. 98620760
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Tea, 601 F.3d. at 1346; see also Naterra Int’l, 92 F.4th at 1116-17 (“Only the DuPont
factors of significance to the particular mark need be considered in the likelihood of
confusion analysis.”).
We have carefully considered all evidence of record and all arguments related
thereto. The marks are virtually identical − both sharing the dominant word element
GREENVIEW. The services share an intrinsic functional connection − both address
the core business need of statistical analysis and reporting − and this relationship is
confirmed by marketplace evidence, including Applicant’s own website, showing that
these services commonly emanate from a single source under a single mark. The
record demonstrates overlapping trade channels and overlapping classes of
consumers. The inherent nature of the services, however, suggests that purchasers
will exercise at least some degree of care.
On balance, the factors favoring a likelihood of confusion − the virtual identity of
the marks, the relatedness of the services, and the overlapping trade channels −
outweigh the modest counterweight of the fourth factor. As we have noted, even
careful purchasers are not immune from source confusion when confronted with very
similar marks for related services. See Shell Oil, 992 F.2d at 1208 (“[E]ven
sophisticated purchasers can be confused by very similar marks.”). The marks at
issue are virtually identical, the services are related, and the record shows that
entities in the relevant market commonly offer both types of services under the same
mark. Under these circumstances, even careful purchasers encountering Applicant’s
GREENVIEW mark for SaaS analytics services would likely assume a connection

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with the source of Registrant’s GREENVIEW services for business consulting.
Accordingly, we find that confusion is likely. To the extent that any doubts might
exist as to the correctness of this conclusion, we resolve such doubts in favor of the
prior registrant. See In re Hyper Shoppes (Ohio), Inc., 837 F.2d 463, 464-65 (Fed. Cir.
1988); In re Martin’s Famous Pastry Shoppe, Inc., 748 F.2d 1565, 1568 (Fed. Cir.
1984); G.B.I. Tile & Stone, 2009 WL 3491050 at *8.
Decision: The Section 2(d) refusal to register is affirmed.