TECHNIP Energies France

This Opinion Is Not a
Precedent of the TTAB
Mailed: August 19, 2026
UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
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Trademark Trial and Appeal Board
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In re Technip Energies France
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Serial No. 79355823
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Jeffrey M. Becker and Preston C. Mason, of Haynes and Boone, LLP, for Technip
Energies France.
George Pelletier II, Trademark Examining Attorney, Law Office 132,
Brandon Marsh, Managing Attorney.
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Before Pologeorgis, Thurmon and Casagrande, Administrative Trademark Judges.
Opinion by Thurmon, Administrative Trademark Judge:
Technip Energies France (“Applicant”) seeks registration on the Principal
Register of the mark shown below for “Apparatus, namely, industrial electric ovens
and gas purification installations for the production of ethylene, propylene,
butadiene, benzene, toluene, xylene, hydrogen, vinyl chloride monomers, with low
carbon dioxide emissions; apparatus and installations for the production of ethylene,
propylene, butadiene, benzene, toluene, xylene, hydrogen, vinyl chloride monomers,
with low carbon content,” in International Class 11:

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.1
The Trademark Examining Attorney refused registration of Applicant’s mark
under Section 6(a) of the Trademark Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1056(a), based on Applicant’s
failure to comply with the requirement to disclaim E.FURNACE because it is
purportedly merely descriptive of Applicant’s identified goods within the meaning of
Section 2(e)(1) of the Trademark Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1052(e)(1), and is thus an
unregistrable component of the mark. When the refusal was made final, Applicant
appealed and requested reconsideration. After the Trademark Examining Attorney
denied the request for reconsideration, the appeal was resumed. Both Applicant and
the Trademark Examining Attorney filed briefs. The appeal is ready for decision. We
affirm the refusal to register.
1 Application Serial No. 79355823 was filed on September 21, 2022, as a Request for
Extension of Protection under Section 66(a) of the Trademark Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1141(f), based
on International Registration No. 1697139. The Application originally identified the goods
recited above, as well as services in International Classes 40 and 42. Applicant, however,
filed a request to divide the services in Classes 40 and 42 from its involved application. See
6 TTABVUE. The request was granted and processed. See October 8, 2025, Notice that
Processing of Request to Divide Application is Completed. Thus, this appeal only concerns
the goods identified in International Class 11.
The mark is described as follows: “The mark consists of the stylized wording ‘E.FURNACE
BY T.EN’, with the prefix letter ‘E’ and the word ‘BY’ in green, the ‘.’ and the wording
‘FURNACE’ and ‘T.EN’ in blue. The white in the drawing represents background, outlining,
shading and/or transparent areas and is not part of the mark.” The colors green and blue are
claimed as a feature of the mark.
Citations to briefs refer to TTABVUE, the Board’s online docketing system. The number
preceding TTABVUE corresponds to the docket entry number; the number(s) following
TTABVUE refer to the page number(s) of the docket entry. Citations to the prosecution file
refer to the USPTO’s Trademark Status & Document Retrieval (“TSDR”) system.

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Analysis
The Trademark Examining Attorney required disclaimer of “E.FURNACE”
because the prefix letter “E” is used to identify electric or electronic goods and when
used with “FURNACE”, the combination directly and immediately identifies the
“industrial electric ovens” recited in the Application. 11 TTABVUE 4-5. Applicant
argues that the combination is unitary and that it is ambiguous because the letter
“E” may refer to electric or electronic goods. 9 TTABVUE 6, 9. We agree with the
Trademark Examining Attorney.
Applicant’s counsel describes its process as “low carbon steam-cracking
technology,” 9 TTABVUE 8, and Applicant’s website describes its goods as an “electric
cracking furnace.” Final Office Action dated April 17, 2024, TSDR p. 57. Applicant
does not dispute the accuracy of this information from its website, but argues that its
consumers will understand “E.FURNACE” as a source identifying brand. 9
TTABVUE 8-9. Applicant provides no evidence to support this argument.
In short, we have a term “E.FURNACE” that directly describes one of the specific
goods identified in the Application (“industrial electric ovens”). We find this term is
merely descriptive of (if not generic for) these goods. In the absence of acquired
distinctiveness, which Applicant does not claim here,2 merely descriptive terms are
unregistrable under Section 2(e)(1) of the Trademark Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1052(e)(1), and
2 The Application seeks an extension of protection and no evidence of use in commerce in the
United States has been provided. It would be impossible for an applicant to claim a mark has
acquired distinctiveness in the United States without use of the mark in commerce in this
country.

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therefore are subject to disclaimer requirement under Section 6(a), 15 U.S.C.
§ 1056(a), if the mark is otherwise registrable. A “disclaimer” is a statement that an
applicant does not claim exclusive rights to an unregistrable component of a mark:
[A] disclaimer of a component of a composite mark amounts
merely to a statement that, in so far as that particular
registration is concerned, no rights are being asserted in
the disclaimed component standing alone, but rights are
asserted in the composite; and the particular registration
represents only such rights as flow from the use of the
composite mark.
In re La. Fish Fry Prods., Ltd., 797 F.3d 1332, 1338 (Fed. Cir. 2015) (Newman, J.,
concurring). Failure to comply with a disclaimer requirement is a basis for refusal. In
re Stereotaxis, Inc., 429 F.3d 1039, 1041 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (“[T]he Trademark Office
may require a disclaimer as a condition of registration if the mark is merely
descriptive for at least one of the products or services involved.”); In re Korn Ferry,
No. 90890949, 2024 TTAB LEXIS 224, at *5 (TTAB 2024) (“Failure to provide the
required disclaimer constitutes a ground for refusing registration.”) (quoting In re
Lego Juris A/S, No. 88698784, 2022 TTAB LEXIS 175, at *6 (TTAB 2022)).
We find the record here supports the disclaimer requirement. Applicant’s own
promotional materials (i.e., its website) make clear that it sells electric cracking
furnaces for use in chemical industries. In re N.C. Lottery, 866 F.3d 1363, 1367-69
(Fed. Cir. 2017) (applicant’s own promotional materials supported mere
descriptiveness determination). The term “E.FURNACE” is merely descriptive of
these goods. The mark is stylized and claims color, and these elements are sufficiently
distinctive to allow registration of the mark with an appropriate disclaimer of
“E.FURNACE” from the mark as a whole.

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While Applicant argues that E.FURNACE is not merely descriptive of the electric
ovens it uses, as we noted above, Applicant also argues in the alternative (for the first
time on appeal) that the first goods in the Application include distinct parts of its
system. That is, Applicant argues that the even if the term E.FURNACE must be
disclaimed because of the electric ovens in the identification, the term is not merely
descriptive of the “gas purification installations” also listed as part of the first goods
identified in the Application. 9 TTABVUE 15. Applicant’s counsel argues that the
“gas purification installations … have different applications, components and
functions than the ‘electric ovens’” in the identification. This is purely attorney
argument and it was submitted for the first time during this appeal with no
supporting evidence. Martahus v. Video Duplication Servs. Inc., 3 F.3d 417, 420 (Fed.
Cir. 1993) (“[M]ere attorney arguments unsubstantiated by record evidence are
suspect at best.”).
The Trademark Examining Attorney submitted evidence that appears to show the
electric ovens and other parts of Applicant’s system.3 Applicant did not provide
additional evidence or supply any explanation of the system shown in this evidence.
Applicant waited until this appeal to raise the issue of a limited disclaimer that
excludes the “gas purification installations.” We have no evidence from which we
could determine whether such a limited disclaimer is warranted here. Are the electric
ovens and the gas purification installations part of an integrated system? Do the gas
purification installations also use electric ovens or some other form of electric heat?
3 Office Action dated July 10, 2023, at 51-52.

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These and other questions may require an answer before a determination can be
made on the proposed limited disclaimer Applicant seeks in the alternative in this
appeal.
We interpret Applicant’s alternative request as a request for a remand for further
investigation of this issue. To support a remand, an Applicant must show good cause.
In re Thomas White Int’l, Ltd., No. 77080379, 2013 TTAB LEXIS 8, at *5 n.2 (finding
no good cause for an applicant’s suggestion during appeal that an amendment might
resolve the issued presented by the appeal); TRADEMARK TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD
MANUAL OF PROCEDURE § 1209.04 (2026) (“No matter what the purpose, the request
for remand must include a showing of good cause.”). Unsupported attorney argument
submitted at the eleventh hour does not constitute good cause for a remand. We,
therefore, deny Applicant’s alternative request for a limited disclaimer.
We note that Applicant provided a list of registrations it argues show the Office
allows registrations with the “e” prefix in the context of electric or electronic goods. 9
TTABVUE 11-14. We have reviewed Applicant’s list and find two significant issues
with it. First, Applicant provided only some information about the registrations, and
no information about the prosecution of the applications that led to the listed
registrations. See, e.g., In re Harris-Intertype Corp., 518 F.2d 629, 632 (CCPA 1975)
(“Appellant cites the registration of ‘HARRIS’ (to other owners) on the principal
register without reliance on subsection 2(f), as shown by registration Nos. 743,358
(January 8, 1963) and 888,113 (March 24, 1970). We do not know what evidence was
before the PTO when the applications were considered, so the citations have no

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precedential value.”) (citation omitted); In re Cooper, 254 F.2d 611, 617 (CCPA 1958).
The same is true here. We cannot determine whether the listed registrations resulted
from similar circumstances to those present in the current application.
Second, some of the entries in Applicant’s list do not show a close connection
between use of the “e” prefix (meaning electric) with goods identified in the
registration. For example, the marks E-CYCLER for “walk-behind electric lawn
mowers” and EPOWER for “parts for electric arc welding machines, namely torch
liners” do not show the same direct connection between the use of the “e” prefix and
the identified goods that we see in the evidence of record for the applied-for mark.
While we appreciate Applicant’s desire for consistency and fairness, the Board is
not bound by the prior decisions of examining attorneys in allowing marks for
registration. Although the USPTO strives for consistency, each case must be decided
on its own facts and record. See In re Shinnecock Smoke Shop, 571 F.3d 1171, 1174
(Fed. Cir. 2009) (“Even if all of the third-party registrations should have been refused
registration . . . , such errors do not bind the USPTO to improperly register
Applicant’s marks.”) (citation omitted); In re Nett Designs Inc., 236 F.3d 1339, 1342
(Fed. Cir. 2001) (“Even if some prior registrations had some characteristics similar to
[the] application, the PTO’s allowance of such prior registrations does not bind the
Board or this court.”); In re Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith Inc., 828 F.2d 1567,
1569 (Fed. Cir. 1987). As such, we are obligated to assess, and have assessed, the
registrability of Applicant’s mark on its own merits.

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Decision: The Section 6(a) disclaimer refusal is affirmed. However, if Applicant
submits a disclaimer of “E.FURNACE” within thirty (30) days from the mailing date
of this decision, the disclaimer requirement will have been met and the application
will proceed to publication. See Trademark Rule 2.142(g), 37 C.F.R. § 2.142(g). The
disclaimer should read as follows: “No claim is made to the exclusive right to use
E.FURNACE apart from the mark as shown.”