GSM Services, Inc.

This Opinion Is Not a
Precedent of the TTAB
Mailed: May 20, 2026
UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
_____
Trademark Trial and Appeal Board
_____
In re GSM Services, Inc.
_____
Serial Nos. 98318207, 98318223
(Consolidated)
_____
Blake E. Vande Garde, of Avek IP, LLC for GSM Services, Inc.
Davis Creef, Trademark Examining Attorney, Law Office 125,
Robin Mittler, Managing Attorney.
_____
Before Larkin, Thurmon and Elgin, Administrative Trademark Judges.
Opinion by Thurmon, Administrative Trademark Judge:
GSM Services, Inc. (“Applicant”) seeks registration on the Principal Register of
the mark GSM HEATING AND COOLING SINCE 1927, in standard characters with
“HEATING AND COOLING SINCE 1927” disclaimed, and the word-and-design
mark shown below (with the same wording disclaimed), both for “Advisory services
relating to the installation of heating and cooling apparatus; Air conditioning
apparatus cleaning services; Air duct cleaning services; Home energy assessment
services for the purpose of determining home improvements needed to improve
energy use and efficiency; HVAC contractor services; HVAC duct cleaning services;

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Installation of heating and cooling apparatus; Installation of insulating materials;
Installation of insulating materials in buildings and structures; Installation of
building insulation; Repair or maintenance of power generators; Installation of
HVAC systems; Maintenance and repair of electricity generators,” in International
Class 37.
1
The Trademark Examining Attorney issued a final refusal of registration in both
applications under Section 2(d) of the Trademark Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1052(d), finding a
likelihood of confusion, based on a Registration of the mark GSM ROOFING, in
1 Application Serial No. 98318207 (the word mark) and Application Serial No. 98318223 (the
word-and-design mark) were filed December 17, 2023, based on allegations of a bona fide
intention to use the marks in commerce under Trademark Act Section 1(b), 15
U.S.C. § 1051(b).
The mark in the ’223 Application is described as follows: “The mark consists of a stylized
diamond shaped shield with a teal outline and red interior. Within the shield are the stylized
words ‘SINCE 1927’ in white, below which are the stylized letters ‘GSM’ in shades of gray
with a teal hexagon to the right. Below ‘GSM’ is a teal banner containing the stylized words
‘HEATING & COOLING’, with ‘HEATING’ and ‘COOLING’ appearing in black and the ‘&’
appearing in white and contained by a red circle. To the left of the shield is the stylized design
of a white, gray, and brown dog outlined in black with an outer gray outline, with its eyes
appearing in blue, black, and white. The dog is wearing a red shirt, blue pants and hat, and
black shoes and has one hand showing a ‘thumbs up’ sign with its right hand. In its other
hand, the dog is holding a yellow-handled gray screwdriver.” The colors red, white, brown,
grey, blue, black, teal and yellow are claimed as a feature of the mark in the ’223 Application.

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standard characters, with “ROOFING” disclaimed, for “Roofing services,” in
International Class 37.2
We consolidate the appeals sua sponte and decide them in a single opinion because
they involve common issues of law and fact with similar records. See In re Anderson,
Nos. 76511652 and 76514799, 2012 TTAB LEXIS 42, at *9 (Board sua sponte
consolidated two appeals). All record references are to Serial No. 98183207, unless
otherwise noted.3 The appeals are briefed and ready for final decision. We affirm the
refusals to register.
Section 2(d) – Applicable Law
Our determination under Section 2(d) is based on an analysis of all of the
probative evidence of record bearing on a likelihood of confusion. In re E. I. DuPont
de Nemours & Co., 476 F.2d 1357, 1361 (CCPA 1973) (“DuPont”), cited in B&B
Hardware, Inc. v. Hargis Indus., Inc., 575 U.S. 138 (2015); see also In re Majestic
Distilling Co., 315 F.3d 1311, 1314 (Fed. Cir. 2003). We must consider each DuPont
factor for which there is evidence and argument. See, e.g., In re Guild Mortg. Co., 912
F.3d 1376, 1378-79 (Fed. Cir. 2019). “Whether a likelihood of confusion exists between
an applicant’s mark and a previously registered mark is determined on a case-by-case
basis, aided by application of the thirteen DuPont factors.” Omaha Steaks Int’l, Inc.
v. Greater Omaha Packing Co., 908 F.3d 1315, 1318 (Fed. Cir. 2018).
2 Registration No. 3782367, issued April 27, 2010, and has been renewed.
3 Citations to the prosecution file are to entries in the USPTO’s Trademark Status &
Document Retrieval (“TSDR”) system in .pdf format. Citations to the appeal record are to
TTABVUE, the Board’s online docketing system.

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“Each case must be decided on its own facts and the differences are often subtle
ones.” Indus. Nucleonics Corp. v. Hinde, 475 F.2d 1197, 1199 (CCPA 1973). Varying
weights may be assigned to each DuPont factor depending on the evidence presented.
See Citigroup Inc. v. Cap. City Bank Grp., 637 F.3d 1344, 1356 (Fed. Cir. 2011); Shell
Oil, 992 F.2d at 1206 (“the various evidentiary factors may play more or less weighty
roles in any particular determination”). In any likelihood of confusion analysis, two
key considerations are the similarities between the marks and the similarities
between the goods or services. See In re i.am.symbolic, llc, 866 F.3d 1315, 1322 (Fed.
Cir. 2017) (quoting Herbko Int’l, Inc. v. Kappa Books, Inc., 308 F.3d 1156, 1164-65
(Fed. Cir. 2002)); In re Chatam Int’l Inc., 380 F.3d 1340, 1342 (Fed. Cir. 2004);
Federated Foods, Inc. v. Fort Howard Paper Co., 544 F.2d 1098, 1103 (CCPA 1976)
(“The fundamental inquiry mandated by § 2(d) goes to the cumulative effect of
differences in the essential characteristics of the goods and differences in the
marks.”).
Likelihood of Confusion – Analysis
Applicant and the Trademark Examining Attorney focused on the first two
DuPont factors, with some additional argument submitted under factors three, four,
five, seven, eight and twelve. We address these factors below.
A. Similarity of the Marks
To evaluate the similarity of the marks under the first DuPont factor, we consider
the marks in their entireties as to appearance, sound, connotation and commercial
impression. See, e.g., Palm Bay Imps., Inc. v. Veuve Clicquot Ponsardin Maison

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Fondee En 1772, 396 F.3d 1369, 1371 (citing DuPont, 476 F.2d at 1361). “Similarity
in any one of these elements may be sufficient to find the marks confusingly similar.”
In re Inn at St. John’s LLC, No. 87075988, 2018 TTAB LEXIS 170, *13 (quoting In re
Davia, No. 85497617, 2014 TTAB LEXIS 214, at *4), aff’d mem., 777 F. App’x 516
(Fed. Cir. 2019); accord Krim-Ko Corp. v. Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 390 F.2d 728, 732
(CCPA 1968) (“It is sufficient if the similarity in either form, spelling or sound alone
is likely to cause confusion.”) (citation omitted).
“The proper test is not a side-by-side comparison of the marks, but instead
whether the marks are sufficiently similar in terms of their commercial impression
such that persons who encounter the marks would be likely to assume a connection
between the parties.” Coach Servs. Inc. v. Triumph Learning, LLC, 668 F.3d 1356,
1368 (Fed. Cir. 2012). The focus is on the recollection of the average purchaser, who
normally “retains a general rather than a specific impression of marks.” In re
i.am.symbolic, llc, No. 85916778, 2018 TTAB LEXIS 281, *11.
The cited mark is GSM ROOFING. This mark is used in connection with roofing
services, so the word “roofing” is descriptive of, if not generic for, the services. This
word was disclaimed, which confirms the nondistinctive nature of this portion of the
cited mark. The term GSM is the dominant part of the cited mark, partly because it
is the first term in the mark and partly because the other term (roofing) has no source-
identifying significance when used in a mark for roofing services. In re Detroit Athletic
Co., 903 F.3d 1296, 1303 (Fed. Cir. 2018) (finding “the identity of the marks’ two
initial words is particularly significant because consumers typically notice those

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words first”); Palm Bay Imps., 396 F.3d at 1372-73; Presto Prods., Inc. v. Nice-Pak
Prods. Inc., 1988 TTAB LEXIS 60, at *8 (“it is often the first part of a mark which is
most likely to be impressed upon the mind of a purchaser and remembered”). We will
compare the cited mark to each of the applied-for marks separately below.
1. Applicant’s Word Mark (the ’207 Application)
The applied-for word mark GSM HEATING AND COOLING SINCE 1927 is
similar to the cited mark. Applicant intends to use this mark in connection with
heating and cooling services. The disclaimed phrase “heating and cooling since 1927,”
therefore, is descriptive of Applicant’s intended services and thus is not a distinctive
element of the applied-for mark. Just as the term “roofing” is not distinctive for the
roofing services identified in the cited Registration, Applicant’s reference to “heating
and cooling” in its mark also directly names Applicant’s services. The term GSM is
the sole distinctive element in this applied-for mark. It is, therefore, the dominant
element.
The marks are similar in appearance, despite the fact that each mark uses
different descriptive words following the shared term GSM. Consumers will notice,
recall and rely on the distinctive GSM element of both marks. This type of similarity
will lead consumers to confuse the two marks due to the fact that the same term
(GSM) is the first and dominant element in both marks.
Given consumers’ tendency to shorten marks, we find these marks are also similar
in sound. In re Bay State Brewing Co., No. 85826258, 2016 TTAB LEXIS 46, at *9
(“[W]e also keep in mind the penchant of consumers to shorten marks.”). Because
these marks have a single distinctive element followed by descriptive text, it is likely

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that many consumers will drop the descriptive parts of the marks when verbalizing
the marks. That leaves only the shared GSM elements, which will sound identical.
It appears the GSM element of the applied-for mark is an acronym for Gastonia
Sheet Metal, a tradename used by Applicant, but we cannot consider this possible
meaning because there is no reference to it in the drawing of the mark.4 There is no
evidence showing any particular meaning of the GSM element in the cited mark.
We must assume that the GSM element of the applied-for mark will have no
established and understood meaning for consumers of the identified services. For
these consumers, the GSM elements of the applied-for marks and the cited mark will
have the same meaning. In re Embiid, No. 88202890, 2021 TTAB LEXIS 168, at *20-
21 (finding no evidence to support a different meaning of the applied-for mark with
different goods).
The commercial impressions created by the marks also are similar. Both marks
feature the element GSM followed by descriptive text. The applied-for mark connotes
a heating and cooling business using GSM as the source-identifying element of its
mark, while the cited mark connotes a roofing business using GSM as its source-
identifying element of its mark. These are similar commercial impressions, differing
only in the nature of the specific services described in each mark.
Finally, there is a risk that consumers familiar with the cited mark will see this
applied-for mark as a business extension. Such consumers would know that GSM is
a source-identifier for a roofing business. Seeing the same GSM identifier with a
4 6 TTABVUE 13 (stating that Applicant was known “previously as Gastonia Sheet Metal”).

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heating and cooling business would lead some consumers to mistakenly believe the
owner of the cited Registration has expanded from roofing into heating and cooling
work. The similar structure of the marks and the reliance in each on a single
distinctive element make this type of confusion likely. See, e.g., Joel Gott Wines, LLC
v. Rehoboth Von Gott, Inc., 2013 TTAB LEXIS 314, at *32 (“Purchasers of opposer’s
GOTT and JOEL GOTT wines are likely to assume that applicant’s goods, sold under
the mark GOTT LIGHT and design, are merely a line extension of goods emanating
from opposer.”).
On balance, and taking into account the marks in their entireties, we find the
applied-for mark GSM HEATING AND COOLING SINCE 1927 is similar to the cited
mark GSM ROOFING. The first DuPont factor supports the Section 2(d) refusal.
2. Applicant’s Word-and-Design Mark
Applicant’s second mark, shown below, has more differences when compared to
the cited GSM ROOFING mark.
The visual elements of this applied-for mark include important distinctions from
the cited mark. The cartoon dog with a screwdriver is a distinctive element of this

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mark and one that consumers are likely to recall.5 The colors and stylization of the
text in this mark are not points of distinction because the cited mark is not limited to
any particular fonts, styles or colors. Trademark Rule 2.52(a), 37 CFR 2.52(a); see
also In re Aquitaine Wine USA, LLC, 2018 TTAB LEXIS 108, *13 (“[T]he rights
associated with a standard character mark reside in the wording per se and not in
any particular font style, size, or color.”). In other words, the cited GSM ROOFING
mark may be presented in the same fonts and colors used in Applicant’s word + design
mark. The cartoon dog, on the other hand, is an important visual difference. On
balance, we find this applied-for mark is not visually similar to the cited mark. The
GSM element remains an important shared visual element in this applied-for mark
and the cited mark, but the visual differences are somewhat striking, and overall,
render the two marks less visually similar. In re White Rock Distilleries, Inc., 2009
TTAB LEXIS 601, at *4 (“As to appearance, we find that the prominent design feature
and the term TERZA in the registered mark serve to distinguish the registered mark
visually from applicant’s mark. The term TERZA clearly dominates over the term
VOLTA in the registered mark as TERZA appears in large bold letters above
VOLTA.”)
This applied-for mark, however, is very similar in sound to the cited mark. As we
noted above, consumers have a tendency to shorten longer marks, particularly with
5 It is not clear whether the GSM element or the cartoon dog element of this applied-for mark
are visually dominant. We make no finding in that regard, as both of these elements are
distinctive and likely to be remembered by consumers. The cartoon dog is prominent and
appears to be a wholly arbitrary feature of the mark.

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respect to verbiage that has no source-identifying significance. We find this practice
is likely more common with marks like those at issue here, which both begin with a
distinctive literal element followed or surrounded by non-source-identifying wording.
Consumers may recall the cartoon dog portion of this applied-for mark, but they are
not likely to use that cartoon image to ask for Applicant’s services. Consumers asking
about Applicant’s services, or the services provided under the cited mark, are likely
to simply ask for “GSM.” Very few, if any, consumers are likely to ask for Applicant’s
goods by describing the cartoon dog feature of this applied-for mark.
The meaning and commercial impression created by this applied-for mark are
similar to those created by Applicant’s word mark. The design elements, particularly
the cartoon dog, are important visual elements of this applied-for mark. But the only
real contribution these visual elements have on the meaning and commercial
impression of this applied-for mark is to create a more playful or whimsical visual
impression than that created by the word mark alone. This is a point of distinction,
because the cited mark contains no similar features. But we find the literal elements
of the marks will create a similar meaning and commercial impression to that created
by the cited mark.
On balance, and considering the marks in their entireties, we find Applicant’s
word-and-design mark is also similar to the cited mark. There is less similarity
between this applied-for mark and the cited mark than we found for Applicant’s word
mark, but there is enough similarity here to support the Section 2(d) refusal as to the
word-and-design mark, too.

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B. Similarity or Relatedness of the Services
We evaluate the second DuPont factor based on the services identified in the
Applications and the cited Registration. See Stone Lion Cap. Partners, LP v. Lion
Cap. LLP, 746 F.3d 1317, 1323 (Fed. Cir. 2014); Octocom Sys., Inc. v. Hous. Comput.
Servs. Inc., 918 F.2d 937, 942 (Fed. Cir. 1990). It is sufficient for a finding of likelihood
of confusion as to an entire class of services in the application if relatedness is
established between any of the services identified in that class and the cited
Registration. Tuxedo Monopoly, Inc. v. Gen. Mills Fun Grp., 648 F.2d 1335, 1336
(CCPA 1981); see also Double Coin Holdings Ltd. v. Tru Dev., No. 92063808, 2019
TTAB LEXIS 347, *18; In re Aquamar, Inc., No. 85861533, 2015 TTAB LEXIS 178,
*9 n.5. In addition, the services need only be sufficiently related that a relevant
consumer would be likely to assume, upon encountering services marketed under the
marks at issue, that the services originate from, are sponsored or authorized by, or
are otherwise connected to the same source. See Black & Decker Corp. v. Emerson
Elec. Co., No. 91158891, 2007 TTAB LEXIS 50, *25-26.
The cited Registration identifies “Roofing services,” in International Class 37.
Both Applications identify heating and cooling services in International Class 37,
including advisory, cleaning and installation services for HVAC systems. The services
are different. Roofing services are distinct from HVAC services, a point Applicant
makes forcefully in its briefs.6
6 6 TTABVUE 11-12.

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While it is important to note that the identified services are different, that does
not end the analysis. We are interested in whether there is some connection between
the services in the mind of the consuming public. Shen Mfg. Co., Inc. v. Ritz Hotel,
Ltd., 393 F.3d 1238, 1244 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (“[G]oods that are neither used together
nor related to one another in kind may still ‘be related in the mind of the consuming
public as to the origin of the goods. It is this sense of relatedness that matters in the
likelihood of confusion analysis.”’) (quoting Recot, Inc. v. Becton, 214 F.3d 1322, 1329
(Fed. Cir. 2000)). To answer this question, we look for evidence in the record showing
that these two types of services (roofing and HVAC services) are often provided under
a single trademark. The more often consumers see other trademarks used with both
types of services, the more consumers will become conditioned to expect to find such
services sold under a single mark. In this case that means we look for evidence that
third parties provide both roofing services and HVAC services under a single mark.
The Trademark Examining Attorney submitted this type of evidence, including:
• OHA Home Service provides both HVAC and roofing services under a single
mark. An illustration of this third party’s branding is shown below, where
a banner lists some services the business provides. These include “HVAC,”
“AC” and “Roofing.” Additional materials provided from this business’
website confirm that it provides both HVAC services and roofing services
under its OHA mark.

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7
• Intelligent Design also provides both AC and roofing services under its
mark, as the image below shows.
8
• Southland Home Services provides both HVAC and roofing services under
its mark.9
• Crowther Roofing & Cooling provides, not surprisingly, both roofing and
HVAC services under its mark.10
7 Final Office Action dated February 19, 2025, at 10-29.
8 Id. at 30-58. This business provides air duct cleaning services, one of the specific services
identified in the Applications. Id. at 41-50.
9 Id. at 109-12.
10 Id. at 115-16.

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• Complete Home Solutions provides HVAC and roofing services under its
mark.11
• Big Mountain Heating & Air provides HVAC and roofing services under its
mark.12
• CFS Roofing provides roofing and HVAC services under its mark.13
These are representative examples. The Trademark Examining Attorney
submitted other examples of third parties providing both HVAC and roofing services
under a single mark.14 In addition, there is evidence in the record that some of the
businesses listed above, plus at least five others, provide both roofing services
(identified in the cited Registration) and either “Home energy assessment services for
the purpose of determining home improvements needed to improve energy use and
efficiency” or “Installation of insulating materials,” (both identified in the
Applications) under a single mark.15
The evidence of record shows that the services identified in the Applications and
in the cited Registration are commonly offered under a single mark, showing they are
related. The evidence comes from all over the country, with businesses from Arizona,
Florida, Virginia and Pennsylvania, just to list a few. Consumers of these services
will be accustomed to such practices, and that increases the likelihood of confusion.
The second DuPont factor supports the refusal.
11 Id. at 134-41.
12 Id. at 173-93.
13 Id. at 196-211.
14 Id. at 212-36, 315-35.
15 Id. at 237-335.

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C. Trade Channels and Customer Care – The Third and Fourth
DuPont Factors
The third DuPont factor asks whether the trade channels overlap or are similar.
This consideration is important because when services travel through the same trade
channels, consumers will see the services together in those channels, thus increasing
consumers’ exposure to both marks. The fourth DuPont factor considers the likely
care exercised by relevant consumers. DuPont, 476 F.2d at 1361 (considering “[t]he
conditions under which … sales are made, i.e. ‘impulse’ vs. careful, sophisticated
purchasing”).
Most of the third-party evidence we discussed above (i.e., under the second DuPont
factor) came from internet sites promoting both sets of services. This evidence not
only shows that these services are often sold under the same mark, but also that these
services are marketed and sold through the same channels to the same consumers.
The trade channels, therefore, overlap and the third DuPont factor supports the
refusal. Applicant argues the trade channels are different, but cites only to a website
purportedly operated by the owner of the cited mark.16 The fact that this party may
currently offer only roofing services tells us little about whether the trade channels
overlap. There is ample evidence of record showing that these services are commonly
promoted via internet sites of local businesses. These sites contain means for
consumers to contact the business to discuss or schedule the potential services. All of
16 6 TTABVUE 12.

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the third-party business evidence reflects use of this same trade channel for
promoting and rendering the services.
Applicant also argues that the goods are expensive and that consumers of these
goods are sophisticated and careful.17 This argument fails for two reasons. First and
foremost, the services identified in the Applications and the cited Registration are
not limited to particular price points. We accept Applicant’s assertion that HVAC
systems are costly and that it can be costly to replace a roof. But these are not the
only services covered by the Applications and the cited Registration. “Roofing
services” includes any type of services related to roofing. A roof cleaning or inspection,
for example, may be relatively inexpensive, but would be within the scope of the
services identified in the cited Registration. Similarly, the services identified in the
Applications include inspections and other services that are much less involved than
replacement of an entire HVAC system. So, while some consumers buying some of
the services may be careful, it is also likely that other consumers buying other
identified services may not be so careful.
The second reason this argument fails is for lack of evidence. The evidence of
record does not show pricing information, nor does it provide an exhaustive list of
actual services that fall within the identifications. Arguments presented without
supporting evidence are entitled to little weight in our analysis. Martahus v. Video
Duplication Servs. Inc., 3 F.3d 417, 420 (Fed. Cir. 1993) (“[M]ere attorney arguments
unsubstantiated by record evidence are suspect at best.”).
17 Id.

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Finally, we are required to base our decision “on the least sophisticated potential
purchasers.” Stone Lion Capital Partners, 746 F.3d at 1325. We find that the “least
sophisticated potential purchasers” of the services at issue in these appeals are likely
to exercise ordinary care in making purchasing decisions regarding some of the
services. Such ordinary care does not alter the likelihood of confusion. The fourth
DuPont factor is neutral.
D. Other DuPont Factors
Applicant presents brief arguments under DuPont factors five, seven, eight and
twelve. No evidence is cited in support of these arguments and we can find no
evidence in the record to shed light on these factors. Applicant argues that the cited
mark is not famous and is used regionally.18 We agree the record does not show that
the cited mark is famous, which makes DuPont factor five neutral, as is common in
ex parte appeals. In re Mr. Recipe, 2016 TTAB LEXIS 80, *4-5. The region in which
the cited mark is used is irrelevant to our analysis because Applicant seeks
unrestricted nationwide registrations in both applications.
Applicant argues, without evidence, that it has coexisted for “over 20 years” with
the cited mark.19 If we had evidence showing that these two marks coexisted in the
same geographic region and served the same types of consumers within that region,
we could evaluate whether there was meaningful coexistence without confusion. In
re Guild Mortg.¸ 912 F.3d at 1380-81 (suggesting that “evidence of concurrent use of
18 6 TTABVUE 13.
19 Id.

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the two marks for a particularly long period of time—over 40 years—in which the two
businesses operated in the same geographic market—southern California—without
any evidence of actual confusion” may be probative under the eighth DuPont factor).
There is, however, no evidence in the record that would allow such a determination.
DuPont factors seven and eight are neutral.
Finally, Applicant argues that any confusion would be de minimis. We see no
evidence or logical basis for this argument. With similar marks and related services,
we see nothing that would tend to limit the amount of consumer confusion that could
occur other than potential geographic separation. That, however, is not an issue in
these appeals because the cited Registration and the Applications are not
geographically limited. The twelfth DuPont factor is neutral.
E. Conclusion: Summarizing the Factors
We have reviewed and evaluated all the evidence of record and all the arguments
presented. Only the first three DuPont factors are probative in this appeal, and all
three support the Section 2(d) refusal. The marks are similar and the services are
related. The trade channels overlap. We evaluated the fourth DuPont factor, but find
it neutral. The other factors addressed by Applicant are also neutral. The record
supports the refusal. Confusion is likely.
Decision: The Section 2(d) refusals are affirmed in both applications.