ADG VANGUARD IP LLC

This opinion is not a
precedent of the TTAB
Mailed: May 18, 2026
UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
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Trademark Trial and Appeal Board
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In re ADG Vanguard IP LLC
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Serial No. 98516000
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Carmine Lippolis, Robert Kleinman, of Common Sense Counsel LLP,
for ADG Vanguard IP LLC.
Martha Fromm, Trademark Examining Attorney, Law Office 106,
Mary Sparrow, Managing Attorney.
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Before Goodman, Casagrande, and Brock,
Administrative Trademark Judges.
Opinion by Casagrande, Administrative Trademark Judge:
Applicant ADG Vanguard IP LLC appeals the refusal of its application to register
the mark GRUPPO VAVA in standard-character format, with the term “GRUPPO”
disclaimed, on the Principal Register for goods in International Class 25 ultimately
identified as follows: Blazers; Blouses; Boots; Dresses; Footwear; Gloves; Hats;
Hoodies; Scarves; Shirts; Shorts; Trousers; Business wear, namely, suits, jackets,
trousers, blazers, blouses, shirts, skirts, dresses and footwear; Clothing jackets for
men, women and children; Polo shirts; Running shoes; Sports jerseys; Sweat pants;

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Sweat shirts; T-shirts; Track suits; Waist belts; Baseball caps and hats; Shoes; Skirts;
none of the aforesaid being lingerie, bras, underwear, or intimate apparel.1
The Examining Attorney bases the refusal on Section 2(d) of the Trademark Act,
15 U.S.C. § 1052(d), due to likelihood of confusion with the mark VAVA, which is
registered on the Principal Register in standard-character format for “lingerie,” in
International Class 28.2
After the Examining Attorney made the refusal final,3 Applicant appealed.4
Applicant and the Examining Attorney each filed briefs.5 The case is now ready for
decision. For the reasons explained below, we affirm the refusal to register.
ANALYSIS
A. Section 2(d) refusals generally
Section 2(d) of the Trademark Act prohibits registration of a mark that “so
resembles a mark registered in the Patent and Trademark Office … as to be likely,
when used on or in connection with the goods of the applicant, to cause confusion, or
1 Application Serial No. 98516000 was filed on April 23, 2024, under Section 1(b) of the
Trademark Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1051(b), based on Applicant’s allegation of a bona fide intent to
use the mark in commerce. The application states: “The English translation of GRUPPO in
the mark is group.”
2 Reg. No. 6088674 issued on June 30, 2020, with a date of first use anywhere and in
commerce of May 20, 2017.
3 See June 29, 2025, Final Office Action. Citations to the application record are to the
version of the documents downloaded in .pdf format from the United States Patent and
Trademark Office (USPTO) Trademark Status and Document Retrieval (TSDR) database.
4 See 1 TTABVUE. References to the briefs and appeal record cite to the Board’s TTABVUE
electronic docket system. The number preceding “TTABVUE” represents the docket number
assigned to the cited filing in TTABVUE, and any number immediately following
“TTABVUE” identifies the specifically-cited page(s), if any.
5 See 4 TTABVUE (Applicant); 6 TTABVUE (Examining Attorney).

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to cause mistake, or to deceive.” 15 U.S.C. § 1052(d). We determine whether confusion
is likely by analyzing all evidence of record relevant to the likelihood-of-confusion
factors set forth in In re E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 476 F.2d 1357, 1361 (CCPA
1973) (“DuPont”). See, e.g., In re Charger Ventures LLC, 64 F.4th 1375, 1379 (Fed.
Cir. 2023). Though DuPont lists thirteen numbered factors, we generally address only
those that are relevant and material to the case before us. See, e.g., Shen Mfg. Co. v.
Ritz Hotel, Ltd., 393 F.3d 1238, 1241 (Fed. Cir. 2004); Octocom Sys., Inc. v. Hous.
Comput. Servs., Inc., 918 F.2d 937, 943 (Fed. Cir. 1990). Typically, those are the
factors that the parties address and on which there is relevant evidence in the record.
See, e.g., Dollar Fin. Grp., Inc. v. Brittex Fin., Inc., 132 F.4th 1363, 1371-72 (Fed. Cir.
2025); Cunningham v. Laser Golf Corp., 222 F.3d 943, 946-47 (Fed. Cir. 2000). After
making findings on the relevant factors, we then weigh them together to determine
if, on balance, they indicate that confusion is likely. See, e.g., Charger Ventures, 64
F.4th at 1381; In re Majestic Distilling Co., 315 F.3d 1311, 1319 (Fed. Cir. 2003).
B. Comparison of the goods, trade channels, and classes of
customers
The second-listed factor in DuPont is “[t]he similarity or dissimilarity and nature
of the goods or services as described in an application or registration.” DuPont, 476
F.2d at 1361. “The [goods or] services need not be identical—the evidence need only
establish that the respective products are related in some manner and/or that the
circumstances surrounding their marketing are such that they could give rise to the
mistaken belief that they emanate from the same source.” Apex Bank v. CC Serve
Corp., 156 F.4th 1230, 1234 (Fed. Cir. 2025) (cleaned up; citation omitted).

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The Examining Attorney placed in the record dictionary definitions of “lingerie”
as including women’s intimate apparel, sleepwear, and nightclothes.6 The record also
contains well over a dozen third-party, use-based registrations that list, under one
mark, the goods in the cited registration (lingerie) as well as one or more of the
clothing items identified in the application.7 This type of evidence shows that
consumers perceive these types of goods to emanate from the same source under a
single mark. See, e.g., Made in Nature, LLC v. Pharmavite LLC, No. 91223352, 2022
WL 2188890, at *24 (TTAB 2022); In re Country Oven, Inc., No. 87354443, 2019 WL
6170483, at *5 (TTAB 2019); accord In re Halo Leather Ltd., 735 F. App’x 722, 727
(Fed. Cir. 2018). The record also contains evidence that four companies, on their
respective websites, offer the goods in the registration and one or more of the goods
in the application under the same overarching mark. Similarly, this, too, is evidence
of product relatedness. See, e.g., Naterra Int’l, Inc. v. Bensalem, 92 F.4th 1113, 1117
(Fed. Cir. 2024); In re Detroit Athl. Co., 903 F.3d 1297, 1306 (Fed. Cir. 2018); Hewlett-
Packard Co. v. Packard Press, Inc., 281 F.3d 1261, 1267 (Fed. Cir. 2002).
Applicant “stipulates that the Examining Attorney has submitted adequate
evidence to establish the relatedness of the Applicant’s and Registrant’s goods.”8
We agree that the record shows that the goods related. This factor will weigh in
favor of a conclusion that confusion is likely.
6 See June 29, 2025, Final Office Action, at TSDR 8-22.
7 See, e.g., id. at 224-25, 226-27, 228-29, 230-31, 232-33, 234-35, 236-37, 238-39, 240-41,
242-43, 244-45, 246-47, 248.
8 4 TTABVUE 4.

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The third-listed factor in DuPont is “[t]he similarity or dissimilarity of established,
likely-to-continue trade channels.” 476 F.2d at 1371. DuPont further lists “buyers to
whom sales are made.” Id.; see also In re Shell Oil Co., 992 F.2d 1204, 1207 (Fed. Cir.
1993) (“It is relevant to consider the degree of overlap of consumers exposed to the
respective [goods or] services ….”). The Examining Attorney contends that the four
websites that offer goods in the cited registration and the application show that “the
relevant goods are sold or provided through the same trade channels and used by the
same classes of consumers in the same fields of use.”9 In addition, we note that neither
the application nor the cited registration contains any restrictions as to type of
customers or channels of distribution, and thus we must presume the use of all the
usual channels of trade for the type of goods. See, e.g., Detroit Athl., 903 F.3d at 1308
(“The registration contains no restrictions on the channels of trade or classes of
customers. As a result, the Detroit Athletic Club’s clothing is presumed to be sold in
all normal trade channels to all the normal classes of purchasers.”) (citation omitted).
Applicant does not address these factors at all, let alone argue that the clothing
goods listed in its application typically travel in different trade channels to different
consumers than “lingerie.”
On this record, we find that there is overlap in the respective trade channels and
classes of customers.
9 6 TTABVUE 8.

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In sum, the relatedness of the goods, the overlap in the trade channels, and the
overlap in classes of customer will weigh in favor of a conclusion that confusion is
likely when we engage in our final weighing of the relevant factors.
C. Comparison of the marks
DuPont begins its list of potentially relevant factors with “[t]he similarity or
dissimilarity of the marks in their entireties as to appearance, sound, connotation
and commercial impression.” DuPont, 476 F.2d at 1371. Our primary reviewing court
has termed this, along with the comparison of the goods or services, as a
“predominant inquiry” in the likelihood of confusion analysis. Herbko Int’l, Inc. v.
Kappa Books, Inc., 308 F.3d 1156, 1165 (Fed. Cir. 2002); Hewlett-Packard, 281 F.3d
at 1265. In comparing the marks, we take into consideration that “[t]hose who
comprise the purchasing public for [the] goods ordinarily must depend upon their past
recollection of marks to which they were previously exposed.” Franklin Mint Corp. v.
Master Mfg. Co., 667 F.2d 1005, 1007 (CCPA 1981) (citation omitted). Thus, “marks
must be considered in light of the fallibility of memory and not on the basis of side-
by-side comparison.” In re St. Helena Hosp., 774 F.3d 747, 751 (Fed. Cir. 2014)
(cleaned up; citation omitted).
We compare marks in their entireties, Oakville Hills Cellar, Inc. v. Georgallis
Holdings, LLC, 826 F.3d 1376, 1380 (Fed. Cir. 2016), assessing their appearances,
how they sound, what, if anything, they mean, and their overall commercial
impressions. In re i.am.symbolic, llc, 866 F.3d 1315, 1323 (Fed. Cir. 2017). Similarity
in any one of these characteristics could be enough to result in likely confusion. Krim-

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Ko Corp. v. Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 390 F.2d 728, 732 (CCPA 1968). Ultimately,
“[s]imilarity is not a binary factor but is a matter of degree.” St. Helena Hosp., 774
F.3d at 752 (citation omitted).
There is no dispute that VAVA in both marks is visually and aurally identical and
has no dictionary meaning. To that extent, the marks are identical. Here, however,
Applicant’s mark begins with GRUPPO and, frequently, first words can make the
biggest impact as source identifiers. See, e.g., Century 21 Real Estate Corp. v. Century
Life of Am., 970 F.2d 874, 876 (Fed. Cir. 1992). But its impact is blunted because
Applicant disclaimed GRUPPO—which is Italian for “group”10—because it has
descriptive, rather than source-identifying, significance. See 15 U.S.C. § 1056(a);
Citigroup Inc. v. Cap. City Bank Grp., Inc., 637 F.3d 1344, 1351 (Fed. Cir. 2011)
(“when a mark consists of two or more words, some of which are disclaimed, the word
not disclaimed is generally regarded as the dominant or critical term”) (citation
omitted). In Sabhnani v. Mirage Brands, LLC, No. 92068086, 2021 WL 6072822
(TTAB 2021), we noted the “penchant of consumers to shorten marks and drop the
non-source-identifying word.” Id. at *18 (cleaned up; citations omitted). Here,
consumers who do so would almost certainly refer to Applicant’s mark as VAVA, not
GRUPPO (i.e., “group”).
Further, Applicant’s mark incorporates the mark in the cited registration in its
entirety. That can be significant in comparing the marks for likelihood-of-confusion
purposes. See, e.g., Wella Corp. v. Cal. Concept Corp., 558 F.2d 1019, 1022 (CCPA
10 See Application; see also Applicant Brief, 4 TTABVUE 16.

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1977) (“When one incorporates the entire arbitrary mark of another into a composite
mark, inclusion in the composite mark of a significant, nonsuggestive element will
not necessarily preclude a likelihood of confusion. And inclusion of a merely
suggestive or descriptive element, of course, is of much less significance in avoiding
a likelihood of confusion.”) (citations omitted).
Applicant nevertheless argues that consumers will not perceive VAVA in the two
marks the same. Applicant argues that consumers will perceive the cited VAVA mark
as comprising the first part of the known phrase “va-va-voom,” which connotes
sexiness, which Applicant says naturally is associated with lingerie.11 In contrast,
theorizes Applicant, consumers will not perceive “va-va-voom” with its mark because
“GRUPPO” before the term “VAVA” will cause consumers to see “VAVA” not as part
of “va-va-voom” but just a “vaguely Italian-sounding term.”12 Applicant also argues
that its goods aren’t sexy.13
These are interesting theories, but we see little, if any, evidence, to back this up.
“Each of the DuPont factors presents a question of fact” and, on any appeal, the
Federal Circuit reviews each challenged finding to determine if substantial evidence
supports it. Omaha Steaks Int’l, Inc. v. Greater Omaha Packing Co., 908 F.3d 1315,
1319 (Fed. Cir. 2018); see also In re Fiesta Palms, LLC, No. 76595049, 2007 WL
950952, at *7 (TTAB 2007) (“we must decide the case based on the evidence of record
11 4 TTABVUE 7-10.
12 Id. at 16-17.
13 Id. at 12-13.

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and not on what either the examining attorney or applicant argues the facts are”);
Acomb v. Polywood Plastics Corp., No. 91054738, 1975 WL 21253, at *3 (TTAB 1975)
(“Speculation and surmise is no substitute for evidence.”). If Applicant wants us to
make a finding on this factor in its favor, we need evidence to do so, and here there’s
almost no evidence that consumers will make the distinction that Applicant urges.
There’s only the fact that Applicant doesn’t list lingerie in its application and the
definition of “va-va-voom.”
We are unconvinced. “Sexiness” is highly subjective, and we don’t think the “va-
va-voom” connotation—if indeed that’s the connotation that “VAVA” without the
“VOOM” imparts—can be so precisely limited only to lingerie. Although Applicant
characterizes some of the clothing items in its identification of goods as “functional”—
as opposed to “sexy”—items (e.g., business wear, running shoes, track suits),14 other
types of clothing listed in the application (dresses, skirts, shirts, blouses, and shorts,
for example) are made or worn in a wide variety of ways, including ways that are
perceived as “sexy.” So even if we considered VAVA in the cited registration to have
that connotation in connection with lingerie, that wouldn’t differentiate that
connotation from the connotation it very well could have in connection with other
items of clothing, such as several items identified in the application. Moreover, the
dictionary definitions of “lingerie” in the record indicate that, besides women’s
14 4 TTABVUE 13.

Serial No. 98516000
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intimate apparel, it also includes “sleepwear,”15 which is not exclusively a “sexy”
category of goods and—to use Applicant’s terms—includes “functional” sleepwear.
Finally, we note that Applicant placed in the record documents from its prior
application to register VAVABALL. In successfully arguing against a likelihood-of-
confusion refusal in light of the same VAVA registration cited in this case, Applicant
argued that “[w]hen consumers hear the Cited Mark ‘VA’ pronounced, they are
triggered, consciously or subconsciously, to conjure the omitted syllable ‘voom,’ much
like one would upon hearing ‘BADA BING BADA, ‘YABBA DABBA, or ‘YADDA.’”
But, according to Applicant, adding a term after VAVA, like BALL, would “disrupt”
the consumer’s tendency to add “VOOM.”16 By that logic, however, there’s nothing
after “VAVA” in Applicant’s GRUPPO VAVA mark to replace the otherwise-implied
“VOOM” after VAVA.
In short, Applicant’s mostly evidence-free theories about the marks’ differing
connotations, while creative, simply fail to persuade us that consumers will perceive
these marks as dissimilar. The marks aren’t identical. But they don’t have to be. See,
e.g., Bridgestone Ams. Tire Operations, LLC v. Fed. Corp., 673 F.3d 1330, 1337 (Fed.
Cir. 2012) (“Exact identity is not necessary to generate confusion as to source of
similarly-marked products.”) (citation omitted); Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Knox Indus.
Corp., 277 F.2d 945, 947 (CCPA 1960) (same). Overall, we find the marks similar.
That’s enough for this factor to weigh in favor of a conclusion that confusion is likely
15 See May 14, 2025, Response to Office Action, at TSDR 57; June 29, 2025, Final Office
Action, at TSDR 8; see also June 29, 2025, Final Office Action, at TSDR 12-13 (nightclothes).
16 See May 15, 2025, Response to Nonfinal at TSDR 174-75.

Serial No. 98516000
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when we weigh all the factors upon which we’ve made findings. It won’t weigh as
heavily as this factor would have had the marks been identical, see, e.g., Majestic
Distilling, 315 F.3d at 1315, but it will, nevertheless, weigh on that side of the ledger.
D. Conclusion as to whether confusion is likely
Having made our findings on the relevant likelihood-of-confusion factors, our final
step is to assess these findings together to determine if, on balance, they indicate that
confusion is likely. See, e.g., Charger Ventures, 64 F.4th at 1384. Here, we found the
marks to be similar. We also find the goods to be related. And there is overlap in the
trade channels and classes of customers for these related goods. No factors indicate
confusion is unlikely. With the only relevant factors all indicating that confusion is
likely and nothing to counterbalance them, there’s no real balancing to be done. On
the record here, we conclude that confusion is likely.
Decision: The refusal to register Applicant’s mark is affirmed.