SC Bucin Mob SRL

This Opinion Is Not a
Precedent of the TTAB
Mailed: April 6, 2026
UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
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Trademark Trial and Appeal Board
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In re SC Bucin Mob SRL
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Serial No. 79403753
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John Alumit, of Alumit IP, for SC Bucin Mob SRL.
Dannean Hetzel, Trademark Examining Attorney, Law Office 106,
Mary Sparrow, Managing Attorney.
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Before Larkin, Thurmon and Cohen, Administrative Trademark Judges.
Opinion by Thurmon, Administrative Trademark Judge:
SC Busin Mob SRL (“Applicant”) seeks registration on the Principal Register of
the mark shown below for “Skadi-style non-metallic prefabricated houses; laminated
wood carpentry, namely, laminated wooden exterior doors, wooden shutters,” in
International Class 19

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.1
The Trademark Examining Attorney issued a final refusal of registration under
Section 2(d) of the Trademark Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1052(d), for the goods in International
Class 19, finding a likelihood of confusion, based on the registered mark INFINITY
for “windows and plastic window frames,” in International Class 19.2
The appeal is briefed and ready for final decision. We affirm the refusal to register.
Section 2(d) – Applicable Law
Our determination under Section 2(d) is based on an analysis of all of the
probative evidence of record bearing on a likelihood of confusion. In re E. I. DuPont
de Nemours & Co., 476 F.2d 1357, 1361 (CCPA 1973) (“DuPont”), cited in B&B
1 Application Serial No. 79403753 was filed on October 31, 2023, as a Request for Extension
of Protection under Section 66(a) of the Trademark Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1141(f), based on
International Registration No. 1808061. The Application also identifies goods and services in
International Classes 20, 35, 37 and 42 that are not part of this appeal.
The word “WOOD” is disclaimed. The mark is described as follows: “The mark consists of an
orange infinity design above the word WOOD in blue above the word INFINITY in orange.
The entire mark appears on a beige background.” The colors blue, beige, and orange are
claimed as a feature of the mark.
Citations to briefs refer to TTABVUE, the Board’s online docketing system. The number
preceding TTABVUE corresponds to the docket entry number; the number(s) following
TTABVUE refer to the page number(s) of that particular docket entry. Citations to the
prosecution file refer to the USPTO’s Trademark Status & Document Retrieval (“TSDR”)
system.
2 Registration No. 1552897 issued August 22, 1989, and has been renewed. The mark was
registered as Typeset Words/Letters/Numbers, which is equivalent to a standard character
registration today. In re Viterra Inc., 671 F.3d 1358, 1363 n.2 (Fed. Cir. 2012).

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Hardware, Inc. v. Hargis Indus., Inc., 575 U.S. 138 (2015); see also In re Majestic
Distilling Co., 315 F.3d 1311, 1314 (Fed. Cir. 2003). We must consider each DuPont
factor for which there is evidence and argument. See, e.g., In re Guild Mortg. Co., 912
F.3d 1376, 1378-79 (Fed. Cir. 2019). “Whether a likelihood of confusion exists between
an applicant’s mark and a previously registered mark is determined on a case-by-case
basis, aided by application of the thirteen DuPont factors.” Omaha Steaks Int’l, Inc.
v. Greater Omaha Packing Co., 908 F.3d 1315, 1318 (Fed. Cir. 2018).
“Each case must be decided on its own facts and the differences are often subtle
ones.” Indus. Nucleonics Corp. v. Hinde, 475 F.2d 1197, 1199 (CCPA 1973). Varying
weights may be assigned to each DuPont factor depending on the evidence presented.
See Citigroup Inc. v. Cap. City Bank Grp. Inc., 637 F.3d 1344, 1356 (Fed. Cir. 2011);
Shell Oil, 992 F.2d at 1206 (“the various evidentiary factors may play more or less
weighty roles in any particular determination”). In any likelihood of confusion
analysis, two key considerations are the similarities between the marks and the
similarities between the goods or services. See In re i.am.symbolic, LLC, 866 F.3d
1315, 1322 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (quoting Herbko Int’l, Inc. v. Kappa Books, Inc., 308 F.3d
1156, 1164-65 (Fed. Cir. 2002)); In re Chatam Int’l Inc., 380 F.3d 1340, 1342 (Fed.
Cir. 2004); Federated Foods, Inc. v. Fort Howard Paper Co., 544 F.2d 1098, 1103
(CCPA 1976) (“The fundamental inquiry mandated by § 2(d) goes to the cumulative
effect of differences in the essential characteristics of the goods and differences in the
marks.”).

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Likelihood of Confusion – Analysis
Applicant’s arguments are limited to the first DuPont factor, which considers the
similarity of the marks. The Trademark Examining Attorney also addressed the
second and third DuPont factors. We will address the first, second and third factors.
A. Similarity of the Marks
To evaluate the similarity of the marks under the first DuPont factor, we consider
the marks in their entireties as to appearance, sound, connotation and commercial
impression. See, e.g., Palm Bay Imps., Inc. v. Veuve Clicquot Ponsardin Maison
Fondee En 1772, 396 F.3d 1369, 1371 (citing DuPont, 476 F.2d at 1361). “Similarity
in any one of these elements may be sufficient to find the marks confusingly similar.”
In re Inn at St. John’s LLC, No. 87075988, 2018 TTAB LEXIS 170, *13 (quoting In re
Davia, No. 85497617, 2014 TTAB LEXIS 214, *4, aff’d mem., 777 F. App’x 516 (Fed.
Cir. 2019); accord Krim-Ko Corp. v. Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 390 F.2d 728, 732 (CCPA
1968) (“It is sufficient if the similarity in either form, spelling or sound alone is likely
to cause confusion.”) (citation omitted).
“The proper test is not a side-by-side comparison of the marks, but instead
whether the marks are sufficiently similar in terms of their commercial impression
such that persons who encounter the marks would be likely to assume a connection
between the parties.” Coach Servs. Inc. v. Triumph Learning, LLC, 668 F.3d 1356,
1368 (Fed. Cir. 2012). The focus is on the recollection of the average purchaser, who
normally “retains a general rather than a specific impression of marks.” In re
i.am.symbolic, llc, No. 85916778, 2018 TTAB LEXIS 281, *11.

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The first word “WOOD” in the applied-for mark, shown again below, is not
dominant, partly because it is descriptive of the wood-based goods identified in the
Application.
Applicant disclaimed the exclusive right to use “WOOD” apart from the mark. For
these reasons, consumers are not likely to rely on the term “wood” alone to distinguish
the source of Applicant’s wooden building materials from those of others. While
WOOD appears in the center and in a dark, bold color, it is clear that the word
“INFINITY” and the infinity symbol, which helps to further emphasize the word
“INFINITY,” are the sole distinctive elements of the applied-for mark and thus, the
dominant elements. Tao Licensing, LLC v. Bender Consulting Ltd., No. 92057132,
2017 WL 6336243, at *17 (TTAB 2017) (although no mechanical test to select
dominant element of a mark, “consumers would be more likely to perceive a
distinctive term … as the source-indicating feature of the mark.”). The cited mark,
INFINITY, is identical to the dominant element of the applied-for mark, and this
similarity increases the likelihood of confusion. The cited mark INFINITY is
subsumed in its entirety by the applied-for mark. See, e.g., China Healthways Inst.
Inc. v. Wang, 491 F.3d 1337, 1340 (Fed. Cir. 2007) (applicant’s mark CHI PLUS is

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similar to opposer’s mark CHI both for electric massagers). And while the infinity
symbol in the applied-for mark is a visual difference from the cited mark, the symbol
is a visual reference to the word or concept of infinity. This shared meaning increases
the overall similarity of the marks. The word “WOOD” in the applied-for mark creates
a visual distinction, but not one that consumers are likely to place much weight on
given that the word “wood” is not distinctive for some of the goods identified in the
Application.3
The marks also sound similar. The cited mark sounds identical to the dominant
INFINITY element of the applied-for mark when the marks are verbalized. “[W]e also
keep in mind the penchant of consumers to shorten marks.” In re Bay State Brewing
Co., No. 85826258, 2016 TTAB LEXIS 46, at *9. It is likely that consumers familiar
with the applied-for mark will sometimes verbalize the mark as simply INFINITY
when asking for the goods. We find the marks are similar in sound.
Applicant argues that “where a mark or a portion of a mark is so commonly used,
the importance of additional elements (such as or words or designs) included in the
mark are significantly increased because the public will look to such other elements
to distinguish the source of the goods or services.” 4 TTABVUE 7. Applicant
3 For example, the cited Registration identifies the following goods that are suited for outdoor
use: “thermal blanket being survival blankets to prevent injury due to hypothermia,” and
“solar-powered battery chargers for charging mobile and handheld electronic devices.”
Hypothermia is uncommon indoors, as is sufficient solar energy to power “solar-powered
battery chargers.”

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submitted evidence of third-party registrations and websites to show that the word
“infinity” is commonly used for similar goods.4
There are at least three problems with Applicant’s argument. First, if the word
“infinity” is so widely used that it is a weak source identifier, what else is there in
either the applied-for mark or the cited mark for consumers to use to distinguish the
source of one marked product from the source of another? Applicant disclaimed the
word “wood” because it describes some of Applicant’s goods. The infinity symbol is
just another way of communicating the concept of infinity to consumers. As we
explained above, we find “INFINITY” is the dominant element of the applied-for
mark. It may be a somewhat commonly-used term in trademarks, but it remains the
only distinctive literal element of the applied-for mark and the sole element of the
cited mark.
Second, most of the third-party evidence submitted by Applicant is not probative
because it involves goods that are not similar enough to those identified in the cited
Registration, which identifies “windows and plastic window frames.” See Omaha
Steaks, 908 F.3d at 1325 (error to rely on third-party evidence of similar marks for
goods that have not been shown to be similar to the goods sold under the assessed
mark, as Board must focus “on goods shown to be similar”); In re i.am.symbolic, llc,
4 Third-party evidence of the type submitted by Applicant is often considered under the sixth
DuPont factor, not the first factor. Spireon, Inc. v. Flex Ltd., 71 F.4th 1355, 1363 (Fed. Cir.
2023). Applicant did not make any arguments under the sixth factor, but argued that the
cited mark is weak and therefore, any similarity in the marks will be less likely to contribute
to a likelihood of confusion. We will consider these arguments under the first DuPont factor,
as they were presented by Applicant, but we also will outline the potential probativity of
Applicant’s third-party evidence under the sixth factor, below.

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866 F.3d 1315, 1328-29 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (disregarding third-party registrations for
other types of goods where the proffering party had neither proven nor explained that
they were related to the goods in the cited registration). Applicant included third-
party evidence relating to many goods that on their face appear to have little, if
anything, in common with windows or plastic window frames and there is no evidence
to demonstrate that the goods are related to windows or plastic window frames.
In Omaha Steaks, the Federal Circuit explained the importance of limiting the
scope of the inquiry into third-party uses. Omaha Steaks, 908 F.3d at 1324-25. The
parties in Omaha Steaks identified “meat” as their goods, but the third-party
evidence included other foods, like popcorn and wine. Id. at 1325. Because the
identified goods were limited to meat, the court held it was error to consider third-
party registrations for other types of food in the absence of proof of relatedness. Id.
Similarly, because the cited Registration identifies only windows and plastic window
frames, it would be error to consider registrations and use of marks with building
materials that do not include windows or plastic window frames in the absence of
proof of relatedness.
Only one of the third-party registrations submitted by Applicant mentions
windows, and that registration identifies “glass shapes used in windows and
ornamental designs.”5 This identification is not for windows per se, but for a different
item “used in windows.” We don’t find this registration similar enough to be
probative, but even if it was, a single third-party registration does not tell us anything
5 Registration No. 1634084.

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about the meaning of the word “infinity” within the market for windows and plastic
window frames.
Of the third-party website uses submitted by Applicant, we find three that
mention windows. Request for Reconsideration dated April 23, 2025, at 40-48
(Infinity Window Coverings), 66-69 (Infinity Exteriors of Wisconsin); Response to
Office Action dated March 8, 2025, at 52-54 (Infinity Windows of Florida). In all three
of these examples, the term “Infinity” is used, but these appear to be parties providing
installation or design services. This evidence shows some use of the term “Infinity” in
connection with window-related businesses, but these uses do not show some special
meaning of the term within the window market itself. These materials also fail to
show that the marks are used on goods, rather than with services. We find the third-
party evidence fails to show that the cited mark INFINITY is weak as used with
“windows and plastic window frames.”
Applicant argues that its evidence included marks used with “building materials
used for homes and buildings.” 4 TTABVUE 5. This sweep is too broad. A typical
home building supply store today sells many disparate goods. If all building materials
are similar enough to be probative here, the Omaha Steaks court would have found
wine and meat similar enough. The goods must be similar enough that common use
of a particular term with such goods is probative of what the term means to the
relevant consumers. If the number of uses is too small, or the goods are too varied, it
is unlikely that we will find a relevant pattern of use. That is true in this case, where
Applicant’s evidence is both too little and too far off target. We do not find the third-

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party use and registration evidence has any impact on the conceptual or commercial
strength of the cited INFINITY mark.
Third, because the cited Registration of the INFINITY mark is “prima facie
evidence of the validity of the registered mark,’’ see Section 7(b) of the Trademark
Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1057(b), we must assume the mark is inherently distinctive as
evidenced by its registration on the Principal Register without a claim of acquired
distinctiveness under Section 2(f) of the Trademark Act. See Brooklyn Brewery Corp.
v. Brooklyn Brew Shop, LLC, 17 F.4th 129, 146 (Fed. Cir. 2021); Tea Bd. of India v.
Republic of Tea Inc., No. 91118587, 2006 TTAB LEXIS 330, at *62-63; New Era Cap
Co. v. Pro Era, LLC, No. 91216455, 2020 TTAB LEXIS 199, USPQ2d 10596, at *29-
30. Thus, at the very least, we must afford the cited INFINITY mark “the normal
scope of protection to which inherently distinctive marks are entitled.” Bell’s Brewery,
Inc. v. Innovation Brewing, No. 91215896, 2017 TTAB LEXIS 452, at *20. Applicant’s
third-party use and registration evidence is insufficient to show any conceptual
weakness of the INFINITY mark for windows and plastic window frames.
We find the marks are similar in appearance, sound, meaning and commercial
impression. Applicant devoted its entire Appeal Brief to arguments under this first
DuPont factor. Those arguments are not persuasive. The first factor supports the
refusal.
B. DuPont Factors Two and Three Similarity or Relatedness of the
Goods and Trade Channels
We evaluate the second and third DuPont factors based on the goods identified in
the Application and the cited Registration. See Stone Lion Cap. Partners, LP v. Lion

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Cap. LLP, 746 F.3d 1317, 1323 (Fed. Cir. 2014); Octocom Sys., Inc. v. Hous. Comput.
Servs. Inc., 918 F.2d 937, 942 (Fed. Cir. 1990). It is sufficient for a finding of likelihood
of confusion as to a class of goods in the Application if relatedness is established
between any of the goods identified in that class and the goods identified in the cited
Registration. Tuxedo Monopoly, Inc. v. Gen. Mills Fun Grp., 648 F.2d 1335, 1336
(CCPA 1981); see also Double Coin Holdings Ltd. v. Tru Dev., No. 92063808, 2019
TTAB LEXIS 347, *18; In re Aquamar, Inc., No. 85861533, 2015 TTAB LEXIS 178,
*9 n.5. In addition, the goods need only be sufficiently related that a relevant
consumer would be likely to assume, upon encountering goods marketed under the
marks at issue, that the goods originate from, are sponsored or authorized by, or are
otherwise connected to the same source. See Black & Decker Corp. v. Emerson Elec.
Co., Nos. 91158891 and 91158941, 2007 TTAB LEXIS 50, *25-26.
The cited Registration identifies “windows and plastic window frames.” Applicant
included “laminated wooden windows” in the goods identified in the original
Applicant, and such goods are a subset of the “windows” broadly identified in the cited
Registration. When Applicant requested reconsideration after the Final Office Action
issued, it deleted the “laminated wooden windows” from the identification. The
amended identification includes “laminated wooden exterior doors,” and “wooden
shutters,” both of which are related to the “windows and plastic window frames”
identified in the cited Registration.
The Trademark Examining Attorney submitted evidence showing that doors and
windows are often sold by a single entity under a single mark. With the Final Office

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Action, the Trademark Examining Attorney submitted third-party registrations of
marks for both goods that include the following sample:
• STEELCRAFT – identifies “building doors” and “windows” – Final Office
Action dated April 16, 2025, at 9;
• POKLAY – identifies “window frames” and “wooden doors” – Id. at 11;
• CLASSICMACHER – identifies “non-metal windows and doors” – Id. at 13;
• FENETEX – identifies “non-metal storm windows” and “non-metal window
shutters” – Id. at 17;
• IMAGINE SOMETHING BETTER – identifies “vinyl windows and doors”
– Id. at 19; and,
• FERCHE FRAMES + design – identifies “non-metal doors and windows” –
Id. at 22.
The Trademark Examining Attorney also submitted internet evidence showing
businesses that sell doors and windows under a single mark. Final Office Action at
53-95. We find this evidence sufficient to show that consumers are accustomed to
seeing doors and windows sold under a single mark. Such evidence shows the goods
are related.
Finally, the fact that Applicant included windows in its original Application,
which was based on a registration of its mark in Romania, shows that Applicant
intended to use its mark on both doors and windows, which is further evidence that
these goods are related. Octocom Sys., 918 F.2d at 941 (Fed. Cir. 1990) (on the issue
of the relatedness of the applicant’s “modems” and the opposer's “computer
programs,” the fact “that such goods might come from a single source is shown by
[applicant’s] original application, which indicates [applicant] itself used the mark
OCTOCOM for both modems and computer programs.”); In re HerbalScience Grp.,

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LLC, No. 77519313, 2010 TTAB LEXIS 382, *10 (the applicant’s concession that its
identified goods and those of the registrant can emanate from a single source under
a single mark was supported by the fact that “applicant originally included
nutritional supplements and dietary supplements in its identification of goods.”).
The evidence of record shows the goods in the Application and the cited
Registration are related. The second DuPont factor also supports the refusal.
Applicant presented no arguments under DuPont factor two.
The third-party evidence submitted by the Trademark Examining Attorney also
shows that doors and windows are sold through the same channels of trade. Indeed,
the evidence shows that some businesses sell both types of goods through a single
business and under a single mark. The trade channels for doors and windows overlap.
The third DuPont factor also supports the refusal.
C. Factor Six – Conceptual Strength
Conceptual strength is a measure of a mark’s distinctiveness and may be placed
“in categories of generally increasing distinctiveness: . . . (1) generic; (2) descriptive;
(3) suggestive; (4) arbitrary; or (5) fanciful.” Two Pesos, Inc. v. Taco Cabana, Inc., 505
U.S. 763, 768 (1992). As noted, Applicant presented evidence of third-party
registrations and internet uses of marks that contain the word “INFINITY” in
International Class 19. Such evidence can help us understand the meaning of a mark,
or a part of a mark, in a manner similar to dictionary evidence. Juice Generation, Inc.
v. GS Enters. LLC, 794 F.3d 1334, 1338-39 (Fed. Cir. 2015); Jack Wolfskin

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Ausrustung Fur Draussen GmbH v. New Millennium Sports, S.L.U., 797 F.2d 1363,
1373 (Fed. Cir. 2015).
As we explained above, the evidence submitted by Applicant (including third-
party registrations and internet uses) does not show any clear pattern of use of the
word “INFINITY” in connection with “windows and plastic window frames,” the goods
identified in the cited Registration. As discussed above, the cited INFINITY mark is
inherently distinctive and entitled to the normal scope of protection given such
marks. The sixth DuPont factor is neutral.
D. Conclusion
The marks are similar and the goods are related. The key first two DuPont factors
are dispositive in this appeal, as both factors point toward a likelihood of confusion.
The trade channels also overlap, which further supports the likelihood of confusion
refusal.
Decision: The Section 2(d) refusal is affirmed.