Caplan Medicus, PLLC

This Opinion is Not a
Precedent of the TTAB
Mailed: March 24, 2026
UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
_____
Trademark Trial and Appeal Board
_____
In re Caplan Medicus, PLLC
_____
Serial No. 98101298
Serial No. 98103180
(Consolidated)
_____
Bobby W. Braxton of Braxton Perrone, PPLC for Caplan Medicus, PLLC.
Udeme Attang, Trademark Examining Attorney, Law Office 115,
Daniel Brody, Managing Attorney.
_____
Before Wellington, Larkin, and Lebow,
Administrative Trademark Judges.
Opinion by Larkin, Administrative Trademark Judge:
Caplan Medicus, PLLC (“Applicant”) seeks registration on the Principal Register
of the standard-character mark HELIOS TELEMEDICINE, and the composite word-
and-design mark shown below
both for “Telemedicine services; medical, telehealth, remote care and virtual health
care services, namely, providing medical services and consultation over the telephone

Serial Nos. 98101298 and 98103180 (Consolidated)
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and via the Internet through the use of personal computers, smartphones, tablets,
and mobile wireless devices via video, email, or a global computer network; providing
telehealth, telemedicine, remote care, and virtual health care services by providing
real-time access to medical professionals; telemedicine services for men” in
International Class 44.1
The Examining Attorney assigned to both applications has refused registration
under Section 2(d) of the Trademark Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1052(d), on the ground that
Applicant’s marks so resemble the standard-character mark HELIOSVISIT,
registered on the Principal Register for “Telemedicine services” in International Class
44,2 as to be likely to cause confusion when used in connection with the services
identified in Applicant’s two applications.
When the Examining Attorney made the refusals final, Applicant appealed and
requested reconsideration in both cases, which was denied. The appeals are fully
1 Application Serial No. 98101298 to register the standard-character mark was filed on July
25, 2023 under Section 1(a) of the Trademark Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1051(a), based on Applicant’s
claimed first use of the mark anywhere and first use of the mark in commerce at least as
early as May 30, 2023. Applicant has disclaimed the exclusive right to use TELEMEDICINE
apart from the mark as shown.
Application Serial No. 98103180 to register the composite mark was filed on July 26, 2023
under Section 1(a) of the Trademark Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1051(a), based on Applicant’s claimed
first use of the mark and first use of the mark in commerce at least as early as May 30, 2023.
Applicant has disclaimed the exclusive right to use TELEMEDICINE FOR LONGEVITY
apart from the mark as shown. Applicant describes the mark as follows: “The mark consists
of the words ‘HELIOS’ with the ‘I’ in the shape of a cone and flames above the cone with the
words ‘TELEMEDICINE FOR LONGEVITY’ under ‘HELIOS’.” Color is not claimed as a
feature of the mark.
2 Registration No. 7069589 issued on May 30, 2023. It also covers services in International
Class 42 that are not cited by the Examining Attorney in support of the refusals to register.

Serial Nos. 98101298 and 98103180 (Consolidated)
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briefed.3 Because the issues and records in both appeals are very similar, we
consolidate the appeals sua sponte, In re S. Malhotra & Co., No. 79194076, 2018 WL
4660940, at *1 (TTAB 2018), and will decide them both in a single opinion. We affirm
both refusals to register.
I. Prosecution Histories and Records on Appeal4
As noted above, both applications were assigned to the same Examining Attorney
and their examinations proceeded in parallel. We briefly summarize the prosecution
histories of the applications to provide background to our disposition of the appeals.
Applicant filed both applications on the basis of the same specimen of use, which
we reproduce below:
3 Citations in this opinion to the briefs and other materials in the case dockets refer to
TTABVUE, the Board’s online docketing system. The number preceding TTABVUE
corresponds to the docket entry number, and any numbers following TTABVUE refer to the
page(s) of the docket entry where the cited materials appear. In both appeals, Applicant’s
appeal briefs appear at 6 TTABVUE, and its reply briefs appear at 9 TTABVUE, and the
Examining Attorney’s briefs appear at 8 TTABVUE. Except where otherwise indicated, we
will cite the briefs in Serial No. 98101298.
4 Citations in this opinion to the application records are to pages in the downloadable .pdf
version of the Trademark Status & Document Retrieval (“TSDR”) database of the United
States Patent and Trademark Office (“USPTO”).

Serial Nos. 98101298 and 98103180 (Consolidated)
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5
In the initial Office Action in both cases, the Examining Attorney refused registration
based on the cited registration and made of record USPTO electronic records
regarding the cited registration.6 In Serial No. 98101298, the Examining Attorney
also refused registration on the ground that the mark shown on Applicant’s specimen
did not match the mark shown in the drawing, and required a disclaimer of
TELEMEDICINE apart from the mark as shown.7 In Serial No. 98103180, the
Examining Attorney required a disclaimer of TELEMEDICINE FOR LONGEVITY
apart from the mark as shown, and made of record a dictionary definition of the word
“telemedicine,” third-party webpages displaying the phrase “Longevity Medicine,”
and a Wikipedia entry captioned “Age management medicine.”8
5 July 25, 2023 Application Serial No. 98101298 at TSDR 7-8; July 26, 2023 Application Serial
No. 98103180 at TSDR 7-8. Applicant described the specimen as a page from its website at
heliostelemedicine.com.
6 April 5, 2024 Office Action at TSDR 2-4, 8-11 (Ser. No. 98101298); April 5, 2024 Office Action
at TSDR 2-5, 7-8 (Ser. No. 98103180).
7 April 5, 2024 Office Action at TSDR 4-6 (Ser. No. 98101298).
8 April 5, 2024 Office Action at TSDR 5, 9-28 (Ser. No. 98103180).

Serial Nos. 98101298 and 98103180 (Consolidated)
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Applicant responded to the Office Actions and argued against the Section 2(d)
refusals.9 In both cases, Applicant made of record USPTO electronic records
regarding the two applications and the cited registration, and USPTO electronic
records regarding third-party registrations of, and applications to register, HELIO-
and HELIOS-formative marks.10 In Serial No. 98101298, Applicant entered a
disclaimer of TELEMEDICINE,11 and in Serial No. 98103180, Applicant entered a
disclaimer of TELEMEDICINE FOR LONGEVITY.12
The Examining Attorney then issued Office Actions in both cases making final the
Section 2(d) refusals to register,13 and Applicant appealed both final refusals and
simultaneously requested reconsideration. In its requests for reconsideration,
Applicant again made of record USPTO electronic records regarding the two
applications and the cited registration, and USPTO electronic records regarding
third-party registrations of, and applications to register, HELIO- and HELIOS-
formative marks.14 The Examining Attorney denied both requests for
9 October 4, 2024 Responses to Office Action at TSDR 6-10 (Ser. Nos. 98101298 and
98103180).
10 October 4, 2024 Response to Office Action at TSDR 13-17 (Ser. No. 98101298); October 4,
2024 Response to Office Action at TSDR 12-70 (Ser. No. 98103180). Applicant also argued
against the refusal based on its specimen in Serial No. 98101298. October 4, 2024 Response
to Office Action at TSDR 10 (Ser. No. 98101298).
11 October 4, 2024 Response to Office Action at TSDR 11 (Ser. No. 98101298).
12 October 4, 2024 Response to Office Action at TSDR 10 (Ser. No. 98103180).
13 November 25, 2024 Final Office Actions at TSDR 2-7 (Ser. Nos. 98101298 and 98103180).
The Examining Attorney accepted Applicant’s disclaimers in both cases, and withdrew the
refusal in Serial No. 98101298 based on Applicant’s specimen.
14 May 27, 2025 Requests for Reconsideration at TSDR 13-71 (Ser. Nos. 98101298 and
98103180).

Serial Nos. 98101298 and 98103180 (Consolidated)
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reconsideration, making of record in each case dictionary definitions of the words
“helios” and “helio.”15 The appeals were then resumed and are now ready for decision.
II. Preliminary Matters
Before turning to the merits of the appeals, we must address three matters raised
by Applicant’s briefs.
First, Applicant attached almost 50 pages of materials as “Exhibit A” to both of its
appeal briefs and both of its reply briefs. 6 TTABVUE 12-70; 9 TTABVUE 9-67. The
Board strongly discourages this practice:
Parties to Board cases occasionally seem to be under the
impression that attaching previously-filed evidence to a
brief and citing to the attachments, rather than to the
original submission is a courtesy or a convenience to the
Board. It is neither. When considering a case for final
disposition, the entire record is readily available to the
panel. Because we must determine whether attachments
to briefs are properly of record, citation to the attachment
requires examination of the attachment and then an
attempt to locate the same evidence in the record developed
during the prosecution of the application, requiring more
time and effort than would have been necessary if citations
directly to the prosecution history were provided.
In re Michalko, No. 85584271, 2014 WL2531202, at *1 (TTAB 2014). Where, as here,
the attached materials are in the record, applicants should simply cite the pertinent
portions of the record, and the Board panel will find and review the cited materials.
Second, in each of its appeal briefs, Applicant “requests remand” and “submits
there is good cause to remand the mark [sic] for additional consideration.” 6
15 July 25, 2025 Denials of Requests for Reconsideration at TSDR 1-13 (Ser. Nos. 98101298
and 98103180).

Serial Nos. 98101298 and 98103180 (Consolidated)
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TTABVUE 3. Requests for remand should not be made in a brief on appeal, but should
be made in a “separately captioned request for remand and suspension of proceedings
with the Board, ideally prior to the deadline for filing an appeal brief, so that the
Board can make a prompt ruling on the request and the examining attorney does not
have to draft a potentially unnecessary appeal brief.” In re Ox Paperboard, LLC, No.
87847482, 2020 WL 4530517, at *2 (TTAB 2020). See also TRADEMARK TRIAL AND
APPEAL BOARD MANUAL OF PROCEDURE (“TBMP”) Section 1207.02 (June 2025) and
cases cited therein (discussing requests for remand for consideration of additional
evidence). We deny Applicant’s perfunctory, eleventh-hour requests for remand
because they fail to provide any cause, much less the required “good cause,” for the
requested remands. Ox Paperboard, 2020 WL 4530517, at *2-3.
Third, Applicant states in both of its appeal briefs that “[i]n support of the present
Appeal, Applicant relies on the arguments set forth in the below section, the
arguments made in the previously filed responses, and the evidence on file in the
application file wrapper, all of which are incorporated by reference herein as if fully
set forth at length.” 6 TTABVUE 4. Applicant’s statements purporting to incorporate
by reference “arguments made in the previously filed responses” are a nullity:
Section 1203.02(g) of the TBMP warns applicants who
institute ex parte appeal proceedings at the Board as
follows: “If an applicant, in its appeal brief, does not assert
an argument made during prosecution, it may be deemed
waived by the Board.” While the TBMP does not have the
force of law, it performs the important function of providing
parties appearing before the Board and their counsel with
basic information about how the Board conducts its appeal
and trial proceedings and what is expected of participants
in those proceedings.

Serial Nos. 98101298 and 98103180 (Consolidated)
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In re Princeton Equity Grp., No. 97397212, 2025 WL 1638891, at *2 (TTAB 2025).
“Parties whose briefs purport to incorporate by reference arguments made during
prosecution will be held to have failed thereby to present whatever arguments the
incorporation statement purports to cover to the Board and will be deemed to have
forfeited them.” Id.16 Accordingly, we will consider only those arguments made in
Applicant’s briefs.
III. Analysis of Likelihood of Confusion Refusals
“The Trademark Act prohibits registration of a mark that so resembles a
registered mark as to be likely, when used on or in connection with the goods or
services of the applicant, to cause confusion [or] mistake, or to deceive.” In re Charger
Ventures LLC, 64 F.4th 1375, 1379 (Fed. Cir. 2023) (cleaned up). Our determination
of the likelihood of confusion under Section 2(d) of the Trademark Act is based on an
analysis of all probative facts in the record that are relevant to the likelihood of
confusion factors set forth in In re E.I. DuPont DeNemours & Co., 476 F.2d 1357, 1361
(CCPA 1973) (“DuPont”). Charger Ventures, 64 F.4th at 1379. We consider each
DuPont factor for which there is evidence and argument. See, e.g., In re Guild Mortg.
Co., 912 F.3d 1376, 1379 (Fed. Cir. 2019).
16 The Board acknowledged in Princeton Equity that “we have not previously held, in a
precedential opinion, that such incorporation-by-reference statements are inadequate to
present on appeal whatever arguments an applicant may thereby be contemplating,”
Princeton Equity, 2025 WL 1638891, at *3, and stated that it would not apply the new rule
in that case, but would do so thereafter. Id. Applicant’s appeal briefs were filed more than
three months after the Princeton Equity decision issued.

Serial Nos. 98101298 and 98103180 (Consolidated)
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“Two key factors in every Section 2(d) case are the first two factors regarding the
similarity or dissimilarity of the marks and the goods or services, because the
fundamental inquiry mandated by §2(d) goes to the cumulative effect of differences
in the essential characteristics of the goods [or services] and differences in the
marks.” DC Comics v. Cellular Nerd LLC, No. 91246950, 2022 WL 17832492, at *10
(TTAB 2022) (internal quotations and quotation marks omitted).
In its appeal briefs, Applicant focuses on the first DuPont factor, 6 TTABVUE 5-
7, and also invokes the fourth DuPont factor, the “conditions under which and buyers
to whom sales are made, i. e. ‘impulse’ vs. careful, sophisticated purchasing,” DuPont,
476 F.2d at 1361, 6 TTABVUE 10, and the sixth DuPont factor, the “number and
nature of similar marks in use on similar goods.” DuPont, 476 F.2d at 1361, 6
TTABVUE 7-10.
We will begin our analysis with the second and sixth factors because the similarity
of the involved services and the possible weakness of the cited HELIOSVISIT mark
may affect the degree of similarity between the marks required under the first factor
for confusion to be likely. See, e.g., Keystone Consol. Indus., Inc. v. Franklin Inv. Corp.,
No. 92066927, 2024 WL 3771168, at *19 (TTAB 2024) (“[w]hen marks would appear
on virtually identical goods or services, the degree of similarity between the marks
necessary to support a conclusion of likely confusion declines”) (quoting Century 21
Real Estate Corp. v. Century Life of Am., 970 F.2d 874, 877 (Fed. Cir. 1992)); Apex
Bank v. CC Serve Corp., 156 F.4th 1230, 1236 (Fed. Cir. 2025) (“Because commercial
impression informs the analysis under the first DuPont factor, we must . . . vacate

Serial Nos. 98101298 and 98103180 (Consolidated)
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the Board’s analysis here because reconsideration of the sixth DuPont factor may
result in a different determination of the mark’s commercial strength or weakness
and affect the overall commercial impression”); Heil Co. v. Tripleye GmbH, No.
91277359, 2024 WL 4925901, at *17 (TTAB 2024) (“Because it affects the scope of
protection to which it is entitled, we commence by addressing the strength or
weakness of Opposer’s registered 3RD EYE mark.”).
A. Similarity or Dissimilarity of the Services, Channels of Trade,
and Classes of Consumers17
“The second DuPont factor considers ‘[t]he similarity or dissimilarity and nature
of the goods or services as described in an application or registration . . . .” In re Detroit
Athletic Co., 903 F.2d 1297, 1306 (Fed. Cir. 2018). “This factor considers whether ‘the
consuming public may perceive [the goods or services] as related enough to cause
confusion about the source or origin of the goods or services.’” In re St. Helena Hosp.,
774 F.3d 747, 752 (Fed. Cir. 2014) (quoting Hewlett-Packard Co. v. Packard Press,
Inc., 281 F.3d 1261, 1267 (Fed. Cir. 2002)). “In analyzing the services, the Board
considers [t]he similarity or dissimilarity and nature of the services as described in
an application or registration.” In re OSF Healthcare Sys., No. 88706809, 2023 WL
6140427, at *4 (TTAB 2023) (quoting In re Embiid, Ser. No. 88202890, 2021 WL
2285576, at *10 (TTAB 2021)).
17 We will consider the pertinent factors together in this section with respect to both appeals
because the involved identifications of services, which drive our analysis, are identical in the
two applications. “Apparently conceding the issue, Applicant did not address these du
Pont factors in its brief[s], so we offer only a brief explanation of our conclusion.” In re
Morinaga Nyugyo K.K., No. 86338392, 2016 WL 5219811, at *2 (TTAB 2016).

Serial Nos. 98101298 and 98103180 (Consolidated)
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The “Examining Attorney need not prove, and we need not find, similarity as to
each [service] listed in the description of [services]” in Class 44 in the application. Id.
at *5 (citation omitted). “‘[I]t is sufficient for finding a likelihood of confusion if
relatedness is established for any [service] encompassed by the identification of
[services] within a particular class in the application.” Id. (citations omitted).
The identifications of services in both applications begin with “Telemedicine
services,” which are also the Class 44 services identified in the cited registration.
Because the two applications and the cited registration cover identical “telemedicine
services,” the second DuPont factor strongly supports a conclusion that confusion is
likely as to the marks shown in both applications. Id. at *9.
The third DuPont factor considers the “similarity or dissimilarity of established,
likely-to-continue trade channels.” DuPont, 476 F.2d at 1361. “Because the
[telemedicine] services are identical and unrestricted as to trade channels and
consumer classes, we must presume that the services travel in the same ordinary
trade and distribution channels and will be marketed to the same potential
consumers.” In re Jimenez, No. 97551823, 2025 WL 3126703, at *4 (TTAB 2025)
(citing In re Viterra Inc., 671 F.3d 1358, 1362 (Fed. Cir. 2012)). The third DuPont
factor pertaining to channels of trade and classes of consumers for the services also
strongly supports a conclusion that confusion is likely as to the marks shown in both
applications. Id.

Serial Nos. 98101298 and 98103180 (Consolidated)
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B. The Sixth DuPont Factor18
The sixth DuPont factor, “‘[t]he number and nature of similar marks in use on
similar goods’ . . . is a measure of the extent to which other marks weaken the
assessed mark.” Spireon, Inc. v. Flex Ltd., 71 F.4th 1355, 1362 (Fed. Cir. 2023)
(quoting DuPont, 476 F.2d at 1361 and citing Palm Bay Imps., Inc. v. Veuve Clicquot
Ponsardin Maison Fondee en 1772, 396 F.3d 1369, 1373 (Fed. Cir. 2005)).
“There are two prongs of analysis for a mark’s strength under the sixth factor:
conceptual strength and commercial strength.” Id. (citation omitted). “Conceptual
strength is a measure of a mark’s distinctiveness . . . and distinctiveness is often
classified in categories of generally increasing distinctiveness[:] . . . (1) generic; (2)
descriptive; (3) suggestive; (4) arbitrary; or (5) fanciful.” Id. (citation and quotation
and quotation marks omitted). “Distinctiveness is relevant to a mark’s overall
strength in the likelihood of confusion analysis.” Id. (citation omitted). “Commercial
strength, on the other hand, is ‘the marketplace recognition value of the mark.’” Id.
at 1363 (quoting 2 J. Thomas McCarthy, MCCARTHY ON TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR
COMPETITION § 11:80 (5th ed. 2023)). Here, Applicant challenges only the conceptual
strength of the cited HELIOSVISIT mark because Applicant offers only third-party
registrations of, and applications to register, HELIO- and HELIOS-formative marks,
rather than evidence of the use of such marks, or other marketplace evidence. See
Tao Licensing, LLC v. Bender Consulting Ltd., No. 92057132, 2017 WL 6336243, at
18 As with the second and third factors, we will consider the sixth factor in this section with
respect to both appeals because Applicant offers the same evidence in support of its
arguments in both appeals.

Serial Nos. 98101298 and 98103180 (Consolidated)
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*14 (TTAB 2017) (“Use evidence may reflect commercial weakness, while third-party
registration evidence that does not equate to proof of third-party use may bear on
conceptual weakness if a term is commonly registered for similar goods or services.”).
Because the cited HELIOSVISIT mark “is registered on the Principal Register,
with no claim of acquired distinctiveness under Section 2(f), we presume it
is inherently distinctive, i.e., that it is at worst suggestive of the [services].” Heil Co.,
2024 WL 4925901, at *18 (citing 15 U.S.C. § 1057(b)). As noted above, however, the
“existence of third-party registrations on similar [services] can bear on a mark’s
conceptual strength,” Spireon, 71 F.4th at 1363 (citing Juice Generation, Inc. v. GS
Enters. LLC, 794 F.3d 1334, 1339 (Fed. Cir. 2015)), because “third-party registrations
containing an element that is common to both . . . marks can show that that element
has ‘a normally understood and well-recognized descriptive or suggestive meaning.’”
Id. (quoting Jack Wolfskin Ausrustung Fur Draussen GmbH v. New Millenium
Sports, S.L.U., 797 F.3d 1363, 1374 (Fed. Cir. 2015)).
Applicant argues in both appeals that “[t]he list of marks which identify goods and
services within the medical field and use the term HELIO (or a phonetic equivalent)
is large. . . . There are a number of marks which show that the term HELIO is common
and well known such that the usage is crowded.” 6 TTABVUE 8.19 Applicant discusses
several specific examples, and argues that
19 To the extent that Applicant relies on third-party registrations of marks containing the
word HELIO, rather than the word HELIOS that is common to the marks shown in the cited
registration and in Applicant’s two applications, we note that the words “helio” and “Helios”
have different meanings in English, with “helio” referring to “sun, sunlight, light,” July 25,
2025 Denial of Request for Reconsideration at TSDR 11 (COLLINS DICTIONARY), and “Helios”

Serial Nos. 98101298 and 98103180 (Consolidated)
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[t]hese results demonstrate that consumers are used to
seeing the term “HELIO” and have learned to carefully
pick one from the other. This is a significant amount of
usage of the term “HELIO” within the relevant classes.
However it is sliced, the term “HELIO” is used repeatedly
throughout the relevant classes. With so many marks
using the terms “HELIO” as part of the mark, it
demonstrates that the public has learned to distinguish
between the numerous marks used for various related
goods/services using the term “HELIO”. It also indicates
that the Patent and Trademark Office has recognized the
public awareness, allowing the marks because it recognizes
that there would be no likelihood of confusion resulting
from the use of the Cited Marks or the registration of
Applicant’s Mark.
Given that there are so many marks and there is a
dissimilarity of the dominant portion of the marks, it is
evident that there is no likelihood of confusion. When taken
into consideration here, it is evident that Applicant’s mark
is not confusingly similar to the Cited Mark.
Id.
Applicant further argues that “there are 29 alive [sic] and registered marks with
the term ‘Helioy’ [sic] in the trademark and insurance [sic] listed as goods and
services” and that the “amount of third-party marks in this case is similar to the
amount found sufficient” in the Juice Generation case. Id. at 9.
The Examining Attorney responds that Applicant “submitted a number of pending
applications which were not considered in this analysis,” 8 TTABVUE 7, that “[o]f the
third-party registrations applicant submitted, 18 appear to be active and based on
use in commerce,” id., and that “the applied-for mark and the cited mark are the only
two which utilize the identical term ‘HELIOS’ in connection with services in Class
referring to “the god of the sun in Greek mythology.” July 25, 2025 Denial of Request for
Reconsideration at TSDR 8 (MERRIAM-WEBSTER DICTIONARY).

Serial Nos. 98101298 and 98103180 (Consolidated)
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044.” Id. The Examining Attorney further argues that “[t]he overwhelming majority
of the third-party registrations submitted by applicant appear to be for goods and/or
services that are predominantly different from or unrelated to those identified in the
cited registration and applicant’s application,” and that “these third-party
registrations submitted by applicant are not probative on whether a portion or all of
the mark is inherently or conceptually weak.” Id. at 8.
In its reply briefs, Applicant argues that the Examining Attorney improperly did
not consider the pending applications to register HELIO-formative marks in Class
44, 9 TTABVUE 5, and that “there are 29 alive [sic] marks with the term ‘HELIOS’
(or similar) in the trademark with medical type services listed in goods and services.”
Id. at 5-6.
Applicant made of record USPTO electronic records regarding eight pending or
allowed third-party applications to register HELIO- or HELIOS-formative marks.20
The Examining Attorney properly did not consider them. For purposes of the sixth
DuPont factor, “[t]hird-party applications are evidence only of the fact that they have
been filed . . . and have no other probative value.” Made in Nature, LLC v. Pharmavite
LLC, No. 91223352, 2022 WL 2188890, at *14 (TTAB 2022) (citations omitted).
20 October 4, 2024 Response to Office Action at TSDR 22-23 (Ser. No. 97441083), 38-39 (Ser.
No. 97770120), 44-45 (Ser. No. 97701005), 46-47 (Ser. No. 97701003), 48-49 (Ser. No.
97701006), 56-57 (Ser. No. 97761415), 68-69 (Ser. No. 98351546), 70-71 (Ser. No. 98469525)
(Ser. No. 98101298); October 4, 2024 Response to Office Action at TSDR 21-22 (Ser. No.
97441083), 37-38 (Ser. No. 97770120), 43-44 (Ser. No. 97701005), 45-46 (Ser. No. 97701003),
47-48 (Ser. No. 97701006), 55-56 (Ser. No. 97761415), 67-68 (Ser. No. 98351546), 69-70 (Ser.
No. 98469525) (Ser. No. 98103180).

Serial Nos. 98101298 and 98103180 (Consolidated)
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Applicant also made of record 18 subsisting third-party registrations of HELIO-
or HELIOS-formative marks for a hodge-podge of goods and services within what
Applicant calls “the medical field.” 6 TTABVUE 8.21 None of the registrations covers
the identical “telemedicine services” identified in the cited registration and in
Applicant’s two applications. Instead, they cover goods and services such as:
• “Mental health treatment; substance use disorder treatment inpatient,
residential, outpatient, and aftercare settings; detoxification and
rehabilitation services; psychiatric services; treatment for gambling
addiction; behavioral health services” in Class 44 (Reg. No. 5678819);22
• “Medicated serums for treatment of skin, hair, eyes, and tissue, and for use
in dermatology, ophthalmology and orthopedics; Medicinal hair growth
preparations; Medicated hair tonic agents for preventing hair loss;
Medicines for human use, namely, pharmaceutical preparations for the
treatment of damaged skin and tissue, inflammatory system disorders,
tendon and muscle injuries, cartilage and bone injuries and regeneration,
for use in dermatology, ophthalmology and orthopedics; Medicinal agents
for human use, namely, pharmaceutical preparations for the treatment of
damaged skin and tissue, inflammatory system disorders, tendon and
muscle injuries, cartilage and bone injuries and regeneration, for use in
dermatology; Preparations to facilitate teething; Pharmaceutical
preparations for skin care; Blood plasma; Albuminous preparations for
medical use; Wadding for medical use; Culture media, namely, cell culture
21 October 4, 2024 Response to Office Action at TSDR 20-21 (Reg. No. 5678819), 24-25 (Reg.
No. 5513940), 26-27 (Reg. No. 4723444), 28-29 (Reg. No. 4758962), 30-31 (Reg. No. 6245882),
32-33 (Reg. No. 4832093), 34-35 (Reg. No. 4786126), 36-37 (Reg. No. 5451927), 40-41 (Reg.
No. 6576908), 42-43 (Reg. No. 7287960), 50-51 (Reg. No. 2625520), 52-53 (Reg. No. 7247534),
54-55 (Reg. No. 2975194), 58-59 (Reg. No. 5089048), 60-61 (Reg. No. 3063831), 62-63 (Reg.
No. 6036115), 64-65 (Reg. No. 6036116), 66-67 (Reg. No. 6970513) (Ser. No. 98101298);
October 4, 2024 Response to Office Action at TSDR 19-20 (Reg. No. 5678819), 23-24 (Reg. No.
5513940), 25-26 (Reg. No. 4723444), 27-28 (Reg. No. 4758962), 29-30 (Reg. No. 6245882), 31-
32 (Reg. No. 4832093), 33-34 (Reg. No. 4786126), 35-36 (Reg. No. 5451927), 39-40 (Reg. No.
6576908), 41-42 (Reg. No. 7287960), 49-50 (Reg. No. 2625520), 51-52 (Reg. No. 7247534), 53-
54 (Reg. No. 2975194), 57-58 (Reg. No. 5089048), 59-60 Reg. No. 3063831), 61-62 (Reg. No.
6036115), 63-64 (Reg. No. 6036116), 65-66 (Reg. No. 6970513) (Ser. No. 98103180).
22 October 4, 2024 Response to Office Action at TSDR 20 (Ser. No. 98101298).

Serial Nos. 98101298 and 98103180 (Consolidated)
- 17 -
supplements for medical use for cultivating human cells” in Class 5 (Reg.
No. 5513940);23
• “Medical diagnostic instruments for the analysis of body fluids” in Class 10
(Reg. No. 4723444);24
• “Braces for limbs and joints, for medical use” in Class 10 (Reg. No.
4758962);25
• “Providing on-line non-downloadable software for population health
management so as to reduce the need for medical services through the
aggregation of patient data into a single record and using analytics and
reports to calculate patient risk scores, identify potential gaps in care, and
compute population statistics in order to identify medically high-risk
populations” in Class 42 (Reg. No. 6245882);26
• “Medical and surgical implants, apparatus, and instruments, namely,
orthopedic fixation devices used in spine surgery” in Class 10 (Reg. No.
4832093);27
• “Medical leads, namely, temporary cardiac pacing leads” in Class 10 (Reg.
No. 5451927);28
• “Downloadable software in the nature of a mobile application for providing
healthcare staff with remote access to patient records, health assessments,
health care plans, medications, healthcare interactions and patient medical
information” in Class 9 (Reg. No. 7287960);29
• “Oxygen supply systems for medical use, namely, stationary oxygen supply
units and portable oxygen supply units” in Class 10 (Reg. No. 2625520);30
23 Id. at TSDR 24.
24 Id. at TSDR 26.
25 Id. at TSDR 28.
26 Id. at TSDR 30.
27 Id. at TSDR 32.
28 Id. at TSDR 34.
29 Id. at TSDR 42.
30 Id. at TSDR 50.

Serial Nos. 98101298 and 98103180 (Consolidated)
- 18 -
• “Skincare products, namely, sunscreen, face and body milk sold to doctors”
in Class 10 (Reg. No. 2975194);31
• “On-line retail store services featuring medical devices, clinical supplies,
acupuncture needles and supplies, therapeutic equipment and accessories;
Retail store services featuring medical devices, clinical supplies,
acupuncture needles and supplies, therapeutic equipment and accessories;
Wholesale distributorships featuring medical devices, clinical supplies,
acupuncture needles and supplies, therapeutic equipment and accessories”
in Class 35 (Reg. No. 5089048);32
• “Pharmaceutical preparations for treating skin disorders; diet foods for
medical use” in Class 5 (Reg. No. 3063831);33 and
• “Business management consulting, strategic planning and business
advisory services provided to pharmaceutical companies and healthcare
providers” in Class 35 (Reg. No. 6036115).34
Where, as here, the involved goods or services are identical for purposes of the
second DuPont factor, “the Board should retain the same scope in its consideration of
similarity under the other factors,” Apex Bank, 156 F.4th at 1236 (citations omitted),
including the sixth factor, which considers the number and nature of marks in use in
connection with “similar” goods or services. For purposes of the sixth DuPont factor,
the similarity between the goods or services identified in a cited registration and the
goods or services identified in third-party registrations must be proven in every case
if the relevant goods or services are not identical on the face of the respective
identifications. Cf. Omaha Steaks Int’l Inc. v. Greater Omaha Packing Co., 908 F.3d
1315, 1325 (Fed. Cir. 2018) (where the involved goods were identical meat products,
31 Id. at TSDR 54.
32 Id. at TSDR 58.
33 Id. at TSDR 60.
34 Id. at TSDR 62.

Serial Nos. 98101298 and 98103180 (Consolidated)
- 19 -
the Board erred in considering third-party uses on other food products that had not
been shown to be “similar” to the identical meat products).
Under Apex Bank and Omaha Steaks, we are not concerned with third-party
registrations of marks for goods and services in what Applicant calls “the medical
field,” 6 TTABVUE 8, and “the relevant classes,” id., or marks for “medical type
services,” 9 TTABVUE 6, but rather with marks registered for “telemedicine services”
and any goods and services that have been shown by record evidence to be “similar”
to those services. Applicant offers no argument, much less evidence, that the various
goods and services identified in the referenced third-party registrations and
summarized above are “similar” to “telemedicine services” for purposes of the sixth
DuPont factor. Consequently, the third-party registrations do not show conceptual
weakness of HELIOS for the relevant services, and the sixth factor is thus neutral in
our analysis of the likelihood of confusion. We will accord the cited HELIOSVISIT
mark the “normal scope of protection to which inherently distinctive marks are
entitled.” Iron Balls Int’l Ltd. v. Bull Creek Brewing, LLC, No. 92079099, 2024 WL
2844425, at *15 (TTAB 2024) (citation omitted).
C. Similarity or Dissimilarity of the Marks35
Under the first DuPont factor, “we consider the ‘similarity or dissimilarity of the
marks in their entireties as to appearance, sound, connotation and commercial
impression.’” In re Ye Mystic Krewe of Gasparilla, No. 90522364, 2025 WL 2953731,
35 In this section, we will first discuss general principles under the first DuPont factor, and
then compare the marks in separate sub-sections because the applications show different
marks, each of which must be compared to the cited mark.

Serial Nos. 98101298 and 98103180 (Consolidated)
- 20 -
at *4 (TTAB 2025) (quoting DuPont, 476 F.2d at 1361). “Similarity in any one of these
elements may be sufficient to find the marks confusingly similar.” Sage Therapeutics,
Inc. v. Sageforth Psych. Servs., LLC, No. 91270181, 2024 WL 1638376, at *5 (TTAB
2024) (quoting In re Inn at St. John’s LLC, No. 87075988, 2018 WL 2734893, at *5
(TTAB 2018) (citation omitted), aff’d mem., 777 F. App’x 516 (Fed. Cir. 2019)); accord
Krim-Ko Corp. v. Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 390 F.2d 728, 732 (CCPA 1968) (“It is
sufficient if the similarity in either form, spelling or sound alone is likely to cause
confusion.”) (citation omitted).
“The proper test is not a side-by-side comparison of the marks, but instead
whether the marks are sufficiently similar in terms of their commercial impression
such that persons who encounter the marks would be likely to assume a connection
between the parties.” Sage Therapeutics, 2024 WL 1638376, at *5 (quoting Coach
Servs., Inc. v. Triumph Learning LLC, 668 F.3d 1356, 1368 (Fed. Cir 2012)). The
“marks ‘must be considered . . . in light of the fallibility of memory’ and ‘not on the
basis of side-by-side comparison.’” St. Helena Hosp., 774 F.3d at 751 (quoting San
Fernando Elec. Mfg. Co. v. JFD Elecs. Components Corp., 565 F.2d 683, 685 (CCPA
1977)). “The focus is on the recollection of the average purchaser, who normally
‘retains a general rather than a specific impression of marks.’” Sage Therapeutics,
2024 WL 1638376, at *5 (quoting In re i.am.symbolic, llc, No. 85916778, 2018 WL
3993582, at *4 (TTAB 2018) (citations omitted)).
Where, as here, “the services are identical, the degree of similarity between the
marks necessary to support a determination that confusion is likely declines.”

Serial Nos. 98101298 and 98103180 (Consolidated)
- 21 -
Jimenez, 2025 WL 3126703, at *4 (citing Bridgestone Ams. Tire Operations, LLC v.
Fed. Corp., 673 F.3d 1330, 1337 (Fed. Cir. 2012)).
1. Serial No. 98101298
The marks at issue in Serial No. 98101298 are HELIOS TELEMEDICINE and
HELIOSVISIT, both in standard characters. Applicant states that the basis for its
disagreement with the Examining Attorney under the first DuPont factor “is that the
marks are dissimilar with respect to appearance of the mark such that consumers
are likely not confused . . . .” 6 TTABVUE 6. Applicant argues that “the marks are
most noticeably dissimilar in appearance in that the applied-for mark includes the
words ‘HELIOS TELEMEDICINE’, while the Cited Mark is simply ‘HELIOSVISIT’.”
Id. Applicant further argues that “the instant application has many words whereas
the Cited Mark only has one,” and “[t]he Examining Attorney discounts the
significance of the words ‘TELEMEDICINE’ noting that this is descriptive,” but that
“this is a significant portion of the mark [that] further describes what the services
are, as well as who the audience is” and “a significant addition which should not be
ignored.” Id.
Applicant concludes that it “is highly unlikely that a purchaser of the services
would confuse the two marks due to the appearance of the marks. The applied for
mark, has the term ‘TELEMEDICINE’, where the Cited Mark does not. Further, the
Cited Mark includes the term ‘VISIT’ whereas the Applicant’s Mark does not.” Id. at
7.
The Examining Attorney responds that “the marks are very similar in appearance,
sound, commercial impression and connotation” because “they share the identical

Serial Nos. 98101298 and 98103180 (Consolidated)
- 22 -
term HELIOS within the marks.” 8 TTABVUE 5. The Examining Attorney rejects
Applicant’s argument for visual dissimilarity, arguing that it “is not persuasive
because the applied-for mark does not consist of many words; both marks are
composed of two words, wherein, the wording in the cited mark is compressed into
one word,” and that “consumers are generally more inclined to focus on and remember
the first word, prefix, or syllable in a mark, which is the term HELIOS in the
respective marks.” Id. at 6 (citations omitted). With respect to the significance of the
word TELEMEDICINE in Applicant’s mark, the Examining Attorney notes that
“even if the relevant public is not aware that TELEMEDICINE is disclaimed, they
are surely aware that this wording is generic because it only serves to identify the
services,” and argues that “this wording is less significant and less dominant when
comparing the respective marks.” Id. (citations omitted). The Examining Attorney
concludes that
in the context of the services, the wording VISIT in the
cited mark connotes a doctor’s visit which is rendered via
telemedicine services. Therefore, the commercial
impressions of the marks are not vastly different as both
relate to telemedicine services. Thus, the wording
TELEMEDICINE in the applied-for mark does not
diminish the likelihood of confusion, as the dominant and
source indicating element of each mark is HELIOS.
Id. at 7.
In its reply brief, Applicant argues that the “Examining Attorney suggests that
HELIOSVISIT is two words, but the Cited Mark really has a single unique word” and
that “[t]he consumer will focus on this unique and different first word.” 9 TTABVUE
3.

Serial Nos. 98101298 and 98103180 (Consolidated)
- 23 -
Marks must be considered in their entireties, but “in articulating reasons for
reaching a conclusion on the issue of confusion, there is nothing improper in stating
that, for rational reasons, more or less weight has been given to a particular feature
of a mark, provided the ultimate conclusion rests on consideration of the marks in
their entireties.” Detroit Athletic Co., 903 F.3d at 1305 (quoting In re Nat’l Data Corp.,
753 F.2d 1056, 1058 (Fed. Cir. 1985)).
We agree with the Examining Attorney that the word HELIOS is the dominant
portion of both marks. HELIOS is the first word in both marks, Sage Therapeutics,
2024 WL 1638376, at *6 (finding the first word SAGE in the marks SAGEFORTH
and SAGE CENTRAL to be “dominant in both of them”),36 and in Applicant’s mark
HELIOS is the only word with source-identifying significance because the second
word TELEMEDICINE is the generic name for the services provided by “HELIOS.”37
We turn now to the required comparison of the marks in their entireties, giving
greater weight in that comparison to the first word HELIOS in each mark than to the
second word in each mark.
36 Like the applicant’s mark SAGEFORTH in Sage Therapeutics, the cited mark
HELIOSVISIT is a compound word consisting of the two words HELIOS and VISIT written
as one. The compounding of the two words into one word does not materially affect the
appearance, sound, or meaning of the mark, which will be read, spoken and heard, and
understood as HELIOS VISIT. Cf. In re Iolo Techs., LLC, No. 7739654, 2010 2513865, at *2
(TTAB 2010) (marks ACTIVE CARE and ACTIVECARE found to be “substantially
identical”).
37 We note in that regard that Applicant identifies itself as “Helios” alone on the second page
of its specimen of use of both marks shown above, on which it states that “Helios is a true
medical clinic, not a healthcare store.”

Serial Nos. 98101298 and 98103180 (Consolidated)
- 24 -
“The marks are visually similar, as both begin with the word [HELIOS]” and “[w]e
have noted in other decisions that consumers are more likely to notice and remember
the first elements of a trademark . . . .” Id. (citations omitted). “The second elements
of the marks are different, and some consumers may notice and recall the difference”
but the HELIOS TELEMEDICINE and HELIOSVISIT marks “share the same
structure, starting with the dominant [HELIOS] element and then add[ing] a second
word to create a [HELIOS]-formative mark.” Id. “This structure results in marks that
look like variations on a [HELIOS] theme,” and the “common [HELIOS] element of
the marks anchors them in a way to the same theme and creates a risk that
consumers will mistakenly assume connections between the [identical] services
provided under the marks. This type of similarity increases the likelihood of
confusion.” Id.
Applicant does not dispute that the “marks are also similar in sound, as the first
and dominant [HELIOS] element of each mark will sound identical” when the marks
are verbalized. Id. “The marks as a whole sound partially different, but the shared
[HELIOS] element will have the same impact when spoken or heard as it does when
seen,” and the “[r]isk here is that consumers will believe that [Applicant and the
registrant] are connected because of their shared use of the word [HELIOS], featured
so prominently in their marks used for [identical] services.” Id.
Applicant also does not dispute that the HELIOS TELEMEDICINE and
HELIOSVISIT marks are similar in connotation and commercial impression due to
the common presence of the dominant first word HELIOS, which will have the same

Serial Nos. 98101298 and 98103180 (Consolidated)
- 25 -
meaning as a reference to the god of the sun in Greek mythology in each mark. In the
context of telemedicine services, the addition of the suffix -VISIT to the prefix
HELIOS- in the cited compound mark and the addition of the word TELEMEDICINE
to the word HELIOS in Applicant’s mark both conjure up images of a virtual medical
visit.
Under the first DuPont factor, “similarity is not a binary factor but is a matter of
degree.” St. Helena Hosp., 774 F.3d at 752 (quoting In re Coors Brewing Co., 343 F.3d
1340, 1344 (Fed. Cir. 2003)). We find that the HELIOSVISIT and HELIOS
TELEMEDICINE marks are quite similar in appearance, sound, and connotation and
commercial impression, and the first DuPont factor strongly supports a conclusion
that confusion is likely with respect to the mark shown in Serial No. 98101298.
Naterra, Inc. v. Bensalem, 92 F.4th 1113, 1119 (Fed. Cir. 2024).
2. Serial No. 98103180
The marks at issue in Serial No. 98103180 are the cited mark HELIOSVISIT in
standard characters and Applicant’s composite word-and-design mark, which we
reproduce again below for ease of reference in following our discussion:
Applicant again cites only differences in appearance between the involved marks
as the basis for its claim of dissimilarity. 6 TTABVUE 5-7. Applicant argues that “the
marks are most noticeably dissimilar in appearance in that the applied-for mark . . .
includes the design, including the words ‘TELEMEDICINE FOR LONGEVITY’,

Serial Nos. 98101298 and 98103180 (Consolidated)
- 26 -
while the Cited Marks is simply ‘HELIOSVISIT’,” id. at 6, and “Applicant’s mark has
several words whereas the Cited Mark only has one.” Id. Applicant concludes that
[i]t is highly unlikely that a purchaser of the services would
confuse the two marks due to the appearance of the marks.
The applied for mark is a design mark which is different
from the words HELIOSVISIT. Applicant’s mark also has
the terms “TELEMEDICINE FOR LONGEVITY” which is
absent from the Cited Mark.
Id. at 7.
The Examining Attorney responds that
Applicant’s argument is not persuasive because when
evaluating a composite mark consisting of words and a
design, the word portion is normally accorded greater
weight because it is likely to make a greater impression
upon purchasers, be remembered by them, and be used by
them to refer to or request the goods and/or services.
8 TTABVUE 6 (citations omitted). The Examining Attorney further argues that
“although marks must be compared in their entireties, the word portion is often
considered the dominant feature and is accorded greater weight in determining
whether marks are confusingly similar, even where the word portion has been
disclaimed,” and that “consumers are generally more inclined to focus on and
remember the first word, prefix, or syllable in a mark, which is the term HELIOS in
the respective marks.” Id. (citations omitted).
According to the Examining Attorney, “in the context of the services, the wording
VISIT in the cited mark connotes a doctor’s visit which is rendered via telemedicine
services,” and that “the commercial impressions of the marks are not vastly different
as both relate to telemedicine services.” Id. at 7. The Examining Attorney concludes
that “the wording TELEMEDICINE FOR LONGEVITY in the applied-for mark does

Serial Nos. 98101298 and 98103180 (Consolidated)
- 27 -
not diminish the likelihood of confusion, as the dominant and source indicating
element of each mark is HELIOS.” Id.
In its reply brief, Applicant argues that the Examining Attorney “is completely
discounting 1) the design, and 2) the additional terms ‘For Longevity’,” and that the
“instant mark has several words (four in total) whereas the Cited Mark only has one,”
which Applicant claims “is listed as one single unique word.” 9 TTABVUE 3.
Applicant concludes that
[i]t is highly unlikely that a purchaser of the services would
confuse the two marks due to the appearance of the marks.
The applied for mark is a design mark which is different
from the words HELIOSVISIT. Applicant’s mark also has
the terms “TELEMEDICINE FOR LONGEVITY” which is
absent from the Cited Mark.
Given the unique single word of the Cited Mark, as well as
the design and elements of Applicant’s mark which are not
in the Cited Mark, the two are significantly different.
Id. at 4.
As discussed above, the dominant portion of the cited compound-word mark
HELIOSVISIT is the lead word HELIOS. We find that the word HELIOS is also the
dominant portion of Applicant’s composite mark.38 The word HELIOS is displayed in
large bold letters above the phrase “TELEMEDICINE FOR LONGEVITY,” which
appears in much smaller block letters, and Applicant has disclaimed the exclusive
right to use the phrase, thus conceding that it is not inherently distinctive and
currently has no source-identifying significance. DowntownDC Bus. Improvement
38 In Applicant’s mark, each letter in the word HELIOS appears in block-letter font with the
exception of what Applicant describes as “the ‘I’ in the shape of a cone and flames above the
cone.”

Serial Nos. 98101298 and 98103180 (Consolidated)
- 28 -
Dist. v. Clarke, No. 91275100, 2024 WL 4449409, at *11 n.81 (TTAB 2024) (citations
omitted).39 We turn now to the required comparison of the marks in their entireties,
giving greater weight in that comparison to the word HELIOS in Applicant’s mark
than to the words TELEMEDICINE FOR LONGEVITY.
With respect to appearance, the cited HELIOSVISIT standard-character mark
“could be used in any typeface, color, or size, including the same stylization actually
used or intended to be used by [Applicant], or one that minimizes the differences or
emphasizes the similarities between the marks.” Anheuser-Busch, LLC v. Innvopak
Sys. Pty Ltd., No. 91194148, 2015 WL 5316485, at *8 (TTAB 2015) (citing Citigroup
Inc. v. Cap. City Bank Grp. Inc., 637 F.3d 1344, 1353 (Fed. Cir. 2011) (the “registrant
is entitled to depictions of the standard character mark regardless of font style, size,
or color, not merely ‘reasonable manners’ of depicting its standard character mark.”)).
Accordingly, we must assume that the cited HELIOSVISIT mark could be displayed
in the same font style and size as the word HELIOS in Applicant’s mark,40 which
39 The word “Telemedicine” in the mark is again the generic name for the involved services,
and the record suggests that “Longevity Medicine” is a term of art for a particular medical
field devoted to longevity. April 5, 2024 Office Action at TSDR 14-26 (Ser. No. 98103180). As
shown above, on its specimen of use of its composite mark, Applicant identified itself simply
as “Helios,” and stated that “Helios Telemedicine for Longevity is different.”
40 We cannot assume use of what Applicant describes as a “cone and flames above the cone”
that form the letter “I.” In re Aquitaine Wine USA, LLC, No. 86928469, 2018 WL 1620989, at
*6 (TTAB 2018) (“when we are comparing a standard character mark to a word + design mark
for Section 2(d) purposes, we will consider variations of the depictions of the standard
character mark only with regard to ‘font style, size, or color’ of the ‘words, letters, numbers,
or any combination thereof.’” (emphasis in bold here in italics in Aquitaine Wine) (citing
Citigroup, 637 F.3d at 1353)). Applicant’s use of the cone-and-flame design creates some
visual differences between the two marks, but in the context of the word HELIOS in
Applicant’s mark, the design is clearly recognizable as the letter “I,” and it is likely to be
recalled as such in a consumer’s “general rather than a specific impression of [the] mark[ ].’”
Sage Therapeutics, 2024 WL 1638376, at *5.

Serial Nos. 98101298 and 98103180 (Consolidated)
- 29 -
would “minimize[ ] the differences and emphasize[ ] the similarities between the
marks.” Id.
As discussed above, marks must be compared “in light of the fallibility of memory
and not on the basis of side-by-side comparison.’” St. Helena Hosp., 774 F.3d at 751
(quotation and quotation marks omitted). Whether the cited mark is displayed in the
same font as the word HELIOS in Applicant’s composite mark, or in block letters, we
find that the marks are more similar than dissimilar due to the common presence of
the dominant word HELIOS in the marks.
Applicant again does not dispute that the compared marks are similar in sound.
Applicant’s composite mark is a proverbial “mouthful” if it is verbalized as “Helios
Telemedicine for Longevity,” but the Board has acknowledged the “‘penchant of
consumers to shorten marks.’” Iron Balls, 2024 WL 2844425, at *25 (quoting In re
Bay State Brewing Co., No. 85826258, 2016 WL 1045677, at *3 (TTAB 2016) (citing
In Abcor Dev. Corp., 588 F.2d 811, 815 (CCPA 1978) (Rich, J., concurring) (“the users
of language have a universal habit of shortening full names from haste or laziness or
just economy of words.”)). Particularly given that Applicant’s website identifies
Applicant simply as “Helios,” we find it very likely that consumers will engage in the
penchant to shorten the four words in Applicant’s composite mark to “Helios” when
the mark is verbalized. But whether Applicant’s composite mark is verbalized as
“Helios” alone or as “Helios Telemedicine for Longevity,” it is far more similar than
dissimilar in sound to the cited mark HELIOSVISIT.

Serial Nos. 98101298 and 98103180 (Consolidated)
- 30 -
Finally, with respect to meaning, Applicant again does not dispute that the marks
both connote the same virtual medical visit with a telemedicine provider identified
as HELIOS.
We find that the marks are similar in appearance, and quite similar in sound and
meaning. The first DuPont factor strongly supports a conclusion that confusion is
likely with respect to the mark shown in Serial No. 98103180. Naterra, 92 F.4th at
1119.
D. The Fourth DuPont Factor
The fourth DuPont factor considers the “conditions under which and buyers to
whom sales are made, i. e. ‘impulse’ vs. careful, sophisticated purchasing.” DuPont,
476 F.2d at 1361. Applicant’s entire argument regarding the fourth factor in its
appeal briefs and reply briefs reads as follows: “Here, the relevant purchasers of
physician services are purchasers that are unlikely to be confused as to the source of
the services they are purchasing. A consumer seeking a specific physician will not be
confused.” 6 TTABVUE 10; 9 TTABVUE 7.
Applicant does not point to anything in the record to support its position, and
“[a]ttorney argument is no substitute for evidence.” Ye Mystic Krewe of Gasparilla,
2025 WL 2953731, at *6 n.15 (citing Cai v. Diamond Hong, Inc., 901 F.3d 1367, 1371
(Fed. Cir. 2018) (internal citation omitted)). At the same time, the Board has
recognized that “in purchasing healthcare services, even ordinary consumers are
likely to exercise greater care and will know with whom they are dealing.” Carefirst
of Md., Inc. v. FirstHealth of the Carolinas Inc., No. 91116355, 2005 WL 2451671, at

Serial Nos. 98101298 and 98103180 (Consolidated)
- 31 -
*13 (TTAB 2005). Telemedicine services, however, appear to be something of a new
and different form of “healthcare services” because they are rendered virtually (and
to some degree anonymously), rather than face-to-face, where a patient may be
examined by a doctor.
For example, it is not clear that consumers can “seek[ ] a specific physician,” as
Applicant posits, when they schedule telemedicine services, including what
Applicant’s website describes as “One-on-One Consultations With a Doctor,”
“Personalized Treatment Regimens,” or “Hormone Health” or “Weight Management”
appointments, or that consumers who employ Applicant’s services on more than one
occasion can maintain a relationship with the same physician in the manner in which
consumers typically do so in the brick-and-mortar world.
Moreover, by their nature, telemedicine services may be sought when physicians’
brick-and-mortar offices are closed and a consumer has a medical concern for which
he or she seeks basic advice without going to an emergency room. In that scenario, it
is not clear that a consumer would (or could) “seek[ ] a specific physician,” or would
otherwise exercise significant care in selecting between available providers of 24/7
telemedicine.
The Examining Attorney does not dispute Applicant’s basic position, however,
arguing only that “the fact that purchasers are sophisticated or knowledgeable in a
particular field does not necessarily mean that they are sophisticated or
knowledgeable in the field of trademarks or immune from source confusion,” 8
TTABVUE 4 (citations omitted), and that “where the purchasers consist of both

Serial Nos. 98101298 and 98103180 (Consolidated)
- 32 -
professionals and the public, the standard of care for purchasing the goods is that of
the least sophisticated potential purchaser.” Id. (citations omitted). With respect to
the latter argument, Applicant’s website does not show that consumers of
telemedicine services are likely to include “both professionals and the public,” but
rather only “ordinary consumers” of the sort referenced in Carefirst, who the Board
found are inherently likely to exercise a heightened degree of care. Carefirst, 2005
WL 2451671, at *13. We find that the fourth DuPont factor slightly supports a
conclusion that confusion is unlikely.
E. Balancing the DuPont Factors
“The final step in analyzing likelihood of confusion is to weigh the DuPont factors
for which there has been evidence and argument; ‘explain the results of that
weighing;’ and discuss ‘the weight [we] assigned to the relevant factors.” Jimenez,
2025 WL 3126703, at *8 (quoting Charger Ventures, 65 F.4th at 1379).
“No mechanical rule determines likelihood of confusion, and each case requires
weighing of the facts and circumstances of the particular mark.” Id. (quoting In re
Mighty Leaf Tea, 601 F.3d 1342, 1346 (Fed. Cir. 2010)). “‘[T]he weight afforded to
each factor depends on the circumstances’ and ‘[a]ny single factor may control a
particular case.’” Id. (quoting Stratus Networks, Inc. v. UBTA-UBET Commc’ns Inc.,
955 F.3d 994, 998 (Fed. Cir. 2020)).
In both appeals, the key first and second DuPont factors, and the third factor, all
strongly support a conclusion that confusion is likely, while the fourth DuPont factor
weighs slightly in the other direction, and the sixth DuPont factor is neutral. The

Serial Nos. 98101298 and 98103180 (Consolidated)
- 33 -
services, channels of trade, and classes of consumers are identical, which reduces the
degree of similarity between each of Applicant’s marks and the cited mark that is
necessary for confusion to be likely, and each of Applicant’s marks is sufficiently
similar to the cited mark. To the extent that consumers of telemedicine services are
likely to exercise a heightened degree of care, the Federal Circuit has explained that
even “careful or sophisticated consumers are not immune from source confusion.”
Charger Ventures, 65 F.4th at 1383. We conclude that the similarity of the marks,
and the identical nature of the services, channels of trade, and classes of consumers,
outweigh the possible heightened degree of care with which telemedicine services
may be purchased, and that consumers with a general rather than specific impression
of the cited HELIOSVISIT mark for telemedicine services who separately encounter
each of Applicant’s two marks for the identical services are likely to believe
mistakenly that the services have a common source.
Decision: The refusals to register are affirmed in Serial No. 98101298 and Serial
No. 98103180.