Gateway Rehabilitation Center

THIS OPINION IS NOT A
PRECEDENT OF THE TTAB
Mailed: March 4, 2026
UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
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Trademark Trial and Appeal Board
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In re Gateway Rehabilitation Center
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Serial No. 98516522
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Jared N. Leland of Houston Harbaugh PC for Gateway Rehabilitation Center.
Viktoriia Martynov, Trademark Examining Attorney, Law Office 133,
Laurie Kaufman, Managing Attorney.
_____
Before Dunn, Allard and Cohen, Administrative Trademark Judges.
Opinion by Cohen, Administrative Trademark Judge:
Applicant, Gateway Rehabilitation Center, seeks registration on the Principal
Register of the mark GREENBRIAR in standard characters for “Rehabilitation of
alcohol-addicted patients, drug-addicted patients, and narcotic-addicted patients in
Washington, Pennsylvania” in International Class 44.1
1 Application Serial No. 98516522 was filed on April 24, 2024, under Section 1(a) of the
Trademark Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1051(a), based on an allegation of use in commerce and anywhere
of July 1, 2022.
Citations to the prosecution file refer to the USPTO’s TRADEMARK STATUS & DOCUMENT
RETRIEVAL (TSDR) system and identify the documents by title, date, and page in the
downloadable .pdf version. Citations to the briefs and other materials in the appeal record
refer to the Board’s TTABVUE online docket system.

Serial No. 98516522
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The Examining Attorney has refused registration under Section 2(d) of the
Trademark Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1052(d), on the ground that Applicant’s mark, when used
in connection with the identified services, is likely to cause confusion, to cause
mistake, or to deceive because it resembles the marks in the following registrations,
owned by the same entity:2
• GREENBRIER HEALTH in standard characters on the Principal Register
for “healthcare” in International Class 44;3
• THE GREENBRIAR in typeset form on the Principal Register for
“diagnostic health care services” in International Class 44;4 and
• on the Principal Register for “Health resort services, namely,
providing food and lodging that specialize in promoting patrons’ general
health and well-being” in International Class 43 and “health care” in
International Class 44.5
When the refusals were made final, Applicant filed a request for reconsideration
and amended its identification of services.6 After the request for reconsideration was
2 The Examining Attorney withdrew her prior refusals to register based on Registration Nos.
7225764 (THE GREENBRIER LEGACY CLUB), 2869459 (THE GREENBRIER SPA) and
1634426 (THE GREENBRIER). See June 5, 2025 Final Office Action at TSDR 2; July 8, 2025
Request for Reconsideration Denied at TSDR 2.
3 Registration No. 4122276 issued on the Principal Register on April 3, 2012; renewed. A
Section 7 amendment was accepted which amended the mark from GREENBRIERHEALTH,
one word, to GREENBRIER HEALTH, two words. See May 30, 2017 Section 7 Request at
TSDR 1; August 22, 2017 Updated Registration Certificate at TSDR 1.
4 Registration No. 1619169 issued on the Principal Register on October 23, 1990; renewed.
5 Registration No. 3430939 issued on the Principal Register on May 20, 2008; renewed. Color
is not claimed as a feature of the mark.
6 The services “Rehabilitation of alcohol-addicted patients, drug-addicted patients, and
narcotic-addicted patients” were amended to “Rehabilitation of alcohol addicted patients,
drug-addicted patients, and narcotic-addicted patients in Washington, Pennsylvania.”

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denied, Applicant filed an appeal which has been briefed. For the reasons explained
below, we affirm the refusal to register.
I. Likelihood of Confusion
As an initial matter, for purposes of our likelihood of confusion analysis, we will
focus on Registration No. 4122276 for the mark GREENBRIER HEALTH for
“healthcare” in International Class 44 (the “Cited Registration” or “Cited Mark”)
because it has the most points in common with the mark in the Application. If we do
not find a likelihood of confusion with the Cited Mark and identified services, then
there would be no likelihood of confusion with the mark and services in the other
registrations cited by the Examining Attorney. See, e.g., Monster Energy Co. v. Lo,
No. 91225050, 2023 WL 417620, at *6 (TTAB 2023); Sock It To Me, Inc. v. Fan, No.
91230554, 2020 WL 3027605, at *9 (TTAB 2020) (confining Section 2(d) analysis to
most similar pleaded mark) (citing N. Face Apparel Corp. v. Sanyang Indus. Co., No.
91187593, 2015 WL 6467820, at *7 (TTAB 2015)).
“The Trademark Act prohibits registration of a mark that so resembles a
registered mark as to be likely, when used on or in connection with the goods or
services of the applicant, to cause confusion [or] mistake, or to deceive.” In re Charger
Ventures LLC, 64 F.4th 1375, 1379 (Fed. Cir. 2023). Our determination of the
likelihood of confusion under Section 2(d) of the Trademark Act is based on an
analysis of all probative facts in the record that are relevant to the likelihood of
confusion factors set forth in In re E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 476 F.2d 1357,
1361 (CCPA 1973) (“DuPont”); Charger Ventures, 64 F.4th at 1379. We consider each

Serial No. 98516522
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DuPont factor for which there is evidence and argument. See, e.g., In re Guild Mortg.
Co., 912 F.3d 1376, 1379 (Fed. Cir. 2019).
In any likelihood of confusion analysis, different DuPont factors may play a
dominant role and some factors may not be relevant. Naterra Int’l, Inc. v. Bensalem,
92 F.4th 1113, 1116 (Fed. Cir. 2024) (citing Tiger Lily Ventures Ltd. v. Barclays Cap.
Inc., 35 F.4th 1352, 1362 (Fed. Cir. 2022)). In addition, varying weight may be
assigned to each factor depending on the evidence presented, and “any one of the
factors may control a particular case.” Id.; see also Charger Ventures, 64 F.4th at 1381.
Two key considerations are the similarities between the marks and the similarities
between the goods or services, which are addressed under the first two DuPont
factors. In re i.am.symbolic, llc, 866 F.3d 1315, 1322 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (quoting Herbko
Int’l, Inc. v. Kappa Books, Inc., 308 F.3d 1156, 1164-65 (Fed. Cir. 2002)). We discuss
the relevant factors below.
A. Similarity of the Marks
“Under the first DuPont factor, we consider ‘the similarity or dissimilarity of the
marks in their entireties as to appearance, sound, connotation and commercial
impression.’” Sabhnani v. Mirage Brands, LLC, No. 92068086, 2021 WL 6072822, at
*13 (TTAB 2021) (quoting Palm Bay Imps. v. Veuve Clicquot Ponsardin Maison
Fondee En 1772, 396 F.3d 1369, 1371 (Fed. Cir. 2005)). “Similarity in any one of these
elements may be sufficient to find the marks confusingly similar.” In re Inn at St.
John’s, LLC, No. 87075988, 2018 WL 2734893, at *5 (TTAB 2018), aff’d 777 Fed.
Appx. 516 (Fed. Cir. 2019) (quoting In re Davia, No. 85497617, 2014 WL 2531200, at

Serial No. 98516522
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*2 (TTAB 2014)). “No element of a mark is ignored simply because it is less dominant,
or would not have trademark significance if used alone.” In re Electrolyte Labs. Inc.,
929 F.2d 645, 647 (Fed. Cir. 1990) (citing Spice Islands, Inc. v. Frank Tea & Spice
Co., 505 F.2d 1293, 1295 (CCPA 1974)). On the other hand, “there is nothing improper
in stating that, for rational reasons, more or less weight has been given to a particular
feature of a mark, provided the ultimate conclusion rests on consideration of the
marks in their entireties. Indeed, this type of analysis appears to be unavoidable.” In
re Nat’l Data Corp., 753 F.2d 1056, 1058 (Fed. Cir. 1985).
Applicant effectively concedes the marks similarity by not addressing the issue in
its brief except to assert that “the mark GREENBRIAR is similar to the mark
GREENBRIER in appearance.”7 See In re Morinaga Nyugyo K.K., No. 86338392, 2016
WL 5219811, at *2 (TTAB 2016).
We agree with the Examining Attorney8 that GREENBRIAR and GREENBRIER
HEALTH are quite similar. Both marks lead with the identical and dominant word
GREENBRIAR, although with variant spellings,9 and there is no indication that
GREENBRIAR would be pronounced differently. In re Detroit Athl., 903 F.3d 1297,
1303 (Fed. Cir. 2018) (The marks’ “lead words are their dominant portion and are
likely to make the greatest impression on consumers.”); see also In re Dare Foods Inc.,
No. 88758625, 2022 WL 970319, at *6 (TTAB 2022). While the Cited Registration
7 4 TTABVUE 2 (emphasis in original).
8 6 TTABVUE 5-7.
9 See November 14, 2024 Office Action at TSDR 19 (WIKTIONARY.COM webpage which
identifies “greenbriar” as an alternate spelling of “greenbrier.”

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includes the word HEALTH, when used in connection with Registrant’s healthcare
services, it does not make a significant impact in the minds of consumers for purposes
of distinguishing the mark. Both the Cited Registration and the Application are in
standard character format and thus may be displayed in any font, size or style,
including the same or very similar stylization. See Trademark Rule 2.52(a), 37 C.F.R.
§ 2.52(a); i.am.symbolic, llc, 866 F.3d at 1324. Further, GREENBRIAR is the entirety
of the mark shown in the Application and is subsumed in its entirety by the Cited
Mark. See, e.g., China Healthways Inst. Inc. v. Wang, 491 F.3d 1337, 1340 (Fed. Cir.
2007) (applicant’s mark CHI PLUS is similar to opposer’s mark CHI both for electric
massagers).
As to connotation or commercial impression, there is no evidence or argument that
GREENBRIAR has any special meaning or significance in connection with the
involved services. Moreover, because Applicant’s mark is an alternative spelling of
the Cited Mark and likely to be perceived as such, it is likely to connote the same or
similar meaning and create the same or similar commercial impression.
When comparing the marks overall, they are similar in appearance, sound,
connotation and commercial impression. On the whole, the first DuPont factor weighs
strongly in favor of finding a likelihood of confusion. See Double Coin Holdings, Ltd.
v. Tru Development, No. 92063808, 2019 WL 4877349, at *9 (TTAB 2019).
B. Relatedness of the Services, Trade Channels and Consumers
We consider the “similarity or dissimilarity and nature of the goods or services as
described in an application or registration” under the second DuPont factor. Stone
Lion Cap. Partners, L.P. v. Lion Cap. LLP, 746 F.3d 1317, 1320 (Fed. Cir. 2014)

Serial No. 98516522
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(quoting DuPont, 476 F.2d at 1361). Under the third DuPont factor we consider “the
similarity or dissimilarity of established, likely-to-continue trade channels.” DuPont,
476 F.2d at 1361; Detroit Athl., 903 F.3d at 1306, 1308.
The services need not be identical or even competitive in order to find a likelihood
of confusion. Rather, the question is whether the services are marketed in a manner
that “could give rise to the mistaken belief that they emanate from the same source”
or are sponsored or endorsed by the same entity. Coach Servs., Inc. v. Triumph
Learning LLC, 668 F.3d 1356, 1369 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (quoting 7-Eleven Inc. v.
Wechsler, No. 91117739, 2007 WL 1431084, at *6 (TTAB 2007)); Majestic Distilling
Co., 315 F.3d at 1316; see also Hewlett-Packard Co. v. Packard Press, Inc., 281 F.3d
1261, 1267 (Fed. Cir. 2002) (“Even if the goods and services in question are not
identical, the consuming public may perceive them as related enough to cause
confusion about the source or origin of the goods and services.”).
We focus here, as we must, on the identification of services set forth in the
Application and Cited Registration, rather than on alleged marketplace differences
between the services. When, as in this case, the Cited Registration’s identification
does not limit how or where the services are sold or to whom, we are required to give
“full sweep” to the identification of services regardless of Registrant’s actual business.
Paula Payne Prods. Co. v. Johnson Publ’g Co., Inc., 473 F.2d 901, 902 (CCPA 1973);
see In re FCA US LLC, No. 85650654, 2018 WL 1756431, at *4 n.18 (TTAB 2018)
(Board may not consider arguments “about how the parties’ actual goods, services,
customers, trade channels, and conditions of sale are narrower or different from the
goods and services identified in the applications and registrations”). In other words,

Serial No. 98516522
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Applicant may not restrict the scope of the services covered in the Application or the
Cited Registration by argument or extrinsic evidence. Stone Lion Cap. Partners, 746
F.3d at 1323 (“It was proper, however, for the Board to focus on the application and
registrations rather than on real-world conditions ….”).
Applicant’s services are “rehabilitation of alcohol-addicted patients, drug-addicted
patients, and narcotic-addicted patients in Washington, Pennsylvania” and the Cited
Registration services are “healthcare.” “Healthcare” is a broad term defined as
“efforts made to maintain, restore, or promote someone’s physical, mental, or
emotional well-being especially when performed by trained and licensed
professionals”10 or as “the field concerned with the maintenance or restoration of the
health of the body or mind”;11 and “rehabilitation” is defined as “the action, process,
or result of rehabilitating or of being rehabilitated: such as … the process of restoring
a person to a drug- or alcohol-free state.”12
As demonstrated by these definitions, Registrant’s healthcare services which
include efforts to restore a person’s physical and mental well-being are broad enough
to encompass efforts to rehabilitate or restore alcohol-, drug-, or narcotic-addicted
10 We take judicial notice of the definition of healthcare. MERRIAM-WEBSTER.COM, MERRIAM-
WEBSTER.COM/DICTIONARY/HEALTHCARE (accessed March 2, 2026); see B.V.D. Licensing
Corp. v. Body Action Design, Inc., 846 F.2d 727, 728 (Fed. Cir. 1988) (the Board may take
judicial notice of dictionary definitions retrieved from online sources when the definitions
themselves are derived from dictionaries that exist in printed form); In re Cordua Rests. LP,
No. 85214191, 2014 WL 1390504, at *2 n.4 (TTAB 2014), aff’d 823 F.3d 594 (Fed. Cir. 2016).
11 COLLINSDICTIONARY.COM, COLLINSDICTIONARY.COM/DICTIONARY/ENGLISH/HEALTHCARE
(accessed March 3, 2026).
12 We take judicial notice of the definition of rehabilitation. MERRIAM-WEBSTER.COM,
MERRIAM-WEBSTER.COM/DICTIONARY/REHABILITATION (accessed March 3, 2026). ); see B.V.D.
Licensing Corp., 846 F.2d at 728.

Serial No. 98516522
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patients and thus, the services are legally identical.13 See In re St. Julian Wine Co.,
No. 87834973, 2020 WL 2788005, at *5 (TTAB 2020); In re Info. Builders Inc., No.
87753964, 2020 WL 2094122, at *4 (TTAB 2020) (finding services legally identical in
part where registrant’s services encompassed by applicant’s services); In re Country
Oven, Inc., No. 87354443, 2019 WL 6170483, at *2 (TTAB 2019) (quoting Sw. Mgmt.,
Inc. v. Ocinomled, Ltd., No. 94002242, 2015 WL 4464550, at *17 (TTAB 2015) (where
the identification of services is broad, the Board “presume[s] that the services
encompass all services of the type identified”)). While we do not ignore the restriction
in the application to “patients in Washington, Pennsylvania,” because the services in
the Cited Registration are unrestricted, the registered services are available to all
patients, including those in Washington, Pennsylvania.
Applicant’s argument that it is “unreasonable and potentially offensive”14 to find
that the services are the same ignores our caselaw which requires us to decide the
question of registrability on the identifications set forth in the Application and Cited
Registration. Octocom Sys., Inc. v. Houston Computers Servs. Inc, 918 F.2d 937,
942 (Fed. Cir. 1990) (“The authority is legion that the question of registrability of an
applicant’s mark must be decided on the basis of the identification of [the services]
set forth in the application regardless of what the record may reveal as to the
13 The Examining Attorney argued that the services of both Applicant and Registrant are the
type of services commonly offered by the same entity under the same mark. 6 TTABVUE 8-
10; see November 14, 2024 Office Action at TSDR 19-52; June 5, 2025 Final Office Action at
TSDR 9-146. Given that we find the services are legally identical, we need not address this
evidence or argument.
14 4 TTABVUE 2.

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particular nature of an applicant’s [services], the particular channels of trade or the
class of purchasers to which the sales of [services] are directed.”).
Despite Applicant’s arguments that the “channels of trade associated with the two
marks are entirely independent”,15 because the services are legally identical, we
presume that the channels of trade and classes of purchasers for the services overlap.
See Am. Lebanese Syrian Associated Charities Inc. v. Child Health Rsch. Inst., No.
91190361, 2011 WL 4090447, at *6 (TTAB 2011) (the relevant services are legally
identical and so, “the marketing channels of trade and targeted classes of consumers
and donors are the same.”); Genesco Inc. v. Martz, No. 91121296, 2003 WL 1154482,
at *10 (TTAB 2003) (“Given the in-part identical and in-part related nature of the
parties’ goods, and the lack of any restrictions in the identifications thereof as to trade
channels and purchasers, these clothing items could be offered and sold to the same
classes of purchasers through the same channels of trade”).
Based on the foregoing, we find that the respective services are legally identical,
and the channels of trade and classes of customers overlap. The second DuPont factor
weighs strongly in favor of a likelihood of confusion and third factor weighs in favor
of a likelihood of confusion.
II. Conclusion
Having considered all evidence and argument bearing on the relevant DuPont
factors, we find that the similarity of the marks and the legal identity of the services
weigh strongly in favor of finding a likelihood of confusion, and the overlap in
15 Id. (emphasis in original).

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channels of trade and classes of customers weigh in favor of finding a likelihood of
confusion. No factor weighs against a likelihood of confusion.
We conclude that confusion is likely.
Decision: The refusal to register Applicant’s proposed mark is affirmed under
Section 2(d), 15 U.S.C. § 1052(d).