Tulster, LLC

This Opinion is Not a
Precedent of the TTAB
Mailed: February 23, 2026
UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
_____
Trademark Trial and Appeal Board
_____
In re Tulster, LLC
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Serial No. 98092120
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Scott R. Zingerman, Gable Gothwals, for Tulster, LLC.
Shannon Twohig, Examining Attorney, Law Office 105,
Jennifer L. Williston, Managing Attorney.
_____
Before Thurmon, Stanley and O’Connor,
Administrative Trademark Judges.
Opinion by O’Connor, Administrative Trademark Judge:
Tulster, LLC (“Applicant”) seeks to register the standard-character mark ECHO
on the Principal Register for “carriers adapted for firearm accessories in the nature
of handgun magazines,” in International Class 13.1
1 Application Serial No. 98092120 was filed on July 19, 2023 under Section 1(a) of the
Trademark Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1051(a), claiming first use anywhere and in commerce at least
as early as July 30, 2015.
Citations to the prosecution file are to entries in the USPTO’s Trademark Status & Document
Retrieval (“TSDR”) system in .pdf format. Citations to the appeal record are to TTABVUE,
the Board’s online docketing system.

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The Trademark Examining Attorney refused registration under Section 2(d) of the
Trademark Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1052(d), due to a likelihood of confusion with the mark
ECHO, also in standard characters, for “noise suppressors for guns; silencers for
firearms,” in International Class 13 (the “Cited Registration” or “Cited Mark”).2
When the refusal was made final, Applicant appealed. The appeal has been fully
briefed and is ready for decision. We affirm the refusal to register.
Likelihood of Confusion
“The Trademark Act prohibits registration of a mark that so resembles a
registered mark as to be likely, when used on or in connection with the goods or
services of the applicant, to cause confusion, mistake, or to deceive.” In re Charger
Ventures LLC, 64 F.4th 1375, 1379 (Fed. Cir. 2023) (cleaned up). Our determination
of the issue of likelihood of confusion is based on analysis of all of the probative facts
in evidence that are relevant to the factors set forth in In re E.I. DuPont de Nemours
& Co., 476 F.2d 1357, 1361 (CCPA 1973) (the “DuPont factors”), cited in B&B
Hardware, Inc. v. Hargis Indus., Inc., 575 U.S. 138, 145 (2015)). We consider each
DuPont factor for which there is evidence and argument. See, e.g., In re Guild Mortg.
Co., 912 F.3d 1376, 1379 (Fed. Cir. 2019). The overriding concerns are not only to
prevent buyer confusion as to the source of the goods, but also to protect the registrant
from adverse commercial impact due to use of a similar mark by a newcomer. See In
re Shell Oil Co., 992 F.2d 1204, 1207-08 (Fed. Cir. 1993).
2 Registration No. 4982097 issued on June 21, 2016 on the Principal Register; maintained.

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Varying weight may be assigned to each DuPont factor depending on the evidence
presented. See Charger Ventures, 64 F.4th at 1381 (“In any given case, different
DuPont factors may play a dominant role and some factors may not be relevant to the
analysis.”) (citation omitted). In determining likelihood of confusion, two key
considerations are the similarity or dissimilarity of the marks and the similarity or
dissimilarity of the goods or services. In re i.am.symbolic, llc, 866 F.3d 1315, 1322
(Fed. Cir. 2017) (quoting Herbko Int’l, Inc. v. Kappa Books, Inc., 308 F.3d 1156, 1165
(Fed. Cir. 2002)); Federated Foods, Inc. v. Fort Howard Paper Co., 544 F.2d 1098,
1103 (CCPA 1976) (“The fundamental inquiry mandated by § 2(d) goes to the
cumulative effect of differences in the essential characteristics of the goods and
differences in the marks.”).
A. The Marks
The first DuPont factor compares the marks “in their entireties as to appearance,
sound, connotation and commercial impression.” In re Detroit Athletic Co., 903 F.3d
1297, 1303 (Fed. Cir. 2018) (quoting DuPont, 476 F.3d at 1361). “Similarity in any
one of these elements may be sufficient to find the marks confusingly similar.” In re
Inn at St. John’s, LLC, No. 87075988, 2018 TTAB LEXIS 170, at *13 (quoting In re
Davia, No. 85497617, 2014 TTAB LEXIS 214, at *4). In considering the marks, we
focus “on the recollection of the average customer, who retains a general rather than
specific impression of the marks.” Inter IKEA Sys. B.V. v. Akea, LLC, No. 91196527,
2014 TTAB LEXIS 166, at *17-18 (citations omitted). “[S]imilarity is not a binary

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factor but is a matter of degree.” In re St. Helena Hosp., 774 F.3d 747, 752 (Fed. Cir.
2014) (citation omitted).
In this case Applicant’s mark is ECHO and the cited mark is ECHO, both in
standard characters. The word ECHO comprises the entirety of each mark. The
marks feature the identical, known word, rendering them identical in appearance,
sound and meaning. Cf. In re i.am.symbolic, llc, No. 85044495, 2015 TTAB LEXIS
414, at *18 (“typical customers know the meaning of the words I AM; accordingly,
both marks would immediately be perceived to have the same literal meaning”), aff’d,
866 F.3d 1315 (Fed. Cir. 2017).
Applicant contends that ECHO has a different connotation when used with
Registrant’s noise suppressors for guns and silencers for firearms as opposed to
Applicant’s carriers for handgun magazines. According to Applicant, the Cited Mark
ECHO is a play on words as applied to noise suppressors and silencers because it
“conveys to a consumer that the goods significantly diminish[] the sound of the
gunshot, or is a reflection of the sound of the gunshot. Instead of a loud gunshot
report, the purchaser could expect to hear a mere echo of the otherwise unsuppressed
report.”3 In contrast, Applicant argues, its mark ECHO does not have a connotation
relating to sound or mitigation of a gunshot report but, to the extent it is not purely
arbitrary, could reflect that the “spare magazine would be the same or similar to the
magazine in the handgun (a repetition).”4
3 11 TTABVUE 5.
4 Id. Neither Applicant nor the Examining Attorney provided evidence of the meaning of
“magazine” in the context of handguns, but we take judicial notice from COLLINS DICTIONARY

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We are not persuaded. Applicant did not make of record any evidence supporting
these supposedly different connotations. See In re Embiid, No. 88202890, 2021 TTAB
LEXIS 168, at *27-28 (rejecting argument that the identical mark has one meaning
when used with the applicant’s goods and a second and different meaning when used
with the registrant’s goods absent evidence or other reason for such a finding); In re
Country Oven, Inc., No. 87354443, 2019 TTAB LEXIS 381, at *3-4 (noting lack of
evidence that consumers would perceive identical mark to engender a different
meaning or commercial impression in the context of retail bakery shop and similar
services as opposed to bread buns). Further, consumers could also perceive
Applicant’s mark as connoting a repeated sound created by the use of an additional
magazine being carried in Applicant’s goods.
And even if we were to accept Applicant’s argument that the identical marks
convey slightly different connotations when used with the respective goods, the
overall commercial impressions of the marks would still be very similar. Consumers
receive general impressions of trademarks and are unlikely to engage in “a multi-step
reasoning process”5 as argued by Applicant to discern a different connotation when
encountering the identical ECHO mark applied to its goods. Moreover, Applicant does
not dispute that the marks are identical in appearance and sound, and similarity in
that, “[i]n an automatic gun, the magazine is the part that contains the bullets.”
https://www.collinsdictionary.com/dictionary/english/magazine (accessed February 2026).
See, e.g., In re Nextgen Mgmt., LLC, No. 88098031, 2023 TTAB LEXIS 1, at *10 n.5 (Board
may take judicial notice from “online dictionaries which exist in printed format or have fixed
regular editions”).
5 11 TTABVUE at 5-6.

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even one of the relevant criteria is enough to render the marks confusingly similar.
See, e.g., Krim-Ko Corp. v. Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 390 F.2d 728, 732 (CCPA 1968)
(“It is sufficient if the similarity in either form, spelling or sound alone is likely to
cause confusion.”).
The first DuPont factor weighs heavily in favor of a likelihood of confusion.
B. The Goods and Channels of Trade
Under the second and third DuPont factors, we consider “[t]he similarity or
dissimilarity and nature of the goods or services as described in an application or
registration” and the “similarity or dissimilarity of established, likely-to-continue
trade channels.” DuPont, 476 F.2d at 1361. With each factor, our determination is
based on the identification of goods in the Application and Cited Registration. See,
e.g., Detroit Athletic, 903 F.3d at 1306, 1308.
The goods need not be identical or even competitive to find a likelihood of
confusion, but must be “related in some manner and/or if the circumstances
surrounding their marketing are such that they could give rise to the mistaken belief
that they emanate from the same source.” Coach Servs., Inc. v. Triumph Learning
LLC, 668 F.3d 1356, 1369 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (citation omitted); see also Recot Inc. v.
M.C. Becton, 214 F.3d 1322, 1329 (Fed. Cir. 2000) (“[E]ven if the goods in question
are different from, and thus not related to, one another in kind, the same goods can
be related in the mind of the consuming public as to the origin of the goods.”).
Moreover, where goods are complementary, such as because they are used together,
they are often found to be related in a likelihood of confusion analysis. See, e.g., In re

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Martin’s Famous Pastry Shoppe, Inc., 748 F.2d 1565, 1567 (Fed. Cir. 1984)
(“complementary use has long been recognized as a relevant consideration in
determining a likelihood of confusion”); Sage Therapeutics, Inc. v. Sageforth Psych.
Servs., LLC, No. 91270181, 2024 TTAB LEXIS 139, at *19 n.39 (“Complementary
goods and services are typically found to be related.”) (citations omitted).
As indicated above, Applicant’s goods are “carriers adapted for firearm accessories
in the nature of handgun magazines” and Registrant’s goods are “noise suppressors
for guns; silencers for firearms.” Handguns are a firearm and type of gun and thus,
on their face, both Applicant’s and Registrant’s goods are for use with overlapping
goods. Although both goods are for use with guns, Applicant argues that there is no
per se rule that goods within the same broad field are related for likelihood of
confusion purposes.6 Applicant further argues that the goods are fundamentally
different and serve different purposes and the same purchasers would not be looking
to buy these goods.7
The Examining Attorney argues that the goods are closely related, relying on the
following evidence:
• Carolina Sporting Arms website offering magazine carriers and gun
silencers;8
6 Id. at 7 (citing Cooper Indus. v. Repcoparts USA, Inc., No. 91064343, 1983 TTAB LEXIS
127, at *7).
7 Id. at 6-7 (displaying images of “exemplary” products taken from Applicant’s and
Registrant’s websites and providing Internet link). As the Board has made clear, “providing
hyperlinks to internet materials is insufficient to make such materials of record.” In re Weiss,
No. 88621608, 2024 TTAB LEXIS 277, at *3-4. Even if properly made of record, such evidence
would be of little probative value because we must base our decision on the goods as they are
identified in the Application and Registration, not as they may be seen in the marketplace.
8 July 31, 2024 Final Office Action, TSDR 7-13.

Serial No. 98092120
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• Omaha Outdoors website offering magazine carriers and suppressors for
guns;9
• Rifle Gear website offering magazine carriers and gun silencers;10
• Shooting Surplus website offering magazine carriers and gun
suppressors;11
• Sig Sauer website offering magazine carrier and gun suppressors;12
• The Armories website listing magazine carrier and gun silencer.13
Applicant argues that the Examining Attorney’s evidence does not support a
finding of relatedness because it does not show any instances of the respective goods
emanating from a single source.14 As a factual matter, this is not accurate, as the
silencer and magazine carrier listed on the Sig Sauer website both originate with that
company.15 The evidence of record further shows that the same retailers commonly
9 Id. at 14-23.
10 Id. at 24-28.
11 Id. at 29-33.
12 Id. at 34-46.
13 Id. at 47-53.
14 11 TTABVUE 8. In its reply Applicant theorizes that the same companies may not offer
both magazine carriers and gun silencers due to reasons such as the materials used,
manufacturing techniques, or regulatory restrictions applying to silencers that do not apply
to magazine carriers. 14 TTABVUE at 4. Applicant does not provide any evidence supporting
these contentions, which amount to nothing more than speculation. Cai v. Diamond Hong,
Inc., 901 F.3d 1367, 1370 (Fed. Cir. 2018) (attorney argument is not evidence); Acomb v.
Polywood Plastics Corp., No. 91054738, 1975 TTAB LEXIS 82, at *11 (“Speculation and
surmise is no substitute for evidence.”).
15 July 31, 2024 Final Office Action, TSDR 34-46.
The Examining Attorney also made of record three use-based third-party registrations for
the same or similar goods as the involved goods, indicating that consumers are accustomed
to encountering a variety of gun parts, accessories and supplies under the same mark. See
March 22, 2024 Nonfinal Office Action, TSDR 7-12 (attaching registrations that cover both
gun silencers or suppressors and gun carriers, holsters and/or magazines). See, e.g., In re
Albert Trostel & Sons Co., No. 74186695, 1993 TTAB LEXIS 36, at *7 (“Although third-party
registrations are not evidence that the marks shown therein are in commercial use, or that
the public is familiar with them, nevertheless third-party registrations which individually
cover a number of different items and which are based on use in commerce may have some

Serial No. 98092120
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sell the goods of both Applicant and Registrant which also supports a finding that the
goods are related, and likely complementary, for purposes of the second DuPont
factor. See Hewlett-Packard Co. v. Packard Press, Inc., 281 F.3d 1261, 1267 (Fed. Cir.
2002) (evidence that “a single company sells the goods and services of both parties, if
presented, is relevant to a relatedness analysis”); In re Davey Prods. Pty, No.
77029776, 2009 TTAB LEXIS 524, at *15 (evidence including websites offering the
involved goods of the applicant and registrant supported finding of relatedness).
Applicant’s argument that the fact retailers offer both types of goods “does not, in
itself, evidence relatedness of the goods themselves as modern retailers may offer a
large number of different goods from many manufacturers/suppliers”16 does not
detract from the probative value of the evidence. These are not “big box” retail stores
or online retailers selling a wide variety of goods, but are specialty retailers with a
focus on firearms and firearm accessories. This targeted type of retailing is narrower
in scope, and the fact that more targeted sellers of firearms offer the type of firearm
accessories identified in both the Cited Registration and the Application shows that
the goods are related. See In re Ox Paperboard, LLC, No. 87847482, 2020 TTAB
LEXIS 266, at *18.
Indeed, the evidence shows that consumers seek both the items identified in the
Application and the Cited Registration for use with the same goods, guns and
probative value to the extent that they serve to suggest that the listed goods and/or services
are of a type which may emanate from a single source.”).
16 11 TTABVUE 8.

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handguns, including when outfitting a weapon for use.17 In this sense, the goods by
their nature are complementary: Applicant’s “carriers adapted for firearm accessories
in the nature of handgun magazines” are purchased to hold ammunition for a gun
and Registrant’s “noise suppressors for guns; silencers for firearms” are purchased to
quiet the sound produced when ammunition is put to its intended purpose when a
user fires the gun. The Examining Attorney’s evidence shows that both Applicant’s
and Registrant’s goods are among items offered specifically for use with guns and
shooting.18 We cannot ignore this inherent relationship and we accord it some weight
in our analysis. See In re Martin’s Famous Pastry Shoppe, Inc., 748 F.2d 1565, 1567
(Fed. Cir. 1984) (“Evidence of complementary use may be given more or less weight
depending on the nature of the goods, but this evidence may not be ignored. The
extent to which particular food products are deemed related will depend on the facts
of each individual case. In the instant case, we take notice that the products ‘bread’
and ‘cheese’ are often used in combination. Such complementary use has long been
recognized as a relevant consideration in determining a likelihood of confusion.”). See
also In re Sela Prods., LLC, No. 77629624, 2013 TTAB LEXIS 175, at *19-20
(applicant’s wall mounts and brackets and registrant’s surge protectors
complementary where both were marketed specifically for use with audio, television
17 See, e.g., July 31, 2024 Final Office Action, TSDR 18-22 (Omaha Outdoors offering
suppressors along with selection of other items such as rounds and magazines, including both
suppressors and magazines offered under the same SUREFIRE brand).
18 See id. at 7-13 (Carolina Sporting Arms specializes in firearms and firearms-related
products; its website offers a variety of items for use with guns); 14-23 (Omaha Outdoors
offers guns and items for use with them); 29-32 (Shooting Surplus offers the same).

Serial No. 98092120
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and home theater equipment “such that a purchaser can encounter both types of
goods in the course of purchasing a television, audio or home theater system”).
The same third-party website evidence discussed above also shows that the goods
of both Applicant and Registrant travel in at least one common channel of trade, retail
gun shops, and are directed to the same consumers, purchasers and users of guns. In
re Toshiba Med. Sys. Corp., No. 79046106, 2009 TTAB LEXIS 447, at *21; Davey
Prods., 2009 TTAB LEXIS 524, at *18 (internet evidence of third party websites
offering goods of both the applicant and registrant showed “that the normal trade
channels for applicant’s and registrant’s respective goods are the same and
overlapping”).
The second and third DuPont factors support a likelihood of confusion.
C. Purchasing Conditions
Applicant argues that the fourth DuPont factor, “[t]he conditions under which and
buyers to whom sales are made, i.e. ‘impulse’ vs. careful, sophisticated purchasing,”
DuPont, 476 F.2d at 1361, weighs against likelihood of confusion.19 “Purchaser
sophistication may tend to minimize likelihood of confusion. Conversely, impulse
purchases of inexpensive items may tend to have the opposite effect.” Palm Bay Imps.,
Inc. v. Veuve Clicquot Ponsardin Maison Fondee En 1772, 396 F.3d 1369, 1376 (Fed.
Cir. 2005) (citation omitted).
19 See 11 TTABVUE 9-10.

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According to Applicant, the goods are sold to discerning customers, who engage in
“planned purchases,” entailing a degree of care that minimizes the risk of confusion.20
Applicant notes that these are “durable goods, which cost more and are replaced less
frequently than perishable goods or consumables” and in particular “[a] silencer or
suppressor is a specialty item that requires certain permits to purchase and own,” as
evidenced by the website printouts attached to the Final Office Action.21 That
evidence shows magazine carriers offered at prices from approximately $18 to $7022
and suppressors and silencers offered at prices from approximately $700 to over
$2000.23 Some of the product listings indicate that a permit is required to possess a
silencer.24
Thus, Applicant argues, this case is similar to Primrose Ret. Cmtys., LLC v.
Edward Rose Senior Living, LLC, No. 91217095, 2016 TTAB LEXIS 604, at *30,
where the Board found that “even in the case of the least sophisticated purchaser, a
decision as important as choosing a senior living community will be made with some
thought and research, even when made hastily.”
Similar to Primrose, then, even the least sophisticated
purchaser of a silencer or suppressor or a handgun
magazine carrier would have a need for and research the
products with some modicum of thought before investing in
either. Certainly, even the least sophisticated purchaser
would differentiate a suppressor from a magazine carrier.
20 Id.
21 Id. at 10.
22 July 31, 2024 Final Office Action, TSDR 12, 34.
23 Id. at 20-21.
24 See id. at 18-19 (stating that the listed silencer “is a Class III item. NFA items need Form
4 registration to possess”).

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Consumers are sophisticated enough not to confuse
Appellant’s goods with Registrant’s goods.25
Yet the issue is not whether purchasers would confuse the goods, but whether
there is a likelihood of confusion as to the source of the goods. Ox Paperboard, 2020
TTAB LEXIS 266, at *16 (citing inter alia L’Oreal S.A. v. Marcon, No. 91184456, 2012
TTAB LEXIS 77, at *20).
The Application and Cited Registration identify goods that are not restricted by
target consumer, price, or in any other manner that might suggest higher than
normal consumer sophistication. We can infer from the nature of the goods that they
are not the subject of routine purchases and the evidence indicates that silencers in
particular have a price point and permit requirements lending themselves to
reasonably careful purchasing. But even careful or sophisticated consumers are not
immune from source confusion. See In re Research & Trading Corp., 793 F.2d 1276,
1279 (Fed. Cir. 1986).
The fourth DuPont factor weighs somewhat against likelihood of confusion.
D. Strength or Weakness of the Cited Mark
Applicant argues that “[t]here is no evidence that the mark of the cited
registration has become a famous mark in connection with Registrant’s goods,”26
implicating the fifth DuPont factor, the strength of the mark. However, “the absence
of such evidence is not particularly significant in the context of an ex parte
proceeding,” where evidence going to fame is generally not available. Davey Prods.,
25 11 TTABVUE 10.
26 Id.

Serial No. 98092120
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2009 TTAB LEXIS 524, at *21. See also In re Majestic Distilling Co., 315 F.3d 1311,
1317 (Fed. Cir. 2003) (although fame of a registered mark is relevant to likelihood of
confusion under the fifth DuPont factor, court declined to establish “the converse rule
that likelihood of confusion is precluded by a registered mark’s not being famous”).
Potentially implicating the sixth DuPont factor, “[t]he number and nature of
similar marks in use on similar goods,” 476 F.2d at 1361, Applicant asserts that the
Cited Mark merits a narrow range of protection because there “are over 100 other
U.S. registrations for marks which consist of or contain ‘ECHO,’” 8 of which are in
Class 13.27 Applicant submitted no evidence of any such other registrations and we
therefore have no basis to find the Cited Mark to be weak. See Cai, 901 F.3d at 1371
(assertions of fact made in a brief are not evidence under any of the relevant rules).
Because the Cited Mark is on the Principal Register, with no claim of acquired
distinctiveness under Trademark Act Section 2(f), “we presume it is inherently
distinctive, i.e., that it is at worst suggestive of the goods.” Heil Co. v. Tripleye GmbH,
No. 91277359, 2024 TTAB LEXIS 494, at *48-49 (citing 15 U.S.C. § 1057(b)
(registration is “prima facie evidence of the validity of the registered mark”); In re
Fiesta Palms, LLC, No. 76595049, 2007 TTAB LEXIS 51, at *9)).
The fifth and sixth DuPont factors are neutral in our analysis.
27 Id. at 9.

Serial No. 98092120
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E. Lack of Actual Confusion Despite Contemporaneous Use
Applicant also argues that the marks have been used contemporaneously for at
least ten years without any known instances of actual confusion,28 indicating that
confusion is unlikely. The eighth DuPont factor addresses “[t]he length of time during
and conditions under which there has been concurrent use without evidence of actual
confusion.” DuPont, 476 F.2d at 1361. This factor requires the Board “to look at actual
market conditions, to the extent there is evidence of such conditions of record.” In re
Guild Mortg. Co., No. 86709944, 2020 TTAB LEXIS 17, at *19. Again, this factor is
typically less important in ex parte cases absent contextual evidence of the length of
time and degree to which Applicant’s and Registrant’s “commercial activities would
have provided an opportunity for confusion to have manifested itself if it were likely.”
Embiid, 2021 TTAB LEXIS 168, at *53-54.
Applicant has provided no such evidence,29 and because Registrant is not a party,
we have no way of knowing whether it has evidence of actual confusion. Majestic
Distilling, 315 F.3d at 1317 (“uncorroborated statements of no known instances of
actual confusion are of little evidentiary value”). In addition, “a showing of actual
confusion is not necessary to establish a likelihood of confusion.” i.am.symbolic, 866
F.3d at 1322 (quoting Herbko, 308 F.3d at 1165).
The eighth DuPont factor is neutral.
28 Id. at 8-9.
29 Applicant relies only on the dates of first use set forth in the Application and Registration,
which “is not evidence on behalf of the applicant or registrant.” Trademark Rule 2.122(b)(2),
37 C.F.R. 2.122(b)(2).

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Conclusion—Weighing the DuPont Factors
The final step in analyzing likelihood of confusion is to assess our findings under
the DuPont factors and determine whether, on balance, confusion is likely. See
Charger Ventures, 64 F.4th at 1384. Both marks comprise the sole word ECHO (in
standard characters), rendering them identical in sight, sound and meaning and at
minimum very similar in overall commercial impression, such that the first DuPont
factor weighs heavily in favor of likelihood of confusion. We are mindful that “because
the marks are identical, the degree of similarity between the goods or services
required for confusion to be likely declines.” DeVivo v. Ortiz, No. 91242863, 2020
TTAB LEXIS 15, at *36 (citation omitted); i.am.symbolic, 2015 TTAB LEXIS 369, at
*17 (where marks are identical, “[i]t is only necessary that there be a ‘viable
relationship between the goods’ to support a finding of likelihood of confusion”)
(citation omitted). Here, the evidence shows that Applicant’s “carriers adapted for
firearm accessories in the nature of handgun magazines” and Registrant’s “noise
suppressors for guns; silencers for firearms” are related and complementary. The
evidence also shows that the goods travel through at least one common channel of
trade to the same classes of consumers. The second and third DuPont factors weigh
in favor of likelihood of confusion. By virtue of the nature of the goods and evidence
reflecting high prices and regulation in particular for Registrant’s goods, we find that
consumers are likely to be reasonably sophisticated and exercise care in purchasing
the goods, with the fourth DuPont factor weighing somewhat against a likelihood of

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confusion. Consumers still may be confused, however, particularly by the use of
identical marks. No other factor weighs against a likelihood of confusion.
Balancing the factors, we conclude that confusion is likely between Applicant’s
mark and the Cited Mark when used with their respective identified goods.
Decision:
The refusal to register Applicant’s mark under Trademark Act Section 2(d) is
affirmed.