Culine Imports LLC

This Opinion is Not a
Precedent of the TTAB
Mailed: January 16, 2026
UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
_____
Trademark Trial and Appeal Board
_____
In re Culine Imports LLC
_____
Serial No. 98480830
_____
Parham Javaherizadeh of J&M Legal Group, for Culine Imports LLC.
Samuel Song, Trademark Examining Attorney, Law Office 125,
Robin Mittler, Managing Attorney.
_____
Before Larkin, Stanley, and Bradley,
Administrative Trademark Judges.
Opinion by Bradley, Administrative Trademark Judge:
Culine Imports LLC (“Applicant”) seeks registration on the Principal Register of
the composite mark depicted below:
for “consumer electronic products, namely, audio amplifiers, audio speakers, audio
receivers, electrical audio and speaker cables and connectors, audio decoders, video

Serial No. 98480830
- 2 -
decoders, speakers, power conversion devices, power converters, and power inverters”
in International Class 9.1
The Examining Attorney refused registration under Section 2(d) of the Trademark
Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1052(d), on the ground that Applicant’s mark is likely to cause
confusion with the marks FUZZIX2 (in standard characters) and 3
both registered on the Principal Register to the same owner in International Class 11
for:
LED Lighting apparatus; lighting and effect lighting
apparatus, namely lighting installations for use in
discotheques, restaurants, ballrooms, living rooms and
vehicles, as well as outdoors; lighting and laser light effect
apparatus in the nature of laser light projectors;
professional and consumer lighting and effects apparatus
for light, smoke machines and laser effects, namely laser
light projectors and Smoke generating machines for
creating special theatrical effects; colour-changing lighting
apparatus, namely lighting installations; led lighting
installations; neon lighting, namely lighting installations;
smoke machines in the nature of smoke generating
machines for creating special theatrical effects; snow
cannons; snow foam generators for entertainment
purposes; smoke generating machines for creating special
theatrical effects and lighting effect equipment in the
nature of stage lighting apparatus; fixtures for light, smoke
and laser light effects, namely lighting installations;
electric fans for use in combination with light, smoke and
1 Application Serial No. 98480830 was filed on April 2, 2024, under Section 1(b) of the
Trademark Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1051(b), alleging Applicant’s bona fide intent to use the mark in
commerce. The description of the mark states that it “consists of a stylized lightning bolt
followed by the stylized wording ‘FUZIX’.” Color is not claimed as a feature of the mark.
2 Registration No. 7362125, registered on April 23, 2024. We will refer to the common owner
of the cited registrations as the “Registrant.”
3 Registration No. 7362126, registered on April 23, 2024. The TSDR record does not contain
a description of the mark, but does list the following design search codes: 26.01.13 - Circles,
two (not concentric); Two circles, and 26.01.21 - Circles that are totally or partially shaded.

Serial No. 98480830
- 3 -
sound effects; lamps; laser light projectors; fixtures for
lighting, fixtures for smoke machines and lighting and
laser light effect apparatus, namely lighting fixtures and
laser light projectors; lamps for the aforesaid goods; fittings
included in this class for the aforesaid lighting and lighting
effects, namely tripods for Lighting apparatus, plastic
transport crates, electric cables and Electrical plugs.
After the Examining Attorney issued the final refusal, Applicant appealed.4 The
appeal is fully briefed.5 We affirm the refusal to register.
I. Likelihood of Confusion
Our determination under Section 2(d) of the Trademark Act involves an analysis
of all of the probative evidence of record that is relevant to the factors bearing on a
likelihood of confusion. See In re E.I. DuPont DeNemours & Co., 476 F.2d 1357, 1361
(CCPA 1973) (“DuPont”); see also Palm Bay Imps., Inc. v. Veuve Clicquot Ponsardin
Maison Fondee En 1772, 396 F.3d 1369, 1371 (Fed. Cir. 2005).
We must consider “each DuPont factor for which there is evidence and argument.”
Spireon, Inc. v. Flex Ltd., 71 F.4th 1355, 1362 (Fed. Cir. 2023) (citing In re Guild
Mortg. Co., 912 F.3d 1376, 1380 (Fed. Cir. 2019)). In any likelihood of confusion
analysis, two key considerations are the similarities between the marks and the
4 1 TTABVUE.
Citations in this opinion to the briefs and other materials in the appeal docket refer to
TTABVUE, the Board’s online docketing system. Specifically, the number preceding
TTABVUE corresponds to the docket entry number, and any number(s) following TTABVUE
refer to the page number(s) of the docket entry where the cited materials appear. Page
references to the application file refer to the online database of the USPTO’s Trademark
Status & Document Retrieval (“TSDR”) system. All citations to documents contained in the
TSDR database are to the downloaded .pdf versions of the documents.
5 4 TTABVUE (Applicant’s brief); 6 TTABVUE (Examining Attorney’s brief); 7 TTABVUE
(Applicant’s reply brief).

Serial No. 98480830
- 4 -
similarities between the goods. See In re i.am.symbolic, llc, 866 F.3d 1315, 1322 (Fed.
Cir. 2017) (“The likelihood of confusion analysis considers all DuPont factors for
which there is record evidence but ‘may focus … on dispositive factors, such as
similarity of the marks and relatedness of the goods.’”) (alteration in the original)
(quoting Herbko Int’l, Inc. v. Kappa Books, Inc., 308 F.3d 1156, 1164-65 (Fed. Cir.
2002)). These and other factors are discussed below.
We focus our likelihood of confusion analysis on the standard -character mark
FUZZIX in cited Registration No. 7362125 (the “Cited Registration”). Because we find
confusion likely based on the mark in this registration, we need not consider the
likelihood of confusion between Applicant’s mark and the composite mark
in Registration No. 7362126. See In re Max Cap. Grp. Ltd., No.
77186166, 2010 TTAB LEXIS 1, at *4-5 (TTAB 2010) (“Because the design element
in the cited MAX and design mark arguably contains an additional point of difference
with applicant’s mark, we confine our analysis to the issue of likelihood of confusion
between applicant’s mark and the cited registration for MAX in typed drawing
form.”).
A. Similarity of the Marks
We begin by evaluating “[t]he similarity or dissimilarity of the marks in their
entireties as to appearance, sound, connotation and commercial impression.” In re
Detroit Athletic Co., 903 F.3d 1297, 1303 (Fed. Cir. 2018) (citing DuPont, 476 F.2d at
1361). “Similarity in any one of these elements may be sufficient to find the marks
confusingly similar.” In re Inn at St. John’s, LLC, No. 87075988, 2018 TTAB LEXIS

Serial No. 98480830
- 5 -
170, at *13 (TTAB 2018), aff’d mem., 777 F. App’x 516 (Fed. Cir. 2019) (citation
omitted). “The proper test is not a side-by-side comparison of the marks, but instead
whether the marks are sufficiently similar in terms of their commercial impression
such that persons who encounter the marks would be likely to assume a connec tion
between the parties.” i.am.symbolic, 866 F.3d at 1323 (quoting Coach Servs. Inc. v.
Triumph Learning LLC, 668 F.3d 1356, 1368 (Fed. Cir. 2012)). Additionally, the
marks “must be considered … in light of the fallibility of memory ….” In re St. Helena
Hosp., 774 F.3d 747, 751 (Fed. Cir. 2014) (citation omitted). The focus is on the
recollection of the average purchaser, who normally retains a general rather than a
specific impression of trademarks. In re Bay State Brewing Co., No. 85826258, 2016
TTAB LEXIS 46, at *6 (TTAB 2016) (citation omitted).
Here, Applicant’s mark is , and the cited mark is FUZZIX in
standard characters. “It is well-established that it is improper to dissect a mark, and
that marks must be viewed in their entireties.” Coach Servs., 668 F.3d at 1368; Jack
Wolfskin Ausrustung Fur Draussen GmbH & Co. KGaA v. New Millennium Sports,
S.L.U., 797 F.3d 1363, 1371 (Fed. Cir. 2015) (“the touchstone of this factor is
consideration of the marks in total”). Nonetheless, “it is settled that one feature of a
mark may be more significant than another, and it is not improper to give more
weight to this dominant feature in determining the commercial impression created
by the mark.” Bay State Brewing, 2016 TTAB LEXIS 46, at *7-8 (citing In re Nat’l
Data, 753 F.2d 1056, 1059 (Fed. Cir. 1985) (“There is nothing improper in stating
that, for rational reasons, more or less weight has been given to a particular feature

Serial No. 98480830
- 6 -
of a mark, provided the ultimate conclusion rests on consideration of the marks in
their entireties.”)). Applicant argues that the lightning bolt design in its mark “is a
dominant visual feature, functioning as a source-identifying element,”6 and that it “is
not ornamental or incidental.”7 However, there is nothing particularly distinctive
about the lightning bold design, particularly in the context of “consumer electronic
products,” and it is a standard depiction that is completely shaded in with no color
claimed as a feature of the mark. In terms of visual appearance, we agree with the
Examining Attorney that the “lightning bolt is the same size as the wording in the
mark, and does not significantly change the mark’s appearance.”8 Accordingly, we
find that the literal portion of Applicant’s mark FUZIX is dominant because it “likely
will appear alone when used in text and will be spoken when requested by
consumers.” In re Viterra Inc., 671 F.3d 1358, 1366 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (“the verbal
portion of a word and design mark likely will be the dominant portion”). As such the
word “FUZIX” is entitled to greater weight than the design element in Applicant’s
mark in our comparison of the marks in their entireties.
The dominant literal component of Applicant’s mark FUZIX is nearly identical to
Registrant’s standard character mark FUZZIX. Applicant argues that the “visual
appearance” of its mark is “distinct” and that “the spelling difference creates a clear
dissimilarity, particularly for arbitrary marks where each letter choice carries
6 7 TTABVUE 5.
7 4 TTABVUE 3.
8 6 TTABVUE 5.

Serial No. 98480830
- 7 -
weight.”9 However, the words differ only by one letter in the middle of the mark, with
Applicant’s mark using a single “z”, and Registrant’s mark using a double “z”. Such a
slight difference in the marks is likely to be overlooked by consumers. See E. I. du
Pont de Nemours & Co. v. Sunlyra Int’l, Inc., No. 91089559, 1995 TTAB LEXIS 5, at
*3 (TTAB 1995) (“[T]he two marks are as similar as possible without being identical.
Persons familiar with opposer’s LYCRA mark would, upon encountering applicant’s
mark LYRA, be apt in many instances to fail to notice the absence of the middle letter
‘C.’”). Further, since the Cited Registration is in standard characters, it may be
displayed in any font or stylization, including the same stylized text as in Applicant’s
mark, thereby increasing the similarity of the marks. See In re Aquitaine Wine, No.
86928469, 2018 TTAB LEXIS 108, at *13 (TTAB 2018) (“Since Registrant’s mark is a
standard character mark, we must consider that the literal elements of the mark (the
words and the letters) may be presented in any font style, size or color, including the
same font, size and color as the literal portions of Applicant’s mark.”).
In terms of sound, we agree with the Examining Attorney that “the marks are also
phonetically equivalent, with the additional letter ‘Z’ in the registered mark (or lack
of the letter ‘Z’ in the applied-for mark) not changing its pronunciation.”10 Applicant
argues that “[t]he addition of the second ‘Z’ in the cited marks elongates the middle
of the word, changing its phonetic rhythm . . . [and] produces a softened, drawn-out
‘zz’ sound, whereas [Applicant’s mark] “FUZIX” carries a crisper, clipped
9 4 TTABVUE 3.
10 6 TTABVUE 4.

Serial No. 98480830
- 8 -
pronunciation.”11 Yet, Applicant provides no evidence in support of its asserted
pronunciations or any explanation as to how ‘zz’ and ‘z’ sound different. Moreover,
Applicant admits that “both [Applicant’s and Registrant’s] marks are coined terms.”12
As such, “[t]here is no correct pronunciation of a trademark that is not a recognized
word.” Stoncor Grp., Inc. v. Specialty Coatings, Inc., 759 F.3d 1327, 1331-32 (Fed. Cir.
2014); see also In re Jimenez, No. 97551823, 2025 TTAB LEXIS 441, at *13 (TTAB
2025) (“the principle that there is no correct pronunciation of a mark applies with
greater force when one of the marks involved is a coined mark without a specific
meaning”).
Considering connotation and commercial impression, given that both marks are
coined terms, we agree with the Examining Attorney that “the words ‘FUZIX’ and
‘FUZZIX’ have no meaning in relation to the applicant’s and registrant’s respective
related goods” and therefore, “the similarities in sound and appearance mean that
the marks are likely to convey the same connotation.”13 Applicant argues that:
Registrant’s mark FUZZIX contains the embedded term
“fuzz,” a recognized English word tied to sound distortion
and fuzz effects common in audio engineering. This
immediately creates a rough, buzzing, and distorted
auditory connotation. Applicant’s FUZIX, by contrast,
eliminates the double-Z and evokes a crisp, futuristic
construction reminiscent of “fusion” or “music.” The
lightning-bolt design further underscores a modern,
11 4 TTABVUE 3.
12 Id.
13 6 TTABVUE 5.

Serial No. 98480830
- 9 -
energetic impression, distinct from the Registrant’s word-
only or stylized versions.14
However, Applicant provides no dictionary or any other evidence in support , and
“[a]ttorney argument is no substitute for evidence.” Cai v. Diamond Hong, Inc., 901
F.3d 1367, 1371 (Fed. Cir. 2018) (citation and internal quotation omitted). Moreover,
Applicant makes no attempt to connect its proffered meaning regarding “sound
distortion and fuzz effects common in audio engineering” to Registrant’s lighting or
other goods.
Overall, we find Applicant’s and Registrant’s marks considered as a whole are
terms without meaning that are highly similar in appearance and sound, and convey
the same connotation and hence are similar in commercial impression. Accordingly,
this DuPont factor weighs heavily in favor of a likelihood of confusion. See Naterra
Int’l, Inc. v. Bensalem, 92 F.4th 1113, 1119 (Fed. Cir. 2024).
B. Strength or Weakness of the Registrant’s FUZZIX Mark
“There are two prongs of analysis for a mark’s strength under the sixth [DuPont]
factor: conceptual strength and commercial strength.” See, e.g., Spireon, 71 F.4th at
1362. On commercial strength, Applicant contends that “[e]vidence shows coexistence
of -ZIX marks without confusion”15 and that “‘-IX’ is a common suffix in branding, and
. . . [e]xtending Registrant’s scope this broadly would chill competition and effectively
grant Registrant a monopoly over an entire family of coined ‘-IX’ marks, contrary to
14 7 TTABUVE 3.
15 4 TTABVUE 5.

Serial No. 98480830
- 10 -
established policy.”16 However, Applicant provides no evidence in support of either
assertion regarding the claimed use of third-party marks, and “assertions of fact” in
a brief are “not evidence under any of the relevant rules.” Cai, 901 F.3d at 1371.
Accordingly, we only analyze the conceptual strength or weakness of the cited mark.
See New Era Cap Co. v. Pro Era, LLC, No. 91216455, 2020 TTAB LEXIS 199, at *36
(TTAB 2020) (“Applicant did not provide evidence of any third -party use of marks
consisting of or comprised of the term ERA for these goods, and thus no evidence of
commercial weakness.”).
Conceptual or inherent strength is a measure of a mark’s distinctiveness. In re
Chippendales USA, Inc., 622 F.3d 1346, 1353-54 (Fed Cir. 2010). A mark’s
distinctiveness is “often classified in categories of generally increasing
distinctiveness[:] . . . (1) generic; (2) descriptive; (3) suggestive; (4) arbitrary; or (5)
fanciful.” Two Pesos, Inc. v. Taco Cabana, Inc., 505 U.S. 763, 768 (1992). Because the
Cited Registration is “prima facie evidence of the validity of the registered mark,’’ see
Section 7(b) of the Trademark Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1057(b), we must assume that
Registrant’s mark FUZZIX is inherently distinctive (i.e., at least suggestive), since it
is registered on the Principal Register without a claim of acquired distinctiveness
under Section 2(f) of the Trademark Act. See In re Davia, No. 85497617, 2014 TTAB
LEXIS 214, at *11-12 (TTAB 2014). Applicant admits that “both [Applicant’s and
Registrant’s] marks are coined terms”17 and accordingly, we agree with the
16 7 TTABVUE 4.
17 4 TTABVUE 3.

Serial No. 98480830
- 11 -
Examining Attorney that Registrant’s mark is a “fanciful term[],” and as such is
conceptually strong.18 See Nautilus Grp., Inc. v. Icon Health & Fitness, Inc., 372 F.3d
1330, 1340 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (“A fanciful mark is a non-dictionary word concocted by
the trademark holder for its product[.]”; “arbitrary or fanciful marks . . . are typically
strong”); In re N.C. Lottery, 866 F.3d 1363, 1366 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (categories of
distinctiveness “[w]hen arranged in an ascending order . . . roughly reflects their
eligibility for trademark status and the degree of protection accorded” with arbitrary
or fanciful marks at the upper end of the spectrum).
Applicant has not submitted any evidence that would demonstrate conceptual
weakness of Registrant’s fanciful mark FUZZIX. Accordingly, we find that
Registrant’s inherently-distinctive mark is conceptually strong and that the sixth
DuPont factor is neutral.
C. Similarity of the Goods
We next analyze the “similarity or dissimilarity and nature of the goods or
services” and “consider the applicant’s goods as set forth in its application, and the
[registrant’s] goods as set forth in its registration.” i.am.symbolic, 866 F.3d at 1325
(alteration in the original) (quoting M2 Software, Inc. v. M2 Comm’ns., Inc., 450 F.3d
1378, 1382 (Fed. Cir. 2006)). Under this factor we “consider[] whether the consuming
public may perceive the respective goods . . . of the parties as related enough to cause
confusion about the source or origin of the goods.” Naterra Int’l, 92 F.4th at 1117
(citation omitted). Applicant’s and Registrant’s goods need not be identical or even
18 6 TTABVUE 5.

Serial No. 98480830
- 12 -
competitive in order to find a likelihood of confusion. Rather, the question is whether
the “respective products are related in some manner and/or if the circumstances
surrounding their marketing are such that they could give rise to the mistaken belief
that they emanate from the same source.” Coach Servs., 668 F.3d at 1369 (citation
omitted). See also Hewlett-Packard Co. v. Packard Press Inc., 281 F.3d 1261, 1267
(Fed. Cir. 2002) (“Even if the goods and services in question are not identical, the
consuming public may perceive them as related enough to cause confusion about the
source or origin of the goods.”). Additionally, “it is sufficient for a finding of likelihood
of confusion if relatedness is established for any item encompassed by the
identification of goods within a particular class in the application.” In re Aquamar,
Inc., No. 85861533, 2015 TTAB LEXIS 178, at *9 n.5 (TTAB 2015) (citing Tuxedo
Monopoly, Inc. v. Gen. Mills Fun Grp., 648 F.2d 1335, 1336 (CCPA 1981)).
“Evidence of relatedness may include . . . advertisements showing that the
relevant goods are advertised together or sold by the same manufacturer or dealer.”
In re Ox Paperboard, LLC, No. 87847482, 2020 TTAB LEXIS 266, at *15 (TTAB
2020). Here, the Examining Attorney presented evidence “consisting of Internet
screenshots show[ing] that [A]pplicant’s and [R]egistrant’s respective goods are
commonly manufactured, produced, and provided by the same entities under the
same mark,”19 including the following:
• JBL: offers audio amplifiers, JBL Stage Amplifier A3001, and lighting
installations and laser light projectors, JBL PartyLight Beam;20
19 6 TTABVUE 6.
20 October 21, 2024 Office Action at 14-23.

Serial No. 98480830
- 13 -
• ADJ Products, LLC: offers ADJ speakers, and ADJ LED DJ Lights
(including multi-colored LED lighting effects, stage lighting, DJ laser light
projectors and strobe lights);21
• Behringer: offers BEHRINGER audio amplifiers and BEHRINGER Dual-
Mode LED Derby and Strobe Lighting Effect, a LED lighting apparatus,
lighting and effect lighting apparatus, and laser light projector;22
• Monster: offers MONSTER speakers and MONSTER LED lighting
apparatus;23 and
• Phillips: offers PHILIPS speakers and PHILIPS LED lighting apparatus
and lighting installations for use in living rooms.24
These third-party uses are probative of the relatedness of Applicant and Registrant’s
goods because they suggest that the identified goods are of a type that may emanate
from the same source under the same mark. Applicant asserts that the “Examining
Attorney’s reliance on conglomerates that offer both product categories is
insufficient.”25 But the Examining Attorney’s evidence demonstrates that these third-
party uses are not “big box” retailers selling a wide variety of goods, but rather
targeted retailers. For example, JBL offers specifically targeted categories of products
on its website, namely, “wireless,” “headphone & wearable,” “home audio,” and
related “accessories.”26 ADJ focuses on products from lighting and audio brands.27
And the evidence shows more than that the retailers sell the same “product
21 Id. at 26-28.
22 Id. at 30-31, 37-39.
23 February 12, 2025 Final Office Action at 15-19.
24 Id. at 22-30.
25 7 TTABVUE 3.
26 October 21, 2024 Office Action at 11.
27 Id. at 26-27 (listing includes Elation Lighting, Acclaim Lighting, Avante Audio, Eliminator
Lighting, and American Audio).

Serial No. 98480830
- 14 -
categories,” as they offer the specific goods identified in Applicant’s and Registrant’s
identifications under the same marks. See Ox Paperboard, 2020 TTAB LEXIS 266, at
*17 (“This targeted type of retailing is narrower in scope, and the fact that more
targeted sellers offer goods of both the Registrant and the Applicant tells us that the
goods are related.”).
Applicant argues that its “goods in Class 9 differ fundamentally in nature,
purpose, and consumer expectations from Registrant’s goods in Class 11” 28 and
further asserts that:
Applicant’s goods are consumer electronic audio devices—
amplifiers, receivers, and related audio components.
Registrant’s goods are highly specialized lighting and
effects machinery, such as LED fixtures, lasers, smoke
machines, and snow cannons, all classified under Class 11.
The functional distinction is significant: one category
processes and reproduces sound for consumers; the other
produces lighting and environmental effects for stage
productions.29
Yet, Applicant’s arguments are refuted by a review of Registrant’s identification of
goods. Registrant’s goods are not limited to “highly specialized lighting and effects
machinery,” but rather include common consumer lighting product such as lamps,
lighting installations for use in living rooms and vehicles, fixtures for lighting, and
28 4 TTABVUE 4. To the extent Applicant is arguing that the goods are different because they
appear in different international classes, “[c]lassification is solely for the convenience of
Patent and Trademark Office administration, and is wholly irrelevant to the issue of
registrability.” Detroit Athletic, 903 F.3d at 1307 (internal quotations and citations omitted);
NFL v. Jasper Alliance Corp., No. 91077966, 1990 TTAB LEXIS 37, at *10 n.5 (TTAB 1990)
(“The classification system was established for the convenience of the Office rather than to
indicate that goods . . . in different classes indicates that they are not related”).
29 7 TTABVUE 3; see also 4 TTABVUE 4.

Serial No. 98480830
- 15 -
consumer lighting and effects apparatus for light. And as for the differences in
function, goods do not need to be “interchangeable” to be related and “may
nonetheless be related even if they are not identical, competitive, or combinable .”30
In re G.B.I. Tile & Stone, Inc., No. 77369073, 2009 TTAB LEXIS 647, at *8 (TTAB
2009) (finding floor tiles and roofing tiles related even though “goods differ in nature
and are not used for the same purpose”). See also Shen Mfg. Co., Inc. v. Ritz Hotel,
Ltd., 393 F.3d 1238, 1244 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (“[G]oods that are neither used together
nor related to one another in kind may still be related in the mind of the consuming
public as to the origin of the goods. It is this sense of relatedness that matters in the
likelihood of confusion analysis.”) (citation omitted).
Applicant also asserts that “[w]here goods are distinct but may be used together,
the Board requires ‘something more’ than co-retailing to show relatedness.”31
However, the requirement for showing “something more” is limited “to circumstances
where goods are used in the rendering of services and the relatedness of the goods
and services is not evident, well known, or generally recognized .” In re Samsung
Display Co., No. 90502617, 2024 TTAB LEXIS 258, at *16 (TTAB 2024). “Applicant’s
argument seek[ing] to extend the limited, ‘something more’ principle discussed in [In
re Coors Brewing Co., 343 F.3d 1340 (Fed. Cir. 2003)] and St. Helena Hosp. to
30 Applicant also contends that “[t]he suggestion that audio equipment and stage lighting are
‘complementary’ misses the legal standard.” 7 TTABVUE 4. However, Applicant does not
include any citation to the Examining Attorney’s brief or otherwise, and we do not find that
the Examining Attorney relied on a complementary goods analysis . Rather, the Examining
Attorney focused on evidence showing third-party retailers offering Applicant’s and
Registrant’s respective goods under the same marks.
31 7 TTABVUE 5 (citing St. Helena Hosp., 774 F.3d at 754).

Serial No. 98480830
- 16 -
circumstances involving a comparison of goods, . . . goes beyond its intended
application.” Id.
In view of the foregoing, the second DuPont factor weighs in favor of a likelihood
of confusion.
D. Trade Channels, Classes of Consumers, and Purchaser Care
We next examine similarity or dissimilarity of the trade channels in which the
goods identified in the application and Cited Registration are sold, the consumers to
whom the goods are marketed, and the conditions under which sales are made, i.e.,
‘impulse’ vs. careful, sophisticated purchasing. DuPont, 476 F.2d at 1361; Coach
Servs., 668 F.3d at 1370-71. We must base our analysis on the identifications in the
Cited Registration and Applicant’s involved application. Stone Lion Cap. Partners,
L.P. v. Lion Cap. LLP, 746 F.3d 1317, 1323 (Fed. Cir. 2014); Detroit Athletic, 903 F.3d
at 1308 (factor “must be evaluated with an eye toward the channels specified in the
application and registration”).
Applicant’s identification of goods specifically limits the trade channels and
purchasers to those for “consumer electronic products.” Registrant’s identification of
goods does not contain any limitations as to channels of trade or classes of purchasers
so we must presume that Registrant’s goods “travel in all normal channels and to all
prospective purchasers for the relevant goods” which includes both regular
consumers as well as professionals. Coach Servs., 668 F.3d at 1370. The Examining
Attorney’s evidence summarized above demonstrates that the trade channels for
Applicant’s and Registrant’s goods are the same. Specifically, multiple third-party
companies make and sell goods covered by both Applicant’s and Registrant’s

Serial No. 98480830
- 17 -
identification of goods under the same mark. Additionally, the Examining Attorney
also presented evidence that specialty retailers sell goods covered by both Applicant’s
and Registrant’s identification of goods which further supports the relatedness of the
trade channels including:
• Crutchfield: a specialty audio and related accessories retailer offers audio
receivers and LED lighting apparatus;32
• Sweetwater: a retailer specializing in “music gear” and lighting and
performance gear offers speakers and audio amplifiers as well as LED
lighting apparatus;33 and
• Guitar Center: a retailer specializing in music and audio products as well
as live lighting products offers audio speakers, and electrical audio and
speaker cables and connectors as well as LED lighting apparatus.34
Applicant argues that the “[g]oods are shelved in separate departments and have
distinct promotional strategies”35 and that “[e]ven in retailers that stock both,
products are separated into distinct departments with different sales advisors and
filters. This segregation minimizes any risk of cross-over confusion.”36 Applicant also
asserts that “[p]urchases [of its goods] are made through electronics stores, online
retailers, and home audio installers” while Registrant’s goods are sold “through
specialized catalogs and professional suppliers.”37 Applicant does not provide any
evidence in support of any of these assertions. Applicant’s arguments are further
32 February 12, 2025 Final Office Action at 52-70.
33 Id. at 72-88, 95-100.
34 Id. at 118-135.
35 4 TTABVUE 4.
36 7 TTABVUE 4.
37 7 TTABVUE 3-4.

Serial No. 98480830
- 18 -
refuted by the Examining Attorney’s evidence summarized previously showing goods
covered by Applicant’s and Registrant’s respective identifications being offered for
sale by the same targeted and specialty third-party retailers. Moreover, we evaluate
registrability based on the identifications in the Cited Registration and Applicant’s
involved application, neither of which contain limitations as to any particular retail
outlets or trade channels beyond Applicant’s limitation to those selling “consumer
electronics.” See i.am.symbolic, 866 F.3d at 1327 (“[T]he Board properly declined to
import restrictions into the identification of goods based on alleged real world
conditions.”).
With regard to consumers, Applicant argues that “Applicant’s goods are purchased
primarily by consumers, audiophiles, and semiprofessional users focused on audio
fidelity, codecs, and system compatibility . . . . Registrant’s goods, however, are sold
to DJs, theatrical lighting engineers, and venue operators . . . .”38 However, Applicant
again does not provide any evidence in support of its argument and nothing in the
identification of the involved application or Cited Registration reveals any such
limitations.
Considering conditions of sale and purchaser care, Applicant argues that
Applicant’s and Registrant’s “[c]onsumers are technically informed and discerning.”39
Applicant contends that “[b]oth categories of goods involve deliberate, technical
purchases. Applicant’s goods require consideration of impedance, codecs, and audio
38 Id.
39 4 TTABVUE 4.

Serial No. 98480830
- 19 -
fidelity; Registrant’s goods involve safety certifications, lumens, and DMX control.” 40
Applicant’s arguments again lack evidentiary support. Additionally, Applicant’s
goods are limited to “consumer electronic products” which includes purchasers from
the general public of, for example, speakers or speaker cables that may not consider
such technical concerns. And Registrant’s goods do not contain any limitations on
consumers and include items sold to the general public such as “lamps” and “lighting
installations for use in . . . living rooms and vehicles” which also may not implicate
technical considerations or require any particular care in decision making. See H.D.
Lee Co. v. Maidenform, Inc., No. 91168309, 2008 TTAB LEXIS 21, at *33 (TTAB 2008)
(the “problem with ‘degree of consumer care’ argument . . . is that there is no
corroborating evidence and it is inconsistent with the description of goods in the
application and registration”). We must base our decision on “the least sophisticated
potential purchasers.” Stone Lion, 746 F.3d at 1325.
Finally, because there are no limitations on price points in either the application
or the Cited Registration, we must presume that the audio and lighting goods in the
application and Cited Registration are sold at all price points. “When products are
relatively low-priced and subject to impulse buying, the risk of likelihood of confusion
is increased because purchasers of such products are held to a lesser standard of
purchasing care.” Recot, Inc. v. Becton, 214 F.3d 1322, 1329 (Fed. Cir. 2000). The
Examining Attorney’s evidence shows speaker cables like those identified in the
40 7 TTABVUE 5.

Serial No. 98480830
- 20 -
application offered for sale for low prices such as $6.99, $8.99, $11.67, and $14.39.41
The Examining Attorney’s evidence also shows an LED lighting apparatus offered for
$16.00.42 This evidence demonstrates that at least some of the goods of the type
identified in Applicant’s and Registrant’s identifications are inexpensive and
consumers are likely to use a lesser standard of care in making purchasing decisions
regarding these items. However, we find these goods by their nature would not be
subject to a high degree of impulse purchasing. Overall, given the relatively low cost
of some items and the broad range of potential consumers the purchasing process
does not speak to a high level of care.
We thus find that trade channels and classes of consumers weigh in favor of
likelihood of confusion, and purchaser care is neutral.
E. Other Factors
Applicant submits cursory arguments on two other factors which we address
here.43 First, Applicant asserts that no actual confusion was shown. However, “the
test under § 1052(d) is likelihood of confusion, not actual confusion. Hence, a showing
of actual confusion is not necessary to establish a likelihood of confusion.” Herbko
Int’l, 308 F.3d at 1165. Moreover, “[t]he lack of evidence of actual confusion carries
little weight, especially in an ex parte context,” and the fact that here Applicant filed
its application on an intent-to-use basis, and there is no evidence of Applicant’s use
of the mark, indicate that there has not been an opportunity for confusion to occur.
41 February 12, 2025 Final Office Action at 128-129, 126.
42 Id. at 18.
43 4 TTABVUE 5.

Serial No. 98480830
- 21 -
In re Majestic Distilling Co., 315 F.3d 1311, 1317 (Fed. Cir. 2003) (citation omitted).
Accordingly, we find this factor neutral.
Second, Applicant contends that no evidence was presented on the fame of the
cited mark. However, “[b]ecause of the nature of the evidence required to establish
the fame of a registered mark, the Board does not expect Trademark Examining
Attorneys to submit evidence as to the fame of the cited mark in an ex parte
proceeding, and they do not usually do so.” In re Mr. Recipe, LLC, No. 86040643, 2016
TTAB LEXIS 80, at *4 (TTAB 2016). Rather, in an ex parte analysis, “the ‘fame of the
mark’ factor is normally treated as neutral when no evidence as to fame has been
provided,” and we do so here. In re Goocher, No. 87214736, 2018 TTAB LEXIS 381,
at *14 (TTAB 2018).
II. Conclusion
After reviewing the evidence of record, and the arguments relating thereto, we
conclude that confusion is likely. Applicant’s and Registrant’s marks are highly
similar which weighs heavily in favor of a likelihood of confusion. Additionally,
Applicant’s and Registrant’s goods are related, and the channels of trade and classes
of purchasers are the same or overlapping, which also weigh in favor of a likelihood
of confusion. The factors regarding the strength of Registrant’s mark, purchaser care,
actual confusion, and fame of Registrant’s mark are neutral and do not alter our
conclusion that confusion is likely.
Decision: The refusal to register under Section 2(d) is affirmed.