Find Salt Owned By Independent Restaurants Management One Person Company LLC

This Opinion is Not a
Precedent of the TTAB
Mailed: December 10, 2025
UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
_____
Trademark Trial and Appeal Board
_____
In re Find Salt Owned By Independent Restaurants Management One Person
Company LLC
_____
Serial Nos. 98492526 and 98492654
_____
David L. Oppenhuizen of Oppenhuizen Law PLC,
for Find Salt Owned By Independent Restaurants Management One Person
Company LLC.
Alyssa Paladino Steel, Trademark Examining Attorney, Law Office 124,
Lydia Belzer, Managing Attorney.
_____
Before Greenbaum, Casagrande, and Brock,
Administrative Trademark Judges.
Opinion by Brock, Administrative Trademark Judge:
Find Salt Owned By Independent Restaurants Management One Person
Company LLC (“Applicant”) filed two applications to register the composite marks
SALT 2014 (“2014” disclaimed) and SALT shown below on the Principal Register for
“Bar services; Boarding house bookings; Boarding house services; Cafe services;
Cafeteria services; Canteen services; Food and drink catering; Food sculpting; Hotel
accommodation services; Providing campground facilities; Rental of temporary

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accommodation; Rental of tents; Rental of transportable buildings for temporary
accommodation; Reservation of hotel rooms for travelers; Restaurant services; Self-
service restaurant services; Snack-bar services; Temporary accommodation
reservations; Tourist home services; Washoku restaurant services” in International
Class 43:
1 2
The Examining Attorney refused registration of both marks under Section 2(d) of
the Trademark Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1052(d), based on a likelihood of confusion with the
marks shown below, owned in common and registered on the Principal Register for
“Restaurant and café services” in International Class 43:
1 Application Serial No. 98492526 was filed on April 10, 2024 under Section 1(b) of the
Trademark Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1051(b), based on Applicant’s allegation of a bona fide intention
to use the mark in commerce. The description of the mark is: “[t]he mark consists of the word
‘SALT’ centered on a circular background, and below the word ‘SALT’ is the number ‘2014’,
and to the right of the number ‘2014’ is an Arabic word.” Color is not claimed as a feature of
the mark. The Application also contains a transliteration statement: “The non-Latin
characters in the mark transliterate to ‘MILH’ and this means ‘SALT’ in English.”
2 Application Serial No. 98492654 was filed on April 10, 2024 under Section 1(b) of the
Trademark Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1051(b), based on Applicant’s allegation of a bona fide intention
to use the mark in commerce. The description of the mark is: “[t]he mark consists of the word
‘SALT’ positioned above a travel trailer.” Color is not claimed as a feature of the mark.

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3 4
When the refusal was made final, Applicant appealed. Both Applicant and the
Examining Attorney have filed appeal briefs.5
For the reasons discussed below, we affirm the refusals of registration.
I. Preliminary matter
The appeals present similar issues of fact and law and the records are similar;
therefore, we have considered the appeals together and issue a single decision
3 Registration No. 6144717 was issued on September 8, 2020. The description of the mark is:
“[t]he mark consists of the word ‘SALT’ in cursive lettering.” Color is not claimed as a feature
of the mark.
4 Registration No. 6005433 was issued on March 10, 2020. The description of the mark is:
“[t]he mark consists of two square outlines, one inside the other, in which the word ‘SALT’ is
centered. The white in the drawing represents transparent areas and is not claimed as a
feature of the mark.” Color is not claimed as a feature of the mark.
5 In both appeals, Applicant’s brief is at 4 TTABUE and the Examining Attorney’s brief is at
6 TTABVUE. When citing to the briefs, we note the Application No. (i.e., Appeal No.
98492526, 4 TTABVUE 5), unless the cited language is the same in both appeal records (i.e.,
4 TTABVUE 5).
Citations to the briefs refer to TTABVUE, the Board’s online docket system. Specifically,
the number preceding TTABVUE corresponds to the docket entry number, and any
number(s) following TTABVUE refer to the page number(s) of the docket entry where the
cited materials appear.
Page references to the application file refer to the online database of the USPTO’s
Trademark Status & Document Retrieval (TSDR) system. All citations to documents
contained in the TSDR database are to the downloaded .pdf versions of the documents.

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pertaining to both applications. In re Audemars Piguet Holding SA, No. 90045780,
2025 TTAB LEXIS 1, at *7-8 (because the briefs and evidentiary records in both ex
parte appeals were nearly identical, and although the appeals had not been formally
consolidated, the Board addressed both appeals in a single decision). Each appeal will
“retain[ ] its separate character,” however, and we will enter a separate judgment for
each appealed application. In re Consumer Prot. Firm PLLC, No. 87445801, 2021
TTAB LEXIS 67, at *4. We also will place a copy of this decision in each appeal file.
See id.; see also TRADEMARK TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD MANUAL OF PROCEDURE
(TBMP) § 1214 (2025).
II. Evidentiary Issue
In her briefs, the Examining Attorney requests that the Board take judicial notice
of new dictionary evidence attached to the briefs, namely, a definition of “salt” from
THE AMERICAN HERITAGE DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE.6 Because
dictionary definitions are subject matter of which the Board may take judicial notice,
we grant the Examining Attorney’s request. In re Omniome, Inc., No. 87661190, 2019
TTAB LEXIS 414, at *7 n.17 (granting request to take judicial notice of dictionary
definitions attached to the examining attorney’s brief).
III. Likelihood of Confusion
“The Trademark Act prohibits registration of a mark that so resembles a
registered mark as to be likely, when used on or in connection with the goods or
6 6 TTABVUE 5.

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services of the applicant, to cause confusion [or] mistake, or to deceive.” In re Charger
Ventures LLC, 64 F.4th 1375, 1379 (Fed. Cir. 2023) (cleaned up). Our determination
under Section 2(d) is based on an analysis of all of the probative facts in evidence that
are relevant to the factors bearing on likelihood of confusion. In re E. I. DuPont de
Nemours & Co., 476 F.2d 1357 (CCPA 1973) (“DuPont”); Charger Ventures, 64 F.4th
at 1379. In considering the evidence of record on these factors, we keep in mind that
“[t]he fundamental inquiry mandated by § 2(d) goes to the cumulative effect of
differences in the essential characteristics of the goods [or services] and differences
in the marks.” Federated Foods, Inc. v. Fort Howard Paper Co., 544 F.2d 1098, 1103
(CCPA 1976).
Different DuPont factors may play a dominant role and some factors may not be
relevant. Naterra Int’l, Inc. v. Bensalem, 92 F.4th 1113, 1116 (Fed. Cir. 2024) (citation
omitted). Varying weight may be assigned to each DuPont factor depending on the
evidence presented. See Citigroup Inc. v. Cap. City Bank Grp. Inc., 637 F.3d 1344,
1355 (Fed. Cir. 2011); In re Shell Oil Co., 992 F.2d 1204, 1206 (Fed. Cir. 1993) (“[T]he
various evidentiary factors may play more or less weighty roles in any particular
determination”). Moreover, “each case must be decided on its own facts and the
differences are often subtle ones.” Indus. Nucleonics Corp. v. Hinde, 475 F.2d 1197,
1199 (CCPA 1973). Two key considerations are the similarities between the marks
and the similarities between the services. See In re i.am.symbolic, llc, 866 F.3d 1315,
1322 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (quotation omitted). We discuss all relevant factors below.

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Similarity or Dissimilarity of the Services, Trade Channels,
and Classes of Consumers in the Applications and Cited
Registrations
We begin with the DuPont factors in which we consider “[t]he similarity or
dissimilarity and nature of the … services as described in an application or
registration” and “the similarity or dissimilarity of established, likely-to-continue
trade channels.” In re Detroit Athletic Co., 903 F.3d 1297, 1307 (Fed. Cir. 2018)
(quoting DuPont, 476 F.2d at 1361). Our analysis under these factors is based on the
identifications of services in the applications and the cited registrations. Id. “It is
sufficient for finding a likelihood of confusion if relatedness is established for any
item encompassed by the identification of goods [or services] within a particular class
in the application.” In re Aquamar, Inc., No. 85861533, 2015 TTAB LEXIS 178, at *9
n.5 (citing Tuxedo Monopoly, Inc. v. General Mills Fun Grp., 648 F.2d 1335, 1336
(CCPA 1981)).
The applications identify “Restaurant services” and “Cafe services” among their
services and the cited registrations each identify “Restaurant and café services.” The
services are in-part identical, and it is sufficient for a finding of likelihood of confusion
for a single-class application such as this one if relatedness is established for any item
encompassed in the identification in a particular class. See Tuxedo Monopoly, Inc. v.
Gen. Mills Fun Grp., 648 F.2d 1335, 1336 (CCPA 1981); Double Coin Holdings Ltd.
v. Tru Dev., No. 92063808, 2019 TTAB LEXIS 347, at *18; In re i.am.symbolic, LLC,
No. 85044494, 2015 TTAB LEXIS 369, at *8, aff’d, 866 F.3d 1315 (Fed. Cir. 2017).

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Where the services are in-part identical, we must presume that these services are
offered in the same ordinary trade channels and will be marketed to the same
potential consumers. Cai v. Diamond Hong, Inc., 901 F.3d 1367, 1372 (Fed. Cir. 2018)
(“With respect to similarity of the established trade channels through which the goods
reach customers, the TTAB properly followed our case law and ‘presume[d] that the
identical goods move in the same channels of trade and are available to the same
classes of customers for such goods…’”); see Made in Nature, LLC v. Pharmavite LLC,
No. 91223352, 2022 TTAB LEXIS 251, at *61 (citation omitted) (identical goods are
presumed to travel in same channels of trade to same class of purchasers).
Applicant concedes that “there is some overlap in services,”7 then clarifies that its
“actual services are specifically offered in connection with a Burger Joint concept
restaurant, which differs from the services offered in the cited registrations.”8 As we
have explained in innumerable decisions, however, the Board may not consider
arguments “about how the parties’ actual goods, services, customers, trade channels,
and conditions of sale are narrower or different from the goods and services identified
in the applications and registrations.” In re FCA US LLC, No. 85650654, 2018 TTAB
LEXIS 116, at *12 n.18; see also, e.g., In re i.am.symbolic, 866 F.3d 1315, 1327 (Fed.
Cir. 2017) (“[T]he Board properly declined to import restrictions into the
identification of goods based on alleged real world conditions.”).
7 4 TTABVUE 5.
8 Id. at 6.

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Thus, as to both applications and cited registrations, the partially identity of the
services and resultant overlap in both trade channels and classes of customers all
weigh in favor of a likelihood of confusion.
Similarity or Dissimilarity of the Marks
Under this DuPont factor, we consider the “similarity or dissimilarity of the marks
in their entireties as to appearance, sound, connotation and commercial impression.”
DuPont, 476 F.2d at 1361; see also Stone Lion Cap. Partners, L.P. v. Lion Cap. LLP,
746 F.3d 1317, 1319 (Fed. Cir. 2014). “Similarity is not a binary factor but is a matter
of degree.” Monster Energy Co. v. Lo, No. 91225050, 2023 TTAB LEXIS 14, at *44
(quoting In re St. Helena Hosp., 774 F.3d 747, 752 (Fed. Cir. 2014) (quotation
omitted)).
We consider each of Applicant’s marks in turn.
1. Application No. 98492526
In Applicant’s composite mark, the SALT wording is presented in large, block
letters, with the year 20149 and Arabic characters beneath, both in much smaller
typefaces, all set against a circle. In terms of the relative size of these components,
the circle is the largest element; the SALT wording comprises perhaps the middle
third of the circle; and the 2014 and Arabic characters below that are less than a
quarter of the size of the SALT wording.
9 In its January 24, 2025, Response to Nonfinal Office Action, at 5, Applicant stated that the
number 2014 represented the year 2014.

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Cited Registration No. 6144717 is a stylized mark, depicting the word SALT in a
loose script, akin to handwriting (the “‘717 Registration”), while cited Registration
No. 6005433 is a composite mark with the word SALT appearing within two boxes or
frames (the “‘433 Registration”).
Applicant offers the following visual comparison of the three marks:
10
When evaluating a composite mark consisting of words and a design, the word
portion is normally accorded greater weight because it is likely to make a greater
impression upon purchasers, be remembered by them, and be used by them to refer
to or request the goods or services. See In re Viterra Inc., 671 F.3d 1358, 1362 (Fed.
Cir. 2012); CBS Inc. v. Morrow, 708 F.2d 1579, 1581-82 (Fed. Cir. 1983); Made in
Nature, 2022 TTAB LEXIS 228, at *49-50; Sabhnani v. Mirage Brands, LLC, No.
92068086, 2021 TTAB LEXIS 464, at *39-40. This is often the case when considering
the background shapes and borders in composite marks, as these “common basic
shapes” do not typically impart trademark meaning on their own, absent a showing
of secondary meaning. See In re B & J Mfg. Co., 1977 TTAB LEXIS 111, at *5. “The
10 Appeal No. 98492526, 4 TTABVUE 4.

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rationale … is that designs of this character have been so commonly employed as
background devices for word marks that the origin-indicating feature of the designs,
per se, have been diminished to the extent that purchasers would normally look to
the mark as a whole or to the word portions within the designs to identify and
distinguish the goods sold thereunder.” Id. at *6. Thus, although marks must be
compared in their entireties, the word portion is often considered the dominant
feature and is accorded greater weight in determining whether marks are confusingly
similar. Viterra, 671 F.3d at 1366-67, (citing Giant Food, Inc. v. Nation’s Foodservice,
Inc., 710 F.2d 1565, 1570-71 (Fed. Cir. 1983)).
Here, we find it is appropriate to give the word portions of the marks greater
weight. In Registrant’s marks, SALT is the only wording. The stylization of the ’717
Registration cannot be separated from the SALT term, while the box design elements
of the ’433 Registration simply frame the word SALT. Similarly, in Applicant’s mark,
the circle frames or serves as a background to the wording within: SALT, and the
much smaller 2014 and Arabic script.
And further, we agree with the Examining Attorney that SALT is the dominant
element not only in both cited registrations, but also in the mark in Applicant’s ’526
Application.11 As already noted, SALT is the only wording in the cited registrations;
in the mark in Applicant’s ’526 Application, the SALT wording is significantly larger
than, and appears before and on top of, the 2014 number and the Arabic wording.
Consumers are generally more inclined to focus on and remember the first word,
11 Appeal No. 98492526, 6 TTABVUE 7.

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prefix, or syllable in a mark, see Palm Bay Imps., Inc. v. Veuve Clicquot Ponsardin
Maison Fondee En 1772, 396 F.3d 1369, 1372 (Fed. Cir. 2005).
The emphasis of SALT in Applicant’s mark is borne out by Applicant’s own
treatment of the other elements. First, Applicant entered a disclaimer as to 2014;
disclaimed matter is typically less significant or less dominant when comparing
marks. Detroit Athletic Co., 903 F.3d at 1305. Second, as to the wording in Arabic
script, Applicant itself refers to it only as “an Arabic word.”12 However, given that the
word translates to “salt,” even if the Arabic script is read and understood by a
consumer (instead of viewed only as a visual design), this repetition tends to
underscore that the word SALT is dominant.
Despite sharing the dominant term SALT with the cited marks, Applicant argues
that “[t]he differences in the marks’ visual appearance and resulting commercial
impression are so pronounced that they eliminate any reasonable possibility of
consumer confusion.”13 Applicant does not address the sound or connotation of the
marks.
Considering the marks’ appearance, the Examining Attorney asserts that the
marks are visually similar because they have the same dominant literal element,
SALT14 – the only wording in Registrant’s marks.15 We agree. There are some
differences in the marks’ appearance, but these differences are in the smaller and
12 Appeal No. 98492526, 4 TTABVUE 4, 5.
13 Id. at 5.
14 Appeal No. 98492526, 6 TTABVUE 7.
15 Id.

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less distinctive elements that consumers may overlook, such as the basic shapes of
the ’433 Registration and the stylized typeface of the ’717 Registration. See, e.g., In
re Cordua Rests., Inc., 823 F.3d 594, 606 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (design features in a mark
are “not registrable on the Principal Register unless [they] create an impression on
the purchasers separate and apart from the impression made by the words
themselves, or if it can be shown by evidence that the particular display which the
applicant has adopted has acquired distinctiveness”). We do not think the background
circle of Applicant’s ’526 Application, the boxes of the ’433 Registration, or the script
of the ’717 Registration create an impression apart from the word SALT in the marks.
That is, the dominant, literal SALT element is most apparent in each mark. The
marks are visually similar.
Turning to the sound of the marks, the Examining Attorney contends that “the
word portions of the marks are nearly identical in sound.”16 When spoken, Applicant’s
mark is SALT 2014, with an Arabic word that may or may not be pronounced
depending on whether the consumer can read Arabic. As noted, Applicant
characterizes the Arabic script as “an Arabic word,” although it translates to “salt.”17
In terms of the pronunciation of Applicant’s mark, if a speaker treats the Arabic script
as a design element only, Applicant’s mark would be pronounced as SALT 2014.
Alternately, if a speaker translates the Arabic in Applicant’s mark, it would be
pronounced as SALT 2014 SALT or SALT 2014 “mihl” (as pronounced in Arabic, per
16 Id.
17 Appeal No. 98492526, 4 TTABVUE 4, 5.

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the transliteration statement in the application). Because Registrant’s marks are
only SALT when spoken – the graphical elements are not verbalized – Applicant’s
mark incorporates the entirety of Registrant’s marks. “Marks have frequently been
found to be similar where one mark incorporates the entirety of another mark, as is
the case here.” TiVo Brands LLC v. Tivoli, LLC, No. 91221632, 2018 TTAB LEXIS
439, at *51-52.
Additionally, consumers may shorten Applicant’s mark to SALT alone, given the
propensity of consumers to shorten marks when speaking. See, e.g., Sabhnani, 2021
TTAB LEXIS 464, at *45 (the “similarity in sound will be greater if consumers engage
in ‘the penchant of consumers to shorten marks”); In re Bay State Brewing Co., No.
85826258, 2016 TTAB LEXIS 46, at *9. Or, if consumers recognize the differences in
the marks, those consumers familiar with the registered SALT marks may perceive
Applicant’s SALT 2014 (or SALT 2014 SALT/“mihl”) mark as an extension of
Registrant’s services under an extended version of Registrants’ marks. See, e.g.,
Schieffelin & Co. v. Molson Cos., Ltd., No. 91069312, 1989 TTAB LEXIS 1, at *12
(“Those consumers who do recognize the differences in the marks may believe that
applicant’s mark is a variation of opposer’s mark that opposer has adopted for use on
a different product.”). The marks are thus, at minimum, similar in sound.
Last, we consider the meaning and commercial impression of the marks. We begin
by noting the definition of the word SALT as “a usually whitish crystalline solid,
chiefly sodium chloride, used extensively in ground or granulated form as a food

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seasoning and preservative.”18 The Examining Attorney argues that “[s]ince all three
marks contain the word ‘Salt’, the marks are highly similar in … meaning.”19 We
agree in this case where the services are in-part identical. That is, when the identical
term is used in connection with in-part identical services, that term imparts the same
meaning in both marks. In connection with restaurant and café services, SALT in the
marks is readily understood as “a food flavoring and preservative.” The meaning and
commercial impression of the marks are thus similar.
This DuPont factor weighs in favor of a likelihood of confusion for Application No.
98492526.
2. Application No. 98492654
In Applicant’s other composite mark, the SALT wording is presented in large,
block letters, set atop – as Applicant describes it – “a unique line-art depiction of a
travel trailer or recreational vehicle (RV).”20 In terms of the relative size of these
components, the travel trailer is the largest element; the SALT wording appears
almost as signage propped on top of the vehicle.
We previously described the cited registrations and include Applicant’s visual
comparison below:
18 6 TTABVUE 15, THE AMERICAN HERITAGE DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE,
https://www.ahdictionary.com/word/search.html?q=salt.
19 Id. at 5.
20 Appeal No. 98492654, 4 TTABVUE 4.

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21
First, as SALT is the only word in the marks, they are identical in sound.
Visually, Applicant argues that the image of the travel trailer is dominant in its
mark,22 and therefore readily distinguishable from the “highly stylized cursive
script”23 of the ’717 Registration and the “concentric rectangular boxes” of the ’433
Registration. The Examining Attorney disagrees, asserting that the SALT wording
in Applicant’s mark is dominant “because it is likely to make a greater impression
upon purchasers, be remembered by them, and be used by them to refer to or request
the goods and/or services.”24 See, e.g., Viterra, 671 F.3d at 1362; CBS Inc. v. Morrow,
708 F.2d at 1581-82. While we agree with the Examining Attorney’s points, we find
that the marks are somewhat dissimilar in appearance largely due to the travel
trailer in Applicant’s mark.
21 Id.
22 Appeal No. 98492526, 4 TTABVUE 4.
23 Id.
24 Appeal No. 98492526, 6 TTABVUE 6.

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Turning to the meaning of the marks, Applicant explains that the image of a travel
trailer in its mark suggests “an outdoor or travel lifestyle, which contrasts strongly
with the cited marks that consist solely of stylized word elements without any such
graphical features.”25 While this connotation is not present in the cited marks,
because Applicant’s mark uses the identical word as that in Registrant’s, a consumer
familiar with Registrant’s marks and services may yet believe that Applicant’s mark
is a variation or extension of Registrant’s services. See, e.g., Schieffelin, 1989 TTAB
LEXIS 1, at *12. Moreover, the design elements that may distinguish Applicant’s
mark in a visual comparison also fall away when a consumer seeks out a particular
restaurant. For example, if a consumer were to search for Registrant’s SALT
restaurant and café services on the Internet, the consumer would type or speak SALT
into a web browser; any non-word elements of Applicant’s and Registrant’s are lost
in the search itself and in a words-only list of results. Therefore, even though the
image of the travel trailer in Applicant’s mark may also add a different connotation
than those of Registrant’s marks, this this is still a difference in appearance only; in
practice, the marks are still largely similar in meaning, and that meaning is the word
SALT.
Last, considering the marks as a whole, we find that their overall commercial
impression is that of the word SALT: this is how consumers will ask for or locate the
services, this is what they will read on signs and menus, and the SALT term itself
25 Appeal No. 98492526, 4 TTABVUE 4

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connotes the relevant restaurant services, as we discussed above. Accordingly, the
marks create similar commercial impressions.
In sum, the identical sound of the marks, their similar meaning, and similar
commercial impressions outweighs the visual differences in the marks.
The first DuPont factor weighs in favor of a likelihood of confusion as to
Application No. 98492654.
Other Factors
The thirteenth DuPont factor allows us to consider any other established facts
probative of the effect of use. DuPont, 476 F.2d at 1361. Applicant argues that its own
“numerous foreign registrations demonstrate that the Applicant’s mark and the cited
registrations can coexist in these jurisdictions without confusion”26 and that “foreign
registrations can be considered … to the extent they demonstrate actual marketplace
coexistence without confusion,” citing In re Mucky Duck Mustard Co., No. 73603019,
1988 TTAB LEXIS 11, at *9 n.6, aff’d, 864 F.2d 149 (table), 1988 U.S. App. LEXIS
15679 (Fed. Cir. 1988) (affirming “on the basis of the Board’s opinion”).27 Mucky Duck
does not does not support Applicant’s argument. It discounts the probative value of
“third-party applications and registrations which … were filed [in the United States]
under the provisions of Section 44 of the Act, that is, they are based on foreign
registration rather than on use in commerce.” Id. It is use in commerce in the United
26 4 TTABVUE 6. Although we would not find this evidence probative, as discussed herein,
in submitting only its own registrations and not those of Registrant, there is, in fact, no
evidence “that the Applicant’s mark and the cited registrations can coexist in these
jurisdictions without confusion.” Id.
27 Id.

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States with which we concern ourselves. See Johnson & Johnson v. Salve S.A., 1974
TTAB LEXIS 123, at *4-5 (“likelihood of confusion is determined on the basis of
circumstances surrounding use of involved marks in the United States; that is, use
in commerce which may lawfully be regulated by Congress”); see also KME Ger.
GmbH v. Zhejiang Hailiang Co., No. 91267675, 2023 TTAB LEXIS 379, at *52
(instances of confusion among “consumers … in Europe … does not bear on the
question of whether there has been any actual confusion by consumers in the United
States”), rev’d on other grounds, ECF No. 363, No. 1:23-cv-01606-LMB-LRV (E.D. Va.
Jan. 10, 2025), appeal docketed, No. 25-1129 (4th Cir. Feb. 10, 2025).
The thirteenth DuPont factor is neutral.
IV. Conclusion: Balancing of the DuPont Factors
For both applications, the services are identical in-part to those of the cited
registrations and the trade channels and classes of consumers overlap; these DuPont
factors weigh towards a likelihood of confusion. We then turn to each of Applicant’s
marks, keeping in mind that when, as here, “marks would appear on virtually
identical … services, the degree of similarity necessary to support a conclusion of
likely confusion declines.” Century 21 Real Estate Corp. v. Century Life of Am., 970
F.2d 874, 877 (Fed. Cir. 1992).
As to Application No. 98492526, the marks are similar in sight, sound, meaning,
and commercial impression, which also favors a likelihood of confusion.
In Application No. 98492654, which features the design of a travel trailer, the
identical sound of the marks coupled with similar meaning and commercial

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impression outweighs the marks’ somewhat dissimilar appearance. See In re Inn at
St. John’s, LLC, No. 87075988, 2018 TTAB LEXIS 170, at *13 (citing In re Davia, No.
85497617, 2014 TTAB LEXIS 214, at *4, aff’d mem., 777 F. App’x 516 (Fed. Cir. 2019)
(“Similarity in any one of these elements may be sufficient to find the marks
confusingly similar.”). This factor also weighs in favor of a likelihood of confusion.
The thirteenth DuPont factor is neutral.
Because all of the relevant DuPont factors weigh in favor of a likelihood of
confusion or were neutral, we conclude that the marks in Application Nos. 98492526
and 98492654 are likely to cause confusion with the marks in the cited registrations.
Decision: The refusals to register Applicant’s marks under Section 2(d) of the
Trademark Act are affirmed.