ParanoidLab Inc.

This Opinion is Not a
Precedent of the TTAB
Mailed: June 22, 2026
UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
_____
Trademark Trial and Appeal Board
_____
In re ParanoidLab Inc.
_____
Serial No. 98383907
_____
Jovan N. Jovanovic and Aaron Sternhagen of The Watson IP Group, PLC,
for ParanoidLab Inc.
Lucy Browne, Trademark Examining Attorney, Law Office 125,
Robin Mittler, Managing Attorney.
_____
Before Wellington, Elgin, and Stanley,
Administrative Trademark Judges.
Opinion by Wellington, Administrative Trademark Judge:
ParanoidLab Inc. (“Applicant”) has filed an application to register on the Principal
Register the standard character mark PARANOIDLAB for the following services:
Electronic monitoring of personally identifying information
to detect identity theft via the internet; Software as a
service (SAAS) services featuring software for scanning
and monitoring the Internet to detect private information
that has been compromised or disseminated; Software as a
service (SAAS) services featuring software for scanning
and monitoring the Internet to detect the use of specific
keywords; Software as a service (SAAS) services featuring

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software for detecting identity theft, in International Class
42.1
Applicant appeals the Trademark Examining Attorney’s final refusal to register
its mark on the ground that Applicant’s mark so resembles the registered standard
character mark PARANOID on the Principal Register that it is likely to cause
confusion under Section 2(d) of the Trademark Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1052(d).2 The
registration identifies computer software goods and services in International Classes
9 and 42, including:
Computer security software, in Class 9; and
Providing temporary use of online non-downloadable
security software, in Class 42.
Applicant and the Examining Attorney filed appeal briefs.
For the reasons explained below, we affirm the refusal to register.
I. Likelihood of Confusion
Section 2(d) of the Trademark Act prohibits the registration of a mark that:
[c]onsists of or comprises a mark which so resembles a
mark registered in the Patent and Trademark Office, … as
to be likely, when used on or in connection with the goods
of the applicant, to cause confusion, or to cause mistake, or
to deceive.
1 Application Serial No. 98383907, filed on January 31, 2024, under Section 1(b) of the
Trademark Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1051(b), alleging a bona fide intent to use the mark in commerce.
Citations to the prosecution file refer to the USPTO’s Trademark Status & Document
Retrieval (“TSDR”) system in Portable Document Format (“PDF”). Citations to the record
also include references to TTABVUE, the Board’s online docketing system.
2 Registration No. 5005625 issued on July 26, 2016. On the same day it filed its appeal,
Applicant filed a request for reconsideration of the refusal that was denied by the Examining
Attorney (see 6 TTABVUE).

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15 U.S.C. § 1052(d). Our determination under Section 2(d) is based on an analysis of
all of the probative evidence of record bearing on the likelihood of confusion. In re
E. I. DuPont de Nemours & Co., 476 F.2d 1357, 1361 (CCPA 1973) (“DuPont”), cited
in B&B Hardware, Inc. v. Hargis Indus., Inc., 575 U.S. 138, 144 (2015); see also In re
Charger Ventures LLC, 64 F.4th 1375, 1379 (Fed. Cir. 2023); In re Majestic Distilling
Co., 315 F.3d 1311, 1315 (Fed. Cir. 2003). We have considered each DuPont factor for
which there is evidence and argument. See In re Guild Mortg. Co., 912 F.3d 1376,
1379 (Fed. Cir. 2019). When analyzing these factors, the overriding concerns are not
only to prevent buyer confusion as to the source of the goods or services, but also to
protect the Registrant from adverse commercial impact due to use of a similar mark
by a newcomer. See In re Shell Oil Co., 992 F.2d 1204, 1207 (Fed. Cir. 1993).
Varying weights may be assigned to each DuPont factor depending on the evidence
presented. See Citigroup Inc. v. Cap. City Bank Grp. Inc., 637 F.3d 1344, 1353 (Fed.
Cir. 2011). “Each case must be decided on its own facts and the differences are often
subtle ones.” Indus. Nucleonics Corp. v. Hinde, 475 F.2d 1197, 1199 (CCPA 1973). In
any likelihood of confusion analysis, two key considerations are the similarity or
dissimilarity of the marks and the goods and services. See In re i.am.symbolic, llc,
866 F.3d 1315, 1322 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (citing Herbko Int’l, Inc. v. Kappa Books, Inc.,
308 F.3d 1156, 1164-65 (Fed. Cir. 2002)); see also In re Embiid, No. 88202890, 2021
TTAB LEXIS 168, at *10 (“[T]he fundamental inquiry mandated by § 2(d) goes to the
cumulative effect of differences in the essential characteristics of the goods and
differences in the marks.”) (quoting Federated Foods, Inc. v. Fort Howard Paper Co.,

Serial No. 98383907
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544 F.2d 1098, 1103 (CCPA 1976)). These factors, as well as others, are discussed
below.
A. The Marks
We commence with addressing the similarity or dissimilarity of the marks in their
entireties as to appearance, sound, connotation and commercial impression. See, e.g.,
Charger Ventures, 64 F.4th at 1380 (citing DuPont, 476 F.2d at 1361); Palm Bay
Imps., Inc. v. Veuve Clicquot Ponsardin Maison Fondee en 1772, 396 F.3d 1369, 1371
(Fed. Cir. 2005) (same). “Similarity in any one of these elements may be sufficient to
find the marks confusingly similar.” In re Inn at St. John’s, LLC, No. 87075988, 2018
TTAB LEXIS 170, at *13 (quoting In re Davia, No. 85497617, 2014 TTAB LEXIS 214,
at *21-24), aff’d mem., 777 F. App’x 516 (Fed. Cir. 2019); accord Krim-Ko Corp. v.
Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 390 F.2d 728, 732 (CCPA 1968) (“It is sufficient if the
similarity in either form, spelling or sound alone is likely to cause confusion.”)
(citation omitted).
In making our comparison, we keep in mind that our analysis is not predicated on
dissecting the marks into their components but is based on the marks in their
entireties. In re Nat’l Data Corp., 753 F.2d 1056, 1058 (Fed. Cir. 1985). See also
Franklin Mint Corp. v. Master Mfg. Co., 667 F.2d 1005, 1007 (CCPA 1981) (“It is
axiomatic that a mark should not be dissected and considered piecemeal; rather, it
must be considered as a whole in determining likelihood of confusion.”). However, one
feature of a mark may be more significant than another feature and, where
appropriate, greater weight is given to the dominant feature for purposes of

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determining likelihood of confusion. See, e.g., In re Detroit Athletic Co., 903 F.3d 1297,
1305 (Fed. Cir. 2018). This is especially true in instances involving marks containing
descriptive or generic matter, which generally has less source-indicating weight in
the analysis. Cunningham v. Laser Golf Corp., 222 F.3d 943, 947 (Fed. Cir.
2000) (“Regarding descriptive terms, this court has noted that the ‘descriptive
component of a mark may be given little weight in reaching a conclusion on the
likelihood of confusion.’“) (quoting Nat’l Data, 753 F.2d at 1060).
Here, Applicant’s proposed mark, PARANOIDLAB, begins with and incorporates
the entirety of the registered mark, PARANOID, thus creating strong visual and
aural similarities between the marks. Because consumers are generally pre-
conditioned to focus on the first word or prefix in any trademark, this similarity is
particularly meaningful. See Detroit Athletic, 903 F.3d at 1303; Palm Bay Imps., Inc.,
396 F.3d at 1372-73.
In cases such as this—where one party merely adds a term to that of a registered
mark—similarity between the compared marks is generally found not to be obviated
by that additional term. See, e.g., Stone Lion Cap. Partners, L.P. v. Lion Cap. LLP,
746 F.3d 1317, 1322 (affirming the Board’s finding that applicant’s mark STONE
LION CAPITAL incorporated the entirety of the registered marks LION CAPITAL
and LION, and that the noun LION was the dominant part of both parties’ marks);
Coca-Cola Bottling Co. v. Jos. E. Seagram & Sons, Inc., 526 F.2d 556, 557-58 (CCPA
1975) (finding BENGAL and BENGAL LANCER and design to be confusingly
similar). This is especially true where the shared term is distinctive and appears first,

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and the additional term has less source-identifying significance. Chatam Int’l, 380
F.3d at 1342-43; In re Dixie Rests., 105 F.3d 1405, 1407 (Fed. Cir. 1997) (disclaimed
or descriptive terms are generally considered less significant features of a mark).
Applicant argues that the marks are distinguishable because of their meanings or
connotations. According to Applicant, Registrant’s mark, PARANOID, “evokes a
general, abstract notion of fear or suspicion, often tied to emotions or mental states,”
whereas its mark, PARANOIDLAB, “suggests innovation, research, and structured
processes, invoking images of a laboratory setting or scientific work.”3 Applicant
asserts that this connotation conveyed by its mark “contrasts sharply with the broad
emotional undertones associated with PARANOID.”4
The Examining Attorney, on the other hand, argues that the term LAB does not
help distinguish the marks because, in the context of computers and security, it is
“descriptive and highly unlikely to be the focus of a consumer’s attention.”5 In
support, the Examining Attorney submitted Internet evidence showing three third
parties using LABS at the end of their name in connection with the field of Internet
security.6 For example, one website mentions that “Obscurity Labs … offer[s] cutting
3 4 TTABVUE 11. We take judicial notice that “paranoid” is defined as “of, characterized by,
or resembling paranoia [defined as ‘informal intense fear or suspicion, esp when
unfounded’].” COLLINS ENGLISH DICTIONARY — COMPLETE & UNABRIDGED. 2012 Digital
Edition William Collins Sons & Co. Ltd. 1986 HarperCollins Publishers 2012. In re Omniome,
Inc., No. 87661190, 2019 TTAB LEXIS 414, at *7 n.17 (Board may take judicial notice of
dictionary definitions, including online dictionaries).
4 Id. at 11-12.
5 9 TTABVUE 7.
6 Attached to Office Action issued on September 11, 2025 (6 TTABVUE 8-10).

Serial No. 98383907
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edge cybersecurity solutions.”7 A ReasonLabs website mentions an “all-in-one
platform … keeps scams, fraud, and cyber threats at bay.”8 And the ReversingLABS
website touts “complete software supply chain security.”9 The Examining Attorney
also submitted copies of five registrations for marks with the term LAB[S] disclaimed
from the mark for software-related goods or services. The word LAB is defined as “a
laboratory … a place equipped for experimental study in a science or for testing and
analysis.”10
Here, we find Applicant’s mark, PARANOIDLAB, and Registrant’s mark,
PARANOID, are very similar in connotation and overall meaning. We particularly
agree with the Examining Attorney that the inclusion of the term LAB in Applicant’s
mark is unlikely to make a meaningful impact on consumers for purposes of
distinguishing the two marks. Again, consumers are more likely to focus on and
remember the lead term PARANOID of Applicant’s mark, which is identical to
Registrant’s mark. The Examining Attorney’s evidence, despite some flaws (see Note
10), along with the plain meaning of the term, at least indicates some general
conceptual weakness for the term LAB in connection with companies involved in
computer security and software. We also disagree that the addition of LAB in
Applicant’s mark substantially alters the meaning of the lead term, PARANOID, or
7 Id. (6 TTABVUE 8).
8 Id. (6 TTABVUE 9).
9 Id. (6 TTABVUE 10).
10 We take notice of this definition from MERRIAM-WEBSTER.COM DICTIONARY, MERRIAM-
WEBSTER, www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/laboratory. Accessed June 18, 2026.

Serial No. 98383907
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creates an overall different connotation—rather, we find that any “general, abstract
notion of fear or suspicion” connotation present in Registrant’s mark, as Applicant
contends there is, that same connotation may also be conveyed by Applicant’s mark.
Ultimately, this case falls in line with the cases where a mere addition of a term to a
registered mark generally does not obviate the similarity between the compared
marks. See, e.g., Stone Lion, 746 F.3d 1322.
Finally, we point out that because Applicant’s and Registrant’s marks are in
standard characters, they may be used in the same size, color or stylized font, thereby
heightening the likelihood of confusion. In re Viterra, Inc., 671 F.3d 1358, 1364-65
(Fed. Cir. 2012) (a standard character mark may be depicted in any font style, size,
or color, and not merely “reasonable manners” of depicting such mark).
The overall strong similarity between Applicant’s PARANOIDLAB mark and the
registered PARANOID mark weighs in favor of finding a likelihood of confusion.
B. Identity of Services; Trade Channels
We now compare the services based on the language of the identifications in the
application and cited registration. See Detroit Athletic, 903 F.3d at 1307; Stone Lion,
746 F.3d 1323; Hewlett Packard Co. v. Packard Press Inc., 281 F.3d 1261, 1267 (Fed.
Cir. 2002). This DuPont factor “considers whether the consuming public may perceive
the respective goods and services of the parties as related enough to cause confusion
about the source or origin of the goods and services.” Naterra Int’l, Inc. v. Bensalem,
92 F.4th 1113, 1117 (Fed. Cir. 2024) (quoting St. Helena Hosp., 774 F.3d at 752
(cleaned up) (citation omitted)). “It is [also] sufficient for finding a likelihood of

Serial No. 98383907
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confusion if relatedness is established for any item encompassed by the identification
of goods [or services] within a particular class in the application.” In re Aquamar,
Inc., 2015 TTAB LEXIS 178, at *8 n.5 (citing Tuxedo Monopoly, Inc. v. Gen. Mills Fun
Grp., 648 F.2d 1335 (CCPA 1981)).
Applicant argues that its services are unrelated to the goods and services of
Registrant. According to Applicant, its software services are “directed to electronic
monitoring and detection of identity theft on the internet,” whereas Registrant’s
security software and provision of security software services are “directed to the
provision of security threat detection and monitoring for computers and networks.”11
However, as the Examining Attorney points out, the Registrant’s goods and
services are described broadly as “computer security software” and “providing
temporary use of online non-downloadable security software,” without the restricted
fields of use that Applicant ascribes. Indeed, the Examining Attorney argues that in
view such a broad description, the Registrant’s services “presumably encompass[] all
goods and services of the type described, including applicant’s narrower ‘software as
a service (SAAS) services featuring software for scanning and monitoring the Internet
to detect private information that has been compromised or disseminated …”12
We agree with the Examining Attorney to the extent that there is an overlap, and
thus in-part legal identity, between Registrant’s and Applicant’s Class 42 services. A
plain reading of Registrant’s “providing temporary use of online non-downloadable
11 4 TTABVUE 13-14.
12 9 TTABVUE 10.

Serial No. 98383907
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security software” and Applicant’s “Software as a service (SAAS) services featuring
software for scanning and monitoring the Internet to detect private information that
has been compromised or disseminated … scanning and monitoring the Internet to
detect the use of specific keywords … [and] for detecting identity theft” reveals
substantial overlap. That is, both Applicant’s and Registrant’s services include the
provision of software on a temporary basis to consumers and used for “security”
purposes, including the more specific security aims described in the application.13
Applicant’s argument that the respective services are distinguishable because
“one is directed to system protection, and the other is directed to identity protection,”
is not well-taken. Indeed, and put simply, such an assertion is belied by the fact that
software used to protect personally identifiable information (PII) falls within the
broader category of “security software,” like that provided by Registrant as a service
for temporary use. The Examining Attorney submitted evidence from third-party
websites that best demonstrates this overlap—for example, the ManageEngine
website touts the following features for its DataSecurity Plus software:14
• Contains a “PII scanning tool” to “find, analyze, and report on sensitive
personal data”
• Has ability to “audit, monitor, receive alerts on, and report on all file accesses
and modifications made in your file server environment in real time”
13 SaaS, or software as a service, is defined as “a software distribution method in which a
service provider gives customers access through the internet to applications, usually ones
developed and owned by the provider.” We take judicial notice of this definition from
Dictionary.com Unabridged (www.dictionary.com); based on the Random House Unabridged
Dictionary, Random House, Inc. 2023.
Thus, the provision and use of the software may be on a temporary, e.g. subscription, basis.
14 Office Action issued September 11, 2025, TSDR pp. 5-7.

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• Has many other security features, such as “Data leak prevention … Data risk
assessment ... Cloud protection...”
In sum, protecting PII is merely one possible feature of software used for security
purposes. Thus, the software that Applicant provides as a service with that specific
purpose or feature is encompassed by the “security” software that Registrant provides
as a service.
This brings us to the third DuPont factor, the similarity or dissimilarity of
established, likely to continue trade channels and classes of consumers. DuPont, 476
F.2d at 1361. The application and registration are unrestricted in terms of trade
channels and classes of consumers for their Class 42 services. We must therefore
presume that the parties’ aforementioned legally identical services in Class 42 will
also travel in the same ordinary trade and distribution channels and will be marketed
to the same potential consumers. See Viterra, 671 F.3d 1362 (even though there was
no evidence regarding channels of trade and classes of consumers, the Board was
entitled to rely on this legal presumption in determining likelihood of confusion).
Consequently, the second and third DuPont factors weigh strongly in favor of a
likelihood of confusion.
C. Purchasing Conditions; Alleged Sophistication of Consumers
We now evaluate “[t]he conditions under which … sales are made, i.e. ‘impulse’ vs.
careful, sophisticated purchasing.” DuPont, 476 F.2d at 1361. A heightened degree of
care when making a purchasing decision may tend to minimize likelihood of
confusion. See, e.g., In re N.A.D., Inc., 754 F.2d 996, 999-1000 (Fed. Cir. 1985)
(because only sophisticated purchasers exercising great care would purchase the

Serial No. 98383907
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relevant goods, there would be no likelihood of confusion merely because of the
similarity between the marks NARCO and NARKOMED). Conversely, impulse
purchases of inexpensive goods may tend to have the opposite effect. Palm Bay Imps.,
396 F.3d at 1376.
Applicant argues:15
With respect to Registrant’s services, businesses and individuals
purchasing these services are typically well-informed about their
technology needs. IT professionals and decision makers in organizations
carefully evaluate factors such as compatibility with existing systems,
threat detection capabilities, and technical support. Home users, while less
technically inclined, often rely on detailed research, reviews, and
recommendations before selecting antivirus or endpoint protection
solutions. The high level of technical specificity in these services means
buyers make deliberate, informed choices. Many of such services are paid
for on a monthly basis and require training and implementation.
Likewise, with respect to Applicant’s services Consumers seeking identity
monitoring services are often motivated by concerns about privacy and
financial security. These individuals typically research providers based on
credibility, reputation, and effectiveness in detecting fraud or identity
theft. Financial institutions and businesses purchasing these services to
protect employees or clients also perform rigorous due diligence, ensuring
the service meets regulatory and security standards. Again, such services
are likewise such that they require training and usage manuals and the
like.
Whether consumers are purchasing Registrant’s software services or Applicant’s
software services, Applicant contends that “the decision is not weighed lightly.”16
Applicant’s arguments are unsupported, and “argument is no substitute for
evidence.” Cai v. Diamond Hong, Inc., 901 F.3d 1367, 1371 (Fed. Cir. 2018) (quoting
Enzo Biochem, Inc. v. Gen-Probe Inc., 424 F.3d 1276, 1284 (Fed. Cir. 2005)).
15 4 TTABVUE 17.
16 Id.

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Applicant’s argument also is not persuasive because, as Applicant acknowledges
in its argument, consumers of both Registrant’s and Applicant’s services include
possibly the same individuals, namely, those seeking to protect their online home
personal computer activity. This may be the general public. While some of these
consumers might be more sophisticated, there is no certainty that all consumers
seeking security software for their home personal computers, including software to
protect PII, will exercise the same degree of care. And, basing our analysis “on the
least sophisticated potential purchasers,” Stone Lion, 746 F.3d at 1325, we deem this
DuPont factor neutral.
D. Alleged Weakness and “Peaceful Coexistence of Marks Having
‘PARANOID’ With Relevant Services”
The sixth DuPont factor involves a consideration of evidence, if it exists, of the
number and nature of similar marks in use on similar goods or services. DuPont, 476
F.2d at 1361. This factor “is a measure of the extent to which other marks weaken
the assessed mark,” Spireon, Inc. v. Flex Ltd., 71 F.4th 1355, 1362 (Fed. Cir. 2023),
and indicates whether it is “entitled to only a narrow scope of protection.” Omaha
Steaks Int’l, Inc. v. Greater Omaha Packing Co., Inc., 908 F.3d 1315, 1324 (Fed. Cir.
2018) (quoting Palm Bay Imps., 396 F.3d at 1373). “When a field is crowded with
similar marks, the theory is that customers will be more adept at distinguishing
marks from each other and are less likely to be confused by similar marks.” Apex

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Bank v. CC Serve Corp., 156 F.4th 1230, 1235 (Fed. Cir. 2025) (citing Juice
Generation, Inc. v. GS Enters. LLC, 794 F.3d 1334, 1338 (Fed. Cir. 2015)).
In its brief, Applicant argues that “Applicant and Registrant are not the only
parties that are using the term PARANOID in association with software and services
associated with software,” and that “the term PARANOID is a commonly used term
in the world of software.”17 In support, Applicant refers to copies of screenshots from
nine different websites it submitted that purportedly show use of PARANOID (or
PARANOIA) in connection with related goods or services:
1. The website for a company “paranoid (software) {*}” offers all contact
information in Quito, Ecuador. No US address or telephone number is
provided. The website also describes itself as a “software development and
consultancy company.”18
2. The set of screen shots involving “Paranoid Software” and come from a German
website (www.paranoidsoftware.de), providing all contact information in
Germany, with no given US address or telephone number. The website
describes the company as being involved in gaming software development. 19
3. The website ParanoidAndroid (www.android.com) offers no context as to any
goods or services being offered, but merely states “Team … Blog …
Wallpapers.”20
4. The website Cointelegraph (www.cointelegraph.com) contains an article
describing “US Navy launches ‘PARANOID’ blockchain security tech to private
sector.”21
17 4 TTABVUE 18-19.
18 Applicant’s Request for Reconsideration filed June 23, 2025, TSDR pp. 7-11.
19 Id. at TSDR pp. 12-17.
20 Id. at TSDR p. 18.
21 Id. at TSDR pp. 19-24.

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5. The “Paranoia Works Mobile” website (www.paranoiaworks.mobi) involves an
encryption application for mobile devices.22
6. The screenshots from the GitHub website (www.github.com) describe a
“Paranoid library” and “Project Paranoid” that involves “checks for well known
weaknesses on cryptographic artifacts such as public keys, digital signatures
and general pseudonym numbers.”23
7. The Microsoft Store website (www.microsoft.com) mentions a “Paranoid shield
… a password manager app.”24
8. The Apple website describes a “Paranoid Web Extension” application that
involves “find[ing] all bad comments” and “safeguarding against counterfeit
stores … phishing attempts … scam websites.”25
9. The Paranoia Group website (www.paranoiagroup.com) offers to “Develop/
Sell/ Buy/ Export/ Import/ Install/ Maintain” computers and computer network
systems.26
Applicant, in its brief, also relies on the following two registrations:27
• Reg. No. 6950508 for the mark PARANOID registered in Class 9 for a variety
of electrical switches.28
• (Cancelled) Reg. No. 4561059 for the mark PARANOID BANKER registered
in Class 36 for the provision of financial information and research.29
22 Id. at TSDR pp. 25-26.
23 Id. at TSDR pp. 27-32.
24 Id. at TSDR p. 33.
25 Id. at TSDR pp. 35-37.
26 Id. at TSDR pp. 38-45.
27 Copies of these registrations were not submitted and we note that they are first mentioned
in Applicant’s appeal brief.
28 Applicant’s Request for Reconsideration filed June 23, 2025, TSDR p. 18.
29 Cancelled on January 17, 2025, based on failure to file a Section 8 declaration of continued
use.

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Upon review of Applicant’s evidence, we find that, from both a quantitative and
qualitative perspective, it falls far short of showing significant weakness as to the
registered mark, PARANOID.
As to the Internet evidence of third-party use and as discussed above, two of the
websites (Nos. 1-2 listed above) involve foreign companies with no evident presence
in the United States and no indication that U.S. consumers will be exposed to them.
See In re Well Living Lab Inc., No. 86440401, 2017 TTAB LEXIS 156, at *12 n.10 (“We
evaluate the probative value of foreign information sources on a case-by-case basis.
... Various factors may inform the probative value of a foreign website in any given
case …”). We accord most of these websites very little probative weight because there
is no indication that the goods or services are directed to U.S. consumers. Some of
Applicant’s evidence is also flawed in that several of the websites (Nos. 6, 9) involve
unrelated goods or services, or there is insufficient information to determine the
nature of any goods or services (Nos. 3, 4, 7). And, as to the “Paranoia Works Mobile”
encryption application for mobile devices (No. 5), we note it uses the term “Paranoia,”
not “Paranoid,” and involves encryption. We acknowledge that the “Paranoid Web
Extension” application (No. 8) offered on the Apple website identifies security
features, such as protection against counterfeit stores, phishing attempts, and scam
websites, and this appears to be directed to consumers interested in a secure shopping
experience.
Finally, as to the two third-party registrations Applicant references in its appeal
brief, these lack any probative value because the goods and services covered by these

Serial No. 98383907
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registrations do not bear any relationship to Registrant’s security software services.
See Omaha Steaks Int’l, 908 F.3d at 1324; see also Century 21 Real Estate Corp. v.
Century Life of Am., 970 F.2d 874, 877 (Fed. Cir. 1992). Also, as noted, Reg. No.
4561059 has been cancelled (See Note 29). “The existence of a cancelled registration
– particularly one cancelled for failure to provide a declaration of continued use –
does not tend to show that the cited mark is weak due to third-party use.” Inn at St.
John’s, 2018 TTAB LEXIS 170, at *9.
In sum, Applicant has not adduced sufficient probative evidence that the cited
mark is weak in connection with the services in the cited registration, making the
cited mark deserving a lesser scope of protection. Moreover, the cited registration
issued on the Principal Register without a claim of acquired distinctiveness under
Section 2(f) of the Trademark Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1052(f), and therefore we must presume
that the cited mark, PARANOID, is inherently distinctive for Registrant’s goods. 15
U.S.C. § 1057(b).
This factor is neutral.
E. Applicant’s Allegation of Registrant’s Cessation of Use of Its Mark
In its brief, Applicant argues that the fifth DuPont factor, involving the fame of
the prior (Registrant’s) mark, is relevant because “the Registrant is phasing out the
use of the mark by changing the name of the software.”30
Applicant’s assertion that Registrant has ceased use of its mark is an
impermissible collateral attack on the cited registration and cannot be considered
30 4 TTABVUE 18.

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here. See Dixie Rests., Inc., 105 F.3d at 1408; Nat’l Data, 753 F.2d at 1059-60 & n.8.
An ex parte appeal is not the proper forum for such allegations; they should be
brought in a formal cancellation proceeding. See, e.g., In re Calgon Corp., 435 F.2d
596 (CCPA 1971).
F. Conclusion – Weighing and Balancing the DuPont factors
We now assess our findings under the DuPont factors discussed above and
determine whether, on balance, confusion is likely. See Charger Ventures LLC, 64
F.4th at 1379.
We have carefully considered all of the evidence made of record, as well as all of
the arguments related thereto. Applicant’s mark, PARANOIDLAB, is very similar in
sight, sound, and meaning, to the cited mark and this weighs in favor of concluding
that confusion is likely. Applicant’s services are in-part legally identical to the
Registrant’s services, and these legally identical services will be offered in the same
trade channels to the same class of consumers, i.e., the general public owners of home
personal computers. Applicant has failed to show that the cited mark is weak or that
sophistication of consumers would weigh against finding confusion likely—these
factors are neutral. With no DuPont factors weighing against a likelihood of
confusion, we conclude that confusion is likely.
Decision: The Section 2(d) refusal is affirmed.