Wenbo Zhou v. Hangzhou Ai Xun Trade Co., Ltd.

This Opinion is Not a
Precedent of the TTAB
Mailed: June 17, 2026
UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
_____
Trademark Trial and Appeal Board
_____
Wenbo Zhou
v.
Hangzhou Ai Xun Trade Co., Ltd.
_____
Cancellation No. 92082150
_____
Larry Ford Banister II and Abbie Cook of Ford Banister LLC for Wenbo Zhou.1
Haoyi Chen for Hangzhou Ai Xun Trade Co., Ltd.
_____
Before Goodman, Larkin, and Elgin,
Administrative Trademark Judges.
Opinion by Larkin, Administrative Trademark Judge:
Hangzhou Ai Xun Trade Co., Ltd. (“Respondent”) owns Registration No. 6198078
of the design mark shown below
1 Ms. Cook entered an appearance as additional counsel on December 14, 2025 and signed
Petitioner’s brief. 17 TTABVUE; 18 TTABVUE. The Board’s records have been updated
accordingly.

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for “Athletic apparel, namely, shirts, pants, jackets, footwear, hats and caps, athletic
uniforms; Bottoms as clothing; Bras; Business wear, namely, suits, jackets, trousers,
blazers, blouses, shirts, skirts, dresses and footwear; Children’s and infant’s apparel,
namely, jumpers, overall sleepwear, pajamas, rompers and one-piece garments;
Gloves; Hats; Infant wear; Men’s and women’s jackets, coats, trousers, vests;
Nightwear; Panties, shorts and briefs; Scarves; Shawls; Shoes; Socks; Swimming
costumes; T-shirts; Tops as clothing; Underwear; Women’s clothing, namely, shirts,
dresses, skirts, blouses” in International Class 25.2
Wenbo Zhou (“Petitioner”)3 has petitioned to cancel the ’078 Registration on the
ground that the registered mark so resembles a giraffe design that Petitioner alleges
has been previously used by him at common law in the United States in connection
with clothing as to be likely to cause confusion when Respondent’s mark is used in
connection with the goods identified in the ’078 Registration.
2 Registration No. 6198078 (the “’078 Registration”) issued on November 17, 2020 from a use-
based application claiming first use and first use on commerce at least as early as July 1,
2019.
3 The preamble in Petitioner’s Petition for Cancellation identifies Petitioner as a Chinese
male individual named “Zhou Wenbo.” 1 TTABVUE 3. Where we refer to Petitioner by name,
we will use the Western naming convention and will call him “Mr. Zhou” or “Wenbo Zhou.”

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After Respondent answered Petitioner’s Petition for Cancellation, the case went
to trial, but only Petitioner submitted evidence and filed a brief.4 We deny the Petition
for Cancellation because Petitioner failed to submit any admissible evidence in
support of his entitlement to petition to cancel the ’078 Registration.
I. The Record and Evidentiary Issues
The record consists of the pleadings, the file history of the ’078 Registration, by
operation of Trademark Rule 2.122(b)(1), 37 C.F.R. § 2.122(b)(1), and a document
captioned “Petitioner’s Evidentiary Submission Zhou Wenbo Transcript of Deposition
on Written Questions” (the “Evidentiary Submission”). 16 TTABVUE.
The pleadings are Petitioner’s Petition for Cancellation, 1 TTABVUE, and
“Respondent’s Answers [sic] to Petition for Cancellation.” 5 TTABVUE. In its Answer,
Respondent denied all of the salient allegations in the Petition for Cancellation, id.
at 2-4; as Petitioner puts it in his brief, “Respondent’s only affirmative factual
admissions relate to the contents of its registration, including the alleged July 1, 2019
first-use date.” 17 TTABVUE 11 (citing 5 TTABVUE 5). Because Respondent did not
admit any of the other allegations in Petitioner’s Petition for Cancellation, the
Evidentiary Submission is Petitioner’s only evidence to support both his entitlement
to petition to cancel and his pleaded claim of likelihood of confusion.
4 Only Petitioner was required to do so. See Trademark Rule 2.128(a)(1), 37 C.F.R.
§ 2.128(a)(1). In Board inter partes proceedings, the plaintiff always bears the burden of
proving that the defendant is not entitled to obtain or maintain a registration “even in the
absence of contrary evidence or argument.” DC Comics v. Cellular Nerd LLC, No. 91246950,
2022 WL 17832492, at *9 (TTAB 2022) (citation omitted). Defendants are not required to
submit evidence or a brief, and there are no adverse consequences flowing directly from a
failure to do either.

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As discussed below, the Evidentiary Submission purports to be some sort of trial
testimony. Trademark Rule 2.123, 37 C.F.R. § 2.123, governs the preparation and
submission of trial testimony in inter partes cases, and sub-section (k) provides that
“[e]vidence not obtained and filed in compliance with these sections will not be
considered.” Trademark Rule 2.123(k). Accordingly, we must examine the
Evidentiary Submission to determine whether the purported testimony was obtained
and filed in compliance with Trademark Rule 2.123, even in the absence of any
objection from Respondent.
Where, as here, a trial witness such as Mr. Zhou is “located in a foreign country,
the taking of testimony is limited to either a testimonial affidavit/declaration or a
deposition upon written questions (unless the parties stipulate to or there is good
cause for oral examination).” Andrusiek v. Cosmic Crusaders LLC, No. 92064830,
2019 WL 2514235, at *2 (TTAB 2019) (citing Trademark Rule 2.123(a)(2)). In his
brief, Petitioner describes the Evidentiary Submission as both a “testimonial
declaration on behalf of Petitioner,” 17 TTABVUE 7, and as the “Zhou Wenbo
Transcript of Deposition on Written Questions.” Id. We will address these
characterizations in turn.
A. Testimonial Declaration
Turning first to Petitioner’s characterization of his Evidentiary Submission as a
“testimonial declaration,” id., Trademark Rule 2.123(a)(1) provides in pertinent part
that the testimony of witnesses in inter partes proceedings
may be submitted in the form of an affidavit or a
declaration pursuant to § 2.20 and in conformance with the

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Federal Rules of Evidence5 subject to the right of any
adverse party to elect to take and bear the expense of oral
cross-examination of that witness as provided under
paragraph (c) of this section if such witness is within the
jurisdiction of the United States, or conduct cross-
examination by written questions as provided in § 2.124 if
such witness is outside the jurisdiction of the United
States, and the offering party must make that witness
available . . . .
The “§ 2.20” referenced in Trademark Rule 2.123(a)(1) is Trademark Rule 2.20, 37
C.F.R. § 2.20, which provides that
[i]nstead of an oath, affidavit, or sworn statement, the
language of 28 U.S.C. 1746, or the following declaration
language, may be used: The signatory being warned that
willful false statements and the like are punishable by fine
or imprisonment, or both, under 18 U.S.C. 1001, and that
such willful false statements and the like may jeopardize
the validity of the application or submission or any
registration resulting therefrom, declares that all
statements made of his/her own knowledge are true and all
statements made on information and belief are believed to
be true.
The “Federal Rules of Evidence” referenced in Trademark Rule 2.123(a)(1) include
Rule 603, which requires that “[b]efore testifying, a witness must give an oath or
affirmation to testify truthfully. It must be in a form designed to impress that duty
on the witness’s conscience.” Fed. R. Evid. 603.
Petitioner’s Evidentiary Submission is not an “affidavit or a declaration pursuant
to § 2.20 and in conformance with the Federal Rules of Evidence” within the meaning
of Trademark Rule 2.123(a)(1) because it contains no “oath or affirmation to testify
5 “By operation of Trademark Rule 2.116(a), 37 C.F.R. § 2.116(a), the Federal Rules of
Evidence and Federal Rules of Civil Procedure apply to Board proceedings.” TV Azteca, S.A.B.
de C.V. v. Martin, No. 92068042, 2018 WL 6504575, at *5 n.18 (TTAB 2018).

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truthfully” acknowledged by the witness, Fed. R. Evid. 603, and no substitute
declaration language referencing 18 U.S.C. § 1001 or 28 U.S.C. § 1746. See M/S R.M.
Dhariwal (Huf) 100% EOU v. Zarda King Ltd., No. 91231033, 2019 WL 1915763, at
*3 (TTAB 2019) (discussing the importance of the absence of proper oath language
under 28 U.S.C. § 1746 or 18 U.S.C. § 1001 in declarations executed in India, and not
considering the declarations). Rather, the Evidentiary Submission is a copy of
questions that “shall [be] answer[ed] under oath,” along with a notary “Statement
Letter” purporting to certify that a licensed lawyer in Indonesia “conducted an
interview” with Mr. Zhou and recorded the responses (discussed further below). 16
TTABVUE 3-4.
B. Deposition Upon Written Questions
We turn now to Petitioner’s other characterization of the Evidentiary Submission
as the “Zhou Wenbo Transcript of Deposition on Written Questions.” 17 TTABVUE
7. Trademark Rule 2.123(a)(2) provides in pertinent part that “[t]estimony taken in
a foreign country shall be taken: by deposition upon written questions as provided
by § 2.124, unless the Board, upon motion for good cause, orders that the deposition
be taken by oral examination, or the parties so stipulate. . .” Certain entries in the
case docket, which we summarize immediately below, show that Petitioner
apparently always contemplated taking Mr. Zhou’s testimony in a deposition upon
written questions rather than through a testimony declaration or affidavit.
On March 26, 2024, a few days before the close of Petitioner’s trial period as
originally set, Petitioner moved to extend his trial period, arguing that China does

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not allow attorneys to take depositions in China for use in foreign courts. 7 TTABVUE
2-4. The Board granted that motion as conceded and set June 12, 2024 as the new
date for the close of Petitioner’s trial period. 8 TTABVUE 1. On May 23, 2024,
Petitioner served and filed a “Notice of Deposition on Written Questions of Wenbo
Zhou” to be conducted in Indonesia before a person identified as “Yi Xia,” who was
described in the Notice as an “Advocate” and “a certified court reporter who is
authorized to administer oaths in the place where the deposition will be held.” 9
TTABVUE 2-3.
On August 15, 2024, Petitioner filed a motion to reopen his rescheduled trial
period. Petitioner stated that although he was in Indonesia,
[a]fter service notice [sic], it was discovered that the
presenter was no longer available to administer the
deposition. As a result, Petitioner needed additional time
to locate another qualified individual in Indonesia who was
authorized to administer oaths per the requirement in
TBMP § 703.01(g). The search took longer than
anticipated, and the Petitioner’s 30-day trial period ended.
11 TTABVUE 3.6 Petitioner stated that he “has now identified a new presenter, who
is qualified to administer oaths, depose the witness, and provide the necessary
transcript,” and that he had shown excusable neglect to support the reopening of his
trial period. Id. at 4. Petitioner also purported to amend his previous Notice of
Deposition on Written Questions of Wenbo Zhou “to reflect a change in the presenter.”
Id. Petitioner identified the “new presenter” as “Tang Mu Huo, a qualified individual
6 Trademark Trial and Appeal Board Manual of Procedure (“TBMP”) Section 703.01(g) quotes
the entirety of Rule 28 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, and discusses the taking of
trial depositions in foreign countries.

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in Indonesia with the title of Advocate, who will have a notary present who can
administer oaths, will conduct the deposition, and provide the necessary transcript.”
Id. at 5. The Board granted the motion and amended the Notice accordingly. 13
TTABVUE 1.
On April 29, 2025, Petitioner filed what was captioned as “Petitioner’s Motion to
Reopen Time for Plaintiff’s Trial Period (Agreed),” 14 TTABVUE 2, in which
Petitioner advised the Board that he had “successfully obtained Respondent’s [sic]
Written Deposition on August 19, 2024,” but that “the transcript was not filed with
the Board during the testimonial period as required by 37 C.F.R. § 2.121.” Id. at 3.
The Board granted the motion as conceded, 15 TTABVUE 1, and again extended
Petitioner’s trial period. Id. at 2. Petitioner then filed the Evidentiary Submission
within that extended period. 16 TTABVUE.
Trademark Rule 2.124 contains numerous specific requirements for the taking of
a deposition upon written questions, including that such a deposition must be taken
“before any person before whom depositions may be taken as provided by Rule 28 of
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.” Rule 28 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure
in turn provides in pertinent part that
[a] deposition may be taken in a foreign country: (A) under
an applicable treaty or convention; (B) under a letter of
request, whether or not captioned a ‘‘letter rogatory’’; (C)
on notice, before a person authorized to administer
oaths either by federal law or by the law in the place
of examination; or (D) before a person commissioned by
the court to administer any necessary oath and take
testimony.
Fed. R. Civ. P. 28(b) (emphasis added).

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As discussed above, Petitioner stated that Mr. Zhou’s deposition upon written
questions had to be taken before a person “authorized to administer oaths.” 11
TTABVUE. We reproduce below the “Statement Letter” that appears at the outset of
Petitioner’s Evidentiary Submission and that is pertinent to that requirement and
the other requirements for a deposition upon written questions in a foreign country:
16 TTABVUE 3.7 For the multiple reasons discussed below, the “Statement Letter,”
and the rest of the Evidentiary Submission, do not meet the requirements for a
deposition upon written questions set forth in Trademark Rules 2.123 and 2.124, and
7 Petitioner’s Notice of Deposition Upon Written Questions of Wenbo Zhou, as amended, set
the deposition for August 16, 2024. 11 TTABVUE 5. According to the “Statement Letter,” the
deposition occurred on August 19, 2024, but there is nothing in the case docket that shows
that the change in date was communicated to Respondent or its counsel.

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Federal Rule of Evidence 603, including that Mr. Zhou be administered an oath before
testifying by a person authorized under Indonesian law to administer oaths.
As discussed above, Petitioner amended its Notice of Deposition Upon Written
Questions of Wenbo Zhou to identify “Tang Mu Huo, a qualified individual in
Indonesia with the title of Advocate,” as what Petitioner called the new “presenter,”
11 TTABVUE 5, but “Tang Mu Huo” is not identified in the Statement Letter as
having participated in any way in the “interview” of Mr. Zhou, which was purportedly
conducted by a “Mr. Amandri,” who is described in the Statement Letter as “an
Indonesian citizen” who conducted the “interview” “in his capacity as a licensed
lawyer practicing in Indonesia with registered Number 08.10997 . . . .” Trademark
Rule 2.124(e) provides that “[t]he officer designated in the notice shall take the
testimony of the witness in response to the questions and shall record each answer
immediately after the corresponding question,” but according to the Statement
Letter, Tang Mu Huo, the “officer designated in the [amended] notice,” took no part
in the “interview.”
In his motion to reopen his testimony period, Petitioner acknowledged the need to
involve an officer “who was authorized to administer oaths per the requirement in
TBMP § 703.01(g),” 11 TTABVUE 3,8 but the Statement Letter does not show that
Mr. Amandri was “authorized to administer oaths . . . by the law in the place of
8 TBMP Section 703.01(g) quotes Rule 28 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, and states
that “[i]n a foreign country, a testimony deposition in a Board proceeding may be taken
pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 28(b). This means, for example, that a testimony deposition in a
Board proceeding taken of a willing witness in a foreign country usually may be taken on
notice before a U.S. consular official, or before anyone authorized by the law of the foreign
country to administer oaths therein.” TBMP § 703.01(g).

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examination,” as required by Rule 28(b)(1)(C) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.
We note in that regard that in Petitioner’s amended Notice of Deposition Upon
Written Questions of Wenbo Zhou, Petitioner stated that the named new “presenter”
Tang Mu Huo “will have a notary present who can administer oaths,” 11 TTABVUE
5, suggesting that Tang Mu Huo, who was identified as “a qualified individual in
Indonesia with the title of Advocate,” could not administer oaths.9
Rule 603 of the Federal Rules of Evidence requires that “[b]efore testifying, a
witness must give an oath or affirmation to testify truthfully . . . in a form designed
to impress that duty on the witness’s conscience.” Fed. R. Evid. 603. The preamble
paragraph to the body of the Evidentiary Submission containing the question-and-
answer colloquy simply recites as follows: “Please be advised that witness Wenbo
Zhou shall answer under oath the following questions in the manner described in
Petitioner’s Notice of Deposition Upon Written Questions of Wenbo Zhou.” 16
TTABVUE 4. Even assuming that Mr. Amandri was a disinterested officer who was
authorized by Indonesian law to administer oaths, there is nothing in the Statement
Letter, or in the body of the Evidentiary Submission, showing that Mr. Amandri, or
the notary identified only as “HERLINA, SH, MKn LLM,” actually administered an
9 Rule 28(c) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure states that “[a] deposition must not be
taken before a person who is any party’s relative, employee, or attorney; who is related to or
employed by any party’s attorney; or who is financially interested in the action.” There is
nothing in the Statement Letter confirming that Mr. Amandri, a “licensed lawyer practicing
in Indonesia,” 16 TTABVUE 3, was not Petitioner’s attorney by virtue of his selection by
Petitioner to “conduct [the] interview” of Mr. Zhou. In the context of oral testimony
depositions, the witness’s own counsel typically conducts the direct examination of the
witness. The Statement Letter suggests that Mr. Amandri played functionally the same role
in “conduct[ing] an interview” of Mr. Zhou.

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oath to Mr. Zhou before the “interview” began, as required by Rule 603 of the Federal
Rules of Evidence.10
Unsworn testimony is no testimony at all. See, e.g., TV Azteca, 2018 WL 6504575,
at *4 (citing McDonald’s Corp. v. McKinley, No. 74168, 1989 WL 274414, at *1 n.4
(TTAB 1989) (an “unsworn statement does not constitute testimony in the absence of
an oath or affirmation thereof”); In re Dermahose Inc., No. 76585901, 2007 WL
499919, at *5 (TTAB 2007) (“the common feature of oaths, sworn statements,
unsworn declarations under penalty of perjury, and declarations under Rule 2.20 is
that the person making the statement is subjecting himself or herself to criminal
penalties for making statements that the person knows are not true.”)).
The absence of evidence that Mr. Zhou took an oath before participating in the
“interview” is not a mere technical flaw in Petitioner’s Evidentiary Submission, and
it is particularly problematic because Mr. Zhou is a citizen of China, a foreign country
with a very different legal system. In the context of a testimony declaration by a
foreign citizen, the Board quoted with approval the following analysis of a federal
district court of the importance of the oath requirement:
The purpose of requiring a person outside the United
States to execute the document under penalty of perjury
under the laws of the United States is to impress upon him
the seriousness of the obligation to tell the truth and the
possibility of prosecution for perjury if he fails to tell the
10 The Statement Letter states that “Mr. Amandri posed 76 questions to Mr. Zhou Wenbo and
recorded the responses on this document” and that “[s]ubsequently, both Mr. Amandri and
Mr. Zhou Wenbo affixed their signatures to this document in my presence, a Public Notary
in Jakarta, Indonesia.” 16 TTABVUE 3 (emphasis added). The most reasonable inference to
be drawn from these statements is that the notary was, at most, a passive observer of the
“interview” whose primary, if not sole, task was to authenticate the signatures of the two
active participants when the “interview” was over.

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truth. When a person executes a document outside the
United States, a recitation that it is made under penalty of
perjury without reference to which country’s perjury laws
will be applied provides no assurance of truthfulness
because the penalty of perjury may be non-existent or
trivial in the place where the person signed the document.
Dhariwal, 2019 WL 1915763, at *3 (quoting Jack v. Trans World Airlines, 854 F.
Supp. 654, 658 n.3 (N.D. Cal. 1994)). The same principle applies to trial testimony
given by a foreign witness through a declaration or through a deposition on written
questions.
The Evidentiary Submission does not comply with other requirements for a proper
testimony deposition. Trademark Rule 2.124(e) provides that “[t]he officer designated
in the notice shall take the testimony of the witness in response to the questions and
shall record each answer immediately after the corresponding question. The officer
shall then certify the transcript and mail the transcript and exhibits to the party who
took the deposition.” There is no certification by Mr. Amandri of the transcript of the
“interview.”11
Trademark Rule 2.124(f) provides that “[i]t is the responsibility of the party who
takes the deposition to assure that the transcript is correct” (citing Trademark Rule
2.125(c)). Trademark Rule 2.125(c) in turn provides that
[t]he party who takes testimony is responsible for having
all typographical errors in the transcript and all errors of
arrangement, indexing and form of the transcript
corrected, on notice to each adverse party, prior to the filing
of one certified transcript with the Trademark Trial and
11 The notarial seals that appear on each page were affixed by the notary, who is not identified
in the amended Notice of Deposition Upon Written Questions of Wenbo Zhou and who did
not “take the testimony of the witness in response to the questions . . . .” Trademark Rule
2.124(e).

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Appeal Board. The party who takes testimony is
responsible for serving on each adverse party one copy of
the corrected transcript or, if reasonably feasible, corrected
pages to be inserted into the transcript previously served.12
The “errors of arrangement, indexing and form of the transcript” refer to the
requirements of Trademark Rule 2.123(g), which prescribes the proper form of a
testimony deposition. Trademark Rules 2.123(g)(1) provides, in pertinent part, that
“[t]he pages of each deposition must be numbered consecutively, and the name of the
witness plainly and conspicuously written at the top of each page,” and Trademark
Rule 2.123(g)(3) provides that “[e]ach deposition must contain a word index and an
index of the names of the witnesses, giving the pages where the words appear in the
deposition and where witness examination and cross-examination begin, and an
index of the exhibits, briefly describing their nature and giving the pages at which
they are introduced and offered in evidence.” The Evidentiary Submission does not
comply with any of these arrangement, indexing, and transcript form requirements.
For the reasons discussed above, including the absence of evidence that Mr. Zhou
testified under oath, the Evidentiary Submission did not involve a deposition upon
written questions that was obtained and filed in compliance with Trademark Rules
2.123 and 2.124, and it “will not be considered.” Trademark Rule 2.123(k).
There is a separate set of problems with the Evidentiary Submission having to do
with the fact that Mr. Zhou’s purported testimony appears in English that would
preclude consideration of the Evidentiary Submission even if it otherwise conformed
12 As discussed below, Petitioner’s brief purports to correct an error in translation of one of
Mr. Zhou’s answers in Mandarin Chinese into English.

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to the requirements of Trademark Rules 2.123, 2.124, and 2.125, and Rule 603 of the
Federal Rules of Evidence.
The Statement Letter and the question-and-answer colloquy in the body of the
Evidentiary Submission are entirely in English even though Mr. Zhou is a Chinese
citizen and there is no evidence regarding his proficiency, if any, in English.13 It would
appear from the face of the Evidentiary Submission that Mr. Zhou read, or was read,
the deposition questions in English, and gave his answers in English, which were
“recorded . . . on this document” in English, 16 TTABVUE 3, but Petitioner’s brief
makes it clear that this was not the case.
In his brief, Petitioner discusses a particular answer in which Mr. Zhou identified
the animal design that he claims to have used as a “deer” rather than as a “giraffe”:
Petitioner refers to the stylized animal design as a “deer”
in his testimony. (16 TTABVUE 22). This appears to stem
from a linguistic distinction in Mandarin Chinese where
the word for “deer” is lù (鹿) while the word for “giraffe” is
cháng jǐng lù (长颈鹿), literally meaning “long-necked
deer.” The reference to “deer” therefore appears to be
a translation discrepancy rather than a substantive
identification of a different animal. See Oxford
Chinese–English Dictionary (translating “长颈鹿/cháng
jǐng lù” as “giraffe” and “鹿/lù” as “deer”).
17 TTABVUE 10 n.1 (emphasis added).
The reference to a “translation discrepancy” in Petitioner’s argument makes it
clear that Mr. Zhou’s deposition upon written questions was not conducted in
13 Mr. Zhou’s Chinese passport displays both English and Chinese, 16 TTABVUE 20, but this
fact alone tells us nothing about whether Mr. Zhou reads, speaks, and understands English
well enough to give deposition testimony in English.

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English.14 Instead, the only reasonable inference is that Mr. Zhou was presented with
the questions, in writing or orally, in Chinese, that he answered the questions, in
writing or orally, in Chinese, and that the Chinese-language questions and answers
were then translated by someone from Chinese into English for recordation in the
Evidentiary Submission in English.
We are thus relying on the translation of the questions and answers from Chinese
to English for the accuracy of Mr. Zhou’s testimony, but we have no information
whatsoever regarding the translator, the process of translation, or the original
Chinese-language questions and answers.
According to the Statement Letter, there were at most three people present during
Petitioner’s testimony deposition: Petitioner, the attorney Mr. Amandri, and the
notary identified as “HERLINA, SH, MKn LLM.”15 The description of the “interview”
in the Statement Letter states that Mr. Amandri “posed 76 questions to Mr. Zhou
Wenbo and recorded the responses on this document.” 16 TTABVUE 3. There is no
reference to the notary’s participation as the recorder of testimony or as a translator,
or to a separate translator. It thus appears that all recordation and translation was
done by Mr. Amandri.
14 We assume that the deposition occurred in this manner because Mr. Zhou did not have
sufficient proficiency in English to testify in that language. Cf. ARSA Distrib., Inc v. Salud
Nat. Mexicana S.A. de C.V., No. 91240240, 2022 WL 4592443 (TTAB 2022) (striking
testimony declaration in English where the witness was not an English speaker), rev’d on
other grounds, No. 1:22cv1367 (E.D. Va. Apr. 16, 2024).
15 The notary’s statement does not make it clear that the notary was actually present during
the “interview.”

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We have no information regarding Mr. Amandri’s proficiency, if any, in Chinese
(or, for that matter, in English),16 or his qualifications to translate Chinese into
English. He is identified in the Statement Letter as a “licensed lawyer practicing in
Indonesia,” 16 TTABVUE 3, not as a translator. We do not have the original Chinese-
language questions and answers, or any statement verifying the accuracy of the
translation of the Chinese-language questions and answers into what appears in
English in the Evidentiary Submission.17 The purpose of requiring a neutral and
qualified third party to translate witness testimony in a foreign language into English
is to ensure that the translation is accurate, but we have no such assurances here.
Because there is no evidence regarding the accuracy of the translation of Mr.
Zhou’s Chinese-language testimony into English by a qualified translator, we cannot
consider the English-language answers to the English-language questions in the
Evidentiary Submission.
In the final analysis, although we are not certain exactly what the Evidentiary
Submission is, we are quite certain about what it is not: sworn testimony in a proper
deposition upon written questions, given by a witness testifying under oath before a
16 The Board may take judicial notice of information from encyclopedias. In re Mr. Recipe,
LLC, No. 86040643, 2016 WL 1380730, at *3 n.3 (TTAB 2016) (citing B.V.D. Licensing Corp.
v. Body Action Design Inc., 846 F.2d 727, 728 (Fed. Cir. 1988)). We take judicial notice that
Indonesian is the official language of Indonesia. BRITANNICA (britannica.com, last accessed
on June 8, 2026). We note that English does not appear on Mr. Amandri’s provincial
identification card, but it does appear on what appears to be his membership card in the
“Indonesian Advocates Association.” 16 TTABVUE 19. That alone tells us nothing about the
extent of his ability to read, speak, and understand English, much less to translate Chinese
into English.
17 In that regard, we find it significant that Petitioner himself took issue with the translation
of some of his testimony.

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qualified officer authorized to administer oaths, and translated from the witness’s
native language into English by a qualified translator. Pursuant to Trademark Rule
2.123(k), we will not consider the Evidentiary Submission as evidence on behalf of
Petitioner.
II. Petitioner’s Entitlement to a Statutory Cause of Action
“Entitlement to a statutory cause of action is an element of the plaintiff’s case in
every inter partes proceeding.” El Roblar Inv. Prop. LLC v. Roe, No. 91272200, 2025
WL 2718983, at *18 (TTAB 2025) (quoting Mystery Ranch, Ltd. v. Terminal Moraine
Inc., No. 91250565, 2022 WL 17369425, at *6 (TTAB 2022) (cleaned up)). “To
establish entitlement to bring a statutory cause of action, a plaintiff must
demonstrate: (i) an interest falling within the zone of interests protected by the
statute and (ii) a reasonable belief in damage proximately caused by the registration
or continued registration of the mark.” Iron Balls Int’l Inc. v. Bull Creek Brewing,
LLC, No. 92079099, 2024 WL 2844425, at *1 (TTAB 2024) (citing Corcamore, LLC v.
SFM, LLC, 978 F.3d 1298, 1303-05 (Fed. Cir. 2020); Meenaxi Enter., Inc. v. Coca-Cola
Co., 38 F.4th 1067, 1070 (Fed. Cir. 2022); Advance Mag. Publishers, Inc. v. Fashion
Elecs., Inc., No. 91247034, 2023 WL 4261426, at *2 (TTAB 2023)).
Petitioner argues that
[i]n the Petition for Cancellation, Petitioner alleged
continuous use of his stylized giraffe design on shirts,
polos, and T-shirts in U.S. commerce since at least April
2014. (1 TTABVUE ¶1–3). Petitioner further alleged that
Respondent’s Mark is virtually identical to Petitioner’s
giraffe design and is used on the same goods—apparel
products including shirts and T-shirts. (1 TTABVUE ¶4–
10). These allegations establish that Petitioner has a direct

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commercial interest in the outcome because Respondent’s
registration covers the very goods on which Petitioner has
long used his own Giraffe Mark.
Respondent did not challenge Petitioner’s ability to bring
this cancellation and did not assert lack of standing as an
affirmative defense. (5 TTABVUE). While Respondent
denied knowledge of Petitioner’s factual allegations, such
denials do not defeat standing. (5 TTABVUE). Standing is
determined based on the allegations in the Petition and the
nature of the registered mark itself, both of which
demonstrate that Petitioner has a legitimate interest in
removing a registration that he reasonably believes is
confusingly similar to his own mark used on identical
goods. Because Petitioner has alleged prior use of a similar
mark on the same goods and a reasonable belief that he
will be damaged by the continued existence of Respondent’s
registration, Petitioner has satisfied the minimal burden
necessary to establish standing under the Lanham Act.
17 TTABVUE 12-13.18
Petitioner’s argument that it is enough that he pleaded what he calls “standing”
is based on an incorrect understanding of the law. Entitlement to oppose or petition
to cancel must be shown by a plaintiff whether it is disputed by the defendant or not,
and Petitioner was required to “maintain [his] entitlement to the statutory cause of
action throughout the proceeding and affirmatively prove its existence at the
time of trial by introducing evidence to support the allegations in [his]
pleading that relate to such entitlement as an element of [his] case-in-chief.”
Philanthropist.com, Inc. v. Gen. Conf. Corp. of Seventh-Day Adventists, No. 92065178,
18 “We now refer to standing as entitlement to a statutory cause of action.” El Roblar, 2025
WL 2718983, at *20 n.46 (quoting Univ. of Ky. v. 40-0, LLC, No. 91224310, 2021 WL 839189,
at *4 (TTAB 2021)). “Despite the change in nomenclature, our prior decisions and those of
the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit [addressing standing] remain equally
applicable.” Id. (quotation omitted).

Cancellation No. 92082150
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2021 WL 2472776, at *4 (TTAB 2021) (emphasis added). Accordingly, the threshold
element of Petitioner’s entire case is proof at trial of his entitlement to seek
cancellation of the ’078 Registration under Section 2(d) of the Trademark Act. The
only evidence “to support the allegations in [his] pleading that related to such
entitlement,” Philanthropist.com, 2021 WL 2472776, at *4, is the Evidentiary
Submission, which we have not considered for the multiple reasons discussed above.
Trademark Rules 2.123(a)(1) and (2) expressly permit a foreign witness to submit
trial testimony in the form of an affidavit or a declaration. We are utterly mystified
as to why Petitioner did not simply submit his sworn testimony declaration in
appropriate Chinese-language and English-language versions, rather than going to
the time and expense of taking a deposition on written questions in Indonesia, but
“we must take the record as [Petitioner] made it.” T.A.B. Sys. v. Pactel Teletrac, 77
F.3d 1372, 1378 (Fed. Cir. 1996). The record as Petitioner made it does not support a
finding that Petitioner is entitled to petition to cancel the ’078 Registration, and
because Petitioner did not prove this threshold element of his case, we need not and
do not reach the merits of his Section 2(d) claim to deny his Petition for Cancellation.
Decision: The Petition for Cancellation is denied.