Gurudev Imports Inc v. Ramandeep Singh

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This Opinion is not a
Precedent of the TTAB

Mailed: February 5, 2026

UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE

Trademark Trial and Appeal Board

Gurudev Imports Inc.
v.
Ramandeep Singh

Opposition No. 91291029

Bipin Mehta, pro se
for Gurudev Imports Inc.

David Stewart and Rexford Brabson of T-Rex Law, P.C.
for Ramandeep Singh.

Before Goodman, Lebow and Brock,
Administrative Trademark Judges.

Opinion by Goodman, Administrative Trademark Judge:

Ramandeep Singh (“Applicant”) filed an application on the Principal Register to
register the mark MYSORE SANDAL SOAP (standard characters, SANDAL SOAP

disclaimed) for “Skin soap” in International Class 3.1

1 Application Serial No. 97881934 was filed on April 11, 2023 based upon Applicant’s
allegation of a bona fide intention to use the mark in commerce under Section 1(b) of the
Trademark Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1051(b).

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Gurudev Imports Inc. (“Opposer”) opposes registration of Applicant’s MYSORE
SANDAL SOAP mark on the ground of likelihood of confusion, Section 2(d), 15 U.S.C.
§ 1052(d).2 Opposer alleges that it is the United States distributor of Karnataka Soaps
and Detergents Limited products and has been authorized to represent them in this
Board proceeding.3 Opposer has pleaded common law ownership of the mark
MYSORE SANDAL SOAP as a “Geographical Indication” for soaps and related
products.4
Applicant filed an answer denying the salient allegations in the notice of
opposition5 and asserted affirmative defenses, most of which are amplifications of
denials of the claims.6
References to the briefs and the record refer to the Board’s TTABVUE docket system. The
number preceding TTABVUE corresponds to the docket entry number, and any number(s)
following TTABVUE refer to the page number(s) of the docket entry where the cited materials
appear.
2 Opposer alleged an ownership claim which was not discussed in the brief. As Applicant
points out, this claim was not available because the application is based on intent to use.
Norris v. PAVE, No. 91234909, 2019 TTAB LEXIS 345, at *14-15. See also In re Google Tech.
Holdings LLC, 980 F.3d 858, 862 (Fed. Cir. 2020) (discussing waiver and forfeiture of claims).
Opposer also attempted to allege a Section 2(a) deceptiveness claim but it was not sufficiently
pleaded nor tried (which would be by implied consent of the parties), and is not before us.
3 Notice of Opposition, paragraph 1, 1 TTABVUE.
4 Notice of Opposition paragraphs 5 and 7, 1 TTABVUE.
5 Applicant’s answer, 4 TTABVUE, did not admit any allegations relating to Opposer but
responded to some allegations with “no response is necessary” or “legal conclusion” which is
not a proper response under Fed. R. Civ. P. 8. Rule 8(b) requires that a party admit or deny
an allegation or state that a party lacks sufficient knowledge or information to admit or deny
but does not permit a party to refuse to respond to an allegation with other types of responses.
See generally, State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Riley, 199 F.R.D. 276 (N.D. Ill. 2001)
(discussing improper pleading responses under Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(b) such as “legal conclusion”).
6 Applicant also alleged failure to state a claim but did not pursue this “defense.” “The
asserted defense of failure to state a claim is not a true affirmative defense because it relates
to an assertion of the insufficiency of the pleading of opposer’s claim rather than a statement

Opposition No. 91291029
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The parties filed briefs and Opposer filed a reply brief. 7
I. The Record
The record includes the pleadings8 and, by operation of Trademark Rule 2.122(b),
37 C.F.R. § 2.122(b), the file of the involved application. In addition, Opposer and
Applicant introduced notices of reliance and declaration testimony during their
respective testimony periods.9
The entire record has been considered and relevant evidence is discussed
throughout this opinion, although we do not list its contents. See Quiktrip W., Inc. v.
Weigel Stores, Inc., 984 F.3d 1031, 1036 (Fed. Cir. 2021) (“We have held ‘on multiple
occasions that failure to explicitly discuss every issue or every piece of evidence does
not alone establish that the tribunal did not consider it.’”) (citation and internal
quotation marks omitted); In re Miracle Tuesday LLC, 695 F.3d 1339, 1348 (Fed. Cir.
of a defense to a properly pleaded claim.” John W. Carson Found. v. Toilets.com, Inc., No.
91181092, 2010 TTAB LEXIS 226, at *25.
7 Opposer’s brief and reply brief are at 14 and 16 TTABVUE and Applicant’s brief is at 15
TTABVUE.
8 With an exception for pleaded registrations that is not applicable here, “an exhibit attached
to a pleading is not evidence on behalf of the party to whose pleading the exhibit is attached,
and must be identified and introduced in evidence as an exhibit during the period for the
taking of testimony.” Trademark Rule 2.122(c), 37 C.F.R. § 2.122(c). Accordingly, we give the
exhibits attached to Opposer’s pleading (including distributorship documents and invoices
for goods imported into the U.S.) no consideration.
9 Under Trademark Rule 2.196, 37 CFR § 2.196, Applicant’s filing is timely as his testimony
period ended on a Saturday and the notice of reliance was filed on the next business day, May
27, 2025, which was after a federal holiday. Lumber Liquidators Servs., LLC v. Columbia Ins.
Co., No. 91245585, 2022 TTAB LEXIS 1, at *8-9 (Trademark Rule 2.196 “provides only that,
in defined circumstances, action in compliance of such deadline may be taken on the next
business day.”). Opposer also stated in its brief that Applicant did not provide testimony with
his submissions, 14 TTABVUE 7, but the testimony declaration was filed with the notice of
reliance. This is not the preferred approach, but the failure to file it separately is harmless.
Ricardo Media Inc. v. Inventive Software, LLC, No. 91235063, 2019 TTAB LEXIS 283, at *7.

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2012) (“[T]he mere fact that the Board did not recite all of the evidence it considered
does not mean the evidence was not, in fact, reviewed.”) (citation omitted); SawStop,
LLC v. Felder KG, No. 91255905, 2025 TTAB LEXIS 351, *6-7 (“Although we do not
list the contents of the record, it has been reviewed and considered in its entirety.”).
Evidentiary Objections
In a short appendix to his main brief on the case, Applicant raises hearsay
objections to all of the internet evidence introduced under Opposer’s notice of
reliance.10 15 TTABVUE 23-24.
Applicant’s hearsay objections are moot because, absent testimony from a
competent witness, we consider internet materials only for what they show on their
face, not for the truth of the matters stated in them, “whether there is an objection or
not.”11 WeaponX Performance Prods. Ltd. v. Weapon X Motorsports, Inc., No.
91221553, 2018 TTAB LEXIS 72, at *19 n.18 (citing Safer, Inc. v. OMS Invs., Inc.,
91176445, 2010 TTAB LEXIS 51).
10 Opposer’s notice of reliance references an “official record” which was obtained from the
internet (with URL and date). Opposer’s notice of reliance 10 TTABVUE 4, no. 10. See
Trademark Rule 2.122(e)(1), 37 C.F.R. § 2.122(e)(1). However, this printout does not
constitute a record that was prepared by a public officer. See Flame & Wax, Inc. v. Laguna
Candles, LLC, No. 92072343, 2022 TTAB LEXIS 272, at *9-10 (citation omitted) (‘“Official
records’ . . . are records prepared by a public officer which are self-authenticating in nature
(and hence require no extrinsic evidence of authenticity as a condition precedent to
admissibility), such as certified copies of public records.”). Nonetheless, it can be considered
an internet record under Trademark Rule 2.122(e)(2).
11 Opposer’s witness did not reference or testify about any of the exhibits provided under
Opposer’s notice of reliance.

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A Pro se Opposer Assumes the Risk of Representing Itself
A party, if domiciled in the United States or its territories, may represent itself in
an inter partes proceeding before the Board.12 If the party electing to represent itself
is a corporation, “the party may act through any individual who is (1) an officer of the
party and who is (2) in fact authorized to represent it.”13 Id. If a corporation elects to
act in its own behalf, an officer who is authorized to sign should sign for that
corporation.14
“Because the governing practices and procedures in proceedings before the Board
are quite technical and highly specialized, it is strongly recommended that an
attorney knowledgeable about trademark law represent a party” rather than a party
represent itself.15 Accordingly, Opposer, in proceeding pro se and without assistance
12 TRADEMARK TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD MANUAL OF PROCEDURE (TBMP) § 114.01.
13 Trademark Rule 11.14(e), 37 C.F.R. § 11.14. “Appearance. No individual other than those
specified in paragraphs (a), (b), and (c) of this section will be permitted to practice before the
Office in trademark matters on behalf of a client. Except as specified in § 2.11(a) of this
chapter, any individual may appear in a trademark or other non-patent matter in his or her
own behalf or on behalf of:
(1) A firm of which he or she is a member; (2) A partnership of which he or she is a partner;
or (3) A corporation or association of which he or she is an officer and which he or she is
authorized to represent.”
14 The signatory must be identified. Trademark Rule 2.193(d), 37 C.F.R. § 2.193(d). “The first
and last name, and the title or position, of the person who signs a document in connection
with a trademark application, registration, or proceeding before the Trademark Trial and
Appeal Board must be set forth immediately below or adjacent to the signature. Id. See also
TBMP § 106.02 (A document filed in a proceeding before the Board should include the first
and last name, in typed or printed form, of the person who signed, a description of the
capacity in which the person signed (e.g., as a corporate officer, if the filing party is a
corporation); and the business address and telephone number of the person).
15 TBMP § 114.01. Strict compliance with the Trademark Rules of Practice, and where
applicable the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and the Federal Rules of Evidence, is required
of all parties, whether or not they are represented by counsel. See McDermott v. S.F. Women’s

Opposition No. 91291029
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of counsel, has assumed the responsibility and risk of representing itself. Hole in 1
Drinks, Inc. v. Lajtay, No. 92065860, 2020 TTAB LEXIS 9, *1-3.
Burden of Proof
The burden rests on Opposer to establish its statutory entitlement to oppose and
to prove its claim by a preponderance of the evidence. See B&B Hardware, Inc. v.
Hargis Ind., Inc., 575 U.S. 138, 144 (2015) (“The party opposing registration bears
the burden of proof, see § 2.116(b), and if that burden cannot be met, the opposed
mark must be registered, see 15 U.S.C. § 1063(b)”).
II. Entitlement to Statutory Cause of Action
In every inter partes case, the plaintiff must establish its statutory entitlement to
bring an opposition or cancellation proceeding. See Shenzhen IVPS Tech. Co. v. Fancy
Pants Prods., LLC, No. 91263919, 2022 TTAB LEXIS 383, at *19 (“Entitlement to a
statutory cause of action is an issue in every inter partes case.”). To establish
entitlement to a statutory cause of action, a plaintiff must demonstrate: (i) an interest
falling within the zone of interests protected by the statute (i.e., plaintiff has a “real
interest” in the outcome of the proceeding) and (ii) damage proximately caused by the
registration (i.e., a reasonable basis for its belief in damage). Corcamore, LLC v. SFM,
LLC, 978 F.3d 1298, 1303, 1304, 1305-06 (Fed. Cir. 2020). “Mere allegations or
arguments in support of [entitlement] are insufficient proof thereof. A plaintiff cannot
Motorcycle Contingent, No. 91169211, 2006 TTAB LEXIS 390, at *1 n.2, aff’d unpub’d, 240
Fed. Appx. 865 (Fed. Cir. 2007).

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rest on mere allegations in its complaint or arguments in its brief to prove
[entitlement].” WeaponX Performance Prods., 2018 TTAB LEXIS 72, at *17.
In its notice of opposition and in its brief, Opposer states that it is the United
States Distributor for Karnataka Soaps and Detergents Limited and that it will be
impacted by the allowance of the registration of Applicant’s mark.16 14 TTABVUE 8.
Opposer provided witness declaration testimony signed by Bipin Mehta as an
individual.17 No title is included with Mr. Mehta’s signature to this declaration, nor
is Opposer Gurudev Imports Inc. referenced in the declaration signature block.18 Mr.
Mehta referred to himself in the declaration as “I,” identifying himself individually
as the distributor for Karnataka Soaps and Detergents Limited (“I am the
distributor” with claimed authority and “my duties include selling various
products.”).19 He further asserts that he has been “authorised to represent Karnataka
Soaps and Detergents Limited in these proceedings.”20
However, Mr. Mehta’s testimony fails to establish his relationship to Opposer,
that he is an officer of Opposer, and that he is authorized to represent Opposer. In
particular, Mr. Mehta’s connection or role with Opposer Gurudev Imports Inc. and
16 The brief, 14 TTABVUE 8, references exhibit A of the Notice of Opposition, 1 TTABVUE.
But this and the other attached exhibits to the notice of opposition are not of record as they
were not submitted during Opposer’s testimony period. See note 8.
17 Bipin Mehta declaration, 11 TTABVUE.
18 Mehta declaration, 11 TTABVUE. We note that Mr. Mehta’s officer title with Gurudev
Imports Inc., has never been provided with any filing with the Board to reflect that he is an
officer and authorized to act on behalf of Opposer.
19 Mehta declaration, paragraphs 1 and 2, 11 TTABVUE.
20 Id., paragraph 1.

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his right to act on behalf of Opposer is unexplained, and the declaration does not
otherwise establish on what basis he is entitled to act as an authorized representative
of Opposer or bring this opposition proceeding on behalf of Opposer. He does not
establish any connection between the named Opposer Gurudev Imports Inc. and
himself and his authority to act on its behalf. Simply put, Mr. Mehta’s testimony
establishes that he is Karnataka’s distributor, but nothing more.
Mr. Mehta’s declaration also fails to discuss Opposer Gurudev Imports Inc., the
relationship between Gurudev Imports Inc. and Karnataka Soaps and Detergents
Limited, and Gurudev Imports Inc.’s alleged distributorship activities relating to
MYSORE SANDAL SOAP products in the United States.
To support its entitlement, Mr. Mehta should have submitted more detailed
testimony or competent documentary evidence as to the nature of his role in
Opposer’s business activities in the United States in connection with MYSORE
SANDAL SOAP or his right to act as an authorized representative of Opposer in the
United States. See, e.g., Automedx, Inc. v. Artivent Corp., No. 91182429, 2010 TTAB
LEXIS 343, at *5 (testimony that opposer has been manufacturing and selling
portable ventilators sufficient to prove “standing” to bring 2(d) claim); Panda Travel,
Inc. v. Resort Option Enters., No. 91174767, 2009 TTAB LEXIS 708, at *13-14
(testimony that opposer has used the mark PANDA TRAVEL continuously since June
1981 to identify its travel agency services sufficient to prove “standing” to bring
Section 2(d) claim); Syngenta Crop Prot., Inc. v. Bio-Chek, LLC, No. 9117509, 2009
TTAB LEXIS 70, at *16 n.8 (licensees “have standing to oppose registration”); Revlon,

Opposition No. 91291029
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Inc. v. La Maur, Inc., 1968 TTAB LEXIS 61, at *7 (no number available in original)
(testimony that opposer was the exclusive distributor of REPLIQUE products,
sufficient to possess “standing” in connection with a Section 2d claim).21 Opposer
neglected to do so here and failed to demonstrate an interest falling within the zone
of interests protected by the Trademark Act or a reasonable belief of damage
proximately caused by registration of Applicant’s proposed trademark MYSORE
SANDAL SOAP.
Accordingly, Opposer has not met its burden to prove its statutory entitlement to
bring this opposition proceeding.
III. Conclusion
Because Opposer has not demonstrated the threshold requirement of entitlement
to a statutory cause of action, we need not and do not reach the substantive Section
2(d) claim in the notice of opposition.22
21 “We now refer to standing as entitlement to a statutory cause of action.” Univ. of Ky. v. 40-
0, LLC, Opp. No. 91224310, 2021 TTAB LEXIS 68, at *11. However, “there is no meaningful,
substantive difference between the analytical frameworks in the prior ‘standing’ case law, . .
. and the current ‘entitlement’ case law.” Id. (citation omitted).
22 The time for filing an appeal or for commencing a civil action will run from the date of this
decision. See Trademark Rules 2.129(d) and 2.145, 37 C.F.R. §§ 2.129(d) and 2.145.
A party which takes an appeal from a Board decision to the United States Court of Appeals
for the Federal Circuit stands on the record submitted in the Board proceeding. A party that
appeals a Board decision by initiating a civil action under 15 U.S.C. § 1071(b)(1) has the right
to admit the USPTO record as well as submit any new evidence not presented to the USPTO
admissible under the Federal Rules of Evidence and Civil Procedure. Swatch AG v. Beehive
Wholesale, LLC, 739 F.3d 150, (4th Cir. 2014) (where an appeal of a TTAB decision is made
pursuant to Section 1071(b) of the Trademark Act “the parties have an unrestricted right to
submit further evidence as long as it is admissible under the Federal Rules of Evidence and
Civil Procedure”)).

Decision:

The opposition is dismissed.

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